(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 25, 1994 -- Decided December 14, 1994
CLIFFORD, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
On January 13, 1988, Joszef Kiss was the owner and operator of an automobile that was involved in
a chain-reaction collision on Route 18 in East Brunswick. The Kiss vehicle was struck in the rear by a
vehicle operated by Ziv Jacob, behind which were the automobiles of Marianne M. Warnebold and John A.
Marold. In addition there were several vehicles ahead of the Kiss automobile. Kiss and his wife Edith, who
made a claim for loss of consortium, sued Jacob, Warnebold, Marold, and the drivers of the three vehicles
ahead of the Kiss automobile. Before trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Marold and the
drivers ahead of Kiss, leaving only Jacob and Warnebold as defendants.
Immediately prior to trial, the Kiss's settled with Warnebold for $100,000, the limit of Warnebold's
personal-injury-liability coverage. The trial court bifurcated the trial and the issues of liability were tried
separately from the damages issues. At the liability phase, the jury determined that Warnebold, the settling
defendant, had been negligent but that her negligence had not proximately caused Joszef Kiss's injuries. The
jury found Jacob one hundred percent at fault for the accident. At the damages trial, the jury returned a
total verdict of $45,000: $37,500 for Joszef's lost earnings; $5,000 for Joszef's injuries; and $2,500 for Edith's
loss of consortium claim.
On Jacob's application following trial, the court reduced Kiss's lost-earning award to $11,500 by
deducting the sum of $26,000, which represented the amount that Kiss's automobile insurer had paid in
personal-injury-protection (PIP) benefits for lost income. The court also held that because Warnebold, who
had been found zero percent liable, was not a joint tortfeasor for purposes of the collateral-source statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, the $100,00 that the Kiss's had received in settlement with Warnebold should off-set
Joszef Kiss's personal-injury award of $5,000 and Edith Kiss's recovery of $2,500. The result was a reduction
of Edith's verdict to zero and Joszef's award to $11,500.
On appeal, the Kiss's challenged the trial court's application of the collateral-source statute. Jacob
cross-appealed, contending that the statute required that the Kiss's entire award be extinguished. The
Appellate Division held that the collateral-source statute applied to settlements received from settling parties
that a jury determines are not liable. The court thus determined that Jacob did not have to pay any damages
because Warnebold had already settled with the Kiss's for an amount that exceeded the Kiss's total award.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: The term "benefits" as used in the collateral-source statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, does not include
the proceeds of a plaintiff's settlement with a defendant that is later found not to be liable for
the plaintiff's injuries.
1. The legislative history, the language of the collateral-source statute, and the desirability of
coordinating the statute with the Comparative Negligence Act lead to the conclusion that "benefits" as used
in the collateral-source statute does not include the proceeds of plaintiff's settlement with a defendant later
found to bear no liability. (pp. 4-6)
2. The types of benefits contemplated by the common-law collateral-source rule include those from
life- or health-insurance policies, from employment contracts, from statutes such as workers' compensation
acts and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, from gratuities, from social legislation such as social security
and welfare, and from pensions under special retirement acts. Those are the types of "benefits" the
Legislature focused on when enacting the collateral-source statute. That conclusion is apparent from the
statement of the Assembly Insurance Committee to the Senate Bill that produced the statute. Moreover,
certain language in the statute suggests strongly that the Legislature's essential concern was with insurance-type benefits; there is terminology in the statute that is foreign to tort settlements. (pp. 6-7)
3. In addition, the nonspecific nature of personal-injury settlement amounts render unreliable any
conclusion that the Legislature intended to include "settlements" in the meaning of the term "benefits" as
used in the collateral-source statute. (p. 7)
4. Most important is the effect of the Appellate Division's decision on one of the basic principles of
comparative negligence, namely, that responsibility for a plaintiff's claimed injury is to be apportioned
according to each party's relative degree of fault. That a one hundred percent liable defendant can end up
paying nothing violates that basic tenet. When enacting the collateral-source statute, the Legislature did not
intend to produce such a result. (pp. 7-9)
5. In this case, traditional rules of comparative negligence would call for Jacob's payment of $19,000:
one hundred percent of the jury verdict ($45,000) minus the $26,000 in PIP benefits already paid to Joszef
Kiss. (p. 9)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Law Division
for entry there of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and
STEIN join in JUSTICE CLIFFORD's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
47 September Term 1994
JOSZEF KISS and EDITH KISS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ZIV JACOB,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
ELIVIRA YAKOV, JOHN A. MAROLD,
MARIANNE M. WARNEBOLD, CARLOS A.
PALACIOS, NARENDRA N. PATEL and
JOSE AGABA,
Defendants.
Argued October 25, 1994 -- Decided December 14, 1994
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
268 N.J. Super. 235 (1993).
Michael A. Galpern argued the cause for
appellants (Greitzer and Locks, attorneys;
Mr. Galpern and James J. Pettit, on the
briefs).
John G. Tinker, Jr., argued the cause for
respondent (Leary, Bride, Tinker & Moran,
attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.
