(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued May 2, 2000 -- Decided July 25, 2000
PER CURIAM
The issue in this appeal is whether, pursuant to the Court's decision in Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital,
158 N.J. 404 (1999), the plaintiff has asserted a sustainable cause of action under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA) , N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, when his negative characterization of his co-employees' conduct occurred in the course of
testimony to representatives of the Prosecutor's and the Attorney General's offices.
In 1991, plaintiff, Peter DeLisa, was hired as an investigator in the Bergen County Prosecutor's office by then
Prosecutor John J. Fahy. In August 1994, Deputy Chief of Investigators Ed Denning and Lieutenant of Investigators
Michael Carlino were charged by the Bergen County Prosecutor's office with theft by deception and official misconduct for
allegedly using their official positions to exercise individually the right to purchase three vehicles leased to the Bergen
County Narcotics Task Force. At his request, the State Division of Criminal Justice superseded the Prosecutor in the
conduct of the ensuing investigation.
Thereafter, DeLisa was ordered by one of his superiors to meet with and provide testimony to investigators from
the Prosecutor's and the Attorney General's office concerning the charges against Denning and Carlino. DeLisa's testimony
allegedly supported those charges. Subsequently, however, the Division of Criminal Justice declined to prosecute Denning
and Carlino, but informed Prosecutor Fahy that the evidence might provide grounds for administrative action. Fahy
disagreed with that conclusion, emphasizing that DeLisa's testimony provided a basis for a criminal prosecution. That
notwithstanding, no criminal prosecution ensued and Fahy filed administrative charges against Denning and Carlino.
Subsequently, in March 1995, Fahy resigned as prosecutor. At some point, Denning resigned and the
administrative charges against him were dismissed. The administrative proceeding against Carlino was resolved on March
9, 1995 when he pled guilty to a charge of Neglect of Duty. Acting Prosecutor Charles Buckley reinstated Carlino to duty
effective December 6, 1994, fining him approximately $16,500, representing lost pay up until then. He then awarded him
back pay for the period between his reinstatement (December 6, 1994) and the date of his plea (March 9, 1995). Denning
and Carlino later filed a civil action against Bergen County that was settled by the payment of $125,000 to each of them.
DeLisa was discharged in March 1996. Ultimately, he filed suit against the County, the Office of the Prosecutor,
Buckley, and other individual defendants, maintaining that Buckley and other employees of the Prosecutor's Office engaged
in a series of retaliatory actions against him commencing in May 1995 and continuing until his discharge, and that those
retaliatory acts and his ultimate discharge were causally related to his participation as a witness in the investigation of the
charges against Denning and Carlino. Buckley and the other defendants contended that DeLisa was discharged for good
cause arising, among other things, out his allegedly false testimony in a criminal trial about the circumstances of his
resignation from a prior position, which arguably prejudiced the presentation of the prosecution's case.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the Law Division on the basis of the
Appellate Division's disposition in Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital,
307 N.J. Super. 277 (1998) (Higgins I). In that
case, the Appellate Division had reasoned that, absent employer complicity, CEPA does not protect an employee who
complains about misconduct of co-employees. Concluding that there had been no condonation or ratification of Denning's
and Carlino's actions by the Bergen County Prosecutor, the Law Division determined that DeLisa's CEPA claim must be
dismissed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's grant of summary judgment dismissing DeLisa's complaint,
holding that he had not alleged a cause of action under CEPA because his testimony did not involve misconduct by his
employer as is literally required by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3b, the subsection of CEPA that deals with testimony before public
investigatory bodies.
The Supreme Court granted DeLisa's petition for certification.
HELD: The Conscientious Employee Protection Act's protection against employer retaliation extends to employees who
communicate information either to employers or to public bodies concerning co-employee misconduct encompassed by
N.J.S.A. 39:19-3.
1. CEPA's expansive protection does not depend on a strict parsing of employer and employee conduct. As long as a
reasonable basis exists for a complaint about misconduct, whether of the employer or of a co-employee, the complaining
employee should not be exposed to retaliation by the employer. (pp. 7-11)
2. A construction of CEPA that would protect against employer retaliation an employee who communicated to the employer
an objection concerning a co-employee's criminal conduct, but would not protect that same employee if he or she testified
before a public body investigating the co-employee's criminal conduct, would be anomalous. (p. 11)
3. Statutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is to be presumed; the spirit of
the law should control where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result. (pp. 11-12)
4. CEPA's protection against employer retaliation extends to employees who communicate information either to employers
or to public bodies concerning co-employee misconduct encompassed by N.J.S.A. 39:19-3.
5. There being no allegation of discrimination, if DeLisa's discharge did not violate CEPA, his discharge was lawful
because he served at the will of the Prosecutor. (pp. 12-13)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for
further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.
JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in this PER CURIAM opinion. CHIEF
JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
71 September Term 1999
PETER DeLISA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF BERGEN,
Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff-
Respondent,
and
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
CHARLES BUCKLEY, ACTING
PROSECUTOR FOR BERGEN COUNTY;
JAMES TOBIN; RICHARD MUTI;
FRANK CILENTO and ALAN GRIECO,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Third Party Defendant-
Respondent.
Argued May 2, 2000 -- Decided July 25, 2000
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at
326 N.J. Super. 32 (1999).
Kevin M. Kiernan argued the cause for
appellant (McDonough, Kiernan & Campbell,
attorneys).
J.S. Lee Cohen argued the cause for
respondents Office of the Prosecutor,
Charles Buckley, Acting Prosecutor for
Bergen County, James Tobin, Richard Muti,
Frank Cilento and Alan Grieco (DeCotiis,
Fitzpatrick & Gluck, attorneys).
Barbara H. Parker, Assistant County Counsel,
submitted a brief on behalf of the County of
Bergen (Elizabeth E. Randall, County
Counsel, attorney).
Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Attorney General,
submitted a brief on behalf of the State of
New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney
General, attorney).
Juan C. Fernandez, Essex County Counsel,
submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae, County of Essex.
PER CURIAM
In Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital,
158 N.J. 404, 408
(1999), the critical issue was “whether the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, prohibits
an employer from retaliating against an employee who 'blows the
whistle' on a co-employee.” We held that “[a]s long as a
reasonable basis exists for a complaint about misconduct, whether
of the employer or of a co-employee, the complaining employee
should not be exposed to retaliation by the employer.” Higgins,
supra, 158 N.J. at 425.
In this matter the complaining employee did not complain to
his employer, the Bergen County Prosecutor (Prosecutor), about
the misconduct of co-employees. Rather, plaintiff alleges, and
the allegation is undisputed, that he was directed by his
employer to meet with investigators from the Prosecutor's office
and the Attorney General's office to answer questions and provide
testimony that supported criminal charges previously filed by the
Prosecutor's office against two co-employees of the Prosecutor's
office, Ed Denning and Michael Carlino. Plaintiff alleges that
he was retaliated against and discharged by his employer as a
direct result of the testimony that he provided concerning
Denning and Carlino.
The legal issue is whether, pursuant to our decision in
Higgins, plaintiff has asserted a sustainable cause of action
under CEPA notwithstanding that his negative characterization of
his co-employees' conduct occurred in the course of testimony to
representatives of the Prosecutor's and Attorney General's
offices. The Appellate Division, in a reported opinion, DeLisa
v. County of Bergen,
326 N.J. Super. 32 (1999), affirmed the Law
Division's grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint,
holding that plaintiff had not alleged a cause of action under
CEPA because his testimony did not involve misconduct by his
employer as is literally required by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3b, the
subsection of CEPA that deals with testimony before public
investigatory bodies. DeLisa, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 39.
We now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and
remand the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings.
The facts material to the issue before us may briefly be summarized. In 1991 plaintiff was hired as an investigator in the Bergen County Prosecutor's office by then Prosecutor John J. Fahy.
In August 1994 Deputy Chief of Investigators Ed Denning and Lieutenant of Investigators Michael Carlino were charged by the Bergen County Prosecutor with theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20 4c) and official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2). The allegations supporting those charges were that Denning and Carlino used their official positions to exercise individually the right to purchase three vehicles leased to the Bergen County Narcotics Task Force (BCNTF or Task Force). Pursuant to the lease agreement, the Task Force held the option to purchase the vehicles at the end of the lease term.
At Prosecutor Fahy's request, the State Division of Criminal Justice superceded the Prosecutor in the conduct of the ensuing investigation. In August 1994 plaintiff was ordered by one of his superiors to meet with and provide testimony to investigators from the Prosecutor's and Attorney General's office concerning the charges against Denning and Carlino. Plaintiff alleges that his testimony supported those charges and indicated that Denning attempted to influence the award of the bid for new leased vehicles in an effort to facilitate his plan to purchase a vehicle for his daughter covered by the expiring lease agreement. Subsequently, the Division of Criminal Justice declined to prosecute Denning and Carlino, but informed prosecutor Fahy that the evidence might provide grounds for administrative action. Fahy disagreed with that conclusion, emphasizing that plaintiff's testimony provided a basis for a criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, no prosecution ensued and Fahy filed administrative charges against both Denning and Carlino.
