SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-83-95T5
LARRY S. LOIGMAN, ESQ.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF MIDDLETOWN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP SUPERIOR
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________________________________
Argued: December 16, 1996 - Decided:
February 6, 1997
Before Judges Petrella, Wallace and
Kimmelman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County.
Bernard M. Reilly argued the cause for
appellant (Dowd & Reilly, attorneys; William
F. Dowd, on the brief).
Larry S. Loigman, respondent, argued pro se.
Sidney H. Lehmann argued the cause for
respondent Middletown Township Superior
Officers Association (Szaferman, Lakind,
Blumstein, Watter & Blader, attorneys; Mr.
Lehmann, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PETRELLA, P.J.A.D.
The principal issue on appeal is whether a resident and
taxpayer of a municipality has standing to bring an action to
enforce a collective negotiation agreement between a public
employer and a public employee union.See footnote 1 Stated differently, this
appeal tests the limits to taxpayer standing in this State and
whether a non-party to a labor agreement can intervene to enforce
an interpretation of a contract provision and require expenditure
of public funds thereunder.
Plaintiff Larry S. Loigman, a resident and taxpayer of the
Township of Middletown, instituted suit to enforce a collective
negotiation agreement between the Township of Middletown
(Township) and the Middletown Township Superior Officers
Association (SOA)See footnote 2 when the Township refused to implement a "Me
Too" pay differential or parity clause in the agreement. That
clause provides that each rank of superior officer would earn at
least 12.5" more than its immediately subordinate rank.
The Law Division Judge rejected the Township's argument that
Loigman had no standing to bring this suit and granted his motion
for summary judgment without requiring a showing of "specific
harm." In granting the motion, the judge refused to consider the
validity of the "Me Too" clause, noting that the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC) had primary jurisdiction.
However, his decision had the effect of implementing that clause
without ruling on its validity.See footnote 3 The judge also concluded that
the agreement remained in effect because neither party to it had
notified the other of its cancellation, as required by Article
XXIX of the agreement.
On appeal the Township challenges the judge's determination
that Loigman had standing to sue. It also argues that the judge
improperly determined that the collective negotiation agreement
between it and the SOA was still in effect; and erred in failing
to find the "Me Too" clause illegal and unenforceable.
We agree with the Law Division Judge that the agreement was
still in effect because no steps were ever taken to cancel it,
although we express concern about the very limited window of
opportunity for termination. The judge also correctly determined
that the validity of the "Me Too" provision of the agreement is
an issue in the first instance for PERC. However, we conclude
for the reasons hereinafter stated, that a taxpayer lacks
standing to enforce a public sector labor agreement, as opposed
to challenging any potential illegality of that agreement.
The Township adopted Ordinance 92-2314 in December 1992,
approving salaries, increments and fringe benefits for the SOA,
and incorporating the collective negotiation agreement for 1991
and 1992 between it and the Township. Article XXIII of this
agreement, "Salary" provided: "Effective January 1, 1991, every
SOA member will receive a base salary equal to the highest base
salary paid to his immediate subordinate rank plus a differential
of twelve-and-one-half (12 1/2) percent."See footnote 4
The agreement provided in Article XXIX, "Duration":
A. The term of this agreement shall be
from January 1, 1991 through December 31,
1992.
B. In the absence of written notice
given not more that [sic] one hundred eighty
(180) nor less than one hundred fifty (150)
days prior to the expiration date by either
party, this agreement shall automatically be
renewed for a period of another year, and
from year to year thereafter, until such time
as appropriate notice is given prior to the
annual expiration in accordance with the
terms of this article.
C. If, following receipt of such
notice, negotiations have not been completed
prior to termination date, this agreement may
be extended for an additional thirty (30)
days from its termination date, upon fifteen
(15) days notice in writing by either party
to the other.
D. In such event, however, and if an
extension is accepted, any changes made shall
be effective as of the expiration date. If
the parties fail to reach an agreement either
before the termination of the date the
extended period terminates, this agreement
shall terminate.
Loigman's complaint in lieu of prerogative writs named the
Township and the SOA as party defendants. According to his
complaint, no written notice of termination of the agreement was
ever given, and Ordinance 95-2402, adopted in April 1995, set
salaries, increments and fringe benefits for police officers
represented by the local Patrolmen's Benevolent Association
(PBA)See footnote 5 for 1993, 1994, and 1995. Despite the PBA's salaries
being set, superior officers did not receive the percentage
differential stated in the Township-SOA agreement, but continued
to be paid at 1992's annual rate.
The president of the SOA asserted in a certification filed
in support of the summary judgment motion, that the Township
refused to negotiate with the SOA until negotiations were
completed with the PBA. The unsuccessful negotiations between
the Township and the PBA resulted in interest arbitration and an
award in favor of the PBA. The PBA sought court confirmation of
the award and its members did not receive their 1993, 1994 and
1995 raises until after the Chancery Division confirmed the
award.See footnote 6
Although the Township admitted that it passed the ordinances
and assented to the collective negotiation agreement, it accused
Loigman and the SOA of seeking to obtain from the court what it
asserts they could not obtain from PERC .... enforcement of the
"Me Too" clause. Apparently, after Loigman filed suit the
Township's counsel for the first time researched the issue and
came to the opinion the clause was unenforceable. The Township
denied receiving any benefit from the parity clause, and argued
that estoppel should not be applied against a municipality.
Additionally, the Township contested Loigman's standing to bring
an action which interfered with labor negotiations and matters
properly before PERC, where Loigman could not assert a claim; and
also because some citizens might disagree with his position.
In connection with the Township's application for a stay of
the judgment and of the SOA's enforcement order, the judge
refrained from ruling on the merits of the pay differential
clause because he considered the issue not within his
jurisdiction, but rather that of PERC. He found, however, that
the employment contract had neither lapsed nor been rescinded and
ordered that the superior officers' retroactive raises be paid by
September 8. Although another part of this court denied the
Township's emergent application for a stay, on September 20 the
Supreme Court granted a partial stay, pending determination of
the appeal, of so much of the trial court's order that required
payment of the salary increases retroactive to July 10, 1995.
Meanwhile, on or about September 6, the Township filed an
unfair labor practice petition with PERC, asserting that the SOA
committed an unfair practice "[b]y ignoring its contractual
obligation to seek PERC's review of its position," and by using
"the ruse of the Loigman `citizens' lawsuit" to obtain a judicial
ruling. The Township requested that PERC declare the "Me Too"
clause illegal, and impose interim emergent relief preserving the
status quo. On September 8, PERC declined to hear the matter
because "the Superior Court has asserted jurisdiction over this
matter and therefore the Public Employment Relations Commission
is without jurisdiction."
New Jersey has a broad definition of standing when it comes to challenging governmental actions, and our courts are not confined by the "case or controversy" requirement under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 490 (1980). Moreover, our Rules of Court concerning prerogative writs, 4:69-1, et seq., reflect a commitment to allowing appropriate citizen challenge in lieu of the old common
law writs, e.g., mandamus, quo warranto, and certiorari.See footnote 7
Alexander's Dept. Stores of New Jersey v. Borough of Paramus,
125 N.J. 100, 107 (1991); In re LiVolsi,
85 N.J. 576, 594 (1981).
While this is so, the ability of taxpayers to challenge
governmental action is not unlimited. Taxpayers may not assert
the constitutional rights of another. In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10,
34 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922,
97 S. Ct. 319,
50 L. Ed.2d 289 (1976); N.J. State Chamber
of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Commission,
82 N.J. 57, 67 (1980); Matlack v. Burlington County Freeholder Board,
supra (191 N.J. Super. at 248-249). "[W]e will not render
advisory opinions or function in the abstract nor will we
entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are "mere intermeddlers
or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute." Crescent
Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Eq. Corp.,
58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971).
There must be a substantial likelihood the plaintiff will
experience some harm if the court returns an unfavorable
decision. N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law
Enforcement Comm'n, supra (82 N.J. at 67).
Generally, taxpayer intervention is appropriate where there
are claims of fraud or corruption, see Driscoll v. Burlington
Bridge Co.,
8 N.J. 433, 474-476, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838,
73 S. Ct. 25,
97 L. Ed.2d 652 (1952), or other instances of
illegalities and ultra vires acts. National Waste Recycling,
Inc. v. Middlesex Cty. Imp. Auth.,
291 N.J. Super. 283, 289 (App.
Div.) certif. granted,
146 N.J. 565 (1996); Matlack v. Burlington
Cty. Freeholder Bd.,
191 N.J. Super. 254 (Law Div. 1983), aff'd,
194 N.J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 1984); Koons v. Bd. of Com'rs of
Atlantic City,
134 N.J.L. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd,
135 N.J.L. 204 (E. & A. 1947). Also, in zoning matters, landowners are
permitted to seek review of local legislative or quasi-judicial
action without proof of unique financial detriment to them. See
Kozesnik v. Tp. of Montgomery,
24 N.J. 154, 177 (1957). Other
situations where taxpayers may challenge governmental action
involve claims of illegal bidding procedures. L. Pucillo & Sons,
Inc. v. Tp. of Belleville,
249 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
127 N.J. 551 (1991).
In addition, taxpayers have standing to challenge wrongful
expenditures by their governing body. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
9 N.J. 477, 484 (1952). In this setting, a taxpayer had standing
to challenge salary increases of public employees by challenging
the legitimacy of the referendum which authorized the increases.
Theurer v. Borrone,
81 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (Law Div. 1963). For
obvious reasons such is not the case where a taxpayer suit seeks
to compel expenditures of public funds. While permissible
taxpayer suits generally seek to prevent municipalities from
disbursing funds, Loigman who is not a party to the labor
contract, seeks to enforce a contractual provision and require
governmental expenditures. If individual taxpayers with multiple
competing interests were able to bring suit in such situations,
they could cripple the government's ability to function properly.
In addition, responsibility for labor relations matters is better
left in the first instance to PERC and not arrogated to the
medium of taxpayer suits.
In some public sector labor cases involving exercises of
"legislative or quasi-legislative power," union intervention on
behalf of teachers has been allowed to challenge a board of
education policy limiting employment of supplemental teachers to
two consecutive years. Ridgewood Education Ass'n v. Ridgewood
Board of Education,
284 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 1995).
Similarly, a challenge by a trade organization was allowed where
individuals or trade groups were affected by a local ordinance
relating to the sale of property. Ocean County Board of Realtors
v. Borough of Beachwood,
248 N.J. Super. 241 (Law Div. 1991). In
such cases the restrictions imposed by public entities were being
challenged as unlawful.
The concept of standing takes on a different light when
government entities and public employees are involved in labor
negotiations and disputes. There is little doubt that the SOA
could challenge the Township's interpretation of the agreement,
and that PERC would be the appropriate initial forum. See City
of Hackensack v. Winner,
82 N.J. 1 (1980). Indeed, L. 1968, c.
303, and its progeny, provide a discrete mechanism for public
entity labor negotiation situations. See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.1 et
seq., as amended.
There is scant discussion in our case law of taxpayer
standing with regard to public sector labor agreements. Judge
Richard Cohen in Woodbridge State School Parents' Ass'n v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
180 N.J. Super. 501 (Ch. Div. 1981), concluded in an incisive
decision, with which we agree, that a parents' association did
not have standing to intervene in a labor dispute between
employees at the Woodbridge State School and the governmental
entity responsible for the school's operation. The association
sought damages for two work stoppages, which were essentially
illegal because the employees were governmental employees who are
not permitted to strike. Id. at 503. Cf. Bd. of Ed. Voc. Sussex
v. Sussex Voc-Tec. Teachers,
170 N.J. Super. 426 (Ch. Div. 1979).
In denying standing to the plaintiffs in Woodbridge, Judge
Cohen in part relied on Allen v. Maurer,
6 Ill. App.3d 633,
286 N.E.2d 135 (App. Ct. 1972). There, as in Woodbridge State School
Parents' Ass'n, the court held that taxpayer-parents lacked
standing to enjoin strikes by teachers in order to secure
performance of the State's duty to maintain a public school
system. The Illinois Appeals Court recognized that the situation
before it was not a case of alleged misuse of public funds or
conveyance of public property, and denied standing because:
If standing were conferred upon parents of
school children in a case such as this, one
could conjure up a multitude of situations in
which the desires of a few individual parents
could conflict with the action of the School
Board. While we recognize that parents have
an abiding and a legitimate concern in the
outcome of a dispute such as the one
presented by this appeal, we do not feel that
the interest is the equivalent of, or bestows
legal standing to sue. [Id. at 140].
This reasoning is particularly apposite in the context of a
public sector labor dispute. So too is Judge Cohen's reasoning
in Woodbridge State School Parents' Ass'n v. AFSCME, supra, that
"the most impatient beneficiaries could take over management
responsibilities," if standing were granted. Id. at 505.
Indeed, the present case, involving as it does sensitive labor
negotiations between the public employer and its employees,
concerns management prerogatives of the executive "arm" of local
government. There is no overriding reason to allow a taxpayer to
usurp management responsibilities for the adoption and
implementation of a labor agreement between a public employer and
its employees or to supplant PERC or this State's public sector
labor laws.See footnote 8 Allowing a taxpayer to have standing to bring suit
would frustrate the legislative intent to have such matters
resolved by PERC.
Support for our conclusion that a taxpayer lacks standing
for what on the state or county government level would be the
equivalent of an executive branch responsibility and prerogative
to contract with public employees is found in Matlack v.
Burlington County Freeholder Board, supra (191 N.J. Super. at
248-249). In Matlack, certain taxpayers and residents of the
county were held not to have standing to challenge the purchase
price of Pinelands Development Credits as violative of due
process and just compensation rights. The taxpayers asserted no
special damages, were not potential sellers of credits, and were
deemed "mere interlopers" and strangers to any potential sale of
credits. Ibid.
Our research has not disclosed, and the parties have not
cited, precedent allowing intervention by a taxpayer who is not a
participant nor directly affected by the labor negotiations.See footnote 9
Nor does this case have the "slight additional private interest"
to afford standing to Loigman in such a situation. See Salorio
v. Glaser, supra, 82 N.J. at 491. Here the Township and the SOA
were attempting to negotiate a new contract when Loigman sought
enforcement of a provision under the previous contract. Under
these circumstances, there is no "great public interest" or
special or additional private interest to justify standing for
Loigman to pursue this action.
Finally, Loigman's filing of a complaint in lieu of
prerogative writs is a misapplication of the common law writ of
mandamus. Mandamus is a proper remedy: (1) to compel specific
action when the duty is ministerial and wholly free from doubt,
and (2) to compel the exercise of discretion, but not in a
specific manner. Switz v. Middletown Tp.,
23 N.J. 580 (1957);
Colon v. Tedesco,
125 N.J. Super. 446 (Law Div. 1973); Borough of
Eatontown v. Danskin,
121 N.J. Super. 68 (Law Div. 1972);
Edelstein v. Ferrell,
120 N.J. Super. 583 (Law Div. 1972).
Hence, a prerogative writ action in lieu of mandamus,
seeking an order compelling governmental action, would usually
not be appropriate unless there was a clear and undisputed
ministerial duty or general exercise of discretion involved.
Loigman's suit to compel the Township to exercise its discretion
in a specific manner with respect to a disputed provision of a
labor agreement does not fall within what had been the
prerogative writ of mandamus. Loigman not only lacks standing to
interfere in the Township-SOA labor contract, but his use of a
prerogative writ suit in such a manner is inappropriate.
Although our disposition of the standing issue is in a sense determinative, because of the nature and course of the proceedings below some additional comment is warranted. The Township contends that its agreement with the SOA was no longer in effect. The Township acknowledges that it never formally rescinded the agreement in accordance with Article XXIX, which requires written notice of termination between 180 and 150 days prior to its December 31 annual expiration date.See footnote 10 The Township maintains that its failure to repeal, revoke or modify the
agreement is a "thin procedural reed[]" because it and the SOA
treated the agreement as lapsed or rescinded by proceeding to
negotiate. It argues that if the agreement remained in effect,
there would be nothing to negotiate and that the SOA's failure to
seek enforcement of the parity clause until Loigman filed suit is
further evidence that the agreement was revoked or rescinded.
Despite these assertions, it is clear that the agreement
remained in effect because the Township failed to give any
written notice under the contract which recites that absent such
notice the "agreement shall automatically be renewed." Since no
written notice was given, the agreement was automatically
renewed.See footnote 11 Galloway Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Galloway Tp. Educ.
Ass'n,
78 N.J. 25 (1978) (requiring that the terms of the
agreement remain in effect even if expired).
Absent illegality, fraud or overriding public policy, courts
enforce a contract as written and do not write a better contract
for the parties. Kampf v. Franklin Ins. co.,
33 N.J. 36, 42
(1960); Temple v. Clinton Trust Co.,
1 N.J. 219, 225 (1948);
Karl's Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,
249 N.J.
Super. 487, 490-497 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
127 N.J. 548
(1991) (where terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous there
is no room for interpretation or construction and the courts
enforce those terms as written and do not fashion a better
contract for the parties than they themselves made).
The Township also contends that if the agreement remained in
effect, the Law Division Judge erred in failing to enforce
Article XXII, which requires binding arbitration for the
settlement of grievances. However, Loigman was not a party to
the agreement, and the Article XXII arbitration provision was not
applicable to him. This reinforces our determination that he
lacks standing to interfere in this labor dispute.
The Article XXIX termination provision requiring written notice between 180 and 150 days prior to the agreement's annual expiration date of December 31 deserves comment. This provision essentially means that termination notice can only be given in the preceding month of July before the contract's end or the opportunity to prevent the contract from renewing automatically is lost for the remainder of that year and until July of the next "contract" year. Thus, the contract continues for at least a year and five months after July 31, if no written notice is given.
In the context of an attorney's retainer agreement, the Supreme Court addressed a similar one-month termination provision and found it severely restricted a client's right to terminate a lawyer-client relationship. Under this type of arrangement, the lawyer could claim entitlement for an additional year's retainer fee even if he performed no work. See Cohen v. Radio-Electr. Officers Union, District 3, NMEBA, AFL-CIO, 146 N.J. 140 (1996).
Lawyer-client relationships exist in a similarly regulated
environment as do public employer-public employee relationships.
In the public sector, and considering public policy and
management prerogatives, restricting the termination opportunity
to one month out of the year, or perhaps even one day, is
problematic. It is one thing to say that a public entity has to
give notice of termination,See footnote 12 but quite another thing to say
that if it does not give it on a certain day or in a certain week
or month (and not before), the parties are bound for another
term. We merely highlight this issue and do not decide it.
The Township contends that the pay parity or "Me Too" clause in the collective negotiation agreement is illegal and void, and that the judge erred in taking jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The judge instructed the Township to ask PERC to determine the validity of the parity clause, but inappropriately retained primary jurisdiction by deciding the summary judgment motion. Cf. City of Hackensack v. Winner, supra (82 N.J. at 34-38). Thereafter, PERC declined jurisdiction over the Township's unfair practice petition because the Superior Court had assumed jurisdiction to rule on the matter, even though the Township, the
SOA and the judge agreed that PERC had primary jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the parity clause.See footnote 13
In Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of
Educ.,
78 N.J. 144 (1978), the Court asserted that when the
controversy "concerns the propriety of the parties negotiating
and agreeing on the item in dispute, [the trial judge] should
refrain from passing on the merits of the issue," because "PERC
has primary jurisdiction." Id. at 153-154. The judge did so
here, but then inappropriately went on to presume the validity of
the agreement. He should not have done so. Contrary to the
Township's assertion, the judge never determined that the pay
parity clause was valid; rather, he refrained from passing on the
merits of its validity due to PERC's primary jurisdiction.
Despite PERC's primary jurisdiction, the judge was perhaps
hampered in transferring the matter to PERC because Loigman was a
party in the case. Apparently, severance was not considered. In
In re Tp. of Middletown, 19 NJPER par. 24206 (1993), PERC
determined that plaintiff did not have standing to file an unfair
practice charge because he was not a "public employer, public
employee, public employee organization, or their representative,"
as required by N.J.A.C. 19:14-1.1. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(d)
similarly allows only public employers and majority
representatives to request scope-of-negotiation decisions. PERC
is not authorized to hear citizens' complaints. Clearly, this is
because a citizen has no standing in a public employer-public
employee dispute in a labor matter over which PERC has
jurisdiction.
The SOA argues that the Township waived its right to contest
the validity of the pay parity clause and contends that the
Township is estopped from raising this issue, since it received
the benefit of the objectionable clause for two and one-half
years, during which it did not pay any salary increments, and
refused to negotiate. The Township did not question the validity
of the pay parity clause until Loigman's suit was filed; failed
to seek PERC's review of the objectionable clause, despite the
judge's admonitions to do so until after the appeal was filed;
and did not appeal PERC's decision. Despite this, we reject the
estoppel argument. Estoppel should be sparingly applied against
public entities. O'Malley v. Dept. of Energy,
109 N.J. 309, 316
(1987). Since policy matters and the management prerogatives of
a governmental unit are involved, estoppel is inappropriate.
In view of our disposition of this appeal, there is no basis
for PERC to decline jurisdiction over a scope-of-negotiations
petition to determine the validity of the disputed pay parity
clause. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(d); Ridgefield Park, supra (78 N.J.
at 153-154). We decline at this point to consider the validity
of the "Me Too" clause pending PERC's consideration of that
issue.
Reversed and remanded to PERC for appropriate proceedings.
Footnote: 1See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 19, and N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3; see
also N.J. Turnpike Emp. Union v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.,
64 N.J. 579, 581 (1974) (distinguishing collective negotiation rights
reserved to public employees as opposed to "collective
bargaining" in the private arena).
Footnote: 2This union represented police officers of the rank of
sergeant and above.
Footnote: 3In rejecting the Township's arguments the judge said:
[I]t is this Court's finding that questions
regarding legality of the differential clause
must be first brought to the PERC for
resolution. Until such issue is brought
before PERC and a determination made upon the
legality of the differential clause, this
Court must assume it to be legal.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds
that members of the SOA are entitled to the
12 and a half percent differential as
bargained for in their contract. Such
contract is not expired as no notice has been
properly given by any party. And even if such
contract had expired, until a new contract
has been negotiated, the current terms
control.
Footnote: 4The Township refers to this provision as the "Me Too"
clause. We use that term merely as a matter of convenience.
Footnote: 5The Police Benevolent Association local chapter is the
union for the patrolmen in Middletown.
Footnote: 6We affirmed the Chancery Division's confirmation of the
interest arbitration award with respect to the PBA contract.
Police Benevolent Ass'n Local 124 v. Township of Middletown, No.
A-2688-94 (App. Div. April 25, 1996). As to interest
arbitration, see also Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Borough of
Hillsdale
137 N.J. 71 (1994) and Washington Tp. v. New Jersey
PBA, Local 206,
137 N.J. 88 (1994).
Footnote: 7Other writs include habeas corpus, reserved for criminal
matters; procedendo, remanding to inferior court; and
prohibition, removing jurisdiction from an inferior court.
Footnote: 8Judge Cohen commented in Woodbridge School Parents' Ass'n
v. AFSCME, supra (180 N.J. Super. at 506), that a taxpayer might
be able to seek mandamus in situations involving work stoppages
by public employees.
Footnote: 9Indeed, even union members do not necessarily have standing
where represented by a collective negotiation unit. N.J.
Turnpike Emp. Union v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.,
123 N.J. Super. 461,
467 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd,
64 N.J. 579 (1974).
Footnote: 10This provision purports to permit termination only by
notice in the month of July of the current contract year,
effective at the end of the contract term, unless briefly
extended per Article XXIX of the agreement.
Footnote: 11The SOA inappropriately relies on N.J.S.A. 34:13A-21.
Since no proceedings were sought before an arbitrator here, this
provision does not apply.
Footnote: 12It might be asked why notice of termination is needed at
all if the labor agreement is for a fixed term. Under Galloway,
supra, in the absence of a negotiated contract for a new term,
the old contract terms would essentially continue until
superseded.
Footnote: 13N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(d) provides: "The commission shall at
all times have the power and duty, upon the request of any public
employer or majority representative, to make a determination as
to whether a matter in dispute is within the scope of collective
negotiations."