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N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16 to -24, the Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Act), adopted in New Jersey in
1997. We affirm.
"> 340 N.J. Super. 414"> Original Wordprocessor Version
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) Original WP 5.1 Version
This case can also be found at 340 N.J. Super. 414.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-3106-99T1
KAM-TECH SYSTEMS LIMITED and
DURATION SYSTEMS LIMITED,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
RAFAEL YARDENI, a/k/a RAFAEL
YARDENY, a/k/a RAFI YARDENY,
a/k/a RAFI YARDENI
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted      May 8, 2001 - Decided May 24, 2001
Before Judges Pressler, Kestin and Alley.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, HUD-L- 3395-98.
Oury & Mizdol, attorneys for appellant (Robert E. Laux on the brief).
Sharkey & Campisi, attorneys for respondents (Jeffrey Campisi, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEY, J.A.D.
Defendant appeals from an order of the Law Division which enforced a civil money judgment rendered by an Israeli
court by entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $218,039.73, plus interest, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-16 to -24,
the Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Act), adopted in New Jersey in 1997. We affirm.
The underlying basis of the dispute involved sales by plaintiff to defendant of military and technical equipment, for
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which defendant allegedly did not pay. Plaintiff Kam-Tech Systems Limited is a company registered under the laws of
Israel, and plaintiff Duration Systems Limited is a subsidiary of Kam- Tech. On July 10, 1995, the Magistrate's Court
in Tel Aviv, Israel, by Judge David Geldstein, awarded plaintiffs a monetary judgment against defendant. On April 22,
1998, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant in the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking a judgment under the
Act enforcing the Israeli court's money judgment. On plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, defendant interposed
several provisions of the Act in arguing
against enforcement of the Israeli judgment.
Judge Joseph T. Ryan found as a matter of law that plaintiffs had established their right to prevail with the
exception of two issues, namely, whether defendant had received sufficient notice of the Israeli judicial proceeding,
and whether he had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in Israel. With respect to those issues the
court decided that an evidentiary hearing should be held. Accordingly, the summary judgment motion was denied
without prejudice and a plenary hearing was held on September 30, 1999, in which evidence was received on the
specified issues. In a brief written opinion and an order entering a final judgment dated January 5, 2000, Judge Ryan
rejected defendant's contentions and enforced the Israeli judgment in favor of plaintiffs by entering judgment pursuant
to the Act for $218,039.73, plus interest from February 24, 1998.
I
The Act supplies a useful remedy for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. When New Jersey and the other
twelve former British colonies originally subscribed to the United States Constitution, they did so as sovereign states
accepting the unifying force of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit clause.See footnote 11 The Constitution,
however, made no specific provision for recognizing or enforcing judgments entered by the courts of other nations. As
a result, and in the absence of an implementing treaty or statute, the subject was deemed a matter of "comity," as
explained in the leading case of Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164, 16 S.Ct. 139, 143, 40 L. Ed. 95, 108 (1895). The
Supreme Court in Hilton set forth principles governing the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States:
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a statute of this country. But
when, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of
ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of
parties to suits regularly brought before them ...
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is
derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by
legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon
what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of nations.' Although the phrase has been often
criticized, no satisfactory substitute has been suggested.
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
[Hilton, supra, 159 U.S. at 163-64, 16 S.Ct. at 143, 40                                                                       L. Ed. at 108]
The Supreme Court concluded
[W]e are satisfied that where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceed- ings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in
the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the
comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this
country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
[Id. at 202-03, 16 S.Ct. at 158, 40 L. Ed. at 112]
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See also, Mercandino v. DeVoe & Reynolds, Inc., 181 N.J. Super. 105, 107 (App. Div. 1981).
The Act supplies a statutory basis for enforcing foreign judgments, a basis that was missing in Hilton, and represents
an important progressive step in the recognition and enforcement in this country of money judgments of the courts of
other nations.See footnote 22 Its text, with minor variations, is that of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See 13 U.L.A. 261
(1986). The original 1962 Prefatory Note to the uniform draft includes the following reasons for proposing this
legislation:
In most states of the Union, the law on recognition of judgments from foreign countries is not codified. In a large
number of civil law countries, grant of conclusive effect to money-judgments from foreign courts is made dependent
upon reciprocity. Judgments rendered in the United States have in many instances been refused recognition abroad
either because the foreign court was not satisfied that local judgments would be recognized in the American
jurisdiction involved or because no certification of existence of reciprocity could be obtained from the foreign
government in countries where existence of reciprocity must be certified to the courts by the government. Codification
by a state of its rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more likely that
judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad.
The uniform act is now in effect, with local variations, in over thirty states, and thus is a fairly widespread mechanism
for recognizing and enforcing money judgments awarded in the courts of foreign countries.See footnote 33
II
The Act expressly includes the Constitution's concept of full faith and credit, providing that a judgment enforceable
under the Act will be "enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a court of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-19. New Jersey's courts must recognize a final foreign country judgment for
money damages as "conclusive between the parties," id., unless the judgment debtor establishes one of the specific
grounds for non-recognition that are enumerated in the Act as follows:
2A:49A-20. Conclusiveness of Foreign Judgment
a.      A foreign country money-judgment is not conclusive if:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign country court did not have personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor; or
(3) the foreign country court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
b.      A foreign country money-judgment need not be recognized if:
(1) the judgment debtor in the proceedings in the foreign country court did not receive notice of the proceedings
in sufficient time to enable the judgment debtor to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the cause of action on which the foreign judgment is based is contrary to the public policy of this State;
(4) the judgment conflicts with a prior final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceedings in the foreign country court were contrary to an agreement between the parties under which
the dispute in question was to be settled, other than by proceedings in that court; or
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(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign country court was a seriously
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
Defendant challenges the Israeli judgment on four grounds: due process, personal jurisdiction, notice and fraud, which
we now consider.
III
Defendant urges that the trial court should have deemed the Israeli judgment not conclusive because, he claims, it
comes within a section of the Act that provides that New Jersey courts will not enforce a foreign country judgment
"rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements
of due process of law ...." 953 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App. 1997), where, as here, one of the grounds raised in
opposition to the foreign judgment was that it was rendered "under a system [that did] not provide ... procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process ...." 953 S.W. 2d at 479. See N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-24, that it "shall be so
construed as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." The approach we
take also conforms with our State's general rule regarding the burden of proving affirmative defenses, Pagano v.
United Jersey Bank, 276 N.J. Super. 489, 500 (App. Div. 1994), aff'd 143 N.J. 220 (1996). See R. 4:5-4. It seems
appropriate that the burden should rest on the party asserting such a ground, except when it might be shown that
fundamental fairness would warrant shifting the burden, if, to give one hypothetical example, access to information
about the foreign judicial proceedings is peculiarly within the knowledge or control of the party attempting to enforce a
judgment or is inordinately burdensome for the opponent of the judgment to obtain.See footnote 44
Our jurisprudence does not require that the procedures of a foreign court be identical to those used in the courts of
the United States. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1987). What counts is not
whether the procedures used are similar or dissimilar to ours, but "only the basic fairness of the foreign procedures."
Id. at 688. The due process concept embodied in the Act requires a fair procedure "simple and basic enough to
describe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers." Society of Lloyds' v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th
Cir. 2000). The statute requires simply that the foreign procedure be "compatible with the requirements of due process
of law," namely, that "the foreign procedures are 'fundamentally fair' and do not offend against 'basic fairness.'" Id.
The focus being the "basic fairness" of the foreign procedures, we find no basis for concluding that the procedures of
the Israeli civil justice system fail to measure up to the Act's due process test.
A few words about the legal system of the State of Israel are in order. It formally came into being with the
establishment of the Israeli State in 1948. Until near the end of World War I, the Turkish Ottoman Empire had for
several centuries governed the geographical area in which the State of Israel is now located.
In the period of the so-called British Mandate between the end of Ottoman control and the establishment of the Israeli
government in 1948, aspects of English common law were made part of the legal system, and Magistrate's Courts,
District Courts, and a Supreme Court were organized. Since 1948, substantive law has continued to evolve, but the
court structure of the State of Israel has remained much the same. Courts must have personal jurisdiction over
defendants; notice of proceedings must be given; there are rights to various pre-trial discovery; motions and hearings;
and trials are conducted according to the adversarial system.See footnote 55
In Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, supra, 223 F. 3d at 476, the Seventh Circuit rejected as "risible" an objection to
enforcing, under the Illinois version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, a judgment rendered
by England's High Court, and affirmed by its Court of Appeal and then by the House of Lords' Appellate Committee,
on the ground that the English legal system "does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law ...." See also 58 F.3d 1406, that case actually provides no support whatever for his
position. Bank Melli involved an attempt to enforce a default judgment rendered by the Iranian courts against a sister
of the deposed Shah of Iran, when, based on a showing of then-current political and social circumstances with respect
to judicial proceedings in Iran, it would have been impossible for her to have received a fair hearing.
By contrast, defendant here is simply a judgment debtor in Israel, and we have no basis for questioning the
adherence of the civil courts of the State of Israel to the rule of law or their commitment to the norms of due process.
Defendant offers no specifics to support any of his allegations that attributes of due process were lacking. Moreover,
not only has defendant failed to provide any authority to support his challenge to the Israeli civil judicial system, but in
addition our own research has not uncovered a single case in which a civil judgment of one of those courts has been
found to have been rendered in violation of our due process standards.
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We conclude that there is no merit to defendant's challenge to the judgment of the Israeli court, and in particular that
defendant has furnished no basis for us to conclude that the judgment against him was rendered, in the language of the
Act, "under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law ...." N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-20a(1).
IV
Plaintiff also challenges the judgment of the Magistrate's Court of Tel Aviv by asserting that it is not conclusive
under the Act because the Israeli Court "did not have personal jurisdiction over [him] ...." 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974);
Roberts v. Cowgill, 316 N.J. Super. 33, 37 (App. Div. 1998).
In any event, beyond the proofs as to defendant's voluntary appearance, there was also persuasive evidence that there
were significant general contacts between defendant and Israel, as well as specific contacts between defendant and the
business transactions in Israel that are here in dispute. Defendant's attorney in Israel acknowledged that she represented
him in his "businesses in Israel." Moreover, defendant admitted doing business in Israel at plaintiffs' facility, and he
had inventory supplies and products to which he made claims in Israel and which served as a partial basis for the
events in dispute.
Defendant certainly had the requisite minimum contacts with Israel upon which jurisdiction of the Israel court could
be predicated. He cannot sustain his suggestion that he had such a de minimus nexus with Israel that maintenance of a
suit against him in an Israeli court would be offensive to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed.2d 95, 102 (1945).
Our conclusion in this respect is consistent with a line of cases beginning at least with International Shoe, supra.See
footnote 66 We rely on these principles in the absence of any citation by defendant of any principle of Israeli law as to
personal jurisdiction that was violated by the Tel Aviv Court's having asserted jurisdiction against him, in which case it
is reasonable to use our own concepts concerning personal jurisdiction as a point of reference.
A New Jersey court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the "outermost limits
permitted by the United States Constitution." Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971); R. 4:4-4(b)(1).       In
assessing the reasonableness of subjecting a non-resident defendant to personal jurisdiction, we look to whether there
have been minimum contacts with the forum state that are consistent with due process. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335
N.J. Super. 174, 182 (App. Div. 2000); See also, International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed at
102. The minimum contacts analysis consists of two parts. First, a court must determine whether minimum contacts
exist at all. Waste Management, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 122 (1994). Second, a court must decide
"whether those minimum contacts establish jurisdiction consistent with considerations of fair play and substantial
justice." Id. at 121; International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L. Ed. at 102. Essentially it must be
determined whether the defendant has purposely availed himself of jurisdiction in the forum state. Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S.Ct 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed 2d 528, 542 (1985); Severinsen v. Widener
University, 338 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 2001).
It is beyond legitimate dispute that a fair basis existed for the Israeli court to exercise specific jurisdiction over
defendant.See footnote 77 As noted, the record shows there were general contacts between defendant and the State of
Israel. It also shows specific contacts between defendant, plaintiffs, and the Israeli business transactions in dispute. See
Severinsen, supra. These contacts include defendant's admitted transaction of business in Israel at plaintiffs' facility,
and the inventory, supplies, and products to which he made claims in Israel and which served as a partial basis for the
matters in dispute.
Thus, defendant certainly had the requisite "minimum contacts" with Israel, and the nexus between him and Israel is
such that maintenance of the action in Israel did "not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed at 102. Even apart from his having voluntarily
subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court in Israel, and his agreement to the terms by which the issues in dispute
would be resolved there, it is fully consistent with the norms of due process to conclude that defendant was personally
subject to that court's jurisdiction.
V
Defendant argues that we should exercise our discretion and deny enforcement of the Israeli judgment because he
did not receive notice in sufficient time to enable him to defend in the Israeli proceeding. We reject this contention as
well.See footnote 88
Even accepting defendant's contention that he did not receive the summons, the evidence presented shows that
defendant mounted a defense against the plaintiffs. Defendant appeared in the Israeli case by having his attorney
appear for him, giving notice of his intention to defend the claim. In the course of the litigation there defendant agreed
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to two compromise agreements, the latter of which covered all claims between the parties in Israel. After the plenary
hearing, Judge Ryan specifically determined that in the Israeli proceeding defendant "had a fair opportunity to contest
the claims." We defer to this finding as grounded on substantial evidence. Rova Farms Resort, supra. Defendant has no
basis for asserting that plaintiffs' Israeli judgment is unenforceable under See footnote 99 A foreign country judgment
is not conclusive if the judgment was obtained by fraud. Footnote: 1                                                        1U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, which provides: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
Footnote: 2                                                                                                                 2See generally, with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §481, comments a and b (1987); Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in the
United States Courts (3d ed. 1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration §3 (1993); Linda
J. Silberman, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in the United States, Practicing Law
Institute: International Business Litigation and Arbitration (Course Handbook Series) at 257 (2001); David Epstein,
Jeffrey L. Snyder & Charles Baldwin, International Litigation: A Guide to Jurisdiction, Practice and Strategy §11.09
(3rd ed. 1998).
Footnote: 3                                                                                                                 3Despite the passage of more than one hundred years since Hilton, supra, which noted the absence of a
treaty for the enforcement of foreign judgments, a multilateral treaty on the subject still does not exist. A possible
treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is, however, in the process of current high-level
discussions under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. This draft is provisionally
entitled Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, and its text is available at
www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. See, for example, Arthur T. von Mehren, American Conflicts Law at the Dawn of
the 21st Century, 37 Willamette L. Rev. 133, 142 (Winter 2001). Although the draft Convention is the subject of
continuing negotiation and discussion, there is no assurance that it will be adopted. It is noteworthy, however, that
other conventions sponsored by the Hague Conference with respect to private international laws matters have been
adopted by the United States and numerous other nations. These include the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ( 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231); Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters ( 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163); Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1 343 U.N.T.S. 89, implemented in the United States by the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§11601 to 11610). The United States Department of State is participating in the
negotiations and discussions on the draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge For The ALI: Herein of Foreign
Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 Ind.L.J. 635, 638 (2000). By contrast to the
absence of a multilateral treaty with respect to the international enforcement of court judgments, the enforcement of
international arbitral awards enjoys relatively widespread acceptance under the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517; T.I.A.S. 6997; 330 U.N.T.S. 3) ("New York
Convention"), as implemented in the United States by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201- 208.
Footnote: 4                                                                                                                 4The law on this issue with respect to the uniform act is somewhat sparse, but we note this discussion by
the court in Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 989, 116 S.Ct., 519, 133
L. Ed.2d 427 (1995), which recognized that
[A] strong argument can be made that a claimed lack of due process should be treated as a defense. So doing
would be consistent with the view of a leading commentary that "[t]here is much sense in making the party who claims
the unusual occurrence plead it affirmatively so that the usual assumptions may be indulged in as a matter of course
wherever there is no such claim." 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271, at
445 (1990) ...
A number of courts have so treated it. See Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1005
(5th Cir.1990) ("Section five of the Texas Recognition Act provides that a 'foreign country judgment need not be
recognized' if certain conditions exist. These conditions are phrased as affirmative defenses. Therefore, the burden of
non-recognition rested with Khreich.") ...; McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F.Supp. 436, 440 (D.Mass 1994) (two
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exceptions to the inclusive nature of foreign judgments were raised, and the court determined that the "act specifically
limits the defenses that may be raised in an action to enforce a foreign judgment."); Fiske, Emery & Assocs. v. Ajello,
577 A.2d 1139, 1141-43, 41 Conn.Sup. 376, 378-381 (Conn.Super.Ct. 1989) (the court noted that under the Foreign
Money-Judgments Act, a foreign judgment will be recognized unless "one of the grounds for nonrecognition of the
foreign judgment" is made out; the nonrecognition conditions were characterized as "defense[s]"). Contra, Ackermann
v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff sought enforcement of a foreign judgment under the Act
and had to show prima facie that there was subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and that there were
regular proceedings conducted by tribunals with procedures that are compatible with due process).
While the issue is extremely interesting, we need not resolve it at this time because ..., whether ... [the deposed
Shah's sister] had to put in sufficient evidence to sustain a defense or whether she had only to point to weaknesses in
the Banks' case, she carried her burden.
Footnote: 5                                                                                                                 5See 3 Thomas H. Reynolds & Arturo A. Flores, Foreign Law, III Israel 1-9 (1998); Yuval Levy, Pre-
Trial and Pre-Hearing Procedures Worldwide 167-179 (Charles Platto ed., 1990); Israel Law Digest, in Martindale-
Hubbell International Law Digest at ISR-4-5 (2001). See also, (1) a U.S. Department of State 1999 Country
Commercial Guide for Israel, (2) a U.S. Library of Congress Country Study of Israel, and (3) an article by the Israeli
Judiciary.
Footnote: 6                                                                                                                 6See also, Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 110 S.Ct 2105, 109 L. Ed 2d 631
(1990); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct 559, 62 L. Ed 2d 490 (1980); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97, S.Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed 2d 683 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct 1228, 2 L. Ed
2d 1283 (1958), reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858, 79 S.Ct 10, 3 L. Ed 2d 92; McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78
S.Ct 199, 2 L. Ed 2d 223 (1957).
Footnote: 7                                                                                                                 7If a cause of action arises directly out of a defendant's contacts with the forum state, the court's
jurisdiction is "specific." Waste Management, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., supra, 138 N.J. at 119 (citing Lebel v.
Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 322 (1989)). If, however, the suit is not related directly to the defendant's
contacts with the forum state, but is predicated instead on the defendant's continuous and systematic activities in the
forum state, the state's exercise of jurisdiction is "general." Ibid.; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct 1868, 1872 n. 9, 80 L. Ed 2d 404, 411 n. 9 (1984).
Footnote: 8                                                                                                                 8Under N.J.S.A. 2A:49A-20b, "A foreign country judgment need not be recognized if: (1) the defendant
in the proceedings in the foreign country court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to defend."
Footnote: 9                                                                                                                 9Plaintiffs represented that Israel's judicial procedure allows for a "detention" order mechanism that
prevents a defendant from leaving Israel until a bond has been posted or the order is vacated.
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