(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 13, 1994 -- Decided November 16, 1994
STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
Heidi Novis was employed as a reservationist for Rosenbluth Travel, primarily at its home office in
Iselin. When required to work out of town, Novis was compensated on an hourly basis that took into
account the time spent traveling from her home or from the Iselin office until she arrived at her hotel or
business destination.
On February 13, 1991, Novis was sent to Windsor, Connecticut to work temporarily at one of
Rosenbluth's branch offices. The Windsor branch office was in a three-story office building. An adjacent
parking lot accommodated the building's tenants, including employees and visitors to the Rosenbluth office.
A sidewalk from the parking lot to a common entry provided the only access to the building.
On February 15th, Novis drove from her hotel to the branch office, parked her car in the office
parking lot and walked toward the building. While walking on the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to
the building's entrance, Novis slipped and fell on snow and ice that had accumulated from the prior evening's
snowfall.
Novis filed a claim petition for workers' compensation benefits. She sought temporary disability
benefits and medical expenses for her injuries, including multiple herniated discs, that she sustained in the
course of her employment. On the basis of the Court's holding in Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.,
the judge of compensation concluded that the accident was not compensable because the employer did not
control the employee during the parking process. The judge also ruled that Novis's injury had not occurred
in the course of her employment since she was not entitled to compensation for time spent traveling out of
town from her hotel to the branch office. Based on those conclusions, the Division of Workers'
Compensation denied benefits.
The Appellate Division reversed, construing this Court's holding in Livingstone to imply that the
statutory requirement that employment begin when an employee arrives at the employer's place of
employment, defined to exclude "areas not under the control of the employer," is satisfied by evidence that
the area in which the employee has arrived (here, the parking lot) was "used" by the employer in the conduct
of its business.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: The Workers' Compensation judge correctly applied Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc. in
concluding that Novis's employment had not begun when she fell on the sidewalk leading to the
building entrance.
1. The facts in Livingstone differ significantly from the facts in this case. In Livingstone, the employer
provided a certain designated area of the parking lot for its employees to park that this Court concluded was
essentially equivalent to "control" by the employer. In this case, Rosenbluth exercised no control over any
portion of the adjacent parking lot; Rosenbluth only shared the lot with the other tenants. Thus, workers'
compensation benefits were correctly denied by the judge of compensation. (pp. 4-6)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, and
GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
28 September Term 1994
HEIDI NOVIS,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
ROSENBLUTH TRAVEL,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued September 13, 1994 -- Decided November 16, 1994
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Robert J. Weinstein argued the cause for
appellant (Marie Rose Bloomer, attorney).
Gregory A. Stathis argued the cause for
respondent (Lombardi and Lombardi,
attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
Repsondent, who had traveled out of town on behalf of her employer, sustained injuries while walking across the only sidewalk leading from an office-building parking lot to the entrance of the office building in which her employer's branch office was located. The Division of Workers' Compensation determined that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of her employment. The Appellate Division reversed in an unreported opinion. We granted certification, ___ N.J. ___ (1994), to consider whether the Appellate Division's holding was
consistent with Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.,
111 N.J. 89 (1988). We reverse.
Respondent, Heidi Novis, worked as a reservationist for appellant, Rosenbluth Travel, primarily at its home office in Iselin. When required to work out of town, Novis was compensated on an hourly basis that took into account the time spent traveling from her home or from the Iselin office until she arrived at her hotel or business destination.
At her employer's request, Novis traveled on February 13, 1991, to Windsor, Connecticut, to work temporarily at appellant's branch office located there. The branch office was in a three-story office building. An adjacent parking lot accommodated the building's tenants, including employees and visitors to the branch office. A sidewalk from the parking lot to a common entry provided the sole access to the building.
Arriving at the branch office on February 13, 1991, Novis worked there the balance of the day and stayed overnight at a local hotel. Novis also worked at the branch office the following day from 8:00 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. On February 15, Novis drove from her hotel intending again to work at the branch office. She parked her car in the office-building lot and walked toward the building. While walking on the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to the building's entrance, Novis slipped and
fell because of snow and ice that had accumulated during a
snowfall the prior evening.
Novis's claim petition sought temporary disability benefits
and medical expenses for her personal injuries, including
multiple herniated discs, sustained in the course of her
employment. The compensation judge observed that "[t]he accident
happened in the parking lot at the Windsor office while
petitioner was in the process of reporting for work. There is no
contention that the employer controlled the employee during the
parking process." Accordingly, the judge concluded on the basis
of our holding in Livingstone, supra,
111 N.J. 89, that the
accident was not compensable. Moreover, focusing on Novis's
status as a traveling employee, the compensation judge also ruled
that Novis's injury had not occurred in the course of employment
because she was not entitled to compensation for time spent
traveling out of town from her hotel to the branch office. Based
on those conclusions, the Division of Workers' Compensation
denied benefits.
Reversing, the Appellate Division construed our holding in
Livingstone to imply that the statutory requirement that
employment commence when an employee arrives at the "employer's
place of employment," defined to exclude "areas not under the
control of the employer," N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, is satisfied by
evidence that the area at which the employee has arrived, here
the parking lot, was "used" by the employer in the conduct of its
business. Relying on Ehrlich v. Strawbridge & Clothier,
260 N.J. Super. 89, 91 (App. Div. 1992), the court concluded that
"[t]he fact that [Novis's] employer did not own, maintain, nor
have the exclusive use of this area of the parking lot in which
the plaintiff was injured was irrelevant to the finding of
compensability."
The Appellate Division has overstated the effect of our
holding in Livingstone. As another panel of that court pointedly
has observed: "It is time to recognize that the 'going and
coming rule' has come and gone. It was not resurrected * * * by
the 'spirit of Livingstone.'" Serrano v. Apple Container,
236 N.J. Super. 216, 221 (1989).
The facts in Livingstone differ significantly from those
that control the outcome of this appeal. Abraham & Straus, the
employer in Livingstone, had directed its employees to park at
the outermost edge of the shopping-mall parking lot, although it
neither owned nor leased that portion of the lot for its
exclusive use. Rather, as part of its agreement with the mall's
owner, Abraham & Straus was entitled to share with other tenants
general access to the mall's parking facilities. The directive
was intended to assure that the more convenient parking spaces in
the mall were reserved for customers of Abraham & Straus, and the
undisputed testimony demonstrated that customers rarely, if ever,
had sought access to the remote parking spaces designated for
Abraham & Straus employees. In that specific context, we
concluded that Abraham & Straus's appropriation of the designated
area of the mall lot for its employees' use was the essential
equivalent of "control":
The obvious fact in this record is that
Abraham & Straus had the power to designate
an otherwise under-used area of the shopping
center parking lot for use by its employees.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
portion of the lot designated by Abraham &
Straus for its employees' use was effectively
equivalent to an employer-owned lot. In this
context, the 'control' standard set forth in
the statute is fully satisfied: not only did
Abraham & Straus have the ability to direct
its employees to park in the designated area;
it also had the power to appropriate this far
corner of the lot to its own use, and did so.
Neither customers of the center nor other
tenants of the center contested its use of
the area. Even though Abraham & Straus
lacked control in the formal property law
sense, it possessed, factually, almost the
identical attributes of control, which are
sufficient to satisfy the principles
underlying the statute.
* * * *
Furthermore, by requiring its employees
to park in a distant section of the lot, in
order that customers could enjoy the
convenience of parking adjacent to Abraham &
Straus, appellant caused its employees to be
exposed to an added hazard, on a daily basis,
in order to enhance its business interests.
In our view, it is entirely consistent with
the fundamental purposes of workers'
compensation legislation that appellant
assume responsibility for injuries thus
sustained.
In contrast, appellant exercised no control over any portion of the parking lot adjacent to the office building in which its
branch office was located. Appellant simply shared the lot with
the other tenants, a circumstance vastly different from the
specific facts that influenced our holding in Livingstone. On
this record, the compensation judge correctly applied Livingstone
in concluding that respondent's employment had not commenced when
she fell on the sidewalk leading to the building entrance.
Judgment reversed.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Garibaldi join in this opinion.
NO. A-28 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
HEIDI NOVIS,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
ROSENBLUTH TRAVEL,
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED November 16, 1994
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Stein
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY