(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 30, 1995 -- Decided May 23, 1995
COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue before the Court is whether the Appellate Division was compelled by the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution to exercise original jurisdiction over Laura Maisonet's claim for
attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C.A.
§1988 (section
1988), for an alleged violation of
42 U.S.C.A.
§1983 (section 1983) based on the State's administration of a
federally funded food-stamp program.
On August 15, 1990, Maisonet applied for participation in the Food Stamp Program, which is
authorized by Congress, regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and run by State welfare
agencies pursuant to State regulations based on federal laws. Maisonet stated in her application that the rent
for her apartment was $400 per month. She did not mention that from August 1990 through July 1991, her
cash payment for rent was $150 per month. The $250 reduction in rent was in exchange for her performance
of janitorial services for her landlord. Maisonet failed to report that compensation as income. After finding
out that Maisonet had not reported the rent savings as income, Passaic County Board of Social Services
(PCBSS) instituted an administrative disqualification hearing before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
pursuant to regulation. PCBSS charged Maisonet with an intentional program violation, resulting in an
overpayment of food stamps in the amount of $732.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), relying exclusively on New Jersey regulations, found that
Maisonet was required to report the rental income to PCBSS and that her failure to do so was intentional.
Based on those findings, the ALJ disqualified Maisonet, pursuant to regulation, from the Food Stamp
Program for six months. The Director of the Division of Family Development rejected the ALJ's finding of
an intentional program violation, but accepted the ALJ's conclusion that the $250 monthly rental allowance
should be treated as income.
Maisonet appealed the Director's final decision to the Appellate Division. Her claim of a section
1983 violation, made solely to collect attorney's fees under section 1988, was asserted for the first time in her
notice of appeal. The Appellate Division held that certain federal statutes and regulations should be
interpreted to exclude employer reductions in rent and that New Jersey regulations require the same result.
The court, however, refused to exercise original jurisdiction over Maisonet's claim for attorney's fees
pursuant to section 1988 for an alleged violation of section 1983.
The Supreme Court granted certification to review the propriety of the Appellate Division declining
to exercise original jurisdiction.
HELD: The failure of the Appellate Division to exercise original jurisdiction and hear Maisonet's federal fee
claim does not violate the Supremacy Clause. The only state court required by the Supremacy
Clause to hear a federal fee claim is the Law Division.
1. Whenever an action is brought in state court to enforce federal rights or claims, the Supremacy Clause requires that federal substantive law and policy be applied by the state court. State rules of procedure and
practice ordinarily control how such claims are processed. However, there are no rules of procedure in New
Jersey controlling the handling of a claim for section 1988 attorney's fees arising out of proceedings before a
state administrative agency. Therefore, the Court establishes such a procedure in this opinion. (pp. 7-8)
2. When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the
courts, the Supremacy Clause does not compel a state court to exercise its jurisdiction over federal claims.
The Appellate Division articulated valid, neutral reasons for declining to exercise original jurisdiction over
the federal claims. This case does not fall within either of the two categories in which original jurisdiction
has previously been exercised: 1) to complete the determination of issues raised but not decided in trial
court; and 2) to provide emergent relief in a matter implicating public interest. (pp. 8-11)
3. When civil-rights claims are alleged for the first time in the notice of appeal, if the Appellate Division
decided to resolve the claim, that court would be transformed into a trial court because the attorney's fee
request raises legal issues collateral to the main cause of action. (pp. 11-13)
4. As a matter of policy, a review of a final administrative decision of a State agency by the Appellate
Division ordinarily should be limited to review of the decision of the agency. Thus, if an aggrieved party in
an administrative matter elects not to file a complaint in State court alleging violation of sections 1988 and
1983, but instead raises federal claims in a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, unless the Appellate Division
decides to exercise original jurisdiction, the following procedure should be followed: 1) the notice of appeal
or cross-appeal shall be deemed a complaint and shall toll the running of any statute of limitations; 2) venue
shall be in the county in which the cause of action arose; 3) the Appellate Division shall transfer the federal
claims to the Law Division in the county in which the cause of action arose; 4) Rule 4:9-1 shall control
amendments to the special complaint carved out of the notice of appeal or cross-appeal after the transfer;
and 5) the Law Division, by virtue of the transfer, shall have the power to award section 1988 attorney's fees
for services rendered in the Appellate Division if found to be appropriate. (pp. 14-17)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, and
STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
86 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
LAURA MAISONET,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
FAMILY DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued January 30, 1995 -- Decided May 23, 1995
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
274 N.J. Super. 228 (1994).
Madeline L. Houston argued the cause for
appellant (John D. Atlas, Executive Director,
Passaic County Legal Aid Society, attorney;
Ms. Houston and Cary L. Winslow, on the
briefs).
Peter D. Wint, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Deborah T.
Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel).
Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus
curiae The American Civil Liberties Union of
New Jersey (Crummy, Del Deo, Dolan,
Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Mr.
Romberg and Lawrence S. Lustberg, on the
brief).
Joseph Harris David submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae Legal Services of New
Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President,
attorney; Mr. David and Mr. Miller, on the
brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
The novel issue raised in this appeal is whether the
Appellate Division was compelled by the Supremacy Clause to
exercise original jurisdiction over Laura Maisonet's claim for
attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ l988 (section 1988), for an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C.A.
§ l983 (section 1983) based on the State's administration of a
federally funded food-stamp program. The Appellate Division
declined to exercise original jurisdiction.
274 N.J. Super. 228
(1994). We now affirm and establish guidelines for handling
federal fee claims raised for the first time in the Appellate
Division.
On August 15, 1990, Maisonet applied for participation in the Food Stamp Program (FSP), designed "to supplement the purchasing power of low-income households." 274 N.J. Super. at 232. The FSP is "authorized by the U.S. Congress and regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)." N.J.A.C. 10:87-1.2(a). "In New Jersey, the county welfare agencies . . . are responsible for certifying eligible households," ibid., although "the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring that program operations conform with Federal laws and USDA regulations." N.J.A.C. 10:87-1.2(b). The "[p]olicies and procedures for the
administration of the program are derived from the Food Stamp Act
of l977 (
7 U.S.C. 2011-2029) and current USDA, Food and Nutrition
Service . . . regulations and instructions (which are uniform
nationwide)." N.J.A.C. 10:87-1.3.
Maisonet stated in her application that the rent for her
apartment was $400 per month. She did not indicate, however,
that from August l990 through July l99l, her cash payment for her
apartment was $150 per month. That $250 monthly reduction in
rent was in exchange for her performance of janitorial services
for her landlord, but that compensation was not reported as
income. After the Passaic County Board of Social Services
(PCBSS) had become aware of Maisonet's failure to report the rent
savings as income, it instituted an administrative
disqualification hearing in the Office of Administrative Law
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:87-11.1 to -11.33. PCBSS charged
Maisonet with an intentional program violation pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 10:87-11.5(a)1 and 2 for failing to report receipt of
earned income, which had resulted in an overpayment of food
stamps in the amount of $732.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presided over the
hearing relied exclusively on New Jersey regulations and
concluded that the "rental allowance" provided to Maisonet was
"not essentially different from . . . being given cash or a
check." He found Maisonet was required to report that income to
PCBSS the same as any other earned income. The ALJ also
concluded that Maisonet had intentionally concealed this
information and, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10:87-11.1(a), disqualified
her from participation in the FSP for six months. The Director
of the Division of Family Development rejected the ALJ's finding
of an intentional program violation, but accepted the ALJ's
conclusion that the $250 monthly rental allowance should be
treated as income. Maisonet appealed the Director's final
decision. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
The claim of a
42 U.S.C.A.
§1983 violation, made solely to
collect attorney's fees under
42 U.S.C.A.
§1988, was asserted
for the first time in the notice of appeal. The claim was stated
as follows:
Appellant Maisonet maintains this overpayment
assessment is contrary to 7 C.F.R.
