(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 2, 2001 -- Decided February 27, 2001
Long, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the defense conceded that plaintiff suffered a knee injury in the
automobile accident at issue in this litigation and, if so, whether the single jury interrogatory addressing proximate
cause improperly skewed the outcome of the case.
In December 1992, plaintiff was stopped in traffic in her automobile when she was struck from behind by
the defendant. Damage to plaintiff's car was minimal, but plaintiff testified at trial that the force of the impact thrust
her forward and then back very heavily against the headrest. The collision also caused her knee to strike the steering
column. She did not complain of injuries to police officers at the scene of the accident and the police report
indicated no injuries. After two days, plaintiff reported to the emergency room complaining of soreness in her neck
and back and pain in her right knee. An orthopaedist diagnosed plaintiff with a contusion and synovitis of the right
knee. After eight months of treatment, plaintiff began to experience more severe pain in her legs and arms. After
seeing another orthopaedist, plaintiff was diagnosed with Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy, a nerve disorder.
Additionally, arthroscopic surgery was performed on plaintiff's right knee in November 1994 to address persistent
pain. She experienced some relief from the knee pain, but continued to suffer neck and back pain.
Plaintiff filed suit. At trial, the defendant conceded that he was negligent in causing the accident. Plaintiff
presented expert testimony on her claim that she suffered three distinct injuries as a result of the collision. These
injuries were 1) torn cartilage of the right knee requiring surgery; 2) two herniated cervical discs; and 3) Reflex
Sympathetic Dystrophy. Defendant's experts agreed that plaintiff suffered from cervical disc herniations, but opined
that they were unrelated to the accident. The defense experts also disputed the diagnosis of Reflex Sympathetic
Dystrophy. In respect of the knee injury, the defendant's expert orthopaedist opined that while plaintiff may have
suffered an injury at some point, there was no permanent impairment and the knee was now normal. On cross
examination, the expert did not dispute plaintiff suffered the knee injury as a result of the accident, nor would he
opine that the surgery was unnecessary. Finally, the defense attorney stated in his summation that he had no
evidence to dispute that the accident caused plaintiff's knee injury and that the injury was, in fact, associated with the
accident. However, he argued that the surgery corrected the knee injury so that she was not permanently injured.
The trial court submitted a single interrogatory to the jury: “Did the defendant's negligence proximately
cause damage to [plaintiff]?” The jury answered “no” to that question, and thus returned a no-cause verdict in favor
of the defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, contending that the issue of proximate cause of the knee injury
should have been removed from the jury's consideration because the defense expert conceded it. The trial court
found that the expert had not made a concession and that there was no miscarriage of justice.
On appeal, plaintiff argued, in part, that: 1) the trial court erred in submitting an ambiguous single
interrogatory to the jury; and 2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that proximate cause was no longer
an issue in respect of plaintiff's knee injury. The Appellate Division found that the jury was not misled by the
interrogatory, plaintiff never asked for a directed verdict on the knee injury, and neither defense counsel nor the
defense experts conceded that the knee injury and surgery were causally related to the accident.
HELD: The record clearly establishes that the defense conceded that plaintiff sustained a knee injury in the accident
that was successfully repaired by surgery. Where, as here, plaintiff advanced three distinct injuries from the
accident, the existence of only two of which defendant disputed, the single jury interrogatory was inadequate and a
new trial is required.
1. Although plaintiff's counsel could have moved for a directed verdict on the issue of the knee injury, she was
not compelled to do so and any evidential concession should have been flagged for the jury. (Pp. 9-10).
2. A concession can be inferred from the record. The defense expert did not contest that plaintiff suffered a
knee injury in the accident, nor did he opine that the surgery was not necessary. He further agreed that there was
nothing in the record to suggest that the knee injury was not related to the accident. While that testimony may not
rise to the level of a concession, it was placed into higher relief by defense counsel's remarks on summation. A
reasonable juror could only conclude from those remarks that defendant conceded that plaintiff sustained a knee
injury in the accident that was successfully repaired by surgery. Moreover, no exception was made to plaintiff's
summation, in which plaintiff's counsel informed the jury that the defense expert admitted the knee injury was
caused by the accident and the surgery was the result of that injury. Finally, the trial court's instructions noted that
defendant did not deny that plaintiff sustained an injury from the accident, but merely disputed its nature, extent and
permanency. As such, everyone at trial understood that there was no contest over the fact that plaintiff sustained an
injury to her knee during the accident. (Pp. 10-13).
