SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
R & R. Marketing, L.L.C. et als. V. Brown-Forman Corporation (A-206/207-97)
Argued February 1, 1999 -- Decided April 22, 1999
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal concerns the right of two wholesale distributors of alcoholic beverages to assign their
existing franchise rights to distribute certain brands of alcoholic beverages to a wholly-owned limited liability
company (LLC).
Reitman Industries, Inc. (Reitman), whose operations were centered in North Jersey, and Royal
Distributors and Importers, Ltd., Inc. (Royal), whose operations were in South Jersey, sought to combine
their business operations. Each had been authorized to distribute certain products sold by Brown-Forman.
In an attempt to best preserve their protections under the anti-discrimination law, which entitles a
wholesaler to continue to distribute a product absent exceptional circumstances once a supplier authorizes
sales of a nationally advertised brand, the two decided to form a new entity, a limited liability company.
Under their agreement, Reitman and Royal would each transfer their operating assets to the new entity, R &
R Marketing, L.L.C. (R & R), and in return obtain an ownership interest in R & R. The founding
corporations were to maintain a separate existence, while agreeing to refrain from competition with R & R.
Reitman and Royal first sought to transfer their supplier authorizations to R & R with the consent
of the supplier, if necessary. In the alternative, however, they agreed that they would purchase the alcoholic
beverages required by R & R, and then transfer those beverages to R & R at cost. After the business
combination commenced operations on July 1, 1994, Brown-Forman refused to honor orders placed by the
companies.
The companies then sought protection from the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control (Director) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.6, and requested interim relief compelling sales by Brown-Forman, which was granted as to Royal and Reitman, but not as to R & R. After reviewing the submissions,
the Director found that the statute affords no protection to a New Jersey wholesaler until a manufacturer has
designated it as an authorized distributor, reasoning that the objectives of the law do not include forcing a
distiller to distribute its products to unauthorized wholesalers. While recognizing that the anti-discrimination
law is to be liberally construed, the Director characterized the plan to transfer products to R & R at cost as
a sham agreement. He further found that Reitman and Royal forfeited their protection under the statute
once they entered into an agreement obligating them to front for R & R. Finally, the Director did not
consider the formation of the LLC to constitute a de facto merger.
On appeal, the Appellate Division ruled that the Director's decision inappropriately elevated form
over substance. The panel found that where the new entity is composed of previously approved
wholesalers, the supplier's control of its distribution system is not dissipated.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions for certification of Brown-Forman and the Director.
HELD: While it is not the form of a transaction that will govern a wholesaler's right to restructure its
organization and maintain its protections under the anti-discrimination law, essential economic issues have
not been addressed or clarified in the record below, and the matter is therefore remanded to the Director
for a clearer statement of findings and for future guidance in this area.
1. Courts generally give substantial deference to the interpretation an agency gives to a statute that the
agency is charged with enforcing. Because the conclusions and not the facts are in dispute, review of the
Director's decision should focus on whether denying the protection of the anti-discrimination law to the
newly formed LLC conflicts with or is consistent with legislative policies. (pp. 6-7)
2. The legislative policies underlying the anti-discrimination law seek to ensure an equitable basis for
competition between supplier franchised wholesalers of alcoholic beverages in New Jersey, thus protecting
the public through the promotion of temperance and the elimination of the racketeer and bootlegger. (pp. 7-8)
3. Because none of the economic issues presented by this case have been clarified in the record, the matter
should be remanded to the agency for a clearer statement of findings. Specifically, the agency should
articulate the reasoning why the anti-discrimination law does or does not protect R & R's interests in this
situation. (pp. 9-12)
4. The Division should provide future guidance concerning policies that will apply to transactions similar to
that presented in this case. In particular, the agency should clarify the scope of distributorship rights and the
form of reorganization that will contravene the policies of the anti-discrimination law. (pp. 12-13)
5. The economic reality, and not the form of the restructured organization, will determine a wholesaler's
rights under the anti-discrimination law. (pp. 13-14)
6. Pending further action by the Director concerning the present status of the enterprise, the rights of the
parties shall remain subject to the same conditions as were implemented under the Director's stay order.
