KEVIN JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Respondent.
________________________________________________
Submitted January 4, 2005 - Decided February 28, 2005
Before Judges Stern, S.L. Reisner and Graves.
On appeal from a Final Administrative Decision
of the Department of Corrections.
Kevin Johnson, appellant pro se.
Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Lisa A. Puglisi, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAVES, J.A.D.
Kevin Johnson, an inmate at East Jersey State Prison, appeals from a Final
Administrative Decision of the Department of Corrections finding him guilty of "possession or
introduction of a weapon, such as, but not limited to, a sharpened instrument,
knife or unauthorized tool," in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)*.202. The hearing officer imposed
sanctions of fifteen days detention, 180 days administrative segregation, 180 days loss of
commutation time, and confiscation of the weapon. Johnson filed an administrative appeal and
on February 6, 2004, Assistant Superintendent Thomas Power upheld the guilty finding and
sanctions. We now reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
On January 29, 2004, while on duty at East Jersey State Prison, Senior
Corrections Officer Valentino heard a loud "thud." He looked to his left and
saw inmate Hayes walking away from inmate Nance's bed area toward Johnson's bed
area. Hayes walked over to his own bed area, picked up a cigarette,
and walked back down the tier. Officer Valentino then looked to his left
again, and he saw Nance lying on the floor by the bathroom. Officer
Valentino called for supervisory backup and when Lieutenant Cifelli arrived, he told Officer
Valentino to search Johnson's bed area. Upon searching Johnson's unlocked footlocker, Officer Valentino
found "a can of mackerel in a white sock tied in a knot."
Based on the weapon being found in his footlocker, Johnson was charged with
a disciplinary infraction.
At his disciplinary hearing on February 2, 2004, Johnson maintained he was not
in his area at the time of the incident because he was "making
prayer," and therefore, he had no knowledge of a weapon being in his
footlocker. Counsel substitute stated that inmate Hayes admitted to putting the weapon in
Johnson's unlocked footlocker, and "Johnson had no reason to believe it was there."
The victim of the assault, inmate Nance, did not indicate that Johnson was
involved in his assault, and five other inmates submitted letters indicating they were
attending morning prayer with Johnson at or about the time of the incident.
Based on information provided by a confidential informant (CI), the hearing officer determined
there was "substantial evidence that [Johnson] was involved in the assault and had
knowledge of the weapon." Paragraph 18 of the adjudication form, entitled "Summary of
Evidence Relied on to Reach Decision," reads as follows:
Johnson is charged with possession of a weapon, a can in a sock
found in his locker. He denies knowledge of the item. Inmates do have
the option of locking their lockers. The statement of the informant shows Johnson
was involved in the incident. While inmate Hayes stated at his hearing Johnson
had nothing to do with it, he did not do so until confronted
with all the evidence and may have been trying to minimize the number
of inmates found guilty of the offense. Hayes did not make the statement
until six days after the incident. Johnson states he was in his area
at the time following the incident, while the weapon was there. There is
substantial evidence that he was involved in the assault and had knowledge of
the weapon. It is not shown that Johnson's witnesses would be aware of
the contents of his locker.
Johnson now makes the following arguments:
POINT ONE
APPELLANT JOHNSON WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND FAIRNESS WHEN THE HEARING OFFICER ARBITRARILY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY FOUND HIM GUILTY OF POSSESSING A WEAPON THAT ANOTHER INMATE ADMITTED
TO PUTTING IN HIS FOOTLOCKER.
POINT TWO
APPELLANT JOHNSON WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND FAIRNESS WHEN THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED
TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RELIED UPON IN HIS DETERMINATION
OF GUILT.
POINT THREE
APPELLANT JOHNSON WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND FAIRNESS WHEN THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED
TO INDICATE HIS REASON FOR BELIEVING TESTIMONY OF AN INMATE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND
DISBELIEVING TESTIMONY OF THE REPORTING OFFICER AND THE INMATE WHO ADMITTED PUTTING THE
WEAPON IN THE APPELLANT'S FOOTLOCKER.
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(b) establishes a balance between the need to protect CI's from retaliation
and the potential unfairness resulting from the concealment of information relied upon to
establish an inmate's guilt. Fisher v. Hundley,
240 N.J. Super. 156, 158 (App.
Div. 1990). This regulation requires a written statement summarizing the hearing officer's basis
for relying on confidential information:
Evidence relied upon in making a determination shall be specified on the Adjudication
of Disciplinary Report form.