3. No objection was made to the single jury interrogatory, “Did defendant's negligence proximately cause
damage to [plaintiff]?” As such, the plain error standard applies and the interrogatory will withstand attack unless it
was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Interrogatories are not grounds for reversal unless they were
misleading, confusing or ambiguous. They must also be considered in the context of the charge as a whole since an
accurate and thorough jury charge may cure the potential for confusion that may be present in an interrogatory. (Pp.
13-14).
4. Plaintiff claimed three distinct injuries and only the knee injury was conceded. In considering the two non-
conceded injuries, the jury had to decide four different questions: did the injuries exist, were they were caused by the
accident, the extent of the injuries, and what amount would compensate the plaintiff. In contrast, the jury was only
required to determine the extent and damages of the conceded knee injury. The single interrogatory was inadequate
to alert the jury to its differentiated task. (Pp. 14-15).
5. Where there are multiple allegations, multiple interrogatories are the best way to focus the jury's attention
on the details of the case. Multiple interrogatories also aid in ascertaining, with some degree of specificity, what the
jury has actually determined. As a corollary, a trial judge should eliminate from disposition matters that are not truly
in contest to assist the jury and to avoid unnecessary effort and possible confusion. Not every single case requires
finely diced interrogatories. In a situation such as this one, however, where the plaintiff advanced three distinct
injuries from the accident, only two of which were disputed, the trial court should have created interrogatories that
reflected the concession regarding the knee injury and detailed the distinct approach that was required of the jury as a
result of the defendant's defenses to the different claims. Here, there is no way to be sure whether the jury simply
misunderstood the concession regarding the knee injury or whether it was confused by being required to render a
global answer to questions needing individual and potentially different responses. Because it is impossible to
ascertain what happened and localize the error, a new trial is required. (Pp. 15-16).
The Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for a new trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI
join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
133 September Term 1999
KAREN L. PONZO and JOSEPH C.
PONZO, her husband,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CHRISTOPHER K. PELLE,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 2, 2001 B Decided February 27, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court
Appellate Division.
Bruce H. Nagel argued the cause for appellants (Nagel
Rice Dreifuss & Mazie, attorneys; Mr. Nagel and Susan F.
Connors, on the brief).
Harry D. Norton, Jr., argued the cause for respondent
(Norton, Arpert, Sheehy & Higgins, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LONG, J.
In December 1992, plaintiff Karen Ponzo was stopped in
traffic in her vehicle when she was struck from behind by a
vehicle driven by defendant Christopher Pelle. Ponzo sued Pelle
for negligence. Her husband Joseph Ponzo sued per quod. A five-
day trial took place after which a jury returned a no cause
verdict in favor of Pelle. Ponzo's motion for a new trial was
denied. She appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the
judgment entered upon the jury verdict. We granted certification
and now reverse.
I
The evidence is as follows: As a result of the collision
between Pelle's car and her own, Ponzo's car struck the car in
front of her, resulting in minimal damage. Ponzo testified that
the “force of the impact was so hard that [she] went forward and
came back very heavy against the headrest” and that the collision
caused her knee to strike the steering column. She was “badly
shaken up” by the accident, but did not appear injured at the
scene. In fact, she did not complain of any injuries to police
officers who interviewed her upon arriving at the scene and the
police report indicates that the accident resulted in no
injuries. Ponzo did not seek medical attention on the day of the
accident.
Two days later, she reported to the emergency room of St.
Anthony's Hospital complaining of “soreness” and pain in her
right knee. She sought follow-up care from Dr. Paul Glicksman,
an orthopaedist. Ponzo told Dr. Glicksman that she was
experiencing soreness in her neck and back, as well as pain in
her knee. Dr. Glicksman diagnosed a contusion and synovitisSee footnote 11 of
the right knee, sent Ponzo for an MRI and prescribed medication
to address any inflammation in her knee. Ponzo then began seeing
a chiropractor, Dr. Lisa Bloom.