[§]273.9(c). She seeks from this court
reversal of respondent Reitz's final decision
holding her liable for any overpayment, the
enjoining of respondents from further
recoupment of this amount from appellant
Maisonet's monthly food stamp allotments, and
the restoration of food stamps withheld under
respondent Reitz's final decision.
This action is brought under authority of R.
2:2-3(a)(2) and
42 U.S.C.A.
§1983. At all
relevant times respondent Reitz has acted
under color of state law. Attorney['s] fees
and costs are authorized pursuant to
42 U.S.C.A.
§1988 and R. 4:42-9(a)(8).
Maisonet did not file any pleadings at the administrative level apparently because the pertinent regulations do not require pleadings. See N.J.A.C. 1:1-6.1(a) (stating "[s]pecific pleading requirements are governed by the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over the case"); N.J.A.C. 10:87-11.1 (establishing procedure for administrative disqualification hearings that does
not include filing of pleadings). In any event, the federal
claims could not have been decided in the administrative
proceedings. See Paterson Redevelopment Agency v. Schulman,
78 N.J. 378, 386-88, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 900,
100 S. Ct. 210,
62 L. Ed.2d 136 (l979).
The Appellate Division held that because
7 U.S.C.A.
§2014(d) and 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(1)(iv)(A) exclude from income
housing provided by an employer, those regulations should also be
interpreted to exclude employer reductions in rent. Maisonet,
supra, 274 N.J. Super. at 234-35. Thus, the value of housing,
whether public or employer provided, should be afforded identical
treatment. Id. at 234. The same reasoning was applied to
employee-discounted housing. Id. at 235. The Appellate Division
also found that N.J.A.C. 10:87-5.9(a)2v(2)(A) requires the same
result because it is consistent with the federal regulations.
Id. at 234.
The Appellate Division, however, refused to exercise
original jurisdiction over the claim for attorney's fees pursuant
to section 1988 for an alleged violation of section 1983. In
declining to exercise original jurisdiction, the court stated
that "[w]e do not tarry long with appellant's attempt to convert
an appeal from an administrative determination into a § 1983 and
§ 1988 action at the appellate level. To do so would require us
to exercise our original jurisdiction pursuant to R. 2:10-5. We
see no basis for doing so here." 274 N.J. Super. at 231.
We granted Maisonet's petition for certification to review
the propriety of the Appellate Division declining to exercise
original jurisdiction.
138 N.J. 265 (1994).
Maisonet contends that because she could not raise her sections 1983 and 1988 claims at the administrative level for lack of jurisdiction, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution compelled the Appellate Division to exercise original jurisdiction over the fee claim. Amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, asserts that "a state court overturning an agency decision in an administrative appeal is forbidden by the Supremacy Clause from declining to reach the merits of a federal statutory claim brought in the same action under § 1983 or . . . § 1988." The Division of Family Development makes three responses. First, it asserts that "the mere filing of a notice of appeal from a decision of a state agency does not give rise to a federal civil rights cause of action" where the agency based its decision on state regulations exclusively. Second, it argues that Maisonet should have commenced a separate law suit in the Law Division or in the federal district court alleging sections l983 and l988 causes of action. Third, it contends that a decision overturning plaintiff's food-stamp disqualification does not automatically entitle her to section 1988 attorney's fees.
We first address the threshold issue whether, and in what circumstances, a state court may be required to entertain sections l983 and l988 claims pendent to state-law claims.
A section l983 action may be brought in state court, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7, 100 S. Ct. 553, 558 n.7, 62 L. Ed.2d 481, 488 n.7 (l980), and the section l988 "fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2508, 65 L. Ed.2d 555, 563 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, has reserved the question whether state courts are obligated to entertain section 1983 actions. Id. at 3 n.1, 100 S. Ct. at 2503 n.1, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 558 n.1. New Jersey courts have entertained section 1983 actions for many years. See Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 131-32 (App. Div. 1976).
Whenever an action is brought in a state court to enforce federal rights or claims, the Supremacy Clause requires that federal substantive law and policy be applied by the state court. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor & Council of Carteret, 115 N.J. 536, 552 n.3 (l989). The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, "provides that laws made in pursuance of federal constitutional authority become the `supreme law of the land.'" Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 125 N.J. 455, 464 (1991).