1. In any case in which the Disciplinary Hearing Officer or Adjustment Committee's
decision of guilt is based on evidence which includes confidential information, adjudication shall
contain:
i. A concise summary of the facts on which the Disciplinary Hearing
Officer or Adjustment Committee concluded that the informant was creditable or his or
her information reliable; and
ii. The informant's statement (either in writing or as reported) in language that
is factual rather than a conclusion, and based on the informant's personal knowledge
of the matters contained in such statement.
2. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer or Adjustment Committee is not permitted to disclose
the identity of the informant.
[N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(b).]
In this case, the hearing officer's statement reads as follows:
The confidential information is on document C-1 on file at the SID [Special
Investigations Division] office. This report contains information that may aid in determining the
informant's identity.
This informant is considered reliable and credible as the information is of first
hand nature and the information is supported by the other evidence involved in
this case. The identity of the informant is kept confidential to protect him
from retaliation by those in the inmate population who would use violence to
discourage cooperation with the authorities.
The informant informed the SID Investigator that he had witnessed inmate Johnson walking
back and forth in front of inmate Nance's area as if he was
scoping out the area, and he also witnessed inmate Dadon standing in front
of the officer's area as a lookout prior to the assault on inmate
Nance. The CI stated that he witnessed inmate Hayes swing a white object
at inmate Nance hitting him with it and then inmate Hayes proceeded to
quickly walk away from the scene. The CI also stated that inmate Hayes
had an argument with inmate Nance concerning "snitch" allegations made by Hayes towards
Nance several days prior to the assault on Nance.
The information provided by the CI was the only evidence linking Johnson to
the assault on Nance, and apparently the hearing officer reasoned that if Johnson
was involved in the assault, then Johnson had knowledge of the weapon found
inside his footlocker. Given the requirements of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(b)(1), and the importance of
the information provided by the CI, it was incumbent upon the hearing officer
to ascertain whether the confidential information was accurate and reliable.
Although an effort was made to establish that the CI was credible and
his information was reliable, that effort fell short of its goal. There was
no indication that the CI had previously provided reliable information, and the fact
that the CI claimed to have first-hand knowledge did not automatically make him
a credible and reliable witness. Furthermore, the accuracy of the CI's statement is
called into question, at least to some extent, by Officer Valentino who did
not indicate in his written report that either Johnson or Dadon were observed
to be in the area where the assault occurred, and there is nothing
in Officer Valentino's report to corroborate that Dadon was "standing in front of
the officer's area," as alleged by the CI. The hearing officer's evaluation of
the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their
statements, was particularly important in a case such as this where the CI's
allegations were critical to the adjudication but were uncorroborated by any independent evidence.
Moreover, the hearing officer did not explain why he considered the information furnished
by the CI to be more credible and worthy of belief than the
statements provided by Johnson, inmate Hayes, Officer Valentino, and Johnson's alibi witnesses. In
these circumstances, we reverse the adjudication.
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) requires that "[a] finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall
be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act."
See also Avant v. Clifford,
67 N.J. 496, 530 (1975) (requiring that there
be substantial evidence to support an inmate disciplinary sanction). In reviewing an administrative
decision, our appellate role is limited. We cannot substitute our judgment for that
of the agency where its findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in
the record. Henry v. Rahway State Prison,
81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).
We recognize the deference to which a decision of an administrative agency is
entitled, and we do not require the same level of detail in prison
disciplinary decisions as in some other matters. Blackwell v. Dep't. of Corr.,
348 N.J. Super. 117, 123 (App. Div. 2002). Our appellate obligation, however, "'requires far
more than a perfunctory review.' We are constrained to engage in a 'careful
and principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Williams v. Dep't. of
Corr.,
330 N.J. Super. 197, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v.
Bureau of Sec.,
64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the adjudication cannot be sustained.
The information provided by the CI, and relied upon by the hearing officer,
was critical to a finding of guilt, yet the hearing officer failed to
explain why he found the CI credible and his story reliable. Because of
the hearing officer's failure to adhere to the necessary procedural safeguards of N.J.A.C.
10A:4-9.15(b)(1), Johnson's right to a fair hearing was compromised, and the administrator or
his designee should have ordered a new hearing pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-11.5(a)(2).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.