She received treatment for her injuries for a period of
eight months with little relief. She also began to experience
more severe and debilitating pain in her legs and arms. Thus, in
approximately March 1994, Ponzo decided to seek medical attention
from Dr. Kim Sloan, another orthopaedist. Dr. Sloan sent Ponzo
to Dr. J. Choi, who diagnosed her with Reflex Sympathetic
Dystrophy (RSD), a nerve disorder that causes hypersensitivity to
pain. Dr. Choi subsequently performed nerve blocks and placed
Ponzo on a physical therapy program. In July 1994, Ponzo left
her job as a legal secretary and began to collect disability
insurance.
Ponzo's knee pain persisted and Dr. Sloan performed
arthroscopic surgery on her right knee in November 1994. After
the surgery, Ponzo felt “some relief” from the pain in her knee
but continued to experience neck and back pain. Thus, she sought
further treatment from a neurosurgeon, a psychologist, a physical
therapist, and her family physician.
During the trial, at which Pelle conceded that he was
negligent in causing the accident, Ponzo claimed that she
suffered three distinct injuries as a result of the collision:
(1) torn cartilage of the right knee, requiring arthroscopic
surgery, (2) two herniated cervical discs, and (3) RSD.
At trial, Ponzo presented expert testimony from Dr. Herbie
Sicherman, an orthopaedic surgeon, who opined that as a result of
the accident she suffered an injury to her right knee requiring
surgery, two cervical disc herniations, and RSD. More
particularly, Dr. Sicherman testified that, as a result of the
accident, Ponzo suffered bruising and swelling in her right knee
that caused some “loose bodies” (little chunks of cartilage) to
appear. Dr. Sicherman indicated that surgery was appropriate to
repair that knee injury. Dr. Sicherman also testified that
Ponzo's injuries were permanent in nature, making her totally
disabled for the purpose of performing any significant work.
On cross-examination, Dr. Sicherman acknowledged that an MRI of
Ponzo's knee was reported as normal by two different doctors,
Dr. Glicksman and a radiologist who examined the results of the
MRI.
Pelle offered the testimony of two physicians, Dr. Robert
Goldstone and Dr. Aaron Rabin. Dr. Goldstone, an orthopaedist,
conceded that Ponzo suffered from cervical disc herniations, but
opined that those injuries were unrelated to the accident. Dr.
Goldstone also disputed the RSD diagnosis because he was unable
to find any objective evidence of that condition. Dr. Goldstone
believed that the pain Ponzo was experiencing was due largely to
psychological factors. Regarding the knee injury, Dr. Goldstone,
who examined Ponzo after her arthroscopic surgery, testified that
“[s]he may have suffered an injury prior to the time I saw her,”
but there was no permanent impairment. He further stated that
the “examination of the knee which I carried out was entirely
normal.” On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred
between plaintiff's counsel and Dr. Goldstone:
Q: Now, let me just maybe clear this up before we go
any further. There were reports and there were, well,
certainly there were reports from numerous parties that
Mrs. Ponzo had suffered an injury to her right knee as
a result of the motor vehicle collision that occurred
on December 24, 1992; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you have any dispute with that?
A: No.
Q: So _ and there certainly are reports that indicated
that Dr. Sloan performed arthroscopic surgery on the
right knee of Miss Ponzo, are you familiar with that?
A: Yes.
Q: Was there anything that you saw in any of the
reports that indicated that the surgery performed by
Dr. Sloan was not necessary or in any other way
inappropriate?
A: No.
Q: So that it would be safe for me to say, based on a
reasonable medical certainty, that Miss Ponzo suffered
an injury to her right knee as a result of the motor
vehicle accident of December 24, 1992 and had surgery
as a result of those injuries performed by Dr. Sloan?
A: That was a complex question. Certainly I
acknowledge, if I can take it apart. I certainly
acknowledge she had surgery by Dr. Sloan. Basically, I
can only say that I found no reason to state with a
reasonable degree of medical probability that there was
no relationship.
Q: So there would be nothing based on either the
reports you reviewed or your examination or any other
material you're aware of that indicate the injuries
that Mrs. Ponzo suffered today were not related to the
accident of December 4, 1992.
A: That's correct.
Pelle also presented the testimony of Dr. Rabin, a
neurologist. Dr. Rabin testified that his examination of Ponzo
revealed no evidence of a permanent neurological injury resulting
from the automobile accident. Dr. Rabin disputed the diagnosis
of RSD and the existence of herniated cervical discs. Dr. Rabin
also stated that he found no neurological evidence of an injury
to the knee, but he deferred to the opinion of an orthopaedist
for a more definitive determination.
In summation, defense counsel stated:
But then we get to the next step. We
get to the medical aspect of things, because
again _ I guess there's an expression, at
least I try to teach my kids this, that first
impressions are the best impressions. Well,
in this particular case I submit to you that
what occurred in this particular case was
exactly as was diagnosed by Dr. Glicksman in
his very initial report, in his very initial
examination of Mrs. Ponzo.
He indicated that she suffered a
contusion and synovitis of the right knee,
and he also indicated, and you know this
through the testimonies of the various
doctors, that he indicated a sprain of the
lumbosacral area. That is what he diagnosed.
He went on:
Let's turn to the knee. The knee,
assuming for argument's sake, and we have
nothing to dispute it, folks. I'm going to
tell you at the end again and again that it
was associated with this accident. Dr. Sloan
did a great job. Dr. Sloan did an
arthroscopic procedure and took care of the
knee.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court stated:
In this case, the defendant has not denied
that he was negligent. It's also my
understanding that the defendant does not
deny that Karen Ponzo sustained an injury
from the accident. The defendant, however,
contests the nature and extent of the injury
or injuries, and the defendant maintains that
any injury is not permanent, and that Karen
Ponzo is not totally disabled from gainful
employment.
Thereafter, the trial court submitted a single interrogatory
to the jury: “Did the defendant's negligence proximately cause
damage to Karen Ponzo?” The jury answered “no” to that question
and thus returned a verdict of no cause for action in favor of
Pelle. Ponzo moved for a new trial, contending that the issue of
proximate cause of the knee injury should have been removed from
the jury's consideration because of an alleged concession by Dr.
Goldstone. The trial court found that Dr. Goldstone had not made
a concession and that there was no miscarriage of justice.
On appeal, Ponzo raised the following issues: (1) the trial
court erred in submitting an ambiguous single interrogatory to
the jury; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the
jury that proximate cause was no longer an issue concerning the
injury to Ponzo's knee; (3) remarks by defense counsel during his
summation required a new trial; and (4) the trial court
improperly denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The Appellate Division considered the jury charge as a whole
and held that the jury was not misled by the interrogatory.
Although “it was undisputed that plaintiff struck her knee on
some part of the interior of her car and experienced some
swelling and pain for a period of time after the accident” and
that plaintiff “underwent an arthroscopic procedure in November
1994 to repair cartilage in the knee,” the Appellate Division
held that Ponzo never requested a directed verdict regarding the
knee injury, and that “neither defense counsel nor defendant's
medical witnesses ever conceded that the cartilage damage and the
1994 repair were causally related to the December 1992 accident.”
Thus, the panel found that the issue of proximate causation
should not have been removed from the jury as “[t]he jury was
still required to assess the strength of the opinion regarding
causation proffered by plaintiff's expert witness.” The panel
did note that one segment of defense counsel's summation could,
when viewed by itself, be construed as an admission that Ponzo's
surgery was related to the accident but explained that when the
summation was considered in its entirety, “defendant made no such
concession.” The court rejected Ponzo's remaining arguments as
without merit.
II
We fully agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that
Ponzo's challenge to defense counsel's summation is lacking in
merit. R.2:11-3(e)(1)(e). Accordingly, this appeal implicates
two primary issues: Whether there was a concession that Ponzo
suffered a knee injury in the accident; and if so, whether the
single jury interrogatory improperly skewed the outcome of the
case.
A.
We turn first to the question whether Pelle conceded that
Ponzo sustained an injury in the accident. Preliminarily, we
disagree with the notion suggested by the the Appellate Division
that Ponzo was required to seek a directed verdict on that issue
or forego it altogether. Ponzo might well have made such a
motion, but she was not compelled to do so and, if there was an
evidential concession, the issue should have been flagged for the
jury.
Although this record is not a model of clarity, such a
concession clearly is inferable. Dr. Goldstone did not contest
that Ponzo suffered a knee injury in the accident, nor did he
opine that the arthroscopy was not necessary. Indeed, he agreed
that there was “nothing” in the record to suggest that the knee
injury Ponzo suffered was not related to the accident or to
controvert Dr. Glicksman's initial diagnosis of contusion and
synovitis. That testimony, standing alone, may not rise to the
level of a concession. However, it was placed into higher relief
by defense counsel's remarks on summation. Although defense
counsel's remarks are not evidence, they do underscore the issues
a party concedes and those he or she contests. In summation,
defense counsel said:
I submit to you that what occurred in this
particular case was exactly as was diagnosed
by Dr. Glicksman in his very initial report,
in his very initial examination of Mrs.
Ponzo. He indicated that she suffered a
contusion of the right knee and he also
indicated, and you know this through the
testimonies of the various doctors, that he
indicated a sprain of the lumbosacral area.
That was not a mere recapitulation of Ponzo's evidence; it was a
statement by defense counsel that the jury should accept Dr.
Glicksman's “initial impression” that Ponzo sustained a knee
injury in the accident.
Defense counsel followed those comments with the
acknowledgment that he knew Ponzo was injured in the accident:
Let's turn to the knee. The knee, assuming
for argument's sake, and we have nothing to
dispute it, folks. I'm going to tell you at
the end again and again that it was
associated with this accident.
(emphasis added).
Defense counsel also admitted that the surgery on the knee was
necessary: “The knee, something happened and a great job was
done” to repair it. (emphasis added). A reasonable juror could
only conclude from those comments that Pelle conceded that Ponzo
sustained a knee injury in the accident that was successfully
repaired by surgery.
If there was any doubt regarding the existence of a
concession, it was erased during plaintiff's summation to which
no exception was taken:
Now I want to point out to you one more
thing that has been admitted and I don't want
you to forget this. Dr. Goldstone was asked
by me in his examination that you saw on the
videotape, were the injuries that were
sustained by Karen Ponzo to her knee the
direct result of the accident that occurred
on December 24, 1992, and he testified yes.
I asked him, was the surgery that was
performed on Karen Ponzo's knee by Dr. Sloan
the result of the injuries she sustained in
the accident on December 24, 1992. He
testified yes.
I asked him a third question. I said,
was the surgery that was performed by Dr.
Sloan appropriate, there was nothing wrong
with that surgery. He indicated yes. Now
remember Dr. Goldstone is the defense expert.
He wasn't Mrs. Ponzo's expert. He was their
expert. So he testified one, that _ and Mr.
Norton candidly admitted that before, that
one, the accident caused the injuries to Mrs.
Ponzo's knee. The surgery was a result of
the injuries sustained by Mrs. Ponzo and that
that surgery was appropriate.
As if to drive the point home, the trial court said the
following in his instructions:
It's also my understanding that the defendant
also does not deny that Karen Ponzo sustained
an injury from the accident. The defendant,
however, contests the nature and extent of
the injury or injuries, and the defendant
maintains that any injury is not permanent,
and that Karen Ponzo is not totally disabled
from gainful employment.
Defense counsel apparently did not believe the cited
language was inaccurate and took no exception to it. In short,
everyone at trial understood that, although her other injuries
were hotly contested, there was no contest over the fact that
Ponzo sustained an injury to her knee during the accident. To be
sure, the extent of that injury was hotly disputed but its
existence was not. Although the trial judge took a different
view when faced with a motion for a new trial, the record
clearly establishes Pelle's concession.
B.
Against that backdrop, we turn to the single jury
interrogatory: “Did defendant's negligence proximately cause
damage to Karen Ponzo?” Because there was no objection to the
form of the interrogatory, the plain error standard applies.
R.2:10-2. In other words, the interrogatory will withstand
attack unless it was clearly capable of producing an unjust
result.
Ordinarily, “a trial court's interrogatories to a jury are
not grounds for reversal unless they were misleading, confusing,
or ambiguous.” Sons of Thunder v. Borden, Inc.,
148 N.J. 396,
418 (1997). Interrogatories are meant to serve particular
purposes: “to require the jury to specifically consider the
essential issues of the case, to clarify the court's charge to
the jury, and to clarify the meaning of the verdict and permit
error to be localized.” Wenner v. McEldowney & Co.,
102 N.J.
Super. 13, 19 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
52 N.J. 493 (1968).
“The framing of [jury] questions in clear and understandable
language cannot be overemphasized.” Benson v. Brown,
276 N.J.
Super. 553, 565 (App. Div. 1994).
We are also mindful that in reviewing an interrogatory for
reversible error, we should consider it in the context of the
charge as a whole. Sons of Thunder, supra, 148 N.J. at 418. An
accurate and thorough jury charge often can cure the potential
for confusion that may be present in an interrogatory. Id. at
415-20; Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc.,
162 N.J. 449, 470-71 (2000). That is not the case here.
Here, Pelle conceded negligence so that issue was resolved.
Ponzo claimed three distinct injuries: knee, back and RSD. As we
have indicated, there was a concession that a knee injury was
proximately caused by the accident. Therefore, the jury's only
inquiry regarding that injury was its extent and what amount of
money, if any, was necessary to compensate Ponzo for it.
By contrast, the very existence of Ponzo's two other
injuries was hotly disputed. Indeed Pelle contested whether
Ponzo suffered a back injury or RSD at all. Thus, regarding
those claims, the jury had to decide whether Ponzo suffered an
injury, and, if so, whether it was proximately caused by the
accident. If the jury answered those questions affirmatively,
only then would the extent of Ponzo's injuries and damages
require disposition. In other words, the knee injury implicated
two questions: its extent and damages. On the contrary, the
claimed back injury and RSD required the jury to answer four
questions: did the injuries exist; were they caused by the
accident; what was the extent of the injuries; and what amount
would compensate Ponzo? The single interrogatory was inadequate
to alert the jury to its differentiated task.
Where there are multiple allegations, multiple
interrogatories are not only the best way to focus the jury's
attention on the details of the case but also to ascertain, with
some degree of specificity, what the jury has actually
determined. Kassick v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp.,
120 N.J. 130,
134 (1990) (stating that where plaintiff contends that product
suffers from more than one defect, better practice is to make
each alleged defect subject of separate interrogatory); Benson,
supra, 276 N.J. Super. at 563 (holding that “it would be
preferable not to lump together three questions in a single”
interrogatory). A corollary is that in order to assist the jury,
and to avoid unnecessary effort and possible confusion, a trial
judge should eliminate from disposition matters that are not
truly in contest. Menza v. Diamond Jim's, Inc.,
145 N.J. Super. 40, 45 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that “where the facts adduced
leave no doubt that if there was negligence there was also
proximate cause, the jury should be instructed only as to the
issue of negligence”).
That is not to suggest that every single case requires
finely diced interrogatories. However, where, as here, Ponzo
advanced three distinct injuries from the accident, the existence
of only two of which Pelle disputed , the single jury
interrogatory was inadequate. The trial court should have
crafted interrogatories that reflected the concession regarding
the knee injury and detailed the distinct approach that was
required of the jury where Pelle advanced entirely distinct
defenses to the different claims.
To be sure, as Ponzo has conceded, the interrogatory would
have passed muster if the jury had answered it in the affirmative
and then awarded minimal damages. Because it did not do so, we
cannot be sure whether the jury simply misunderstood the
concession regarding the knee injury or whether it was confused
by being required to render a global answer to questions needing
individual and potentially different responses. Because it is
impossible for us to ascertain what happened and localize the
error, a new trial is required.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG's opinion.
NO. A-133 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
KAREN L. PONZO and JOSEPH C.
PONZO, her husband,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CHRISTOPHER K. PELLE,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED February 27, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Long
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1 1Synovitis is inflamation of the membrane of a movable
joint. The American Heritage Stedman's Medical Dictionary 813
(1995).