(p. 14)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Director
for any further proceedings concerning the present structure of the enterprise.
JUSTICE HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE
O'HERN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-206/
207 September Term 1997
R & R MARKETING, L.L.C.; ROYAL
DISTRIBUTORS AND IMPORTERS, LTD.,
INC., and REITMAN INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued February 1, 1999 -- Decided April 22, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
307 N.J. Super. 474 (1998).
Ross A. Lewin argued the cause for appellant
Brown-Forman Corporation (Jamieson, Moore,
Peskin & Spicer, attorneys).
David N. Bregenzer, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for appellant New
Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control
(Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New
Jersey, attorney).
Edward G. D'Alessandro argued the cause for
respondents (D'Alessandro, Jacovino & Gerson,
attorneys; Mr. D'Alessandro and Frederick E.
Gerson, on the brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
This appeal concerns the right of two wholesale distributors of alcoholic beverages
to assign their existing franchise rights to distribute certain brands of alcoholic beverages
to a wholly-owned limited liability company (LLC). The founding members of the LLC
sought as well to retain the franchise rights to themselves. The Director of the Division
of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Director and ABC) ruled that the restructuring was an
attempt by the two wholesalers to force their suppliers to distribute through an
unauthorized wholesaler, thereby causing the two wholesalers to lose their franchise
rights protected by the anti-discrimination law. The anti-discrimination law provides:
There shall be no discrimination in the sale of any nationally
advertised brand of alcoholic beverage other than malt
alcoholic beverage, by importers, blenders, distillers, rectifiers
and wineries, to duly licensed wholesalers of alcoholic
beverages who are authorized by such importers, blenders,
distillers, rectifiers and wineries to sell such nationally
advertised brand in New Jersey.
[N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.6]
On appeal, the Appellate Division found that the transaction was in substance, if
not form, a merger that should not cause the two wholesalers to lose their franchise
rights.
301 N.J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1998). Because one of the founding members of
the LLC has since acquired the other, we remand the matter to the Director to
reconsider the status of the parties and to adopt rules or other suitable guidelines for
future restructurings in the alcoholic beverage industry.
I
This is our understanding of the facts. Reitman Industries, Inc. (Reitman) and
Royal Distributors and Importers, Ltd., Inc. (Royal) sought to combine their business
operations. Each had been authorized to distribute certain products sold by respondent
Brown-Forman. Reitman's operations were centered in North Jersey, while Royal's
operations were in South Jersey. Both companies distribute alcoholic beverages for
various suppliers, including Brown-Forman. Reitman was authorized by Brown-Forman
to distribute fourteen specific brands, while Royal was authorized to distribute five
brands.See footnote 1
Under the anti-discrimination law, once a supplier authorizes sales of a nationally
advertised brand by a wholesaler, the wholesaler is entitled to continue to distribute the
product absent exceptional circumstances. These authorizations are granted on a
product-by-product basis and are then reflected on a brand registration schedule that
each supplier must file with the ABC for each product. Suppliers sometimes authorize a
single wholesaler to handle a product, creating an exclusive distributorship within the
State. In other instances, suppliers grant multiple authorizations to competing
wholesalers.
We are informed that the majority of the two wholesalers' relationships with
suppliers, including Brown-Forman, are not protected by written contracts. The parties
therefore attempted to determine which structure for their business combination would
afford them the best chance of preserving their protections under the anti-discrimination
law. Due to potential tax consequences the parties rejected a corporate merger and
decided to establish a new entity, a limited liability company, a form of business
organization recently authorized by the New Jersey State Legislature.
Under the agreement, Reitman and Royal would each transfer their operating
assets to the new entity, R & R Marketing, L.L.C. (R & R), and in return obtain an
ownership interest in R & R. The founding corporations were to maintain a separate
existence, while agreeing to refrain from competition with R & R. Reitman and Royal
first sought to transfer their supplier authorizations to the new entity with the consent of
the supplier, if necessary. In the alternative, Reitman and Royal agreed that they would
purchase the alcoholic beverages required by R & R, and transfer those beverages to R
& R at cost. After the business combination commenced operations on July 1, 1994,
Brown-Forman refused to honor orders placed by the companies.
The companies sought protection from the Director pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 33:1-93.6,
and requested interim relief compelling sales by Brown-Forman pending his deposition.
Interim relief was granted as to Royal and Reitman, but not as to R & R. After
reviewing the submissions, the Director found that the statute affords no protection to a
New Jersey wholesaler until a manufacturer has designated it as an authorized
distributor. The Director reasoned that the objectives of the law do not include forcing
a distiller to distribute its products to unauthorized wholesalers. Although he recognized
that the anti-discrimination law is to be liberally construed, the Director characterized
the plan to transfer products to R & R at cost a "sham agreement." He concluded that
"[o]nce Reitman and Royal executed agreements obligating them to front for R & R,
they forfeited their protection under the statute." On the question of whether the
formation of the LLC was a
de facto merger, the Director reasoned that the
distinguishing characteristic of a merger is that the acquired entity ceases to exist. That
did not occur here.
On appeal, the Appellate Division ruled "that the Director elevated form over
substance." 307
N.J. Super. at 486. The court observed that "[t]he crux of the Director's
decision seems predicated on the fact that although both Royal and Reitman are
separately authorized wholesalers, their newly-formed limited liability corporation is
technically not an authorized wholesaler."
Id. at 484. The court reasoned that "where
the new entity is composed of previously approved wholesalers, the supplier's control of
its distribution system is not dissipated."
Id. at 486. We granted the petitions for
certification of Brown-Forman and the Director.
156 N.J. 384 (1998).
II
The judicial capacity to review an administrative agency's decision is limited.
Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protect.,
101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985).
Courts generally "give substantial deference to the interpretation an agency gives to a
statute that the agency is charged with enforcing."
Smith v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
108 N.J. 19, 25 (1987). Although sometimes described as a search for arbitrary or
unreasonable agency action, the judicial role is restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether
the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies; (2) whether the record
contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and (3) whether, in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a
showing of the relevant factors.
Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co.,
supra, 101
N.J. at 103.
Because the power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors is "practically
limitless,"
Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Shieffelin & Co.,
94 N.J. 400, 412 (1983), we would
hesitate to substitute our judgment for the agency's own policy determinations concerning
regulation of the alcoholic beverage industry. And because the facts are not so much in
dispute as are the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, our focus is on the second prong
of the test for agency review: whether denying the protection of the anti-discrimination
law to the newly formed LLC conflicts with or is consistent with legislative policies.
The legislative policies that undergird the anti-discrimination law were set forth in
Reinfeld,
supra. The Court noted that "[t]he purpose of this bill is to ensure an
equitable basis for competition between supplier franchised wholesalers of alcoholic
beverages in New Jersey."
Id. at 408. The Court explained further:
The ultimate goal sought to be attained by the statute in
question, as in the entire scheme of liquor legislation, is the
protection of the public through the promotion of
temperance and elimination of the racketeer and bootlegger.
N.J.S.A. 33:1-3. In order to accomplish this purpose the
statute seeks to achieve as far as necessary the independence
of wholesalers from distillers. . . . For the purpose of
strengthening the wholesaler's resistance if confronted with a
distiller's wish to over-stimulate sales and thus negate the
public policy in favor of temperance or a desire to engage in
other prohibited acts, e.g., tie-in-sales, the statute seeks to
prevent the distiller from arbitrarily closing the source of
supply to a wholesaler.
[Ibid. (citing Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc. v. F.& A.
Distributing Co.,
28 N.J. 444, 455 (1958) (examining the
predecessor to the anti-discrimination statute)).]
It is not so easy to reconcile the promotion of temperance with the parallel goal
of consumerism that is reflected in recent deregulation of the alcoholic beverages
industry. See Heir v. Degnan,
82 N.J. 109 (1980) (sustaining regulations that
substantially expanded competition in pricing for alcoholic beverages). Economics of
scale that may reduce the cost of alcoholic beverages might have the effect of increasing
consumption, not promoting temperance. Nonetheless, it is in this subtle and difficult
area that we are most inclined to defer to the Director: would recognition of protected
rights for R & R conflict with the legislative policies that undergird our alcoholic
beverage control laws?
