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(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) Original Wordprocessor Version
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0710-09T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
D.C., Sr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF D.C., Jr.,
a Minor.
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February 18, 2011
Submitted: February 3, 2011 - Decided:
Before Judges Axelrad, R. B. Coleman,
and J. N. Harris.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family
Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FG-02-82-08.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Durrell Wachtler
Ciccia, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Carla Livingston, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Noel
C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
D.C., Sr., the biological father of D.C., Jr. (Junior), appeals from an August 20, 2009 Family Part judgment
terminating his parental rights to his then six and one-half year old son and awarding guardianship to the
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) for the purpose of effectuating Junior's adoption.1 On appeal,
D.C., Sr. argues DYFS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory prongs required to
establish that Junior's best interests required severance of his parental ties. We note that the Law Guardian
supports termination of D.C., Sr.'s parental rights to his son.
After considering the record and briefs in light of the applicable law, we are satisfied the trial judge's
findings and conclusions are firmly supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record as a whole.
See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. Super. 46, 78 (App. Div. 2003), aff’d in
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part, modified in part and remanded, 179 N.J. 264 (2004), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 603 (2006). We affirm.
I.
We need not describe in detail the many facts the trial court considered. We instead provide a brief
summary of the cogent facts we considered in concluding the judge's findings were well-supported by the
evidence.
The following testimony and evidence were presented during the nine-day trial commencing in January
2009, and concluding in June 2009. DYFS presented the factual testimony of Mildred Alvarez, the family's
current caseworker, and Judy Palumbo, a DYFS supervisor. It also presented the expert testimony of Alison
Strasser Winston, Ph.D., who performed a psychological evaluation of D.C., Sr. and bonding evaluations of
D.C., Sr. and the foster mother with Junior, and Anthony D'Urso, Psy.D., who performed a psychological
evaluation of Junior. D.C., Sr. testified on his own behalf and presented the expert testimony of James R.
Reynolds, Ph.D., who performed a psychological evaluation of him and a bonding evaluation of him and his
son. He also presented the testimony of his mother, L.C., and K.H., his brother's former girlfriend.
Junior was born on January 1, 2003. A year later, when DYFS first became involved with the family, he was
living with his mother in a shelter. She was on the verge of being evicted for drug use and not abiding by
shelter rules. D.C., Sr. had already been ordered to leave for failing to make curfew, and had moved in with
his mother, L.C. In mid-February, L.C. ordered her son to leave her residence and, because both parents
were homeless, they agreed to place Junior with her.
Around that time, D.C., Sr. failed to comply with instructions from a DYFS caseworker to take his ailing son
to the doctor. The caseworker made the appointment and required D.C., Sr. to attend with her. D.C., Sr.
was unable to accurately describe his son's symptoms or medical history to the doctor. He also stated he
had given the child an unknown dose of baby Tylenol, which he believed to be an antibiotic, everyday for
the past two weeks. Accordingly, the pediatrician urged the caseworker to have DYFS supervise the
situation.
Dr. Utica, who performed a psychological evaluation of D.C., Sr., found he was exceedingly immature,
impressionistic, and struggling with gender identity issues. Furthermore, D.C., Sr. was not capable of
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maintaining housing or employment, and was not sufficiently emotionally stable to assume primary
responsibility for his son. Dr. Utica recommended D.C., Sr. have only supervised visitation with his son and
receive psychological treatment and parenting skills classes.
On March 1, 2004, L.C. offered to become her grandson's foster parent. She was employed as a teacher
and owned her own home. DYFS obtained physical and legal custody of Junior and continued his placement
with L.C. D.C., Sr. was only permitted supervised visitation with his son. Over the next year, D.C., Sr. was
hospitalized and participated in outpatient therapy sessions pertaining to mental health issues.
In February and March of 2005, he met with Kenneth Schulman, Ph.D., for a court-ordered psychological
evaluation. D.C., Sr. advised he had not worked since the summer of 2004, and had been living with friends
and relatives for the past year. He admitted to having auditory hallucinations, for which he had been
prescribed medicine, but otherwise appeared to Dr. Schulman to be "faking good," i.e., hiding his negative
characteristics. Dr. Schulman found D.C., Sr.'s personality was obsessive-compulsive, histrionic and
narcissistic. He was also emotionally immature and unable to withstand normal levels of stress, resulting in
a low frustration tolerance and poor impulse control, and was susceptible to becoming anxious, depressed,
listless and discouraged. Accordingly, Dr. Schulman concluded D.C., Sr. was not currently capable of
effectively parenting and was not likely to become capable in the foreseeable future. The psychologist
recommended D.C., Sr. only be allowed supervised visitation with his son.
On August 4, 2005, the court entered an order appointing L.C. as her grandson's legal guardian, with D.C.,
Sr.'s consent. A condition of the guardianship was that D.C., Sr. have only supervised visitation with his
son. DYFS subsequently terminated its involvement with the family.
D.C., Sr. continued to have auditory hallucinations; as a result he was involuntarily committed in October
2005 and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. At some point in 2006, he moved in with L.C. and his son.
On January 17, 2007, DYFS received a referral from a Garfield Police Officer who had been summoned to
Junior's daycare center. Staff had informed the officer they had not seen L.C. since mid-November and had
been unable to reach her. They had also been advised by L.C.'s employer that she was on extended leave.
They had grown concerned when Junior began coming to school looking disheveled and, on at least one
occasion, without a proper lunch, and upon noticing that A.C., a paternal uncle, had been consistently
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dropping him off and picking him up. Junior had also arrived at school with a three-or four-inch long
scratch on his stomach, and told varying stories about how he had been injured, first stating he fell and
then claiming his father had hit him with a stick, which story he also later recanted. Junior also told daycare
staff he was now living with his father.
A.C. divulged to the caseworker that L.C. was in the Dominican Republic but refused to reveal anything
else. Accordingly, DYFS took custody of Junior and placed him in the care of his current foster mother. D.C.,
Sr. told the caseworker he had been living at his mother's home for quite some time and he, not L.C., had
been caring for his son since November 30, 2006. He explained that his son had sustained the cut to his
stomach when he fell off the toilet and into a medicine cabinet that was sitting on the floor pending
installation. D.C., Sr. also confirmed that L.C. was in the Dominican Republic, but stated he did not have
any contact information for her and did not know why she was there. Accordingly, on February 15, 2007,
the court vacated the prior guardianship order because L.C. had allowed unsupervised contact between
Junior and his father.
K.H., who was residing in a small apartment with her and A.C.'s three-year-old daughter, receiving public
assistance, and attending school full-time, was ruled out by DYFS as a potential caretaker. The apparent
reason was because of domestic violence that had occurred in the past between her and A.C.
Between February and June 2007, D.C., Sr. failed to attend seven out of twelve visitations. In March, he
appeared for a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation. He represented he had resolved his gender identity
issues, and while he still viewed himself as a women trapped in a man's body, he no longer took hormones
or wanted to have a sex-change operation. He also admitted to feeling depressed his whole life, frequently
hearing voices, feeling paranoid, and experiencing anxiety when alone in crowded public places. D.C., Sr.
also acknowledged he had previously abused marijuana and had taken ecstasy. Dr. Sonia Oquendo
diagnosed D.C., Sr. as having an untreatable and persistent gender identity disorder with repeated identity
crises, depression with psychosis, poor self-esteem, impulsivity, emotional unpredictability, and serious
problems with interpersonal skills. The psychiatrist was of the opinion these recurring problems were likely
to interfere with D.C., Sr.'s ability to adequately parent his son by himself. However, because she believed
any custody plan should provide for extensive contact between the two, she recommended returning Junior
to L.C.
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Dr. Schulman's psychological re-evaluation in March 2007 produced similar diagnoses. He still was of the
opinion D.C., Sr. "faked good" in completing standardized tests to present his own personality and
relationship with his son in a good light. The psychologist was concerned that D.C., Sr. had not complied
with his recommendations in 2005, other than having seen a psychiatrist for medication.
In April 2007, DYFS learned L.C. was not in the Dominican Republic as reported, but instead was convicted
of a third charge of driving while intoxicated on November 30, 2006, and was incarcerated until April 6,
2007. Two months later the agency also became aware that D.C., Sr. had been arrested on an outstanding
warrant issued by Arizona in 2001. Apparently, while on vacation, twenty pounds of marijuana had been
discovered in his suitcase just before he was to board a plane back to New Jersey. When D.C., Sr. was
released on bail, he fled the state. After being returned to Arizona, D.C., Sr. was sentenced to eighteen
months in prison on October 4, 2007. While in prison, D.C., Sr. presented with persecutory delusions and
unclear thinking, appeared to be a threat to himself, and was diagnosed with schizophrenia and ordered to
take monthly injections of Haldol.
Around that time, Junior became aggressive in school and began acting out in his foster home. L.C. was
ruled out as a caretaker for Junior because she had failed to inform the agency of her incarceration and
had neglected Junior by leaving him with D.C., Sr., who had previously been deemed unfit.
On December 28, 2007, DYFS filed an order to show cause and verified complaint for guardianship of
Junior. After D.C., Sr.'s release from prison, he moved back in with L.C. and intermittently attended
supervised visitation.
During D.C., Sr.'s psychological evaluation with Dr. Strasser Winston in November 2008, he continued to
minimize prior substance abuse and mental health issues and appeared satisfied with himself, thus reducing
his motivation for treatment. The psychologist was persuaded D.C., Sr. possessed basic parenting
knowledge, but his actual parenting capacity was suspect in view of his history of gender identity issues,
numerous psychiatric illnesses, inadequate coping skills, poor judgment, and noncompliance with
psychotherapy. Dr. Strasser Winston concluded it was unlikely D.C., Sr. was capable of providing a stable
environment for his son at that time or in the foreseeable future.
Based on the bonding evaluation, Dr. Strasser Winston found Junior had an equally strong bond with his
father as with his foster mother. She was of the opinion that, if separated from his father, Junior would
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experience grief but his foster mother would be capable of helping him overcome the loss. In contrast, she
found if Junior were separated from his foster mother, D.C., Sr. would not be able to assist him in coping
since he did not comprehend the trauma of such removal. It was also unlikely, based on D.C., Sr.'s own
noncompliance, that he would facilitate psychotherapy for his son. DYFS' expert opined that if reunification
with D.C., Sr. failed and another removal were required, Junior's emotional functioning would likely be
impaired.
Dr. Reynolds, the defense expert, performed psychological and bonding evaluations in January 2009.
Defendant again denied the existence of his reported mental health and substance abuse histories, which
raised questions to the psychologist about D.C., Sr.'s personal insight, judgment, and parental fitness. D.C.,
Sr. remained unemployed and was without his own residence. Dr. Reynolds conceded D.C., Sr.'s parenting
skills might be compromised by his actual psychological functioning and lack of appreciation for the
necessity of therapy. The defense psychologist concluded, however, that D.C., Sr. "may" be an appropriate
candidate to be "eventually" reunified with his son based on his adequate parenting skills and close bond
with him.
Around that time, D.C., Sr. acknowledged to another psychologist that he was experiencing persecutory
delusions and other non-command auditory hallucinations. He was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
and a gender identity disorder and was referred for a psychiatric evaluation for medical management. D.C.,
Sr., however, did not follow through with this recommendation.
The trial began on January 21, 2009. D.C., Sr. disappeared about a month later and did not contact anyone
for four weeks. He claimed he had gone to Arizona to get an injection of Haldol at a walk-in clinic he had
previously frequented while incarcerated in Arizona.
Just prior to his father's departure, Junior was hospitalized after demonstrating hyperactive, defiant, and
aggressive behaviors, and also claiming to hear voices. An April 9, 2009 psychological evaluation by Dr.
D'Urso revealed Junior was hyperactive and impulsive, but not psychotic. The psychologist believed Junior
was suffering from separation anxiety brought on by general insecurity as a result of his placement in foster
care and inconsistent visitation with his father. According to Dr. D'Urso, Junior was classified as having an
emotional disability, with attendant behavioral difficulties and marked neurological problems. The
psychologist recommended therapy and a psychiatric evaluation to determine if medication was necessary.
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In May 2009, D.C., Sr. advised a psychiatrist he was regularly experiencing non-command auditory and
visual hallucinations. He also disclosed he had been feeling increasingly depressed, hopeless, and helpless.
D.C., Sr. was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and prescribed medication.
D.C., Sr. testified at trial, variously admitting and denying he suffered from schizophrenia, auditory
hallucinations, social anxiety disorder, and other psychological problems in the past or currently. He denied
ever having used marijuana or ecstasy. Although D.C., Sr. repeatedly insisted he had regularly received
therapy over the years, he ultimately admitted that nearly all of his appointments simply had been with a
psychiatrist for medication monitoring. He acknowledged he was not presently working and had only ever
worked sporadically at part-time or temporary jobs.
On April 29, 2009, DYFS sent K.H. a rule-out letter based on the conclusion it would be best for Junior to
remain in his current placement, which had been stable for the past two years. It noted that Junior shared
a strong bond with his foster family, and moving him would be detrimental to his well-being. K.H. testified
at trial that she was still willing to care for Junior. She claimed her volatile relationship with A.C. was over,
although she confirmed she was currently pregnant with his second child.
Based on this record and after observing the demeanor and impartially assessing the credibility of the lay
and expert witnesses, examining the exhibits entered into evidence, and hearing arguments of counsel,
Judge John Conte concluded the best interests of Junior required severance of D.C., Sr.'s parental ties. In a
comprehensive written opinion of August 20, 2009, the judge recited the factual and procedural history of
the case, made findings of fact and credibility assessments in favor of DYFS' witnesses, noted the applicable
law, and found DYFS had established by clear and convincing evidence the four-prong test for termination
of parental rights as set forth in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-
10 (1986), and codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1. The determination was memorialized in a judgment of
guardianship. This appeal ensued.
II.
We begin by noting some basic principles. The scope of our review of a trial court's decision to terminate
parental rights is limited. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). We also have a limited
scope of review of the Family Part's factual findings. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279
(2007). In reviewing the factual findings and conclusions of a trial court, we are obliged to accord deference to
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the trial judge's credibility determinations and the judge's "feel of the case" based upon the opportunity of the
judge to see and hear the witnesses. A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J. Super. at 78 (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
411-12 (1998); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988)). "When the credibility of witnesses is an important
factor, the trial court's conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate court
unless clearly lacking in reasonable support." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259
(App. Div. 2005) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999)). We rely upon the trial court's
acceptance of the credibility of the expert testimony and the court's fact-findings based thereon, as it is in a
better position to evaluate the witness' credibility, qualifications, and the weight to be accorded to the expert's
testimony. Ibid.; see also In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 22 (1992).
We are not to disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless they are "so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the
interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (citation
omitted). Additionally, because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate
courts should accord deference to family court factfinding and the conclusions which flow logically from those
findings of fact. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412-13; M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279. Reversal is required only in
those circumstances in which the trial court's findings were "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been
made." M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 279 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we discern
ample evidence in the record supporting the judge's conclusion that Junior's best interests required termination of
D.C., Sr.'s parental rights.
The applicable principles are well settled. "Parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental liberty interest in
raising their biological children." In re Adoption of a Child by W.P. & M.P., 308 N.J. Super. 376, 382 (App. Div.
l998) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982)),
vacated on other grounds, 163 N.J. 158 (2000). "The Federal and State Constitutions protect the inviolability of
the family unit." W.P. & M.P., supra, 308 N.J. Super. at 382 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct.
1208, 1212-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558-59 (1972)). However, government "is not without constitutional control
over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 119 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 230, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 33 (1972)). The State, as parens patriae, may sever the parent-
child relationship to protect the child from serious physical and emotional injury. W.P. & M.P., supra, 308 N.J.
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Super. at 382.
When the child's biological parent resists termination of parental rights, it is the court's function to decide whether
the parent can raise the child without causing harm. J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 10. The cornerstone of our inquiry is
not whether the parent is fit, but whether the parent can become fit to assume the parental role in time to meet
the child's needs. Ibid. (citing A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 607). "The analysis . . . entails strict standards to protect
the statutory and constitutional rights of the natural parents." J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 10. "The burden rests on
the party seeking to terminate parental rights 'to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence' that risk of
'serious and lasting [future] harm to the child' is sufficiently great as to require severance of the parental ties."
W.P. & M.P., supra, 308 N.J. Super. at 383 (alteration in original) (quoting J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 10).
The question for the court "focuses upon what course serves the 'best interests' of the child." W.P. & M.P., supra,
308 N.J. Super. at 383. The State Constitution and N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15(c) and 15.1(a) require satisfaction of the
"best interests of the child" test by clear and convincing evidence before termination of parental rights can occur.
See A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 612; In re Guardianship of Jordan, 336 N.J. Super. 270, 274 (App. Div. 2001).
Specifically, the four-prong test set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires DYFS to prove:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is
unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that
separating the child from his resource family [formerly referred to as "foster"] parents
would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent
correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
These criteria are neither discrete nor separate. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999). They
overlap to provide a composite picture of what may be necessary to advance the best interests of the child. Ibid.
"The considerations involved in determinations of parental fitness are 'extremely fact sensitive' and require
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particularized evidence that address the specific circumstances in the given case." Ibid. (quoting In re Adoption of
Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)).
III.
Our examination of the record discloses all four prongs of the statutory test have been met by clear and
convincing evidence. The judge made an express credibility assessment against D.C., Sr., stating:
[D.C., Sr.,] presented himself on the stand as being evasive, contradictory,
short[-]tempered, and incredulous at times. There were too many questions for
which his answer was not straight-forward, for example, regarding his income,
disability, mental health, employment, and like areas of his background, he was
non-responsive in court and to his doctors. These answers strain his credibility.
The first prong involves an inquiry into whether there has been an "endanger[ing] of the child's health and
development resulting from the parental relationship[,]" and whether there will be future harm to the child's
safety, health, or development if the parental relationship is not terminated. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348.
The focus of the inquiry is not necessarily on a "single or isolated harm or past harm," but rather on "the
effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and development."
Ibid.
The facts, as found by the trial judge from credible evidence, reveal D.C., Sr. suffered from significant and
persistent mental health problems. According to Drs. Strasser Winston and Schulman, D.C., Sr.'s impulsivity
and emotional unpredictability, as well as his depression, psychosis and paranoia, had and would continue
to interfere with his capacity to independently and effectively parent his son. Even defense expert Dr.
Reynolds agreed D.C., Sr. showed no insight into the impact his psychiatric difficulties would have on his
parenting abilities. Because of these deficits, D.C., Sr. had failed to provide proper medical care to his son
in February 2004, and had failed to properly supervise and allegedly struck his son in January 2007. D.C.,
Sr. had also proved incapable of securing independent housing and consistent employment. Furthermore,
his criminal activities had resulted in a lengthy separation from his son. Based on the medical evidence and
D.C., Sr.'s failure to testify in a straightforward manner, the court was persuaded DYFS had presented clear
and convincing evidence satisfying prong one.
There is no merit to D.C., Sr.'s challenge on appeal that Judge Conte improperly relied on outdated reports,
went out of his way to portray him in the worst possible light, ignored positive findings, and disregarded the
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defense expert's testimony that supported placing Junior with his father. According to D.C., Sr., DYFS failed
to present any proof he had or would harm his son.
The record is replete with reports and evaluations confirming D.C., Sr.'s longstanding, significant mental
health problems. The court was entitled to consider the evaluations conducted between 2003 and 2005,
which, rather than being stale, were markedly similar to the evaluations completed between 2007 and
2009, and documented the persistent nature of D.C., Sr.'s problems. In the past, these problems resulted in
Junior's being exposed to homelessness, denied competent medical care, and injured due to lack of proper
supervision. Although D.C., Sr. may presently possess adequate parenting skills, they cannot compensate
for his failure to demonstrate an ability to independently provide a safe and stable home environment for
his son and assume the responsibility of complying with psychotherapy and other treatment to address his
mental health problems.
The second prong contemplates the determination of parental unfitness. DYFS must prove the harm is likely
to continue as a direct result of the parent's unwillingness or inability to eliminate the harm that had
endangered the child's health and development or the parent has failed to provide a "safe and stable home
for the child" and a "delay in securing permanency" will further harm the child. Id. at 348-49. As properly
noted by Judge Conte, the record amply reflects D.C., Sr.'s ongoing psychiatric problems and
noncompliance with treatment. D.C., Sr.'s inability to face his responsibilities was also reflected in his
decision to remain a fugitive from the law for six years. As a result of D.C., Sr.'s dereliction, Junior spent
nearly three years in foster care and developed a strong bond with his foster mother, which would now be
difficult to break.
The third prong requires DYFS to make "reasonable efforts" to assist the parents in correcting or eliminating
the circumstances that caused the harm and consider alternatives to termination. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).
It is undisputed DYFS provided D.C., Sr. with a myriad of services such as parenting skills training,
substance abuse screenings, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and visitation with his son. D.C., Sr.
had also been offered treatment in accordance with the recommendations made by the various psychiatrists
and psychologists, to no avail.
Consonant with its directive, DYFS had initially tried to keep the family intact by successfully petitioning the
court to appoint L.C. as her grandson's legal guardian. DYFS was not to blame for the subsequent failure of
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this arrangement, nor was it responsible for D.C., Sr.'s failure to engage in the therapy deemed essential
for reunification.
Lastly, the statute's fourth prong mandates a determination as to "whether a child's interests will best be
served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008). There is ample basis in the record for the judge's finding that the
evidence strongly pointed towards termination rather than reunification. Throughout the case, D.C., Sr.'s
presentation of himself to medical professionals and in the courtroom was fraught with inconsistency,
evasion, denial, belligerence, and convenient memory lapses. From the court's view, D.C., Sr.'s
unacknowledged psychological problems fatally undermined any parenting capacity he possessed. As noted
by the court, D.C., Sr. had also exhibited exceedingly poor judgment when he decided to become a fugitive
in 2001, thereby exacerbating his problems with the law, and secretly departing for a month-long stay in
Arizona in the middle of trial, without considering the effect of missed visitation on his son. The judge also
noted D.C., Sr. had failed to establish an independent residence and his claims of imminent employment in
various fields, such as the fashion industry, had not come to pass.
Contrary to D.C., Sr.'s representations, Dr. Reynolds never gave a ringing endorsement of him as a parent.
Rather, the defense psychologist merely testified that, while D.C., Sr. did not appear mentally ill during his
evaluation, he could not draw any valid conclusions in this regard because D.C., Sr. was not forthcoming in
discussing his medical history and symptoms, and his standardized test results were invalid. Dr. Reynolds
actually agreed with Dr. Strasser Winston that D.C., Sr.'s mental health problems could negatively affect his
parenting capacity.
In any event, the court was entitled to rely upon Dr. Strasser Winston's opinion that, regardless of D.C.,
Sr.'s strong bond with his son, his significant and unaddressed psychiatric problems rendered him incapable
of independently serving as his son's primary caretaker now or in the foreseeable future. The court was also
entitled to find, again in accordance with Dr. Strasser Winston's testimony, that Junior's equally strong bond
with his foster mother, coupled with her superior ability to address Junior's emotional needs, would help
him avoid lasting harm from the severance of D.C., Sr.'s parental rights. The foster mother also expressed
an intent to adopt Junior, further evidencing the love and stability offered by his current placement. D.C.,
Sr., by contrast, was not capable of addressing his own needs, let alone the special needs of his emotionally
fragile child.
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Although D.C., Sr. may love his son, we are convinced he is unable to provide a safe, stable and permanent
home that the child so desperately needs. As we concluded in In re Guardianship of A.R.G., 318 N.J. Super.
323, 330, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 127 (1999), where there is substantial credible evidence in
the record to support termination of parental rights, there is no reason to delay permanent resolution.
Children cannot afford to wait until such time as their parent might possibly be able to provide a safe,
secure and nurturing environment for them. The trial court properly concluded that termination of parental
rights will not do more harm than good to Junior as it will free him for adoption by his foster mother who
can provide permanency and stability.
Affirmed.
1 The rights of the child's mother, C.G., were also terminated. She has not appealed.
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