After Fahy resigned as prosecutor in March 1995, defendant Charles Buckley became the Acting Prosecutor. In the interim, Denning had resigned and the administrative charges against him were dismissed. The administrative proceeding against Carlino was resolved on March 9, 1995 when he pled guilty to a charge of Neglect of Duty. Buckley reinstated Carlino to duty effective December 6, 1994, fined him approximately $16,500 representing lost pay from August 5 to December 5, 1994, and then awarded him back pay for the period between December 5, 1994 and the date of Carlino's plea.
Denning and Carlino later filed a civil action against Bergen County that was settled by the payment of $125,000 to each of them.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in a series of retaliatory actions against him commencing in May 1995 and continuing until his discharge in March 1996, and that those retaliatory acts and his ultimate discharge were causally connected to his participation as a witness in the investigation of the charges against Denning and Carlino. Defendants allege that plaintiff was discharged for good cause arising out of events completely unrelated to plaintiff's participation in the Denning and Carlino investigation. Defendants support the discharge primarily on the basis of plaintiff's allegedly false testimony in a criminal trial about the circumstances of his resignation from a prior position with the Broward County (Florida) Sheriff's Office that arguably prejudiced the presentation of the prosecution's case. In addition, defendants point to plaintiff's strained relationship with two local police departments, his imprudent conduct in revealing his status as an investigator over the Internet, and a variety of other past indiscretions that, according to defendants, cumulatively provided an independent explanation for his discharge.
The Law Division, relying on the Appellate Division's disposition in Higgins, see Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital, 307 N.J. Super. 277 (1998) (Higgins I), granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. In Higgins I, the Appellate Division reasoned that, absent employer complicity, CEPA does not protect an employee who complains about misconduct of co employees. Concluding that there had been no condonation or ratification of Denning's and Carlino's actions by the Bergen County Prosecutor, the Law Division determined that plaintiff's CEPA claim must be dismissed. The Law Division observed, however, that if its interpretation of CEPA were incorrect, there was sufficient evidence in the record from which “a rational fact finder could conclude that the proffered reasons [for plaintiff's discharge] were, in fact, not the real motivating reasons.”
As noted, the Appellate Division, applying this Court's decision in Higgins, supra, 158 N.J. 404, concluded that plaintiff's CEPA claim was properly dismissed.
In Higgins, supra, 158 N.J. at 419, the Court's opinion
focused first on the provisions of N.J.S.A. 34:19-3, which, in
relevant part, provides:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory
action against an employee because the
employee does any of the following:
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose
to a supervisor or to a public body an
activity, policy or practice of the
employer that the employee reasonably
believes is in violation of a law, or a
rule or regulation promulgated pursuant
to law . . .;
b. Provides information to, or testifies
before, any public body conducting an
investigation, hearing or inquiry into
any violation of law, or a rule or
regulation promulgated pursuant to law
by the employer . . .; or
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate
in any activity, policy or practice
which the employee reasonably believes:
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule
or regulation promulgated pursuant to
law . . .;
(2) is fraudulent or criminal; or
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate
of public policy concerning the public
health, safety or welfare . . . .
We noted that although subsections a and b of the statute
referred only to employer misconduct, subsection c, was not so
limited. Higgins, supra, 158 N.J. at 419. Accordingly, we
observed:
A plain reading of the statute suggests
that the CEPA covers employees who object to
the conduct of co-workers. The term "any" in
subsection "c" indicates that the statute
applies regardless of the source of the
activity, policy or practice. Although
subsections "a" and "b" limit the statute's
application to policies, practices and
activities "of" or "by" "the employer,"
subsection "c" contains no such limitation.
The omission of the phrase "of the employer"
in subsection "c" is too obvious to ignore.
[Ibid.]
The Court proceeded to consider the legislative history of
CEPA, id. at 420, the underlying legislative purpose, id. at 420
21, and interpretations of whistleblower statutes by other courts
throughout the country, id. at 422-24. We noted that the
whistleblower statutes of several states “expressly protect
employees who object to co-employees' activities.” Id. at 423.
We also referred to decisions in Illinois and Massachusetts
recognizing a common-law cause of action on behalf of employees
who are terminated for reporting to a public authority the
illegal activities of a co-worker. Id. at 423-24 (citing
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill.
1986), and Shea v. Emmanuel College,
682 N.E.2d 1348 (Mass.
1997)).
Relying on our review of the statutory purpose, CEPA's
legislative history and precedents from other jurisdictions, we
expressed a generalized conclusion that CEPA's expansive
protection did not “depend on a strict parsing of employer and
employee conduct.” Id. at 421. We held that “[a]s long as a
reasonable basis exists for a complaint about misconduct, whether
of the employer or of a co-employee, the complaining employee
should not be exposed to retaliation by the employer.” Id. at
425. The Court explained:
Misconduct of employees, like that of
employers, can threaten the public health,
safety, and welfare. Especially in hospitals
and other health care institutions, a
practice of a co-employee, like that of the
employer, can threaten the health and safety
of patients. For example, a paramedic's
theft of patient medication, whether or not
condoned by the hospital, could undermine
public health. Sometimes, moreover, only an
employee can bring a co-employee's wrongdoing
to the attention of the employer or a public
agency. If left unprotected, employees who
otherwise would complain about a co-employee
might hesitate to come forward out of fear of
retribution. A vindictive employer could
resent disruption in the workplace or the
disclosure of improper practices within the
organization. In this context, "reporting a
fellow employee's violation . . . is not so
different from traditional notions of
whistleblowing." Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid,
Inc.,
443 Mich. 68,
503 N.W.2d 645, 648
(1993).
Nothing indicates that the Legislature
intended that the CEPA's expansive protection
should depend on a strict parsing of employer
and employee conduct. "The Legislature
obviously intended to provide a comprehensive
and effective cause of action for retaliatory
discharge.” [Young v. Schering Corp.,
141 N.J. 16, 26 (1995)]. A solitary employee may
not be able to determine whether an illegal
activity is the isolated act of a single
co-employee or a systemic practice. When an
employee complains of the wrongdoing, he or
she may not know whether the employer will
condone the act. Failure to protect
complaining employees therefore will inhibit
them from reporting practices for which they
reasonably believe their employer is
responsible.
[Id. at 421 (emphasis added).]
Although the claim in Higgins fell under subsection c of the
statute, the provision that makes no distinction between
employers and employees, our decision in Higgins obviously was
designed to afford the broadest protection under CEPA to
employees retaliated against for objecting to the misconduct of
co-employees. A construction of the whistleblower statute that
would protect against employer retaliation an employee who
communicated to the employer an objection concerning a co
employee's criminal conduct, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c, but would not
protect that same employee if he or she testified before a public
body investigating the co-employee's criminal conduct, see
N.J.S.A. 34:19-3b, surely would be anomalous.
A settled principle is that “statutes are to be read
sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative
intent is to be presumed as 'consonant to reason and good
direction.'” Schierstead v. City of Brigantine,
29 N.J. 220, 230
(1959) (quoting Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Central R.R. Co.,
16 N.J. Eq. 419, 428 (Ch. 1863). We also have observed that the
spirit of the law should control “where a literal interpretation
would create a manifestly absurd result.” Turner v. First Union
Nat'l Bank,
162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999). Moreover, we expressly noted
in Higgins, supra, that sometimes “only an employee can bring a
co-employee's wrongdoing to the attention of the employer or a
public agency.” Id. at 421 (emphasis added). That language
clearly reflects our belief that CEPA's protection against
employer retaliation extends to employees who communicate
information either to employers or public bodies concerning co
employee misconduct encompassed by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.
In view of our conclusion about the correct interpretation
of our holding in Higgins, we reverse the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants. Although the Law Division found
that a rational fact finder could conclude that the non
retaliatory reasons for discharging plaintiff were pretextual, we
express no view whatsoever on that issue. Consistent with our
opinion in Golden v. County of Union,
163 N.J. 420, 433 (2000),
“so long as his actions are not invidiously discriminatory or
contrary to some other pertinent law, the prosecutor may
discharge plaintiff without a formal hearing, in keeping with the
at-will relationship established by statute.” (Emphasis added).
See N.J.S.A. 2A:157-10. Accordingly, there being no allegation
of discrimination, if plaintiff's discharge did not violate CEPA
his discharge is lawful because he served at the will of the
Prosecutor.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division and remand the matter to the Law Division for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in
this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA did not
participate.
NO. A-71 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
PETER DeLISA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF BERGEN,
Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff-Respondent,
and
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
et al.,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Third Party Defendant-
Respondent.
DECIDED July 25, 2000
Justice Stein PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY