Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM L. BLAKELY,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________________
Argued January 11, 2006 Decided
Before Judges Stern, Parker
See footnote 1
and Miniman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket
No. L-3140-03.
Ana P. Esteves argued the cause for appellant (Frank D. Angelastro, attorney; Ms.
Esteves, on the brief).
Robert F. Cox argued the cause for respondent (McCreedy & Cox, attorneys; Mr.
Cox, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MINIMAN, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned)
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant William L. Blakely dismissing the complaint of plaintiff Jose Echeverri for failure
to prove a permanent injury under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act of
1998 (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1 to -35. Echeverri does not contest the trial court's
conclusion that his injuries did not satisfy the limitation on lawsuit threshold. Rather,
he argues that he should not be subject to that threshold at all.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's conclusion
that Echeverri was required by AICRA to prove a permanent injury or a
displaced fracture.
On September 24, 2001, while riding a motorcycle Echeverri was involved in an
accident with an automobile. As a result, Echeverri was taken to Union Hospital
emergency room where he underwent medical treatment and was diagnosed with fractured ribs;
cervical and lumbar strains and sprains with radiculopathy; possible stress fractures of the
right knee, tibia, and humerus; and multiple contusions and abrasions. Echeverri maintained motorcycle
liability insurance, but it did not provide personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. At
the time of the accident, Echeverri resided with his mother and was named
as the principal driver of a 1990 Camaro, one of two vehicles on
his mother's automobile policy. He was also the owner of up to three
uninsured motor vehicles that were principally garaged in New Jersey. His mother elected
the limitation on lawsuit option in her policy, which reduced the premium on
the 1990 Camaro to $4,060.
The trial court, relying on Koff v. Carrubba,
290 N.J. Super. 544, 549
(App. Div.), certif. denied,
146 N.J. 498 (1996), held Echeverri subject to the
AICRA threshold. The trial court found
the Koff case controlling in this instance. The records indicate that the plaintiff
involved in this accident on August 11, 2001 was a resident of his
parent's household. He's a child of the named insured. He's not a named
insured on any other auto policy. The policy, the verbal selection that was
made for that policy is binding upon him. He is PIP eligible under
that policy. The criteria therefore of Koff are controlling. I do believe he
is therefore subject to verbal and the review of the records indicate that
he has not satisfied the verbal threshold as it relates to this case.
On appeal, Echeverri contends that he should not be subject to the limitation
on lawsuit threshold under AICRA. He points out that he was not eligible
for PIP benefits under his mother's policy because the accident happened while he
was riding on a motorcycle. PIP benefits are only available to an injured
person if they were injured while occupying, entering into, alighting from or using
an automobile, or while a pedestrian. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. Echeverri contends that the motion
judge erred as a matter of law when he concluded that Koff was
controlling because Koff owned an automobile for which he chose the verbal threshold.
Thus Koff was required to maintain PIP coverage, whereas here, Echeverri claims that
he did not own an automobile on which he was required to maintain
PIP benefits because his automobiles were in storage and not operable.
See footnote 2
However, the
motion judge did not rest his decision on Echeverri's ownership of a motor
vehicle but rather upon his status in his mother's household and the provisions
of her policy. Our review is confined to that issue.
In determining whether the decision below was correct, we "may review the trial
court's legal interpretation without limitation." Illva Saronno Corp. v. Liberty Hill Realty, Inc.,
344 N.J. Super. 443, 450 (App. Div. 2001); see also Manalapan Realty v.
Township Comm. of Tp. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (holding that
"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference"); and Dolson v. Anastasia,
55 N.J. 2, 7 (1969).
In Koff we sustained a motorcyclist's damage claim for personal injuries when he
collided with an automobile was subject to the verbal threshold, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a), because
he chose that option for a liability policy which insured only his automobile,
not his motorcycle. Koff, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 545. We set out
the test to be applied under the verbal threshold statute when deciding whether
the verbal threshold defense is available:
The plaintiff's claims will be subject to the verbal threshold if (1) the
plaintiff is, or is treated as if he or she were, the owner
of an automobile that is insured under a New Jersey automobile liability insurance
policy for which the verbal threshold option has been selected, and (2) the
plaintiff is either a person required to maintain Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage
because he or she is the "owner . . . of an automobile
registered or principally garaged in this State," N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8a, -3; see also N.J.S.A.
39:6B-1, -2, or, alternatively, is a person who has the right to receive
PIP benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.
[Id. at 546 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).]
The statutory provisions on which this test was based have not been modified
under AICRA. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3, -4, -8(a), N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1, and -2. Therefore, the
test remains the same.