Plaintiffs' appeal challenges the Appellate Division's interpretation of the collateral-source statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97. The court below held that the statute allows a court to
reduce a plaintiff's verdict in a personal-injury case by the
amount paid by a settling defendant that a jury later determines
is not liable in any degree.
268 N.J. Super. 235 (1993). We
granted certification,
137 N.J. 165 (1994), and now reverse.
On January 13, 1988, plaintiff Joszef Kiss was the owner and
operator of an automobile that was involved in a chain-reaction
collision on Route 18, East Brunswick. The Kiss vehicle was
struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by defendant Ziv Jacob,
behind which were automobiles of defendants Warnebold and Marold,
also involved in the collision as were several vehicles ahead of
the Kiss automobile. Kiss and his wife, plaintiff Edith Kiss,
whose claim was for her per quod losses only, sued Jacob,
Warnebold, Marold, and the drivers of three vehicles ahead of the
Kiss automobile. Motions before trial resulted in summary
judgments in favor of Marold and the drivers ahead of Kiss,
leaving only Jacob and Warnebold as defendants.
Immediately prior to trial plaintiffs settled with Warnebold for $100,000, the limits of that defendant's personal-injury-liability coverage. The trial court bifurcated the trial. At the liability phase the jury determined that Warnebold, the settling defendant, had been negligent but that her negligence had not proximately caused plaintiff Joszef Kiss's injuries. The
jury found Jacob 100" at fault for the accident. At the damages
trial the jury returned a verdict in Joszef Kiss's favor for
$37,500 for lost earnings and $5,000 for his injuries. It
awarded plaintiff Edith Kiss $2500 on her per quod claim. The
total award therefore was $45,000.
On Jacob's application following trial, the court reduced
Joszef Kiss's lost-earnings award to $11,500 by deducting from
the $37,500 returned by the jury the sum of $26,000, representing
the amount that Kiss's own automobile insurer had paid in
personal-injury-protection (PIP) benefits for lost income. The
court further ruled that because Warnebold, who had been found
zero percent liable, was not a joint tortfeasor for purposes of
the collateral-source statute, the $100,000 that plaintiffs had
received in settlement with Warnebold should off-set Joszef
Kiss's personal-injury award of $5000 and Edith Kiss's per quod
recovery of $2500. The result was a reduction of Edith's verdict
to zero and of Joszef's award to $11,500.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court's application of the collateral-source statute, and defendant cross-appealed, contending that the statute required that plaintiffs' entire award be extinguished. The Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 applied to settlements received from settling parties that a jury determines are not liable. 268 N.J. Super. at 250. The court below thus determined that Jacob,
who by jury determination was 100" responsible for plaintiffs'
injuries and damages, did not have to pay any damages whatsoever
because Warnebold, whom the jury found to be not liable in any
degree, had already settled with plaintiffs for an amount that
exceeded plaintiffs' total award.
The Legislature's purpose in enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 was
to do away with the common-law collateral-source rule. That rule
permits a tort victim to retain collateral benefits -- that is,
benefits that do not come from a defendant -- in addition to any
amount that the victim might recover from that defendant. The
effect of the rule is to deny a wrongdoer the benefit of any
rights that the victim might have against other entities based on
contract, employment, or some other relation. Patusco v. Prince
Macaroni, Inc.,
50 N.J. 365, 368 (1967). The premise of the rule
is that "[i]t should not concern the tortfeasor that someone else
is obligated to aid his victim because of a duty assumed by
contract or imposed by law," ibid., and that "an injured party
may recover fully from a tortfeasor for personal injuries
notwithstanding that much of his loss was covered by contractual
arrangements, such as for example an accident or life insurance
policy." Theobold v. Angelos,
44 N.J. 228, 239 (1965).
In 1987 the Legislature enacted the following collateral-source rule:
In any civil action brought for personal
injury or death, except actions brought
pursuant to the provisions of P.L. 1972, c.
70 (C. 39:6A-1 et seq.) [the No-Fault law],
if a plaintiff receives or is entitled to
receive benefits for the injuries allegedly
incurred from any other source other than a
joint tortfeasor, the benefits, other than
workers' compensation benefits or the
proceeds from a life insurance policy, shall
be disclosed to the court and the amount
thereof which duplicates any benefit
contained in the award shall be deducted from
any award recovered by the plaintiff, less
any premium paid to an insurer directly by
the plaintiff or by any member of the
plaintiff's family on behalf of the plaintiff
for the policy period during which the
benefits are payable. Any party to the
action shall be permitted to introduce
evidence regarding any of the matters
described in this act.
The question before us is whether, as the Appellate Division held, "benefits" as used in the statute include the proceeds of a plaintiff's settlement with a defendant later found to bear no liability. We think not. Although the arguments of the parties and the Appellate Division's comprehensive treatment of the issue rest on long-standing principles of statutory construction and refer to the Legislature's treatment of "other than a joint tortfeasor" in other enactments, and to New York's treatment of its collateral-source rule, and to public-policy considerations, 268 N.J. Super. at 246-50 & n.5, we believe that the legislative history, the language of the statute, and the desirability of
coordinating the collateral-source statute with the Comparative
Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, overcome the force of
any contrary arguments.
We start by recalling that traditionally the types of
benefits contemplated by the common-law collateral-source rule
include those from life- or health-insurance policies, from
employment contracts, from statutes such as worker's compensation
acts and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, from gratuities,
from social legislation such as social security and welfare, and
from pensions under special retirement acts. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 920A comment c (1979). That those are the
types of "benefits" on which the Legislature focused in N.J.S.A.
2A:15-97, in an effort to control spiralling automobile-insurance
costs, is apparent from the statement of the Assembly Insurance
Committee to the Senate bill that produced the statute:
This bill is intended to prohibit duplicate
recovery by plaintiffs. Thus, if a plaintiff
received disability benefits, health
insurance benefits, unemployment
compensation, or other benefits after having
established an injury, the benefits would be
required to be deducted from the award.
* * * To the extent that the injured party
is being compensated for the same things from
different sources there is double recovery on
the part of the plaintiff. This bill, by
requiring that the benefits received from the
other sources be offset against the award, is
intended to effect cost containment.
(Nov. 23, 1987).]
The foregoing language suggests strongly that the
Legislature's essential concern was with insurance-type benefits.
The statute provides that when an award is reduced by the amount
of benefits that a plaintiff has received, that reduction should
be offset by "any premium paid to an insurer directly by the
plaintiff, or by any member of the plaintiff's family on behalf
of the plaintiff for the policy period for which benefits are
payable" -- terminology that is utterly foreign to tort
settlements.
In addition, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 addresses only those benefits
that "duplicate[] any benefit contained in the award."
Settlements of personal-injury claims are conventionally in the
form of lump-sum payments that are designed to ensure the
settling party's peace from prosecution ever after of the
plaintiff's claim, without reference to any break-down of that
claim into discrete elements of medical expense, lost income,
pain and suffering, permanent disability, and the like. The non-specific nature of a settlement amount renders unreliable any
conclusion that the Legislature intended to include "settlements"
in the meaning of the term "benefits" as used in the collateral-source statute.
Apart from the above, however, and of surpassing importance to our determination is the effect of the Appellate Division's decision on one of the basic principles of comparative
negligence, namely, that "responsibility for a plaintiff's
claimed injury is to be apportioned according to each party's
relative degree of fault." Blazovic v. Andrich,
124 N.J. 90, 107
(1991).
When an alleged tortfeasor settles before trial,
comparative-negligence rules would dictate the allocation of
relative responsibility of the remaining defendants. Under
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2, the trier of fact would determine not only
the full value of the personal-injury plaintiff's damages but
also the extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party's
causative negligence. Therefore, when a settling defendant is in
the picture, the factfinder must assess the negligence of that
defendant as well as of the non-settling defendant. "When one
defendant settles, the remaining codefendant or codefendants are
chargeable with the total verdict less that attributable to the
settling defendant's percentage share." Cartel Capital Corp. v.
Fireco of New Jersey,
81 N.J. 548, 569 (1980). The court in
Rogers v. Spady,
147 N.J. Super. 274, 278 (App. Div. 1977),
explained that
[t]he result of the Comparative Negligence
Law is that if plaintiff makes a particularly
good bargain in settlement and the ultimate
percentage of negligence found attributable
to the settling defendant would have resulted
in a judgment for less than the amount of
settlement, plaintiff will benefit by the
excess amount. * * * However, this is
offset by the potential for a greater loss to
plaintiff if he makes a low settlement.
Application of the principles of comparative negligence to
this case reveals the awkward effect of the Appellate Division's
holding. Had defendant Jacob been found ninety-nine percent
liable and Warnebold one percent liable, Jacob would have been
liable for $18,364.50 (99" of $45,000 minus the PIP benefits
received). Only the value of Warnebold's one percent liability,
or $185.50, would have been deducted from the total verdict.
However, under the Appellate Division's interpretation of the
collateral-source statute, when Jacob's liability rises to 100%,
he owes nothing because the total amount of settlement received
from Warnebold must be deducted from the verdict. That a 100" liable defendant can end up paying nothing violates comparative
negligence's basic tenet that "[e]ach tortfeasor is liable for
the same percentage of negligence found attributable to him."
Rogers, supra, 147 N.J. Super. at 277. We cannot believe that by
enacting the collateral-source statute, the Legislature intended
to produce such an avulsive change in our law.
The traditional rules of comparative negligence, as applied
to this case, would call for defendant's payment of $19,000:
100" of the jury verdicts, $45,000, minus the amount of PIP
benefits, $26,000, already paid to plaintiff Joszef Kiss. We do
not find offense to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97 in that result.
Judgment reversed. The cause is remanded to the Law
Division for entry there of judgment in accordance with this
opinion.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
NO. A-47 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOSZEF KISS and EDITH KISS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ZIV JACOB,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
ELIVIRA YAKOV, JOHN A. MAROLD,
MARIANNE M. WARNEBOLD, CARLOS A.
PALACIOS, NARENDRA N. PATEL and
JOSE AGABA,
Defendants.
DECIDED December 14, 1994
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Clifford
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY