(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 3, 2001 -- Decided March 29, 2001
PER CURIAM.
In 1981, The Borough of Fort Lee (Borough) enacted ordinance 2:15.2(a) which provides that the number
of positions in the police force may be established by resolution. In 1996, Captain Jeremiah O'Sullivan was
appointed as Deputy Chief, a position that had been created pursuant to resolution. Thereafter, O'Sullivan was
promoted to Chief of Police.
The mayor and two competitors for the position of Police Chief sued, challenging the legitimacy of
O'Sullivan's appointment as Deputy Chief. The mayor and competitors argued that because the Deputy Chief
position was not established according to law, O'Sullivan's tenure in the position was also illegal, thus eliminating
him as a possible Chief. The trial court held that the Deputy Chief position to which O'Sullivan had been appointed
was invalid because it was created by resolution and not by ordinance in contravention of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.
That statute provides that a municipality can, by ordinance, establish a police force and that the ordinance shall
provide for the line of authority relating to the functions of that police department. The statute also provides that the
ordinance may provide for the appointment of a chief of police and other personnel as deemed necessary.
As a result of the trial court's ruling, O'Sullivan was removed as Chief of Police and returned to the
position of Captain. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
Appellate Division held that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 and the policies underlying it require the
type and number of police positions to be created by ordinance. As such, the court held that O'Sullivan was not
entitled to the position of Chief of Police.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: The plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 and the policies underlying it require that police positions be
established by ordinance. The interests of justice require that this decision be applied prospectively.
1. The Court affirms that part of the Appellate Division decision holding that, pursuant to statute, police positions
should be created by ordinance. That the Legislature would have insisted that police positions be established by
ordinance is consistent with the significance of those positions and their importance to the public. In addition, the
continuing budgetary implications in creating a police force warrant the formality of an ordinance. (Pp. 4)
2. The Court does not agree with the Appellate Division that O'Sullivan has no entitlement to the position of Chief.
Although police positions should be established by ordinance, the interests of justice and fairness require that that
decision be given prospective application. There has been in existence a long-term interpretation of the law that an
ordinance was not required to create new police positions. The Attorney General has even promulgated a model
police ordinance authorizing the creation of positions by resolution. (Pp. 4-6)
3. Thus, from today forward, no appointment may be made to any police department position not created in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. However, appointments made prior to this date to positions created by
resolution will continue to be valid. Thus, O'Sullivan is not precluded from holding the position of Chief because
the gateway position of Deputy Chief was created by resolution. (Pp. 6)
3. Because there were other challenges to O'Sullivan's entitlement to the position of Deputy Chief that were not
addressed by the Appellate Division, the matter is remanded to that court to dispose of those matters. (Pp. 7)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the matter
is REMANDED to the Appellate Division.
JUSTICE LAVECCHIA, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the majority of the
Court that O'Sullivan is not precluded from occupying the position of Police Chief. However, she disagrees with
the majority's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. Justice LaVecchia finds the statute ambiguous, subject to two
interpretations. One interpretation, embraced by the majority, would require that all positions in a police
department be created by ordinance. Another construction, advanced by the Attorney General would allow for
creation and changes in positions within police departments to be accomplished by resolution once the police
department is established initially by ordinance. Resolutions are more flexible, able to be introduced and passed at
the same meeting. Because the Attorney General is charged with overseeing the coordination and guidance of
municipal police departments, because his interpretation is longstanding,, and because many police departments
have been created by resolution over the years, Justice LaVecchia would defer to the Attorney General's
construction of the statute and his policy choice that the resultant flexibility accorded municipal government is
desirable.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and
ZAZZALI join in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE LAVECCHIA filed a separate opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
117 September Term 1999
JOHN REUTER and BERNARD HART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE
BOROUGH OF FORT LEE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
JOHN ORSO, individually and
as Chief of Police of the
Borough of Fort Lee, NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL and WILLIAM
PEPPARD,
Defendants,
and
JEREMIAH J. O'SULLIVAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
JEREMIAH J. O'SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF FORT LEE, MAYOR
AND MEMBERS OF THE FORT LEE
BOROUGH COUNCIL and THOMAS R.
TESSARO,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL,
Defendant.
Argued January 3, 2001 -- Decided March 29, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at
328 N.J. Super. 547 (2000).
Dennis Calo argued the cause for appellant
(Calo Agostino, attorneys).
Brian M. Chewcaskie argued the cause for
respondent Borough of Fort Lee (Gittleman,
Muhlstock & Chewcaskie, attorneys).
Robert E. Laux submitted a letter in lieu of
brief on behalf of respondents Mayor Jack
Alter and Council Members Lawrence Goldberg,
Jan Goldberg, Thomas Meyers and Joan Voss
(Oury & Mizdol, attorneys).
David L. Rosenberg submitted a letter in
lieu of brief on behalf of respondents John
Reuter and Bernard Hart (Klausner, Hunter &
Rosenberg, attorneys).
Joseph R. Mariniello submitted a letter in
lieu of brief on behalf of respondent Thomas
R. Tessaro.
PER CURIAM
In 1981, the Borough of Fort Lee enacted Ordinance 2:15.2(a)
which provides that the number of positions in the police force
may be established by resolution. In 1996, Captain Jeremiah
O'Sullivan was appointed Deputy Chief, a position that had been
created pursuant to resolution. Thereafter, he was promoted to
Chief.
Subsequently, the mayor and two competitors for the Police
Chief position filed a lawsuit challenging the legitimacy of
O'Sullivan's appointment as Deputy Chief. They argued that
because the Deputy Chief position was not established according
to law, O'Sullivan's tenure in it was also illegal, thus
eliminating him as a possible Chief. The trial court held that
the Deputy Chief position to which O'Sullivan had been appointed
was invalid because it was created by resolution and not by
ordinance thus contravening N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. That statute
provides in relevant part:
The governing body of any municipality, by ordinance,
may create and establish, as an executive and
enforcement function of municipal government, a police
force, whether as a department or as a division, bureau
or other agency thereof, and provide for the
maintenance, regulation and control thereof. Any such
ordinance shall, in a manner consistent with the form
of government adopted by the municipality and with
general law, provide for a line of authority relating
to the police function and for the adoption and
promulgation by the appropriate authority of rules and
regulations for the government of the force and for the
discipline of its members. The ordinance may provide
for the appointment of a chief of police and such
members, officers and personnel as shall be deemed
necessary, the determination of their terms of office,
the fixing of their compensation and the prescription
of their powers, functions and duties, all as the
governing body shall deem necessary for the effective
government of the force.
As a result of the trial court's ruling, O'Sullivan was removed as Chief and returned to the position of Captain. O'Sullivan appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 and the policies underlying it require the type and number of police positions to be created by ordinance.
We affirm that determination substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division's thorough and thoughtful opinion. 328 N.J.Super. 547 (App. Div. 2000). That the Legislature would have insisted that police positions be established by ordinance is consistent with the significance of those positions and their importance to the public. Irvington PBA, Local #29 v. Town of Irvington, 170 N.J. Super. 539, 546 (App. Div. 1979) (observing that police officer is “'a special kind of public employee'”) (quoting Moorestown Tp. v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965), certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966)), certif. denied., 82 N.J. 296 (1980). Likewise, the continuing budgetary implications of the creation of police positions warrant the formality of an ordinance.
We part company from the Appellate Division in connection with its second conclusion - that O'Sullivan has no entitlement to the position of Chief. Although we agree that police positions should be established by ordinance, the interests of justice and fairness require that that decision be given prospective application.
Generally, decisions are retroactive. However prospective application may be appropriate when a decision establishes a new rule of law. State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 57 (1997). In order for a decision to be deemed a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes, “there must be a 'sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice.'” Id. at 58 (quoting State v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996)). That is, “there must be some 'appreciable past from which the rule departs.'” Id. at 58 (quoting State v. Burgess, 298 N.J. Super. 254, 268 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd by, 154 N.J. 181 (1998)). “Together with those considerations, we must weigh whether retroactivity furthers the underlying purpose of the rule and whether retroactive application could produce substantial inequitable results.” Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 295 (1993).
Here, there appears to have been a long-term interpretation of the law to the effect that an ordinance was not required to create new police positions. That is true not only in Fort Lee, but also in other municipalities and even on the part of the Attorney General who promulgated a model police ordinance authorizing the creation of positions by resolution. Model Rules and Regulations, 2d ed. (Nov. 1992) (visited March 22, 2001)
<http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide.htm> . See also Hamill v. City of Clifton, 10 N.J. Misc. 843, 845 (1932) (holding that ordinance providing for appointment of city fireman by nomination of fire committee and confirmation by council was not invalid as ordinance did “not leave the number of fireman to be appointed to the caprice of the committee”).
Indeed, there has been reliance on the notion that police positions can be established by resolution such that if we were to a apply the rule in this case retroactively, our interpretation would have the effect of undermining many police appointments throughout the state. No purpose is served by such an approach.
Thus from today forward no appointment may be made to any police department position not created in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. However, those appointments made prior to this date to positions created by resolution will continue to be valid. In other words, O'Sullivan is not precluded from holding the position of Chief because the gateway position of Deputy Chief was created by resolution. Because a number of other challenges to O'Sullivan's entitlement to the position of Deputy Chief were not addressed by the Appellate Division (for example, whether his appointment violated the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21), we remand the case to that court to dispose of those matters. If the court rules that there is an impediment to O'Sullivan's appointment as Deputy Chief, other than that the position was created by resolution, he need not be reinstated. Contrariwise, if the Appellate Division rejects plaintiff's remaining contentions, O'Sullivan should be reinstated to the position of Chief with respect to which no independent objections have been advanced.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and ZAZZALI join in this opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 117 September Term 1999
JOHN REUTER and BERNARD HART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE
BOROUGH OF FORT LEE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
JOHN ORSO, individually and
as Chief of Police of the
Borough of Fort Lee, NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL and WILLIAM
PEPPARD,
Defendants,
and
JEREMIAH J. O'SULLIVAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
JEREMIAH J. O'SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF FORT LEE, MAYOR
AND MEMBERS OF THE FORT LEE
BOROUGH COUNCIL and THOMAS R.
TESSARO,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
PERSONNEL,
Defendant.
_______________________________
LaVECCHIA, J., concurring and dissenting.
The majority rightfully recognizes that there has been
“long-term doubt about the necessity of an ordinance to create
new police positions” and declines to disrupt appointments to
police department positions, like O'Sullivan's appointment to
deputy chief, heretofore made by a governing body's resolution
instead. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 5). I agree with the majority
that O'Sullivan is not precluded from occupying the position of
chief of police. However, I disagree with the majority's reading
of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 authorizes the creation of municipal
police departments. It was last amended in 1981 and provides in
pertinent part:
The governing body of any municipality, by
ordinance, may create and establish, as an
executive and enforcement function of
municipal government, a police force, whether
as a department or as a division, bureau or
other agency thereof, and provide for the
maintenance, regulation and control thereof.
Any such ordinance shall, in a manner
consistent with the form of government
adopted by the municipality and with general
law, provide for a line of authority relating
to the police function and for the adoption
and promulgation by the appropriate authority
of rules and regulations for the government
of the force and for the discipline of its
members. The ordinance may provide for the
appointment of a chief of police and such
members, officers and personnel as shall be
deemed necessary, the determination of their
terms of office, the fixing of their
compensation and the prescription of their
powers, functions and duties, all as the
governing body shall deem necessary for the
effective government of the force.
The statute is ambiguous. Two alternative constructions are
possible. One construction, embraced by the majority, would
require that all positions in a police department be created by
ordinance. Another construction, advanced by the Attorney
General, acting through the Police Bureau of the Division of
Criminal Justice, would allow for creation and changes in
positions within police departments to be accomplished by
resolution once the police department is established initially by
ordinance. Resolutions are, of course, a more flexible tool than
ordinances, which require two readings, publication, and hearing
before passage. N.J.S.A. 40:49-1. Resolutions, by contrast, may
be introduced and passed at the same meeting. Ibid.
Because the Attorney General is charged with overseeing the
coordination and guidance of municipal police departments,
N.J.S.A. 51:17B-98, -101, -112, or -113, because his
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 is longstanding, and
because, as the majority recognizes, positions in many police
departments have been created by resolution over the years, I
would defer to the Attorney General's construction of the statute
and to his policy choice that the resultant flexibility accorded
municipal government is desirable. I therefore respectfully
dissent.
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 permits a local governing body to create a municipal police department:
The governing body of any municipality, by ordinance, may create and establish, as an executive and enforcement function of municipal government, a police force, whether as a department or as a division, bureau or other agency thereof, and provide for the maintenance, regulation and control thereof.
If such a decision is made, the statute prescribes how the police
department is to be created. That must be accomplished by way of
an ordinance. The statute further prescribes what the ordinance
must minimally contain by the inclusion of the word “shall”:
Any such ordinance shall, in a manner
consistent with the form of government
adopted by the municipality and with general
law, provide for a line of authority relating
to the police function and for the adoption
and promulgation by the appropriate authority
of rules and regulations for the government
of the force and for the discipline of its
members.
In 1981 the statute was amended extensively, and prominent
in the changes was the above language requiring that the
municipal governing body provide by ordinance for an established
“line of authority” between the police department and the
governing body. The amendments, it appears, were intended to
properly structure the relationship between the police department
and the governing body. As the legislative history elucidates,
there had been instances of improper influence between local
governing bodies, or their individual members, and the local
police force:
The Assembly Committee Substitute would
clarify the responsibility for the conduct of
municipal police forces by providing for a
line of authority with respect to the
exercise of the police function in
municipalities and by providing for the
duties and responsibilities of chiefs of
police in those instances where that position
is established by the municipal governing
body.
The bill would provide statutory
direction that the police force is an
executive and enforcement function of
municipal government. Each municipality
having a police force would be required to
establish a line of authority relating to the
police function and to designate an
“appropriate authority” which may be the
mayor, manager or governing body, depending
on the form of municipal government. The
“appropriate authority” shall adopt rules and
regulations for the government of the police
force which the chief of police shall be
subject to. The line of authority would be
required to be consistent with the degree of
separation of executive and administrative
powers from legislative powers inherent in
the municipal form of government. The
municipal governing body and any individual
thereof would be required to act as a body as
[sic] through the “appropriate authority” in
all matters relating to the police function.
[Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and
Defense Committee, Statement to Assembly
Committee Substitute for Senate No. 1243,
June 22, 1981, at 1 (enacted as L. 1981, c.
266).]
The Assembly Committee's Statement further explained what the
Committee perceived to be the “appropriate authority” to exercise
regulatory power over the police function in the various forms of
municipal government extant in the State. A Senate County and
Municipal Government Committee Statement to Senate No. 1243
expressed an analogous concern that a line of authority was
needed in municipalities to clarify the relationship between the
police function and the municipal governing body. Thus, the 1981
amendments to the statute legislated a form of authority through
which the governing body was to interact with the police
department.
The legislative changes in 1981 touched other areas as well.
The amended language responded, approvingly, to the decision in
Jansco v. Waldron,
70 N.J. 320 (1976), that had applied a
practical interpretation to the wording of the predecessor
version of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118. That predecessor statute read as
follows:
The governing body of any municipality, by
ordinance, may create and establish a police
department and force and provide for the
maintenance, regulation and control thereof,
and except as otherwise provided by law,
appoint such members, officers and personnel
as shall be deemed necessary, determine their
terms of office, fix their compensation and
prescribe their powers, functions and duties
and adopt and promulgate rules and
regulations for the government of the
department and force and for the discipline
of its members.
Despite the seemingly directory language requiring a
municipal governing body, in creating a police force, to pass an
ordinance that promulgated rules and regulations governing the
operation of that department, the Court in Jansco upheld
Trenton's ordinance that had delegated that responsibility to the
Director of Public Safety subject to the mayor's approval.
Jansco, supra, 70 N.J. at 326-27. The Court was sympathetic to
the local governing body's argument that it was preferable for it
to delegate that important responsibility in order for the police
force to operate in a modern and efficient manner. Id. at 327.
The delegation was to an official more knowledgeable and able to
act responsively to changing needs in police force management.
Ibid.
In Jansco, the Court chose a reasonable construction of a
statute, whose objective, the Court rightly discerned, is to
enable local governing bodies and their police forces to operate
sensibly with some flexibility. The Court could have, but chose
not to, read the opening reference in the then version of the
statute to require the governing body itself, acting only through
an ordinance, to take all actions listed in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118,
including the act of promulgating rules and regulations for the
police force.
That approach by the Court was ratified by the Legislature
in the 1981 amendments. Although the statute previously had
required the local governing body, by ordinance, “to appoint” and
“to promulgate rules and regulations” for the operation of the
police department it had created, the amendments to the statute
provided differently. Now, a local governing body's ordinance
creating a police force “shall provide for the adoption and
promulgation” of rules and regulations for that department, and
“may provide for the appointment of a chief of police and such
members, officers and personnel as shall be deemed necessary . .
. .” By eliminating the directory language in respect of how the
governing body was to act, and by changing “adopt and promulgate”
to “provide for the promulgation of,” the legislative amendments
brought the statute in line with the flexible and practical
approach taken by the Court in Jansco. The legislative
amendments encompassed similar language for the appointment power
as well, changing “appoint” to “provide for the appointment of.”
That language bespeaks flexibility, including the flexibility to
provide that future appointments be by resolution.
The Appellate Division decision principally relies on
decisional law that involved challenges to local governing body
appointments, but all cases discussed precede the 1986 amendments
to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118, and none involve statutory language akin
to that amended statute. Those decisions are not controlling
here in my view. I perceive a difference between a statute that
authorizes a local governing body actually to appoint such
members, officers, and personnel as are deemed necessary for a
police force, and a statute that authorizes a local governing
body to “provide for the appointment” of such members, officers,
and personnel. The verb “appoint,” denoting direct action, is
not the equivalent of “providing for” the “appointment.”
“Appointment” is defined as the “act of appointing.” Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 105 (1981). The statute thus
would permit a local governing body to pass an ordinance creating
a police force and authorizing the method for the act of
appointing members, officers, and personnel. That is precisely
the view taken by the Attorney General's Division of Criminal
Justice in the longstanding advice it has rendered to
municipalities across the state. The Attorney General's
construction of the statute is a plausible reading. The Attorney
General's interpretation allows for flexibility for local
government. The potential for harm to the public apparently
feared by the majority if a local governing body were permitted
to establish police department positions - officer, member, and
civilian positions alike - by resolution instead of by ordinance
is not well grounded. Public notice of local government police
appointments and scrutiny of local government expenditures on its
police force would still occur through the annual appropriation
process. See N.J.S.A. 40A:4-8 (requiring all appointments to be
set forth annually in municipal budget).
Normally we defer to the interpretation ascribed to a
statute by an administrative agency charged with responsibility
for assisting in the implementation of the legislative design.
Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione,
122 N.J. 202, 212 (1991) (noting
that interpretation of statute is assisted by understanding of
agency charged with responsibility for enforcement, and stating
that “[t]he meaning ascribed to legislation by the administrative
agency responsible for its implementation, including the agency's
contemporaneous construction, long usage, and practical
interpretation, is persuasive evidence of the Legislature's
understanding of its enactment”); Malone v. Fender,
80 N.J. 129,
137 (1979) (stating that in construing doubtful statute, “an
agency's construction of a statute over a period of years without
legislative interference will under appropriate circumstances be
granted great weight . . . .”). Here, the Attorney General,
acting through the Police Bureau within the Division of Criminal
Justice, is charged with general supervision of law enforcement
in the State and, pursuant to that authority, provides regular
guidance to police departments. The Police Bureau has been
providing guidance since 1987, which included the development of
a model ordinance allowing for subsequent appointments by
resolution, recommended for use by municipal governing bodies
when creating a police department for their communities. Model
Rules and Regulations, 2d ed. (Nov. 1992) (visited March 10,
2001) <http://www.state.nj.us/1ps/dcj/agguide.htm> A municipal
governing body should not have to act by its most formal
legislative process, passage of an ordinance after publication
and two readings, each time a position on a police force is to be
established. It could choose in its initial ordinance creating
the police force to set forth a different mechanism by which it
would take such action.
Furthermore, to the extent the decision below interprets the
statutory reference to “line of authority” to mean that the
municipal ordinance must establish a detailed organizational
chart, it is in error. The legislative history plainly discloses
that the “line of authority” language referred to the interaction
between the police department and local government, not the
police department's organizational chart. The statute, after
all, was designed to end the problem of interference with the
police function by elected officials. The 1981 amendments
required the creation of a line of authority between the police
function and the governing body by expressly providing for the
duties and responsibilities of the chief of police when that
position is established by the local governing body, and an
appropriate authority to which the police chief, and the police
function in its entirety, are subordinate. Grasso v. Borough
Council of Borough of Glassboro,
205 N.J. Super. 18, 29 (App.
Div. 1985), certif. denied,
105 N.J. 453 (1986).
Thus, the decision below that the majority affirms
misconstrued the reference to “line of authority” and, I
respectfully suggest, took too rigid an approach on how a
municipality must act when creating police department positions.
See Hamill v. City of Clifton,
10 N.J. Misc. 843, 845 (1932)
(approving validity of ordinance that established method of
appointment of employees to fire departments, permitting fire
committees to nominate persons and city council to confirm
thereafter by resolution). Accordingly, because I consider the
statute to be susceptible to various constructions, I would
follow the approach that affords more flexibility to the local
governing body. In my view, the model resolution developed by
the Attorney General for use by municipalities in creating police
departments, and used by municipalities (albeit not Fort Lee)
across the State for years, complies with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.
NO. A-117 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOHN REUTER and BERNARD HART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
THE BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE
BOROUGH OF FORT LEE,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED March 29, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
DISSENTING OPINION BY