We acknowledged that Koff did not have a right to receive PIP benefits
because he was injured while riding his motorcycle. However, we found that Koff
owned an automobile registered in New Jersey and was required to maintain PIP
coverage. Koff, supra, at 547. These facts alone were sufficient to raise the
verbal threshold defense. Ibid. The fact that Koff had no right to receive
PIP benefits was irrelevant. Ibid.
Like Koff, Echeverri has no right to receive PIP benefits. Therefore, we must
determine whether Echeverri (1) is a person who is treated as if he
were the owner of an automobile insured under a New Jersey policy for
which the limitation on lawsuit option has been selected and (2) is a
person required to maintain PIP coverage because he is the owner of an
automobile principally garaged in New Jersey. Koff, supra, 290 N.J. Super. at 546.
It is undisputed that Echeverri owned one or more automobiles at the time
of the accident that were principally garaged in New Jersey. Thus, the second
prong of the Koff test is satisfied.
We turn to the first prong to determine if Echeverri should be treated
as if he were the owner of a vehicle covered by a limitation
on lawsuit option, an issue which has not previously been expressly decided on
facts such as these.
See footnote 3
AICRA provides that the tort option elected by the
named insured "shall apply to the named insured and any immediate family member
residing in the named insured's household . . . who is not a
named insured under another automobile insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1(a); Stricklen v. Ferruggia,
379 N.J. Super. 296, 301-2 (App. Div. 2005). The "named insured" is defined by
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(g) as "the person or persons identified as the insured in the
policy and, if an individual, his or her spouse, if the spouse is
named as a resident of the same household . . .." "Immediate family
member" is defined as "the spouse of the named insured and any child
of the named insured or spouse residing in the named insured's household, who
is not a named insured under another automobile insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1(a). Thus,
the named insured is Maria D. Lago and Echeverri was an immediate family
member because he resided in his mother's house. An insured's tort option election
binds the insured's resident spouse and resident children. Harbold v. Olin,
287 N.J.
Super. 35, 39-40 (App. Div. 1996).
Echeverri contends that Labas v. Molina,
369 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 2004),
is controlling because Labas did not own an automobile at the time of
the accident and was thus not required to maintain PIP benefits. That is
not correct. Labas, unlike plaintiff here, was only a permissive driver under his
father's policy where the verbal threshold had been selected. He did not reside
in his father's household. Id. at 334-35. We concluded that Labas was not
subject to the verbal threshold because he did not own an automobile and
was not an immediate family member under his father's policy. Ibid.
Echeverri, however, was a member of his mother's household and listed on her
policy. She received a reduced premium on the vehicle that they treated as
belonging to Echeverri. As such, the record supports the finding that Echeverri should
be treated as if he were the owner of a vehicle covered by
a limitation on lawsuit option and is subject to the verbal threshold by
virtue of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.1(a) just as though he owned and insured his own
automobiles with a verbal threshold election.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
Judge Parker did not participate in the oral argument but participated in the
disposition of the appeal with the consent of both parties.
Footnote: 2
During oral argument on the motion below, Echeverri asserted that his vehicles were
neither registered nor in use at the time of the accident, that they
were inoperable, and that he was thus not required to maintain any liability
insurance coverage on those vehicles, relying on Carmichael v. Bryan,
310 N.J. Super. 34 (App. Div. 1998). However, he presented no record evidence to support this
factual claim. We decline to consider this issue because it was not raised
in the trial court and does not go to the jurisdiction of the
court, nor does it concern a matter of substantial public interest. Alan J.
Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow,
153 N.J. 218, 230, (1998); Nieder v. Royal Indem.
Ins. Co.,
62 N.J. 229, 234, (1973). In any event, this issue would
only be relevant if Echeverri was not bound by his mother's verbal threshold
election.
Footnote: 3
The defendant cites Cavanaugh v. Morris, 273 N.J. Super. 38 (App. Div. 1994),
and Puso v. Kenyon,
272 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1994), for the
proposition that the limitation on lawsuit threshold applies without regard to the type
of vehicle occupied by the injured person. These cases do not resolve the
issue before us because the plaintiff in Cavanaugh, who was a passenger in
her husband's truck, also did not contend on appeal that she was not
subject to the verbal threshold. The plaintiff in Puso, who was the passenger
on a motorcycle owned and operated by Kenyon, also did not contend on
appeal that she was not subject to the verbal threshold. Thus, we do
not know on what facts the verbal threshold was applied to these plaintiffs.
A-