(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 4, 1995 -- Decided April 19, 1995
GARIBALDI, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
This appeal addresses the limitations period that applies to the filing of a petition by the State or
one of its political subdivisions contesting real-property tax assessments -- the filing time limitations imposed
under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 or the ten-year period imposed under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2.
On or about August 15, 1991, New Jersey Transit Corporation (Transit) filed petitions with the
Somerset County Tax Board contesting the local property-tax assessments levied against it by the Borough of
Somerville (Somerville). Each petition sought exemption from the 1981 to 1990 tax assessments pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 27:25-16 (Transit tax exemption), N.J.S.A. 54:29A-1 (granting exemptions to certain rail property),
and
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5) (federal exemption of rail property, retroactive to October 1, 1981).
The Somerset County Board of Taxation found the appeals untimely and affirmed the property-tax
assessments. Transit appealed to the Tax Court. Somerville chose not to oppose Transit's challenge to those
assessments. The Tax Court dismissed Transit's appeals, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
appeals because they had not been timely filed within the statutory limitations period imposed by N.J.S.A.
54:3-21.
Transit appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, allowed Transit to file an
appeal at any time within that statute's ten-year limitations period. The Appellate Division affirmed the Tax
Court's determination that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 did not apply to real-property tax appeals. However, the
Appellate Division did find that Transit was entitled, under federal preemption doctrine, to the retroactive
tax exemption granted by
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5). As such, Transit was relieved of liability for those
assessments asserted against it after the operational date of that federal statute, October, 1, 1981.
The Supreme Court granted Transit's petition for certification.
HELD: N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, the general ten-year limitations period, is inapplicable to the State or its
instrumentalities in challenges to real-property tax assessments. Rather, the State falls within the
specific and express limitations period provided in N.J.S.A. 54:3-21.
1. In 1991, this Court abrogated the common-law nullum tempus doctrine, which provides that statutes
of limitations do not run against the State. In response, the Legislature passed N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, the
uniform ten-year limitations period applicable to actions commenced by the State or its subdivisions unless
another limitations provision expressly and specifically applies or a longer limitations period applies. This
statute was intended to apply to cases where, under the common-law doctrine of nullum tempus, the State
and its agencies had been exempt from statutes of limitations generally applicable in civil actions. (pp. 5-6)
2. The common-law doctrine of nullum tempus has not been applied to the State or its agencies in
real-property tax appeals, whereas the filing deadline imposed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 in contesting property
tax assessments has been applied to governmental entities. The Legislature could not have intended N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1.2 provide governmental entities with a longer statute of limitations than they previously had enjoyed.
(pp. 6-7)
3. Under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, Transit's appeals for tax years 1981 to 1990, filed on or about August 15,
1991, were untimely filed. Governmental instrumentalities are taxpayers within the meaning of that statute
and filing deadlines in actions contesting local property-tax assessments have long been applied to taxpayer
governmental entities as well as private litigants. Strong public policy concerns dictate that the State and its
instrumentalities strictly adhere to the filing deadlines of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. Statutes of limitations in tax cases
must be strictly construed because of the need for predictability and certainty in respect of governmental
budgets and revenues. A ten-year statute of limitations to contest property-tax assessments would only result
in uncertainty and chaos. (pp. 7-11)
4. When two statutes conflict, the more specific controls over the more general. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 is
more specific than N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 and therefore prevails. Transit is an aggrieved taxpayer under N.J.S.A.
54:3-21 whose tax appeals were filed out of time. Therefore, Transit is liable for those taxes assessed against
it during the tax years 1981 to 1990. However, because of the exemption of
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5), Transit
is only liable for those taxes levied against it prior to October 1, 1981. (pp. 11-13)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICE STEIN, dissenting, is of the view that the Court's disposition of this appeal is wrong as a
matter of statutory interpretation and because respect for a coordinate branch of government would dictate a
different result.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, and COLEMAN
join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI'S opinion. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
A-
71 September Term 1994
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF SOMERVILLE,
Defendant.
Argued January 4, 1995 -- Decided April 19, 1995
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at 273 N.J. Super l7l (l994).
Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant Attorney
General, argued the cause for appellant
(Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New
Jersey, attorney).
Michael D. Sullivan argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey State League of
Municipalities (Stickel, Koenig & Sullivan,
attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
New Jersey Transit Corporation (Transit) contests the local
real property tax assessments levied against it by the Borough of
Somerville (Somerville). At issue is what limitation period
applies to the filing of a petition by the State or one of its
political subdivisions contesting real-property tax assessments -- the filing time limitations imposed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l or
the ten-year period imposed under N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.2.
The subject property is identified on the Borough of Somerville's Tax Map as Block 123, Lot 1-E (now 1.05), and consists of an embankment supporting the elevated Raritan Valley commuter line. That line was previously owned by the bankrupt Central Railroad of New Jersey (CNJ), and was part of the property transferred by CNJ to the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) in 1976. The State acquired this property from Conrail in 1978. By letter dated January 9, l979, the DOT notified the clerk of every municipality in which it had acquired railroad property pursuant to the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§701 to 797m, of its acquisition and claimed exemption from local property taxation.
Transit became the owner of the property in 1979. However, there was confusion about the ownership of the parcel.
In January 1982, Transit notified Somerville's tax assessor of
its acquisition of the property and sent the assessor a copy of
certain railroad-valuation maps, asking that the assessor mark
the block and lot numbers from the borough's tax maps. Two years
later, in May 1984, Transit wrote to Somerville's Tax Collector,
returning various 1983 property tax bills that had been addressed
to "CRR of NJ (N.J. Department of Transportation)." In the
accompanying letter, Transit attempted to identify ownership of
the various parcels involved, noting that several parcels "appear
to be owned by Conrail," including Block 123, Lot 1.05.
Somerville's tax assessor apparently agreed, writing a short time
later to Transit that he had determined that Block 123, Lot 1.05
had not been conveyed to Transit, but actually belonged to
Conrail.
That understanding remained until the summer of 1990. In
the course of resolving other property-tax matters with
Somerville, the borough's attorney forwarded to Transit's counsel
a list of properties that the parties had been discussing, along
with a list of other properties on the Somerville tax rolls that
the borough believed were "still owned" by Transit. Included on
the latter list was Block 123, Lot 1.05, that the Borough
indicated had been assessed to "CRR of NJ, N.J. Department of
Transportation" and had many years of back taxes outstanding.
Somerville then sent Transit a tax bill for this property, for
the tax years 1981 to 1990.
On or about August 15, 1991, Transit filed petitions with
the Somerset County Tax Board contesting the assessments.
(Transit also filed petitions contesting the 1991 and 1992 tax
assessments, but the Tax Court found those appeals timely and set
aside those assessments; consequently, we do not address them
further.) Each petition sought exemption from the 1981 to 1990
tax assessments pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:25-16 (Transit tax
exemption), N.J.S.A. 54:29A-1 (granting exemptions to certain
rail property), and
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5) (federal exemption of
rail property, retroactive to October 1, 1981).
The Somerset County Board of Taxation found the appeals
untimely and affirmed the assessments. Transit then appealed to
the Tax Court. Somerville determined not to oppose Transit's
challenge to those assessments. The Tax Court dismissed
Transit's appeals sua sponte, finding that it lacked jurisdiction
to hear them, as they had not been timely filed within the
statutory limitations period imposed by N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. l
3 N.J. Tax 339 (l993).
Transit appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, the statutory nullum tempus provision,
allowed Transit to file an appeal at any time within the ten
year limitations period contained therein. The Appellate
Division affirmed the Tax Court's determination that N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1.2 did not apply to real-property tax appeals. However,
the Appellate Division did find that Transit was entitled, under
federal preemption doctrine, to the retroactive tax exemption
granted by
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5). Consequently, Transit was
relieved of liability for those assessments asserted against it
after the operational date of the federal tax exemption
provision, October 1, 1981. We granted Transit's petition for
certification. ___ N.J. ___ (l994), and now affirm the Appellate
Division.
In response to the Court's general abrogation of the common law nullum tempus doctrine, the Legislature passed N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2. That statute, in pertinent part, provides a uniform ten-year limitations period applicable to actions commenced by the State or its subdivisions:
Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any
civil action commenced by the State shall be
commenced within ten years next after the
cause of action shall have accrued.
Transit asserts that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 permits it to contest its tax assessments because N.J.S.A.
54:3-21 does not "expressly and specifically" refer to the State
and its political subdivisions. The Senate Judiciary Committee
statement makes it clear that the Legislature intended N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1.2 to apply to cases where "under the common law doctrine
of nullum tempus, the State and its agencies [had been] exempt
from statutes of limitations generally applicable in civil
actions." Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill
No. 374l (Dec. l2, l99l). That the Legislature, in enacting
N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.2, was concerned only with establishing a
uniform ten-year statute of limitations for actions commenced by
governmental entities where no such limitation had previously
existed under the doctrine of nullum tempus also comports with
common sense. In State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, l
34 N.J. 393, 4l8 (l993), we stated:
Our conclusion is reinforced by Judge Learned
Hand's classic admonition that `[t]here is no
surer way to misread any document than to
read it literally.' Guiseppi v. Walling, l
44 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. l944). As we observed
in Schierstead v. Brigantine, supra, [
29 N.J. 220 (l959)] "statutes are to read sensibly
rather than literally and the controlling
legislative intent is to be presumed as
`consonant to reason and good discretion.'"
29 N.J. at 230 (quoting Morris Canal &
Banking Co. v. Central R.R. Co., l
5 N.J. Eq. 4l4, 428 (Ch. l863)).
The common-law doctrine of nullum tempus has not been
applied to the State or its instrumentalities in real-property
tax appeals. The filing deadline imposed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l
in contesting property tax assessments has been applied to
governmental entities as well as private litigants. The
Legislature could not have intended N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 to give
governmental entities a longer statute of limitations than they
previously had enjoyed.
N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l provides in pertinent part:
A taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of his property, or feeling that he is discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county, or a taxing district which may feel discriminated against by the assessed valuation of property in the taxing district, or by the assessed valuation of property in another taxing district in the county, may, on or before April l [August l5 for years prior to l992] appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal . . . .
It is undisputed that Transit's appeals for tax years l98l to
l990, filed on or about August l5, l99l, were untimely under that
statute.
We have previously interpreted "taxpayer feeling aggrieved"
in N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l broadly to include all entities having an
interest in the real propery that is the subject of a property
tax assessment. Village Supermarkets, Inc. v. Township of W.
Orange,
106 N.J. 628 (1987) (holding that commercial lessee had
sufficient interest in shopping mall's tax assessment to
challange as "taxpayer feeling aggrieved" under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21). No cases support Transit's claim that state
instrumentalities are not "taxpayers" within the meaning of the
statute. Indeed, we have specifically held that "a taxpayer who
claims an exemption from an assessment falls within the category
of an aggrieved person" where the taxpayer is a municipality, a
political subdivision of the State. County of Bergen v. Borough
of Paramus,
79 N.J. 302, 305 (1979); see also Rabstein v.
Township of Princeton,
187 N.J. Super. 18, 24 (App. Div. 1982)
("[T]he [township's] counterclaims should be dismissed since the
Township failed to pursue timely claims for relief before the
Mercer County Board of Taxation."). As the Tax Court noted
below, "`Taxpayer' is a generic term which includes the State of
New Jersey and its instrumentalities to the extent that they have
interests in real property which are assessed and subject to tax
under the property tax statutes." 13 N.J. Tax at 345.
Our courts have never construed legislative intent to exempt
state instrumentalities from the statutory limitations period
provided for appealing tax assessments. Rather, they have held
that both appealing taxpayers and taxing districts must adhere
strictly to the deadlines prescribed by statute. Failure to file
a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect. Clairol v.
Kingsley, l
09 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. l99
(l970), appeal dismissed,
402 U.S. 902 (l97l); Mayfair Holding
Corp. v. Township of North Bergen,
4 N.J. Tax 38, 4l (Tax l982)
(holding that statutory filing requirement is an "unqualified
jurisdictional imperative, long sanctioned by our courts").
Filing deadlines in actions contesting local property-tax
assessments have long been applied to taxpayer governmental
entities as well as to private litigants. F.M.C. Stores Co. v.
Borough of Morris Plains, l
00 N.J. 4l8, 424 (l985) ("taxing
districts are required to comply with the time prescriptions for
filing of tax appeals, as with all other statutory
requirements"); City of Newark v. Fischer,
3 N.J. 488 (l950)
(dismissing appeal filed by city from judgment of county board as
filed out of time); Rabstein, supra, l87 N.J. Super. at 24
(dismissing township's counterclaims as filed out of time);
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Borough of Wood-Ridge, 2 N.J. Tax l43
(Tax l98l) (finding that absent timely appeal, taxing district
was not entitled to increase of its assessment); New Jersey
Turnpike Auth. v. Township of Monroe,
2 N.J. Tax 37l, 375 (Tax
l98l) (Monroe) (holding that court was barred from hearing claim
of exemption in years in which Authority failed to file appeals
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l).
Strong public policy concerns dictate that the State and its instrumentalities strictly adhere to the filing-time limitations of N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l. As the Tax Court properly recognized, "Statutes of Limitations in tax cases always have been strictly
construed due to the necessity of predictability and certainty of
governmental budgets and revenues." l3 N.J. Tax at 343 (citing
F.M.C. Stores, supra, l00 N.J. at 424 (l985) ("Strict adherence
to statutory time limitations is essential in tax matters, borne
of the exigencies of taxation and the administration of local
government."); McCullough Transp. Co. v. Division of Motor
Vehicles, ll
3 N.J. Super. 353, 360 (App. Div. l97l) ("Limitation
periods for claims for refund are common administrative
provisions found in tax legislation and justified by the need for
predictability of revenues by public agencies.")); see also Bass
River Tp. v. Driscoll, 3 N.J. Tax l77 (Tax l98l) (holding that
legislative policy is that proceedings involving assessment of
taxes and governmental fiscal matters be brought within specified
periods of time).
Local governments are highly dependent on the revenues
generated through local property taxation. In construing a
statute, courts must consider "not only the particular statute in
question, but also the entire legislative scheme of which it is a
part." Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., l08 N.J. l23, l29
(l987). The tax court observed that
the entire property tax structure [Title 54]
is fashioned so that contests of property tax
assessments must be promptly filed and
concluded, so as not to prejudice the
budgetary and fiscal stability of the
municipalities that so heavily rely on the
property tax. If all government agencies had
ten years from January l, l992 [the accrual
date found in N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l] to contest
assessments, the resulting uncertainty would
be chaotic. Municipalities would be subject
to appeals by governmental entities covering
as many as ten years of assessments, which
would be devastating if the assessments were
reduced or set aside.
The Legislature did not intend such an absurd and chaotic result.
Transit argues, however, that fiscal stability concerns also
apply to the State. That is true, but not to the extent that
such fiscal stability concerns apply to the municpalities that
rely so heavily on property-tax revenues. As Transit itself
observed, most of the property of the State and its governmental
units is generally exempt from taxation when used for public
purposes. See N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3. Consequently, neither Transit
nor the State will often be called upon to pay tax bills,
provided they file their exemptions and appeals in a timely
fashion.
It is a well established precept of statutory construction that when two statutes conflict, the more specific controls over the more general. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co., 55 N.J. 336, 339 (l970); State by State Highway Comm'r v. Dilley, 48 N.J. 383, 387 (l967). N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l establishes a detailed procedure whereby aggrieved taxpayers can appeal a property assessment. That statute sets a date by which the taxpayer must file a complaint to a county board of taxation. It also provides a stream-lined procedure for those assessments that exceed $750,000, whereby the taxpayer can appeal directly to the Tax Court.
Conversely, N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.2 provides an extended
limitations period for all civil actions commenced by the State,
except where a limitations provision expressly applies to actions
by the State. That statute does not specifically delineate which
State actions are governed by the statute and which are not.
Rather, that statute applies generally to all State claims not
expressly controlled by other statutory limitation periods.
Since N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l is much more specific than N.J.S.A. 2A:l4-l.2, the former prevails over the latter.
We therefore hold that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 is inapplicable to the State or its constituent parts in challenges to real property tax assessments. The Legislature determined in N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l that aggrieved taxpayers must file their petitions of appeal on or before April l (formerly August l5) of the tax year. We have held that the State is a taxpayer under that statute. Nothing in the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 indicates that the Legislature intended thereby to overturn the otherwise then-accepted conclusion that the State, qua taxpayer, must adhere to the specific limitations periods contained in N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l. Consequently, the State falls within the specific and express limitations period provided in N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l. The general ten-year limitations period granted in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 must yield to the specific period prescribed in N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l.
Transit is an aggrieved taxpayer under N.J.S.A. 54:3-2l
whose petitions of appeal were filed out of time. Therefore,
Transit is liable for those taxes assessed against it during the
tax years 1981 to 1990. The Appellate Division held, pursuant to
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5), that Transit is exempt from taxation
retroactive to October 1, 1981. No one appeals that decision.
Consequently, Transit is only liable for those taxes levied
against it prior to October 1, 1981.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler, Pollock, O'Hern,
and Coleman join in this opinion. Justice Stein has filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
71 September Term 1994
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF SOMERVILLE,
Defendant-Respondent.
STEIN, J., dissenting.
The Court's disposition of this appeal is wrong, not only as
a matter of statutory interpretation, but also because respect
for a coordinate branch of government would dictate a different
result.
The background is both relevant and brief. In a series of
decisions, this Court abolished the ancient common-law rule of
nullum tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against the king). See
Holloway v. State,
125 N.J. 386, 397 (1991); New Jersey Educ.
Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen Partnership,
125 N.J. 66, 69 (1991)
(Gruzen); Devins v. Borough of Bogota,
124 N.J. 570, 579 (1991).
Under the rule of nullum tempus, a governmental entity could
assert its rights at any time without regard to the failure of a
public employee or official to assert a claim within the period
set forth in a statute of limitations. In Gruzen, this Court
abrogated the rule of nullum tempus, effective December 31, 1991,
but commended "the matter to the consideration of the Legislature
for any modification of this disposition in light of the special
needs of governmental agencies." 125 N.J. at 69. Directly in
response to the Court's invitation, the Legislature enacted and
the Governor signed L. 1991, c. 387, § 2, codified at N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1.2. The law provides:
Except where a limitations provision
expressly and specifically applies to actions
commenced by the State or where a longer
limitations period would otherwise apply, and
subject to any statutory provisions or common
law rules extending limitations periods, any
civil action commenced by the State shall be
commenced within ten years next after the
cause of action shall have accrued.
The Senate Judiciary Committee statement accompanying the bill
corroborates the bill's otherwise explicit meaning:
Under the common law doctrine of nullum
tempus, the State and its agencies were
exempt from statutes of limitations generally
applicable in civil actions. In a series of
recent decisions, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has abolished the nullum tempus rule.
The effect of these decisions is to subject
the State to the same limitations periods
applicable to private litigants. This bill
proposes to establish a uniform ten-year
statute of limitations for actions commenced
by governmental entities.
The ten-year period would apply unless
another statute expressly provides a
different period for actions commenced by the
State. As in the case of private litigants,
statutory provisions extending limitations
periods under particular circumstances would
extend the ten-year period where applicable.
The bill would also provide that in no case
would the ten-year period be deemed to have
begun prior to January 1, 1992.
[Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to
Senate Bill No. 3741, at 1 (Dec. 12, 1991)
(emphasis added).]
The narrow issue is whether New Jersey Transit Corporation's
(Transit) tax appeals, untimely under the general tax-appeal
statute, are preserved by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2. The tax-appeal
statute, N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, provides in part:
A taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the
assessed valuation of his property, or
feeling that he is discriminated against by
the assessed valuation of other property in
the county, or a taxing district which may
feel discriminated against by the assessed
valuation of property in the taxing district,
or by the assessed valuation of property in
another taxing district in the county, may on
or before April 1 [August 15 for years prior
to 1992] appeal to the county board of
taxation by filing with it a petition of
appeal . . . .
Transit contends that because the tax-appeal limitations period does not "expressly and specifically" apply to "actions commenced by the State," N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2, the ten-year statute of limitations recently enacted by the legislature necessarily is controlling. The Borough of Somerville (Somerville) argues that although, read literally, the ten-year statute applies to Transit's appeals, the Legislature could not have intended so extended a limitations period to apply to tax appeals, because of its potentially disruptive impact on municipal tax rates. The Attorney General responds that the Legislature intended precisely what the statute provides, and that because virtually all state property is tax exempt, tax appeals by the State and its political subdivisions usually are filed to correct erroneous assessments. In that context, the Attorney General argues, the
ten-year limitations period provides an appropriate safeguard
against improper assessments of exempt property.
The Attorney General's position obviously is correct.
Because State property generally is tax-exempt, the legislative
determination to apply a ten-year limitations period to tax
appeals clearly is plausible. In addition, the meaning of the
newly enacted ten-year limitations statute, passed at this
Court's specific invitation, is crystal clear: the only
exceptions to the ten-year limitations period are those
established by statutes that "expressly and specifically" refer
to the State and its political subdivisions. Among the most
basic principles of statutory construction is that if the
statutory language is clear and the result not inconsistent with
obvious legislative intent, a court should apply the statute as
written. See Midland Ins. Co. v. Colatrella,
102 N.J. 612, 621
(1986) (Stein, J., dissenting); State v. Maguire,
84 N.J. 508,
528 (1980).
The majority strays from that settled rule of statutory
interpretation. The Court justifies its determination that the
ten-year limitations period should not apply to tax appeals by
the State by its conclusory observation that "[f]iling deadlines
in actions contesting local property tax assessments have long
been applied to taxpayer governmental entities." Ante at ___
(slip op. at 9). However, all but one of the cases cited by the
majority to support that proposition involve the application of
filing deadlines to public bodies in their capacities as taxing
districts, and do not involve imposition of filing deadlines to
preclude a public body from challenging an assessment of its own
exempt property. Thus, F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris
Plains,
100 N.J. 418, 424 (1985), Rabstein v. Township of
Princeton,
187 N.J. Super. 18, 24-25 (App. Div. 1982), and
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Borough of Wood-Ridge, 2 N.J. Tax 143,
147-48 (Tax 1981), relied on by the majority, ante at ___ (slip
op. at 9), all involved municipalities that had sought to
increase assessments under appeal by taxpayers but had failed to
file counterclaims or appeals within the time prescribed. (The
only case cited by the majority involving exempt public property
held simply that public bodies must file tax appeals rather than
rely only on statements of exemption filed pursuant to N.J.S.A.
54:4-4.4. See New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Township of Monroe, 2
N.J. Tax 371, 379 (Tax 1981)). See also County of Bergen v.
Borough of Paramus,
79 N.J. 302, 310 (1979) (holding that because
of County's failure to file timely tax appeal to challenge
assessment of property used for public purposes, and in view of
involvement of public bodies and public funds, appeal would be
deemed filed nunc pro tunc and matter remanded to Division of Tax
Appeals).
The majority also expresses its concern that application of
a ten-year limitations period to tax appeals by state agencies
would be disruptive to the budgets of local governments dependent
on the revenues generated from local taxation, concluding that
the Legislature "did not intend such an absurd and chaotic
result." Ante at ___ (slip op. at 11). As noted, the Attorney
General sharply disagrees, expressing confidence that application
of the ten-year limitations period would not disrupt municipal
budgets and that the Legislature intended the new statue to apply
to all civil actions by the State and its political subdivisions,
including tax appeals.
Because the Appellate Division concluded that Transit's
property was exempt from local taxation under federal law,
45 U.S.C.A.
§581(c)(5) retroactively to October 1, 1981, a holding
undisputed by the Court's opinion, ante at ___ (slip op. at 13),
Somerville would be deprived of only a nominal sum if the Court
were to hold that the ten-year limitations period applies to tax
appeals by State entities. That result would have minimal
financial consequences for the parties, would apply as written
the Legislative response to the abolition of nullum tempus
enacted at the Court's specific request, and would permit the
Court to afford the Legislature an opportunity to amend the
statute if indeed the Legislature did not intend for it to apply
to tax appeals. On reflection, the Legislature might agree that
tax appeals by the State should be governed by N.J.S.A. 54:3-21;
it might conclude that a three-year limitations period would be
adequate; or it might adopt the Attorney General's view that a
ten-year limitations period is appropriate. I am uncertain about
the choice the Legislature would make if the issue were posed,
but I am convinced that this appeal presents little if any
justification for the Court to assert a clairvoyance that it
surely does not possess.
I would reverse the Appellate Division judgment to the
extent that it holds that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 does not apply to
tax appeals by the State and its political subdivisions.
NO. A-71 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOROUGH OF SOMERVILLE,
Defendant.
DECIDED April 19, 1995
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Garibaldi
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Stein
Footnote: 1On the application of the Attorney General, the Court stayed the effective date of the ruling through March 1, 1992.