(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal challenges the validity of regulations promulgated by the Department of Community
Affairs (DCA) pursuant to the Residential Site Improvement Standards Act, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 to 40.7
(the Act). Those regulations establish a uniform set of site improvement standards for residential
development.
In 1976, the Legislature enacted the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129.
The MLUL authorized municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances relating to the nature and extent of the
uses of land and of buildings and structures. Such ordinances may establish standards for the provision of
adequate physical improvements including, but not limited to, off-street parking and loading areas, marginal
access roads and roadways, other circulation facilities and water, sewerage and drainage facilities. N.J.S.A.
40:55D-65(d). The MLUL permits each municipality to adopt its own set of standards for physical
improvements. This has led to inconsistent requirements, and the lack of uniformity in site improvement
standards has adversely affected construction costs, and therefore housing costs, throughout the State.
The Legislature enacted the Act to facilitate the approval process for new residential developments.
The Act authorized the establishment of a uniform set of technical site improvement standards for streets,
roads, parking facilities, sidewalks, drainage structures, and utilities. The uniform standards were to
"supersede any such site improvement standards incorporated within the development ordinances of any
municipality." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5. Another provision of the Act, however, stated that "nothing contained in
[the Act] shall in any way limit the zoning power of any municipality." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6.
The Act established an Advisory Board (the Board) to prepare and submit to the Commissioner of
the DCA (the Commissioner) recommendations for statewide site improvement standards for residential
development. The Board was directed to adopt the recommendations contained in Article Six of the "Model
Subdivision and Site Plan Ordinance" (the Model Ordinance) prepared by The Center for Urban Policy
Research at Rutgers University. However, the Board was authorized to deviate from the Model Ordinance if
the modifications were supported by standards promulgated under similarly authoritative auspices.
The Board conducted an extensive review of the Model Ordinance and sought comments from
professional planners and engineers throughout the State. During its deliberations, the DCA requested
advice from the Attorney General's Office concerning the extent to which municipal zoning power limited the
DCA's authority to establish uniform standards. Noting that the primary purpose of the Act is to facilitate
residential development through the establishment of uniform standards, the Attorney General's Office
responded that the DCA's authority was not limited by municipal zoning power.
In January 1996, the Board submitted its recommended standards to the Commissioner. The
standards established requirements for streets and parking, water supply, sanitary sewers, and storm water
management. The majority of the standards are technical in nature, although some arguably have the
potential to affect the character or design of a municipality. Prior to the publication of the proposed
standards in the New Jersey Register, the Commissioner added a regulation requiring sidewalks in certain
residential facilities. The Commissioner determined that the provision was necessary after comments from
the Director of the Division of Highway Traffic Safety and others that it would reduce pedestrian fatalities.
The League of Municipalities, together with 157 other individual municipalities and other parties,
appealed from the promulgation of the regulations. Relying on the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6 that
nothing in the regulations "shall in any way limit" the zoning powers of municipalities, the League argued that
where a standard in the regulations conflicts with a requirement in a municipal zoning ordinance, the
ordinance supersedes the standard.
The Appellate Division held that the regulations were facially valid. In so holding, it found that
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6 was not violated because the Legislature had modified municipal zoning power through
the Act.
The Court granted the League's petition for certification.
HELD: The regulations promulgated by the DCA establishing a uniform set of site improvement standards
for residential development are facially valid.
1. Administrative regulations are accorded a presumption of validity. The scope of review of an
administrative regulation is highly circumscribed, and a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. Further, the Legislature's grant of express authority to an administrative agency is
deemed to include incidental authority necessary to effectuate fully the legislative intent. (pp. 13-15)
2. Although the Court has recognized that basic local zoning policy is best left to the individual
municipalities, municipalities have no inherent authority to zone. They have only that power that the
Legislature has delegated to them. N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2. (pp. 15-17)
3. The Court cannot accept the League's literal interpretation of the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6 that
nothing contained in the Act can in any way limit the zoning power of any municipality. That provision is
contradicted by another provision, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5, which provides that the uniform standards
"supersede" municipal zoning ordinances. Because this conflict creates an ambiguity about the scope of the
DCA's authority, the plain language of the statute does not end the inquiry. (pp. 17-18)
4. When one looks beyond the plain language of the statute, it is clear that the Legislature intended to
authorize the DCA to promulgate the regulations. The intent to establish uniform improvement standards is
explicitly stated in the Act. The Act also provides that, in the case of an inconsistency between the Model
Ordinance and the MLUL, the Board is to conform its recommendations to the Model Ordinance. N.J.S.A.
40:55D-40.4(a). (pp. 19-20)
5. Although the majority of the regulations involve technical details, some create the potential for tension
with matters of local zoning policy. If the application of a given standard to a specific development within a
municipality leads to a conflict with local zoning policy, the municipality may make an "as-applied" challenge
to the validity of that standard. The Court anticipates, however, that such challenges will be few. The DCA
must be accorded a certain degree of flexibility to further the Act's goal, and the exceptions that are available
in the regulations can diminish many potential conflicts. (pp. 20-21)
6. The League also asserts that the DCA impermissibly deviated from the Model Ordinance. Many of the
regulations challenged by the League are supported by the required authoritative sources. Those that are not
are insignificant, and such deviations are within the incidental powers granted to the DCA. Similarly, the
Court rejects the League's contention that the Commissioner lacked authority to add the sidewalk provision
to the standards. The Act authorizes the Commissioner to "veto any site improvement standard"
recommended by the Board. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.4(b). The League therefore argues that the Commissioner
was authorized only to veto standards, not to supplement them. The Court rejects the League's narrow
interpretation that the term "veto" means the power only to delete a standard. (pp. 21-24)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
199 September Term 1997
NEW JERSEY STATE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES; an organization of
municipalities; BOROUGH OF ELMER, a
municipal corporation; TOWNSHIP OF
PLAINSBORO, a municipal
corporation; CITY OF PATERSON, a
municipal corporation; GEORGE
FERENSICK, an individual; ABSECON
CITY; ALLOWAY TOWNSHIP; BERKELEY
HEIGHTS TOWNSHIP; BERLIN BOROUGH;
BERNARDS TOWNSHIP; BERNARDSVILLE
BOROUGH; BOGOTA BOROUGH; BOONTON
TOWN; BRANCHBURG TOWNSHIP; BUENA
VISTA TOWNSHIP; BURLINGTON CITY;
CALIFON BOROUGH; CAPE MAY POINT
BOROUGH; CHATHAM BOROUGH; CHESTER
TOWNSHIP; CLINTON TOWNSHIP; CLOSTER
BOROUGH; COLLINGSWOOD BOROUGH;
COLTS NECK TOWNSHIP; CRANBURY
TOWNSHIP; DELAWARE TOWNSHIP; DUMONT
BOROUGH; EAST BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP;
EASTAMPTON TOWNSHIP; ELSINBORO
TOWNSHIP; EMERSON BOROUGH;
ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS BOROUGH; ESSEX
FELLS BOROUGH; EVESHAM TOWNSHIP;
FAIR LAWN BOROUGH; FAIRFIELD
TOWNSHIP; FARMINGDALE BOROUGH;
FLORHAM PARK BOROUGH; FRANKLIN
TOWNSHIP (Hunterdon County);
FREEHOLD TOWNSHIP; FRELINGHUYSEN
TOWNSHIP; FRENCHTOWN BOROUGH;
GIBBSBORO BOROUGH; GREEN BROOK
TOWNSHIP; HACKENSACK CITY; HADDON
TOWNSHIP; HADDONFIELD BOROUGH;
HALEDON BOROUGH; HAMBURG BOROUGH;
HAMILTON TOWNSHIP (Atlantic
County); HAMILTON TOWNSHIP (Mercer
County); HAMPTON TOWNSHIP; HARDING
TOWNSHIP; HARDYSTON TOWNSHIP;
HAZLET TOWNSHIP; HIGHLAND PARK
BOROUGH; HILLSDALE BOROUGH;
HOPATCONG BOROUGH; KEYPORT BOROUGH;
LAFAYETTE TOWNSHIP; LAVALLETTE
BOROUGH; LAWRENCE TOWNSHIP
(Cumberland County); LAWRENCE
TOWNSHIP (Mercer County); LEBANON
BOROUGH; LINCOLN PARK BOROUGH;
LITTLE EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP; LITTLE
SILVER BOROUGH; LIVINGSTON
TOWNSHIP; LODI BOROUGH; LONG BRANCH
CITY; LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK
TOWNSHIP; LUMBERTON TOWNSHIP;
MAHWAH TOWNSHIP; MANALAPAN
TOWNSHIP; MANASQUAN BOROUGH;
MANCHESTER TOWNSHIP; MANNINGTON
TOWNSHIP; MIDDLESEX BOROUGH;
MILLBURN TOWNSHIP; MILLSTONE
TOWNSHIP; MILLVILLE CITY; MONTVALE
BOROUGH; MONTVILLE TOWNSHIP;
MOORESTOWN TOWNSHIP; MOUNT OLIVE
TOWNSHIP; NEPTUNE TOWNSHIP; NEW
PROVIDENCE BOROUGH; NEWTON TOWN;
NORTH BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP; NORTH
CALDWELL BOROUGH; NORTH HALEDON
BOROUGH; NORTH HANOVER TOWNSHIP;
OAKLAND BOROUGH (Bergen County);
OGDENSBURG BOROUGH; OLD BRIDGE
TOWNSHIP; OLD TAPPAN BOROUGH;
OLDMANS TOWNSHIP; ORADELL BOROUGH;
PARK RIDGE BOROUGH; PARSIPPANY-TROY
HILLS TOWNSHIP; PAULSBORO BOROUGH;
PENNS GROVE BOROUGH; PENNSVILLE
TOWNSHIP; PILESGROVE TOWNSHIP; PINE
HILL TOWNSHIP; PITTSGROVE TOWNSHIP;
PLUMSTED TOWNSHIP; QUINTON
TOWNSHIP; RAMSEY BOROUGH; RANDOLPH
TOWNSHIP; READINGTON TOWNSHIP; RED
BANK BOROUGH; RIDGEFIELD PARK
VILLAGE; RIDGEWOOD VILLAGE; RIVER
VALE TOWNSHIP; RIVERDALE BOROUGH;
ROOSEVELT BOROUGH; ROSELAND
BOROUGH; SADDLE RIVER BOROUGH;
SALEM CITY; SAYREVILLE BOROUGH;
SCOTCH PLAINS TOWNSHIP; SEA BRIGHT
BOROUGH; SHREWSBURY BOROUGH; SOUTH
BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP; SOUTH
PLAINFIELD BOROUGH; SOUTH RIVER
BOROUGH; STAFFORD TOWNSHIP; STONE
HARBOR BOROUGH; SUMMIT CITY;
TEANECK TOWNSHIP; TENAFLY BOROUGH;
UPPER FREEHOLD TOWNSHIP; UPPER
PITTSGROVE TOWNSHIP; UPPER SADDLE
RIVER BOROUGH; UPPER TOWNSHIP;
VOORHEES TOWNSHIP; WALL TOWNSHIP;
WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP (Bergen
County); WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP
(Gloucester County); WASHINGTON
TOWNSHIP (Mercer County); WATCHUNG
BOROUGH; WAYNE TOWNSHIP; WEST
AMWELL TOWNSHIP; WEST CALDWELL
TOWNSHIP; WEST LONG BRANCH BOROUGH;
WEST WINDSOR TOWNSHIP; WESTAMPTON
TOWNSHIP; WESTFIELD TOWN; WESTWOOD
BOROUGH; WILDWOOD CITY; WILDWOOD
CREST BOROUGH; WOODCLIFF LAKE
BOROUGH; WOOD-RIDGE BOROUGH;
WOODSTOWN BOROUGH; WYCKOFF
TOWNSHIP; ASSOCIATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITIES;
MUNICIPAL CLERKS ASSOCIATION OF NEW
JERSEY, INC.; NEW JERSEY PLANNING
OFFICIALS, INC; NEW JERSEY
INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL ATTORNEYS;
NEW JERSEY MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION and NEW JERSEY SOCIETY
OF MUNICIPAL ENGINEERS, INC.,
Appellants-Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
and JANE M. KENNY, Commissioner,
Respondents-Respondents.
Argued January 20, 1999 -- Decided May 13, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
310 N.J. Super. 224 (1998).
Stuart R. Koenig argued the cause for
appellants (Stickel, Koenig & Sullivan,
attorneys).
Keith A. Costill, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondents (Peter
Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel).
Thomas F. Carroll, III, argued the cause for
amicus curiae, New Jersey Builders
Association (Hill Wallack, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
This appeal presents a challenge to the validity of
regulations promulgated by the Department of Community Affairs
(DCA) pursuant to the Residential Site Improvement Standards Act,
N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 to -40.7. Those regulations establish a
uniform set of site improvement standards for residential
development. The primary issue before us is whether the
standards impermissibly limit the zoning power of New Jersey's
municipalities. We also consider the ancillary issue of whether
the DCA and the DCA Commissioner exceeded their delegated
authority in adopting certain portions of the regulations.
In 1976, the Legislature enacted the Municipal Land Use Law
(MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129. The MLUL was intended, in
part, [t]o encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate
use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which
will promote the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare and [t]o ensure that the development of individual
municipalities does not conflict with the development and general
welfare of neighboring municipalities, the county and the State
as a whole. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a), -2(d).
The MLUL authorizes municipalities to adopt zoning
ordinances relating to the nature and extent of the uses of land
and of buildings and structures thereon. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a).
Pursuant to the MLUL, such ordinances may
[e]stablish, for particular uses or classes of
uses, . . . standards for the provision of
adequate physical improvements including, but
not limited to, off-street parking and loading
areas, marginal access roads and roadways,
other circulation facilities and water,
sewerage and drainage facilities. . . .
Under the MLUL, each municipality is permitted to adopt its
own set of standards for physical improvements. As a result,
developers that build projects in more than one municipality
often encounter inconsistent requirements. See John M. Kerekes,
Housing Made Easy: New Jersey's Uniform Site Improvements
Standards Act of 1993, 21 Seton Hall Legis. J. 11, 12 (1997)
(observing that curb height standards differ by as much as fifty
percent between contiguous municipalities). The lack of
uniformity among the various municipalities' site improvement
standards has adversely affected construction costs, and
therefore housing costs, throughout the state. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.2a, -40.2b.
Recognizing that [t]he multiplicity of standards for
subdivisions and site improvements . . . increases the costs of
housing without commensurate gains in the protection of the
public health and safety, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.2(a), the
Legislature sought to reduce housing costs by facilitating the
approval process for new residential developments. N.J.S.A.
40:55D-40.2(e). To advance that goal, in January 1993 the
Legislature enacted the Site Improvement Standards Act (Act), L.
1993, c. 32, codified at N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1 to -40.7. In a
statement accompanying the signing of the Act, Governor Florio
noted that the legislation would cut industry costs by promoting
standardization of construction materials and design without
limit[ing] municipal zoning powers. Office of the Governor,
News Release at 1 (Jan. 29, 1993). The Act authorized the
establishment of a uniform set of technical site improvement
standards for streets, roads, parking facilities, sidewalks,
drainage structures, and utilities. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.1. The
uniform standards were to supersede any such site improvement
standards incorporated within the development ordinances of any
municipality. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.5.
Although the Legislature intended to create uniform
technical requirements for residential development, N.J.S.A.
40:55D-40.2(f), it recognized that the policymaking aspects of
development review are best separated from the making of
technical determinations, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.2(g). Consistent
with that recognition, the Legislature amended an earlier
proposed draft of the Act to remove language that would have
authorized the establishment of uniform design standards in
addition to the site improvement standards. That amendment also
added a provision to the final version of the Act stating that
nothing contained in [the Act] shall in any way limit the zoning
power of any municipality. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6.
The Act established an Advisory Board (Board) to prepare and
submit to the Commissioner of the DCA (Commissioner)
recommendations for statewide site improvement standards for
residential development. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.3, -40.4. The Board
was directed to adopt the recommendations contained in Article
Six of the Model Subdivision and Site Plan Ordinance (Model
Ordinance) prepared by The Center for Urban Policy Research at
Rutgers University. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.4(a). However, the Board
was authorized to deviate from the Model Ordinance if the
modifications were supported by standards promulgated under
similarly authoritative auspices of any academic or professional
institution or organization. Ibid.
The Board conducted an extensive review of the Model
Ordinance and sought comments from professional planners and
engineers throughout the state. Subcommittees were formed to
evaluate more thoroughly specific topics addressed by the Model
Ordinance. During the Board's deliberations, the DCA requested
advice from the Attorney General's office concerning the extent
to which municipal zoning power limited the DCA's authority to
establish uniform site improvement standards. Noting that the
primary purpose of the Act is to facilitate residential
development through the establishment of uniform standards, the
Attorney General's office responded that the DCA's authority to
promulgate such standards was not limited by municipal zoning
power.
In January 1996, following approximately two and one-half
years of deliberations, the Board submitted its recommended
standards to the Commissioner. The standards established
requirements for streets and parking (N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.1 to
-4.20), water supply (N.J.A.C. 5:21-5.1 to -5.4), sanitary sewers
(N.J.A.C. 5:21-6.1 to -6.2), and stormwater management (N.J.A.C.
5:21-7.1 to -7.6). Although the majority of the proposed
standards were adopted directly from the Model Ordinance, the
Board modified some of the standards contained in the Model
Ordinance and added others not contained in the Model Ordinance.
The majority of the standards are technical in nature. See,
e.g., N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.18(a)(1) (thickness of concrete sidewalks);
N.J.A.C. 5:21-5.3(h) (pipe size of water mains); N.J.A.C. 5:21-6.2(c)(9) (composition of manholes); N.J.A.C. 5:21-7.5(f)
(structural criteria for stormwater detention basins). Some,
however, arguably have the potential to affect the character or
design of a municipality. See, e.g., N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.2 (street
width); N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.14 (number of parking spaces required per
bedroom).
The regulations contain limited exceptions to the uniform
standards. First, de minimis deviations from the standards may
be granted if the literal enforcement of one or more provisions
of the standards is impracticable or will exact undue hardship
because of peculiar conditions pertaining to the development in
question. N.J.A.C. 5:21-3.1(a). Examples of de minimis
exceptions include authorization to reduce the minimum number of
parking spaces and the minimum size of parking stalls. N.J.A.C.
5:21-3.1(f). A second exception permits a municipality or a
developer to seek a waiver if adherence to a given standard would
pose a danger to public health and safety. N.J.A.C. 5:21-3.2(b). Third, the regulations permit a municipality to
establish special area standards that differ from the uniform
standards. N.J.A.C. 5:21-3.5(a). Special area standards are
intended to apply to sections of a municipality that exhibit a
distinctive character or environmental feature that the
municipality . . . [has] expressed a desire to preserve and
enhance, such as historic districts or rural preservation
areas.See footnote 1 N.J.A.C. 5:21-3.5(b). Finally, a developer and a
municipality may agree to exceed the uniform standards. N.J.A.C.
5:21-3.6.
Prior to the publication of the proposed standards in the
New Jersey Register, the Commissioner added a regulation
requiring sidewalks in certain residential developments located
near schools or recreational facilities. N.J.A.C. 5:21-4.5(b).
The Commissioner determined that the sidewalk provision was
necessary after receiving comments from the Director of the New
Jersey Division of Highway Traffic Safety and others that such a
requirement would reduce pedestrian fatalities. The sidewalk
provision was based on a standard promulgated in a treatise by
the United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration. In adding the sidewalk requirement, the
Commissioner relied on her authority under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.4(b), which provides that the Commissioner
shall promulgate the recommendations of the
board with regard to statewide site improvement
standards without making a change in any
recommended standard unless, in the
commissioner's judgment, a standard would . . .
result in a danger to the public health or
safety. The commissioner may veto any site
improvement standard on the abovementioned
grounds; however, any veto of the commissioner
may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the
board.
Following two hearings and a period for public comment, the
proposed standards, including the sidewalk requirement, were
adopted and became effective on June 3, 1997.
Pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a), the League of Municipalities,
together with 157 individual municipalities and other parties
(collectively League), appealed from the promulgation of the
regulations. Because the municipal zoning power, as delineated
by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-65(d), includes the right to adopt standards
for off-street parking, roads, and water and sewer facilities,
the League contended that the DCA exceeded its authority when it
promulgated regulations governing those aspects of residential
development. Relying on the language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6
that nothing in the regulations shall in any way limit the
zoning powers of the municipalities, the League argued that where
a standard contained in the regulations conflicts with a
requirement in a municipal zoning ordinance, the ordinance
supersedes the uniform standard.
The Appellate Division held that the regulations were
facially valid. League of Municipalities v. Department of
Community Affairs,
310 N.J. Super. 224, 228 (App. Div. 1998). In
so holding, the court found that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-40.6 was not
violated because the Legislature has modified but not limited
municipal zoning power. Id. at 236. Additionally, the
Appellate Division concluded that the Board's modifications of
the Model Ordinance were within its incidental powers. No issue
is raised before us concerning the provisions of the regulations
that the Appellate Division invalidated, N.J.A.C. 5:21-7.1 to
-7.6. We granted the League's petition for certification.
156 N.J. 328 (1998).
Thus, while our Constitution authorizes legislative delegation of
the zoning power to municipalities, it reserves the legislative
right to repeal or modify that delegation.
We turn now to the primary issue in this appeal: whether
the DCA exceeded its authority when it promulgated the uniform
site improvement standards. Our inquiry concerning the scope of
the DCA's authority begins with the terms of the Act. When
construing a statute, courts initially consider the statute's
plain meaning. National Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex
County Improvement Auth.,
150 N.J. 209, 223 (1997). If the plain
language of a statute creates uncertainties or ambiguities, a
reviewing court must examine the legislative intent underlying
the statute and construe the statute in a way that will best
effectuate [that] intent. Ibid. (quoting State v. Szemple,
135 N.J. 406, 422 (1994)). The general legislative intent influences
the interpretation of a statute's component parts. Ibid. To
that end, courts must read statutes sensibly rather than
literally. Roig v. Kelsey,
135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994) (quoting
Schierstead v. City of Brigantine,
29 N.J. 220, 230 (1959)).
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion.
NO. A-199 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
NEW JERSEY STATE LEAGUE
OF MUNICIPALITIES; etc, et al.,
Appellants-Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
and JANE M. KENNY, Commissioner,
Respondents-Respondents.
DECIDED May 13, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Stein
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1 Amicus curiae New Jersey Builders Association contends that the special area exception is contrary to the Act's central purpose of uniformity. Because the parties did not raise that issue directly, it is not before us and we decline to address it.