If claims are brought in state courts, state rules of
procedure and practice ordinarily control how the claims are
processed. Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131, 138,
108 S. Ct. 2302,
2306,
101 L. Ed.2d 123, 137 (1988). The rationale for the rule
is that the federal courts are always available to hear federal
claims. Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala.,
338 U.S. 294, 300,
70 S.
Ct. 105, 108,
94 L. Ed. 100, 104 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). There are no rules of procedure in place in New
Jersey controlling the handling of a claim for section 1988
attorney's fees arising out of proceedings before a state
administrative agency. Today we establish a procedure to guide
the bench and bar in the future.
The Supremacy Clause required the Appellate Division to treat the federal claim the same as it would treat any other state law claim. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2439, 110 L. Ed.2d 332, 348 (l990); Martinez, supra, 444 U.S. at 283 n.7, 100 S. Ct. at 558 n.7, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 488 n.7. As part of the required nondiscriminatory treatment of federal claims in state courts, Howlett, supra, also recognizes that "[w]hen a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts," the Supremacy Clause does not compel a state court to exercise its jurisdiction over federal claims. 496 U.S. at 372, 110 S. Ct. at 2441, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 350. States "may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are
preempted by federal law," without running afoul of the Supremacy
Clause. Id. at 372, 110 S. Ct. at 2441, 110 L. Ed.
2d at 351.
We are persuaded that the Appellate Division articulated valid, neutral reasons for declining to exercise original jurisdiction over the federal claims. The initial filing of a pleading alleging federal claims was in the form of a notice of appeal from a final determination of a state administrative agency. Rule 2:10-5 authorizes the Appellate Division to "exercise such original jurisdiction as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." That is a discretionary rule. The Appellate Division refused to exercise original jurisdiction because this case does not fall into either of the two categories in which original jurisdiction has been exercised in the past: 1) to complete the determination of issues raised but not decided in a trial court, Department of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J. Super. 407, 411 (App. Div. 1970) (exercising original jurisdiction to impose statutory penalty for complete determination of matter where trial court had improperly dismissed penalty complaint), and 2) to provide emergent relief in a matter implicating public interest. State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187, 192-93 (l976) (exercising original jurisdiction in light of defendant's continuing physical deterioration); State v. Rose, 173 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App. Div. l980) (exercising original
jurisdiction because of emergent matter implicating public
interest); Market Maintenance Co. v. City of Newark,
63 N.J.
Super. 233, 235 (App. Div. l960) (exercising original
jurisdiction to promptly resolve public bid dispute). Maisonet,
supra, 274 N.J. Super. at 232. See also White v. Atlantic City
Press,
64 N.J. 128, 133 (1973) (exercising original jurisdiction
to find actual knowledge for complete determination of matter).
The Appellate Division found that Anastasio v. Planning
Board of West Orange,
209 N.J. Super. 499, 518 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
107 N.J. 46 (1986), is to be distinguished on the
facts. Anastasio involved multiple complaints in lieu of
prerogative writs for judicial review of a local planning board's
untimely decision denying site-plan approval. Id. at 504-05.
Plaintiff Anastasio also filed a separate complaint against the
planning board, all but one of its members and others seeking
section 1983 damages. Ibid. The complaint further sought
damages for alleged violations of the Municipal Land Use Law
(MLUL). Ibid. The trial court awarded damages for the alleged
MLUL violations, id. at 505, but did not make factual findings to
support its award of section l983 damages. Id. at 515-18. The
Appellate Division exercised original jurisdiction and
redetermined the section l983 claim because of the protracted
history in the case, and because "the trial judge ha[d] retired."
Id. at 518. Thus, Anastasio falls into the established category
of cases in which the Appellate Division has exercised original
jurisdiction to decide issues raised in the trial court but not
decided by it.
The procedural history in the present case is unique and for that reason is to be distinguished from the Thiboutot line of cases. Compare Thiboutot, supra, 448 U.S. at 1, 100 S. Ct. at 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 555 (involving appeal to state superior court from Department of Human Services' final determination); Rahmey v. Blum, 466 N.Y.S.2d 350 (App. Div. 1983) (involving appeal to trial court from the State Department of Social Services); Maldonado v. Nebraska Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 391 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1986) (involving appeal to the District Court from an administrative agency); Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 439 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 1982) (involving appeal to superior court to review administrative decision). In those cases, actions seeking review of administrative agency decisions were instituted by filing a complaint in a trial court. If the trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the federal claim, the aggrieved party had no other state forum to hear the federal claim. Consequently, that line of cases sought to compel the trial court, rather than an appellate court, to exercise jurisdiction. Here, the challenging party was free to institute a claim in the Law Division with respect to the federal claims.
Apart from those distinctions, this is the first reported decision in New Jersey in which a federal civil rights claim is raised for the first time in the notice of appeal from a final
decision of a state administrative agency. Christian Brothers
Institute v. Northern New Jersey Interscholastic League,
86 N.J. 409 (l98l), cited by Maisonet, involved a complaint filed in the
Law Division alleging a federal civil rights violation after the
Division on Civil Rights had reached a final adjudication of the
plaintiff's alleged religious discrimination claims. The Law
Division entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Appellate
Division affirmed. Id. at 414. This Court reversed and
dismissed the complaint, concluding that the claim filed in the
Law Division was barred by virtue of election-of-remedies
principles. Id. at 414-15. The Court observed that the civil-rights and constitutional claims should have been filed in an
appeal to the Appellate Division from an adverse decision of the
Division on Civil Rights. Id. at 416. The Court did not suggest
that if and when a federal claim was filed for the first time in
a notice of appeal, the Appellate Division should exercise
original jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court held that the
plaintiff's civil rights claim based on discrimination should be
heard by the Division on Civil Rights. Id. at 418-19.
Furthermore, when civil-rights claims are alleged for the
first time in a notice of appeal, if the Appellate Division in
the exercise of its discretion decides to resolve the claim, the
Appellate Division will invariably be transformed into a trial
court because "a request for attorney's fees under § 1988 raises
legal issues collateral to the main cause of action." White v.
New Hampshire Dep't. of Employment Sec.,
455 U.S. 445, 451,
102 S. Ct. 1162, 1166,
71 L. Ed.2d 325, 331 (l982). "An application
for attorney's fees is `uniquely separable from the cause of
action to be proven at trial,' which cannot be commenced until
one party has `prevailed.'" Urban League, supra, 115 N.J. at 547
(quoting White, supra, 455 U.S. at 452, 102 S. Ct. at 1166, 71 L.
Ed.
2d at 331).
Even though Maisonet included in her notice of appeal claims
under sections l983 and l988, the attorney's fee claim could not
be considered until she prevailed in the Appellate Division on
the food-stamp disqualification issue. A claim for attorney's
fees under section 1988 based on a violation of section 1983
requires proof that "(1) a person (2) acting under color of state
law (3) subjected the plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be
subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 829,
105 S. Ct. 2427, 2439,
85 L.
Ed.2d 791, 807-08 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). Viewed in
that context, the issues collateral to the food-stamp
disqualification case would have required the Appellate Division
to sit as a trial court to decide the fee case after it had
exercised its appellate jurisdiction. Once the Appellate
Division invokes its original jurisdiction, it thereby deprives
itself of appellate jurisdiction over the fee claim. The per se
rule sought by Maisonet requiring the Appellate Division to
exercise original jurisdiction in all such cases would be an
anomalous result not compelled by the Supremacy Clause because a
nondiscriminatory, neutral state-court procedure can be
established without violating federal law.
As a matter of policy, we deem it appropriate that a review of a final administrative decision of a State agency by the Appellate Division pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) ordinarily should be limited to scrutiny of the decision of the administrative body. Consistent with that policy, if an aggrieved party in an administrative matter elects not to file a complaint in the Law Division alleging claims under sections l983 and l988, but instead raises federal claims in the notice of appeal or cross-appeal, unless the Appellate Division decides to exercise original jurisdiction, the following procedure should be followed:
1) The notice of appeal or cross-appeal insofar as the federal claims are concerned shall be deemed a complaint under Rule 4:2-2 and shall toll the running of any statute of limitations.
2) Venue shall be laid in the county in which the
cause of action arose.
3) The Appellate Division shall transfer the federal
claims, pursuant to Rule 1:13-4, to the Law Division by
filing with the Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court "in
the county in which the cause of action arose." R.
4:3-2(a)(2). A different venue may be selected in
accordance with Rule 4:3-2(c) when warranted by special
circumstances.
4) Rule 4:9-1 shall control amendments to the special
complaint carved out of the notice of appeal or cross-appeal after transfer.
5) The Law Division, by virtue of the transfer, shall
have the power to award section 1988 attorney's fees
for services rendered in the Appellate Division if they
are found to be appropriate.
Although the procedure we now adopt does not deprive the
Appellate Division of its discretion under Rule 2:10-5, that
procedure contemplates that federal claims arising out of
decisions rendered by state and local administrative agencies
ordinarily will be heard in the Law Division. We note that in
respect of a final decision of a local agency, a proceeding for
review is commenced by filing a complaint in lieu of prerogative
writs in which federal claims may be asserted, see Anastasio,
supra, 209 N.J. Super. at 504-05, and a non-jury trial is
conducted in the Law Division on the complaint to resolve the
state and federal claims. By virtue of the procedure we now
adopt concerning appeals from a state administrative agency, the
transfer of the federal claims filed with the Appellate Division
will enable a Law Division judge sitting without a jury also to
decide the federal claims asserted in that appeal.
Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) deprives the Law
Division of jurisdiction to review a state-law claim decided by a
state agency, the Law Division has jurisdiction to hear the
federal claim.
The federal claims raised in the notice of appeal are the
functional equivalent of an action in lieu of prerogative writs
filed in the Law Division. Because the Superior Court has
general-statewide jurisdiction, a transfer from the Appellate
Division to the Law Division under Rule 1:13-4 is intended to
comply with the allocational scheme when the Appellate Division
is an inappropriate forum. See Schiavone Construction Co. v.
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Comm'n,
98 N.J. 258, 265
(l985) (remanding state administrative agency matter to the Law
Division for determination); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Department of Public Advocate,
227 N.J. Super. 99, 132-34 (App.
Div. l988) (remanding state administrative agency matter to the
Law Division to develop a record), aff'd,
118 N.J. 336 (l990);
Township of Montclair v. Hughey,
222 N.J. Super. 441, 446-48
(App. Div. l987) (permitting state administrative agency matter
to remain in the Law Division to resolve factual disputes).
The Appellate Division made clear that it did not exercise
jurisdiction because this case does not fit into the established
categories for exercising Rule 2:10-5 jurisdiction. The failure
to exercise discretion and hear the federal fee claim does not
violate the Supremacy Clause.
When a state court [trial or appellate]
refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral
state rule regarding its administration of
the courts, we must act with utmost caution
before deciding that it is obligated to
entertain the claim. . . . The States . . .
have great latitude to establish the
structure and jurisdiction of their own
courts.
[Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at 372, 110 S. Ct.
at 2440-41, 110 L. Ed.
2d at 350-51.]
The federal law must take the "state courts as it finds them."
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954).
We do not reach the issue whether plaintiff may be entitled
to counsel fees under section l988. That issue must be decided
initially by the Law Division with either party having the right
of appeal to the Appellate Division. We decide that the only
state court required by the Supremacy Clause to hear plaintiff's
federal claims is the Law Division. The Clerk of the Appellate
Division is directed therefore to transfer plaintiff's federal
claims to the Law Division for resolution in accordance with this
opinion. To the extent feasible, the Law Division will
undoubtedly recognize the need to expedite these cases.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern,
Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
NO. A-86 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
LAURA MAISONET,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
FAMILY DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent-Respondent.
DECIDED May 23, 1995
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY