(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 23, 2000 -- Decided October 25, 2000--Opinion Filed July 19, 2001
PORITZ, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal arises from an effort by the Legislature to have placed on the general election ballot for
November 2000 a resolution to amend the New Jersey Constitution to dedicate certain revenue streams for use in
the construction and repair of the State's transportation system. The issue before the Court is whether the resolution
as framed violates Article IX, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution, referred to as the “separate vote” requirement, which
provides that the Legislature must present “more than one amendment” to the voters “separately and distinctly.”
The proposed amendment to Article VII, Section 2, Paragraph 4 addressed by the resolution at issue,
Concurrent Resolution No. 1 (the Resolution), provided for the dedication of two new revenue sources to the
Transportation Trust Fund (Fund): specified amounts from the gross receipts tax on the sale of petroleum products
and specified amounts from Sales and Use Tax receipts. As with a 0.025 cents per gallon tax on the sale of motor
fuels already constitutionally dedicated to the Fund, the new revenue streams would be used only for activities
related to the construction or repair of New Jersey's transportation system.
Plaintiffs, the League of Woman Voters and its Director of Fiscal Policy (the League), challenged the
Resolution as unconstitutional, being of the view that by combining the two proposed changes to the Constitution
(dedication of two new revenue streams) in one ballot question, the Legislature was depriving voters of their
constitutional right to approve one change and reject another.
The League filed suit in the Superior Court, Law Division seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Resolution violated Article IX, Paragraph 5 and a permanent injunction against placing the Resolution on the
November 2000 ballot. The Secretary of State and the Attorney General moved to dismiss the League's Verified
Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the League's request
for injunctive relief and granted the motion to dismiss the complaint on August 4, 2000.
The League appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the judgment below on October 10, 2000.
The League then filed a notice of appeal as of right with the Supreme Court pursuant to R. 2:2-1(a)(1). After
hearing oral argument, the Court, by Order filed October 25, 2000, affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division.
No opinion was filed at that time due to the proximity of the general election. The Resolution was submitted to and
approved by the voters on November 2, 2000.
Held: Concurrent Resolution No. 1 and the constitutional amendment it proposes do not violate the “separate vote”
requirement or the “single object” test of the New Jersey Constitution because the two proposed changes to the
Constitution are closely related to each other and serve the same purpose.
1. Article IX, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations; therefore, it is
appropriate to consider other related provisions of the Constitution and other sources to ascertain the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. In this case, the “single object” rule, located in Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 and
Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3, is looked to. That constitutional rule is intended to ensure relatedness among
the components of legislative acts. The parties and the courts in this case agree that the Resolution meets the single
object test because only one provision of the Constitution is affected and the changes within that provision further
the same purpose: increasing the future stability of the Fund by dedicating additional monies to it. (pp. 8-14)
2. The history of Article IX reveals evidence of the framers' intent in respect of whether the provision at issue
requires more than the relatedness test of the single object rule. That evidence suggests that the framers did not
intend so narrow a reading as urged by the League. ( pp. 15-17)
3. At least twenty-nine other states have “separate vote” requirements to amend their constitutions and although
there are wide variances in the way state courts have interpreted those requirements and “single object”
requirements, there is a general recognition that the primary goal underlying such requirements is the prevention of
“logrolling.” Logrolling is the legislative practice of combining unrelated popular and unpopular proposals because
voters will approve the entire proposal in order to have the portion of the proposal they favor pass. These
requirements also may prevent the submission of misleading or confusing amendments. (pp. 17-23)
4. The Court favors and adopts the approach of the Oregon Supreme Court on the amendment issue because it
comports with the constitutional history of Article IX, Paragraph 5 in that it incorporates the single object test and
because it recognizes the seriousness of amending a constitution by requiring closer scrutiny of the relationship
between the parts of a proposed amendment than does the single object test. (pp. 24-25)
5. The “separate vote” requirement of the New Jersey Constitution requires that any proposed amendment must not
make two or more changes to the Constitution unless they are closely related to one another. The amendment as
structured and proposed by the Resolution constitutes a reasonably integrated whole in which the parts are closely
related to one another. (pp. 25-26)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF
JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
24 September Term 2000
JUDITH CAMBRIA and THE LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NEW
JERSEY, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DeFOREST B. SOARIES,
Secretary of State of the
State of New Jersey and JOHN
J. FARMER, JR., Attorney
General of the State of New
Jersey,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued October 23, 2000 -- Decided October 25, 2000 --
Opinion Filed July 19, 2001
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at
334 N.J. Super. 437 (2000).
Douglas S. Eakeley argued the cause for
appellants (Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys;
Deborah A. Silodor on the briefs).
Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondents (John J.
Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PORITZ, C.J.
This case involves a provision of the New Jersey
Constitution that establishes the mechanism by which the
Constitution may be amended. We have been asked for the first
time to interpret the requirement set forth in Article IX,
Paragraph 5 that the Legislature must present “more than one
amendment” to the people “separately and distinctly.” In
specific, plaintiffs contend that Article IX, Paragraph 5
prohibits the dedication of two types of state revenues to the
Transportation Trust Fund in one amendment. We hold that under
the standard set forth in this opinion the separate vote
requirement of Article IX is not violated by an amendment so
structured.
[N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 4 (amended 2000).]
In addition to the 0.025 cents per gallon tax on the sale of
motor fuels already constitutionally dedicated to the
Transportation Trust Fund under Article VIII, Section 2,
Paragraph 4, for use in the construction and repair of the
State's transportation system, the amendment proposed the
dedication of two new revenue streams for the same purpose: a
minimum of $100,000 from the gross receipts tax on the sale of
petroleum products in the first year, to be increased to $200,000
in every year thereafter; and a minimum of $80,000 from Sales and
Use Tax receipts in the first year, to be increased to $140,000
in the second year, and to $200,000 in every year thereafter.
According to the Interpretive Statement to the Resolution, the
amount taken from Sales and Use Tax receipts would reflect
approximately one-third of the tax collected from the sale of new
motor vehicles.
Prior to the final approval of the Resolution by the
Assembly, Sandra L. Matsen, President of the League of Women
Voters of New Jersey, Inc. (League), and Judith Cambria, the
League's Director of Fiscal Policy, wrote to and testified before
the Assembly Appropriations Committee, expressing their belief
that the Resolution was unconstitutional. They argued that by
combining the proposed changes in one question, the Resolution
deprived voters of their right under Article IX, Paragrah 5 of
the Constitution to approve one change and reject another.
On July 24, 2000, plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint in
Lieu of Prerogative Writs and an Order to Show Cause with
Temporary Restraints in the Law Division. Plaintiffs sought both
a declaratory judgment that the Resolution violated Article IX,
Paragraph 5, and a permanent injunction enjoining Secretary of
State Soaries and Attorney General John J. Farmer, Jr.
(defendants) from taking action as necessary to have the
Resolution placed on the November 2000 general election ballot.See footnote 11
Defendants responded on July 31, 2000 with a Notice of Cross-
Motion to Dismiss the Verified Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. By decision dated August
4, 2000, the trial court denied plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief and granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
Cambria v. Soaries,
334 N.J. Super. 488 (Law Div. 2000). The
Appellate Division affirmed on October 10, 2000,See footnote 22 Cambria v.
Soaries,
334 N.J. Super. 437 (2000). On October 11, 2000,
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal as of right with this Court.
R. 2:2-1(a)(1). After hearing oral argument on October 24, 2000,
we issued an order affirming the Appellate Division without
opinion because of the need for an immediate response in light of
the imminent general election. The Resolution was submitted to
the voters on November 2, 2000, and was approved. In this
opinion we now explain the basis for our earlier order of
affirmance.
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the language “separately and distinctly” found in Article IX, Paragraph 5, and known generally as the separate vote requirement. Plaintiffs contend that by using the phrase “specific amendment or amendments” in Paragraph 1, the framers of the Constitution intended “amendment” to be synonymous with “change.” It follows, plaintiffs argue, that multiple changes can be effectuated only by means of multiple amendments, each submitted for public approval, each to be voted on “separately and distinctly.” Therefore, the Resolution violates the separate vote requirement of Paragraph 5 because it makes more than one change to the Constitution but allows for only one vote.
Defendants dispute that any special significance should be attached to the phrase “specific amendment or amendments” in Article IX, Paragraph 1. In their view, that provision merely imposes a requirement on the Legislature to propose definite changes to the Constitution as opposed to general, vague modifications. Regarding the meaning of the separate vote requirement in Paragraph 5, defendants suggest that the caselaw interpreting the “single object” language found in Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 and Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3, is instructive. That language traditionally has been given a broad reading by this Court, requiring only relatedness between the various components of a single statute. According to defendants, the Resolution would easily pass such a test because the tax sources in the Resolution are related to the Transportation Trust Fund by virtue of the dedication of monies from those sources to the Fund.
Article IX, Paragraph 5 states:
If more than one amendment be submitted,
they shall be submitted in such manner and
form that the people may vote for or against
each amendment separately and distinctly.
That Article IX, Paragrah 5 is subject to multiple, reasonable
interpretations is evident from the opinions below. On initial
review, the trial court held that the provision imposes a
procedural requirement only on the amendment process. Cambria,
supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 498. According to that court, the
Constitution forbids the submission of multiple proposed
amendments in the form of a single amendment; however, if only
one amendment is proposed by the Legislature, the content of that
amendment cannot be questioned by the courts. Id. at 500. Put
another way, once the Legislature chooses to vote on the proposal
as one amendment, adherence to the separation of powers doctrine
requires the court to stay its hand. Ibid. The Appellate
Division agreed that the proposal as framed is valid, but
disagreed that the separate and distinct language is procedural
in nature. In the view of the appellate court, the Legislature
may submit an amendment containing multiple parts whenever it
makes an “overall change” to a provision of the Constitution.
Cambria, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 441. The panel observed that
because Article IX, Paragraph 5 does not even
impose a single object standard upon proposed
amendments, which is easily satisfied by this
amendment, see New Jersey Association on
Correction v. Lan,
80 N.J. 199 (1979), the
proposed amendment stands as formulated by
the Legislature and may be submitted to the
people for their vote.
The parties also disagree about the meaning of Article IX,
Paragraph 5, although they concur with the Appellate Division's
conclusion that the single object language found elsewhere in the
Constitution is not equivalent to the separate vote requirement
of Paragraph 5. We turn first, then, to the single object rule
so as to determine at the outset whether that rule is helpful to
our consideration of Article IX, Paragraph 5.
A
We explained in Lan that the purpose of the single object rule is to ensure relatedness among the components of legislative acts:
'All that is required is that the act should
not include legislation so incongruous that
it could not, by any fair intendment, be
considered germane to one general subject.
The subject may be as comprehensive as the
legislature chooses to make it, provided it
constitutes, in the constitutional sense, a
single subject, and not several. The
connection or relationship of several
matters, such as will render them germane to
one subject and to each other, can be of
various kinds, as, for example, of means to
ends, of different subdivisions of the same
subject, or that all are designed for the
same purpose, or that both are designated by
the same term. Neither is it necessary that
the connection or relationship should be
logical; it is enough that the matters are
connected with and related to a single
subject, in popular signification.'
[Id. at 215 (quoting Johnson v. Harrison,
50 N.W. 923, 924 (Minn. 1891)).]
See also Bucino v. Malone,
12 N.J. 330, 343-44 (1953) (holding
that single object rule of Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 is
not violated when act's title “embrace[s] but one general
purpose” and “[a]ll provisions of the act are in furtherance of
this purpose”). The single object rule, we stated, is designed
to protect against
the extreme, the 'pernicious,' the
incongruous; the manifestly
repugnant; the palpable contravention
of the constitutional command; fraud
or overreaching or misleading of the people;
the inadvertent; the 'discordant;' or 'the
intermixing in one and the same act [of] such
things as have no proper relation to each
other;' or matters which are 'uncertain,
misleading or deceptive.'
[Lan, supra, 80 N.J. at 212 (citations
omitted).]
See also Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Auth.,
13 N.J. 14, 32
(1953) (stating that purpose of single object clause in Article
VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3 is to ensure that “money thus
provided cannot be expended for one purpose under the guise of
another . . . for the protection of the State's revenue and
credit as well as for an understanding appraisement of the
project by the electorate”).
In sum, to survive a challenge based on the single object
rule, the State need show only that the individual parts of a
statute or of a bond issue meet the “relatedness” test. We
concluded that the bond proposal in Lan was constitutional
because its purpose was to build facilities for those who were
“in custody or other circumstances [and so had] need for State
care, protection and rehabilitation,” all of which were related
through that purpose. Lan, supra, 80 N.J. at 216. See also
Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
180 N.J. Super. 282, 300 (Law Div. 1981) (sustaining act establishing
public agency to implement public transportation system and
ordering dissolution of pre-existing municipal parking
authorities under Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 “one object”
requirement because component parts of act served common purpose
to create one agency with powers that do not overlap those of
other agencies); State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc.,
115 N.J. 83,
111 (1989) (holding New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund
Authority Act constitutional under Article IV, Section 7,
Paragraph 4 because “[a]lthough diverse, the Act's provisions
further its express purpose: the preservation of a sound,
balanced transportation system through the provision of a stable
source of funding”).
The question we must answer therefore is whether Article IX, Paragraph 5 requires more than the relatedness test of the single object rule. There are some indications of the framers' intent regarding that question in the history of the provision itself.
Article IX of the Constitution of 1844 contains language nearly identical to that of Article IX, Paragraphs 1 and 5 of the 1947 Constitution.See footnote 66 During the Constitutional Convention of 1844, a conversation of some relevance to an understanding of that language took place:
Mr. Ryerson moved to amend by adding
that each amendment submitted, should embrace
but one subject. The legislature might
submit a popular amendment, and connect it
with an unpopular one; and both might be
voted down in consequence.
Mr. R. S. Kennedy thought the object of
the mover was already reached by the language
of the report. If the legislature should
disobey that, they might disobey the
restrictions proposed by Mr. R.
. . . .
Mr. Vroom proposed a modification of Mr.
Ryerson's motion, which that gentleman
accepted. The amendment was not agreed to.
[Proceedings of the N.J. State Constitutional
Convention of 1844 at 56 (emphasis added).]
We take from the quoted exchange that the framers expected
Article IX to encompass the requirements of the single object
provisions.
There is also documentary evidence from the Constitutional
Convention of 1947 suggesting that the separate vote requirement
is not as narrow as plaintiffs claim it to be. As noted above,
plaintiffs argue that the framers intended the word “amendment”
in Article IX to mean “change,” such that the Legislature cannot
propose more than one change to the Constitution unless each
change is submitted separately to the public. During the
proceedings in 1947, however, a letter was sent to the Committee
on Rights, Privileges, Amendments, and Miscellaneous Provisions
proposing, among other things, that Article IX explicitly refer
to “change” rather than “amendment.” 3 Proceedings of the State
of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947 at 313-15. The
writer apparently believed his proposed version of Article IX
would ensure that the Legislature could not usurp the power of
the people to amend the Constitution. Ibid. Since his
suggestion was not accepted, it is reasonable to conclude that
the convention members did not intend the separate vote
requirement to be read quite so narrowly.
At one end of the spectrum, we find a simple rational basis test wherein the court pays great deference to the legislature's decision that the different parts of the proposed amendment are appropriate to be presented together, and asks only that the parts be rationally related to each other. Thus, in Fugina v. Donovan, the court sustained a single legislative proposal that would allow legislators to extend their session, serve as notaries, and seek election to other offices because “[w]hile the logical relationship between the propositions is somewhat remote, and perhaps as remote as is permissible, yet it exists; and the relative importance of the propositions makes it not unreasonable that they be joined.” 104 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. 1960). In the same vein, several states have adopted a somewhat stricter, but nonetheless deferential, version of the single object approach. Those states do not distinguish between the single object and separate vote requirements. See, e.g., Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 830-31 (Miss. 1990) (stating amendment may alter “several articles or sections of the Constitution, if all are germane to a single controlling purpose”) (emphasis omitted); Milwaukee Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression v. Elections Bd. of the State of Wisconsin, 317 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Wis. 1982) (holding that several changes to administration of bail were properly presented together because it is within legislative discretion to submit distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to same subject and are designed to accomplish single purpose); Carter v. Burson, 198 S.E.2d 151, 156 (Ga. 1973) (holding that several modifications to procedure for removal of State Treasurer did not violate constitution because “all of the parts . . . of the constitutional amendment are germane to the accomplishment of a single objective”); State ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 282 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1972) (holding invalid proposed amendment changing administration of General Assembly, changing election and duties of executive branch members, and repealing prohibition against convicted felons holding public office, because “each of its subjects . . . [failed to bear] some reasonable relationship to a single general object or purpose”).
A considerably more restricted version of the separate vote requirement insists on a single subject and parts so interdependent that they constitute a whole not able to be separated. In Kerby v. Luhrs, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a proposed amendment addressing the taxation of copper mines and public utilities, and also establishing a tax commission, violated the state constitution. 36 P.2d 549, 554 (Ariz. 1934). The proposal was rejected because
the different changes contained in the
proposed amendment [did not] all cover
matters necessary to be dealt with in some
manner, in order that the Constitution, as
amended, shall constitute a consistent and
workable whole on the general topic embraced
in that part which is amended, and if,
logically speaking, they should stand or fall
as a whole, then there is but one amendment
submitted.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court invalidated a proposal to give
wartime emergency powers to the legislature that would provide
for the temporary succession of the powers and duties of public
officers and allow the legislature to ignore provisions of the
constitution, because one part was not “dependent on [the other
nor] . . . necessary to ensure the workability of the other,
. . . [nor presented in such way that] if the electorate were
given a choice, it might have approved . . . [o]ne, and
disapproved the other.” Lee v. State,
367 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah
1962). See also Farris v. Munro,
662 P.2d 821, 825 (Wash. 1983)
(en banc) (holding that proposed amendment relating to state
lottery did not constitute multiple amendments, even though it
kept intact pre-existing restrictions on divorce, because it did
not “relate to more than one subject [or have] . . . two distinct
and separate purposes not dependent upon or connected with each
other”) (internal citations omitted).
More recently, in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, the Oregon Supreme
Court decided that the state constitution's “separate-vote
requirement, [which] applies only to constitutional amendments,
. . . imposes a narrower requirement than does the single-subject
requirement.”
959 P.2d 49, 63 (Or. 1998). The court stated that
“[s]uch a reading . . . makes sense, because the act of amending
the constitution is significantly different from enacting or
amending legislation,” id. at 63, concluding:
Indeed, because the separate-vote requirement
is concerned only with a change to the
fundamental law, the notion that the people
should be able to vote separately upon each
separate amendment should come as no
surprise. In short, the requirement serves
as a safeguard that is fundamental to the
concept of a constitution.
In order to determine whether the proposal before it violated the
separate-vote requirement, the court asked
whether, if adopted, the proposal would make
two or more changes to the constitution that
are substantive and that are not closely
related. If the proposal would effect two or
more changes that are substantive and not
closely related, the proposal violates the
separate vote requirement.
In essence, because of the heightened importance attached to
modifications of organic law, the Oregon court adopted a somewhat
more restrictive version of the single object test. Under that
test, the court rejected a proposal that dealt with crime
victims' rights, six different individual rights, and juror
qualifications, as having too many disparate and unrelated parts.
Id. at 68. See also Marshall v. State,
975 P.2d 325, 331 (Mont.
1999) (citing with approval Armatta, supra, 959 P.
2d at 63-64).See footnote 88
Amendments to an organic body of law are a serious matter. The New Jersey Constitution contains our most fundamental ideas about the type of government we want to have and how it should function, and the relationship between that government and the people. The framers of the 1947 Constitution provided for amendments to our organic law by establishing a process that begins in the Legislature but includes a public hearing and submission to the public “in such manner and form that [the members] may vote for or against each amendment separately and distinctly.” N.J. Const. art. IX, ¶ 5. The process is appropriately more complex than simple lawmaking and, most important, requires participation by New Jersey voters. Ultimately, it is the voters who will decide whether our Constitution should be modified.
Yet, the provisions of Article IX, Paragraph 5, must be interpreted pragmatically. The Legislature begins the process with a proposed amendment that represents the considered judgment of two-thirds of its members that year (or a majority of its members in two successive years). An excessively narrow reading of the separate vote requirement could result in voters having to consider multiple related amendments without fully understanding the relationship between them. Such fragmentation presents the distinct possibility that only portions of a multi-faceted proposal will gain approval, thus rendering the amendment impractical. Korte v. Bayless, 16 P.3d 200, 204-05 (Ariz. 2001). Yet, as many courts have pointed out, the combination of disparate subjects in one amendment can be equally confusing.
We adopt today the formulation laid out by the Oregon Supreme Court in Armatta, supra, 959 P. 2d at 64. We believe that court's approach comports with the constitutional history of Article IX, Paragraph 5 because it incorporates the single object test, and because it recognizes the seriousness of amending a constitution by requiring a closer examination of the relationship between the parts of a proposed amendment than does the single object test. Put simply, to meet the separate vote requirement of the New Jersey Constitution, any proposed amendment must not make two or more changes to the constitution unless they are closely related to one another. Under that approach, the amendment challenged by plaintiffs does not violate the separate vote requirement of our Constitution. As noted earlier, the amendment effects two discrete changes by the dedication of two new revenue streams to the Transportation Trust Fund. Both new sources of revenue serve the same purpose, to provide stability to the Fund by allocating additional monies for the construction and repair of the State's transportation system through a constitutional dedication. And, the new revenues are derived from taxes on products related to the transportation system, i.e., the sale of petroleum products and the sale of motor vehicles. We already have determined that the component parts of this amendment meet the single object test; we hold, also, that the amendment as structured constitutes a reasonably integrated whole in which the parts are closely related to one another.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion.
NO. A-24 SEPTEMBER TERM 2000
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
JUDITH CAMBRIA and THE LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NEW
JERSEY, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DeFOREST B. SOARIES,
Secretary of State of the
State of New Jersey and JOHN
J. FARMER, JR., Attorney
General of the State of New
Jersey,
Defendants-Respondents.
DECIDED October 25, 2000
OPINION FILED July 19, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Chief Poritz
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1 1Pursuant to Executive Reorganization Plan No. 004-1998, the
statutory electoral duties of the Secretary of State under Title
19 of the New Jersey Statutes have been transferred to the
Department of Law and Public Safety and are now carried out under
the direction of the Attorney General. See
30 N.J.R. 1351(a).
Footnote: 2 2Prior to issuance of the Appellate Division decision,
plaintiffs petitioned this Court for direct certification
pursuant to Rule 2:12-2. On October 13, 2000, after the decision
issued, this Court dismissed the petition as moot.
Footnote: 3 3When the proposed amendment is approved by a majority only,
it is referred for consideration in the next legislative year
and, if approved by a majority in both houses on reconsideration,
it is then submitted to the people. N.J. Const. art. IX, ¶ 1.
Footnote: 4 4Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 states, in relevant
part:
To avoid improper influences which may result
from intermixing in one and the same act such
things as have no proper relation to each
other, every law shall embrace but one
object, and that shall be expressed in the
title.
Footnote: 5 5Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 3 states, in relevant
part:
The Legislature shall not, in any manner,
create in any fiscal year a debt or debts,
liability or liabilities of the State, which
together with any previous debts or
liabilities shall exceed at any time one per
centum of the total amount appropriated by
the general appropriation law for that fiscal
year, unless the same shall be authorized by
a law for some single object or work
distinctly specified therein.
Footnote: 6 6Article IX of the 1844 Constitution states, in relevant
part, that:
Any specific amendment or amendments to the
constitution may be proposed in the senate or
general assembly . . . provided, that if more
than one amendment be submitted, they shall
be submitted in such manner and form that the
people may vote for, or against each
amendment separately and distinctly.
Footnote: 7 7Ariz. Const. art. XXI, § 1; Ark. Const. art. XIX, § 22;
Cal. Const. art. XVIII, § 1; Colo. Const. art. XIX, § 2; Ga.
Const. art. X, § 1, ¶ 2; Haw. Const. art. XVII, § 3; Idaho Const.
art. XX, § 2; Ind. Const. art. XVI, § 2; Iowa Const. art. X, § 2;
Kan. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Ky. Const. § 256); La. Const. art.
XIII, § 1; Md. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. IX, § 1;
Miss. Const. art. XV, § 273; Mo. Const. art. XII, § 2(b); Mont.
Const. art. XIV, § 11; Neb. Const. art. XVI, § 1; N.J. Const.
art. IX, ¶ 5; N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1; Ohio Const. art. XVI, §
1; Okla. Const. art. XXIV, § 1; Or. Const. art. XVII, § 1; Pa.
Const. art. XI, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 3; Wash. Const. art.
XXIII, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. XIV, § 2; Wis. Const. art. XII, §
1; and Wyo. Const. art. XX, § 2.
Footnote: 8 8By way of contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that the Legislature must propose only discrete, straightforward
changes to the constitution. When multiple changes are required,
no matter how interrelated, “each modification, deletion, or
addition [must be] submitted to the voters as a separate
question.” Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Commonwealth,
727 A.2d 632, 635 (Pa. 1999).