III
As we understand the basic policy of the anti-discrimination law, it is designed to
protect against arbitrary action by suppliers, not to enhance existing rights of wholesalers.
The law creates no new property rights in wholesalers; it protects existing rights. Brown-Forman argues that as a supplier it retained the right to choose to whom it wanted to
distribute its product and where, and that the Appellate Division decision materially
altered its distribution network. That decision would permit wholesalers to subdivide
their franchise rights and create a multiplicity of wholesalers, when the supplier had
intended that there be only one. The Director agrees. He found that the form of the
enterprise chosen by the wholesalers constituted an attempt to force Brown-Forman to
distribute to an unauthorized wholesaler.
Brown-Forman argues that the Appellate Division misperceived the purposes of
the anti-discrimination law and the economics of the industry. The Appellate Division
assumed that the restructuring would not affect Brown-Forman's distribution system.
The court reasoned that "where the new entity is composed of previously approved
wholesalers, the suppliers' control of its distribution is not dissipated." 307
N.J. Super. at
486. Not so, insists Brown-Forman, because the "previously approved wholesalers" did
not have parallel rights.See footnote 2 In effect, the restructuring would move the authorizations
Brown-Forman had limited to North Jersey to South Jersey, and conversely to move to
North Jersey authorizations that were limited to South Jersey. For example, Reitman,
whose operations are centered in northern New Jersey, was authorized to distribute Jack
Daniels, one of Brown-Forman's premier products; however, Royal, whose operations are
centered in southern New Jersey, was not designated as a distributer of Jack Daniels.
Brown-Forman has designated Fedway Associates Inc. to distribute Jack Daniels in South
Jersey.
At oral argument, we considered the fact that nominally Reitman's franchise to
distribute Jack Daniels was not limited to North Jersey. There were a number of
strategies that Reitman could have chosen to penetrate the South Jersey market. It
could have hired additional sales people and had them fan out over the southern part of
the State to sell Jack Daniels. Conversely, Royal might have done the same with its
authorized products. We can agree that at some point a wholesaler might
metamorphose into something other than that which the supplier had franchised. At that
point, it might not be arbitrary to refuse to continue to supply the wholesaler that had
materially altered its authorization. To take another example, a supplier might choose to
authorize a tiny wholesaler in Sussex County to serve that market for its product. If that
tiny wholesaler were to become a monster of a wholesaler that starts to spread its efforts
throughout the State, a supplier might justly feel that its distribution network had been
altered.
None of these economic issues have been clarified in this record. Is an
authorization to distribute in New Jersey to be understood as an authorization to
distribute throughout the entire state or an authorization to distribute in the then-existing
territory of the distributor? Were Reitman or Royal about to do something under the R
& R formation that they could not have done under their existing franchises?
Although administrative agencies are entitled to discretion in
making decisions, that discretion is not unbounded and must
be exercised in a manner that will facilitate judicial review.
Administrative agencies must articulate the standards and
principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much
detail as possible.
Van Holten Group v. Elizabethtown
Water Co.,
121 N.J. 48, 67 (1990). When the absence of
particular findings hinders or detracts from effective appellate
review, the court may remand the matter to the agency for a
clearer statement of findings and later reconsideration.
Application of Howard Sav. Inst.,
32 U.S. 29, 53 (1960).
[In re Vey,
124 N.J. 534, 543-44 (1991).]
We do so here. Specifically, the agency should relate its findings in this case to the
statutory [policies] of the anti-discrimination law. Id. at 536. It should articulate the
reasoning why the anti-discrimination law does or does not protect R & R's interests in
this situation. As noted, Reitman has acquired Royal and we shall assume that under
existing law Reitman would be entitled to retain the scope of protection previously
afforded to Royal under the anti-discrimination law. Any further disputes between the
parties should be resolved by the Director.
IV
The circumstances of this case suggest that the Division should provide future
guidance concerning policies that will apply to such transactions. "Administrative
agencies have wide discretion in selecting the means to fulfill the duties that the
Legislature delegated to them[;] [a]gencies may act informally . . . or formally through
rulemaking or adjudication in administrative hearings."
Texter v. Department of Human
Servs.,
88 N.J. 376, 383-84 (1984) (internal citations omitted). Ordinarily, when the
"subject matter of an agency determination concerns matters that transcend those of
individual litigants and involves matters of general administrative policy, [the agency's]
rule-making procedures should be invoked."
Board of Educ., Plainfield v. Cooperman,
209 N.J. Super. 174, 204 (App. Div. 1986),
mod. on other grounds,
105 N.J. 587 (1987)
(approving policy guidelines dealing with treatment of AIDS-infected children in schools
because public comment was allowed). "There is no catechism that mandates that
agency action be one or the other in any given situation."
State, Dept. of Envtl.
Protection v. Stavola,
103 N.J. 425, 442-43 (1986) (Handler, J., dissenting). The agency's
action may be a "hybrid, partaking of elements from both rule-making and adjudicatory
modes."
Id. at 443 (Handler J., dissenting).
A point to be clarified concerns the scope of distributorship rights. Does an
authorization to distribute in New Jersey carry a blanket authorization to distribute
anywhere in the State, or is the authorization to be understood by custom and business
practices to be limited to that area that was reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties? Another matter to be clarified is what form of reorganization will be contrary
to the policies of the anti-discrimination law. For example, would the use of the LLC
have been appropriate if the authorizations were understood to be limited in scope
before the restructuring? Or put another way, what circumstances will justify a
conclusion that, because of a change in the business operations, a wholesaler has
materially deviated from its authorization? We leave to the agency the choice of the
appropriate procedures to elucidate its administrative policy.
In sum, we agree with the Appellate Division that it is not the form of the
transaction that should govern a wholesaler's right to restructure its organization. Rather
it is the economic reality of the restructured organization that will determine a
wholesaler's rights under the anti-discrimination law. In this case, review of the
Director's policy implementation will depend on his analysis of the economic effect of
the restructuring of the enterprises. Did the restructuring materially alter the
distribution rights previously granted by the supplier? For the future, the Director
should provide guidance through regulation, directive or policy statement that will
enable parties to shape their transactions to the law's policies.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter remanded to
the Director for any further proceedings concerning the present structure of the
enterprise. Pending further action by the Director concerning the present status of the
enterprise, the rights of the parties shall remain subject to the same conditions as were
implemented under the Director's July 22, 1994 stay order.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join
in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-206/207 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
R & R MARKETING, L.L.C.;
ROYAL DISTRIBUTORS AND
IMPORTERS, LTD., INC., and
REITMAN INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION,
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED April 22, 1999
Justice Handler PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST
REVERSE &
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ
---------------
----------
-------------
JUSTICE HANDLER
X
JUSTICE POLLOCK
X
JUSTICE O'HERN
X
JUSTICE GARIBALDI
X
JUSTICE STEIN
X
JUSTICE COLEMAN
X
TOTALS
6
Footnote: 1For over thirty years, Reitman had been authorized by
Brown-Forman to distribute certain nationally advertised brands
of alcoholic beverages including: Early Times Whiskey; Canadian
Mist; Southern Comfort; Jack Daniels; Southern Comfort Cocktails;
Korbel Champagne; Bolla Wines; Noilly Pratt Vermouth; Sempe
Armagnac; Pepe Lopez Tequila; Bush Mills Malt Whiskey; Black Bush
Whiskey; Fontana Fredda Wine; and Pepe Lopez Triple Sec. For
over twenty-three years, Royal had been authorized by Brown-Forman to distribute: Southern Comfort; Southern Comfort
Cocktails; Crystal Comfort; Bushmills Irish Whiskey; and Glenn
Morangie Single Malt Scotch.
Footnote: 2 Of the sixteen Brown-Forman products previously
distributed by Royal or Reitman, only one was distributed by both
wholesalers, Southern Comfort.