(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 22, 1996 -- Decided December 16, 1996
COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
The narrow issue raised in this workers' compensation case is whether an improper use of a
transcript of a prior workers' compensation proceeding was so prejudicial that a redetermination of the
merits of the claims should be required.
Reinhart filed a workers' compensation petition alleging that a work-related accident occurred on
December 8, 1989, and that a reinjury occurred on December 12, 1989. Reinhart alleged the injury was to
her back and neck, and occurred while lifting.
Reinhart did not report the injury to her supervisor, and continued working both days. She claims
that she sent a message to a foreman through the computer system, but the letter was never received.
Reinhart alleges that the injury was not initially painful, but rather felt like a "clicking" in her neck and
shoulder area. Reinhart returned to work full-time. She eventually had surgery on her upper back in
November 1990, and did not return to work until February 1991.
In denying that Reinhart sustained a compensable accident in December 1989, Dupont relied heavily
on the facts and circumstances surrounding Reinhart's 1986 workers' compensation hearing that involved a
1984 accident. Counsel for Dupont cross-examined Reinhart in an effort to show that the complaints she
gave in the present case were almost identical to those she had given in the 1986 hearing. He offered into
evidence the transcript of the 1986 hearing. The judge concluded that the transcript was admissible to attack
Reinhart's credibility.
The judge found that Reinhart had not suffered a compensable injury and had not reported the
accident, and the claims were dismissed. In rendering his decision, the judge stated his conclusion that
Reinhart had demonstrated a tendency to be untruthful. He cited to examples from the 1986 transcript in
support of this conclusion.
The Appellate Division reversed. Although recognizing that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to
workers' compensation proceedings, it asserted that a judge relying on the rules must apply them consistently
with their general application. The court concluded that the judge erred in relying on the instances of
Reinhart's untruthfulness contained in the 1986 transcript, noting that evidence of a person's character or
trait is not admissible for the purpose of proving the person acted in conformity therewith. The Appellate
Division reversed and remanded for a redetermination by a new judge.
HELD: The trial judge's use of the 1986 transcript to buttress his conclusion that petitioner had the
tendency to be untruthful was error. However, that error does not require reversal because there is
sufficient credible evidence, independent of the improper evidence, that supports the findings made by the
trial judge.
1. Although the Rules of Evidence do not control the admission of evidence in workers' compensation proceedings, it is well-settled that a judge of compensation's determination must be based on competent evidence. Thus, the real issue presented is not whether evidence was admitted in violation of the Rules of
Evidence, but whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the judgment when the
proofs are considered as a whole. (pp. 7-9)
2. The 1986 transcript was introduced into evidence to attack Reinhart's credibility. N.J.R.E. 607 permits its
use for that purpose. The judge of compensation, however, exceeded the proper scope of the transcript's
permissible use by also using it to buttress his conclusion that Reinhart had a tendency to be untruthful. (pp.
9-11)
3. Where, as here, there is sufficient credible evidence, independent of improper evidence, that supports the
findings of a trial court, the improper use of some evidence does not require a reversal. There is substantial
credible evidence in the record that supports the finding that petitioner was not credible. Consequently, the
error is harmless. (pp. 11-13)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Division of
Workers' Compensation dismissing the petition is reinstated.
JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins, is of the view that the ruling of the
workers' compensation judge was so indelibly tainted by the judge's improper use of the 1986 transcript as to
require a rehearing before a new judge.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, and GARIBALDI join in
JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which
JUSTICE STEIN joins.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
38 September Term 1996
TOBY EASTON REINHART,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Argued October 22, 1996 -- Decided December 16, 1996
On Certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Sheldon Schiffman argued the cause for
appellant (Michals, Wahl, Silver & Leitner,
attorneys).
Fred Hopke argued the cause for respondent
(Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
The narrow issue raised in this workers' compensation case
is whether an improper use of a transcript of a prior workers'
compensation proceeding was so prejudicial that a redetermination
of the merits of the claims should be required. The Appellate
Division concluded that a reversal and remand are required. We
granted certification,
144 N.J. 585 (1996). We now reverse and
hold that the error was harmless.
In June 1990, petitioner Toby Easton Reinhart filed a
workers' compensation petition alleging that a work-related
accident occurred on December 8, 1989, and that a reinjury
occurred on December 12, 1989. E.I. Dupont De Nemours (Dupont),
the employer, disputed both the occurrence and notice of the
accident. Therefore, petitioner bore the burden of proof on
those issues. A description of her work at Dupont is essential
to understanding the mechanics of the alleged accident.
Reinhart worked at Dupont as a machinist for nine years before the alleged accident. Her position as a machine operator involved assemblyline-style packaging of different types of film. There were two distinct job assignments, stacker and boxer, and the machine operators rotated assignments daily. While working the stacker, Reinhart was responsible for removing and bagging sheets of film. The film came out in twenty-nine by forty inch sheets from a machine approximately shoulder height. Once the machine emitted fifty sheets, Reinhart removed the bundle of sheets, placed it on a table, and bagged it before sending it to the next operator. In order to perform the job, Reinhart had to lift the bundles above shoulder height, turn and place the bundles on the table approximately five feet from the stacker,
and then lift the bundle approximately one inch off the table in
order to slide it manually into the bag.
When working the boxer rotation, Reinhart was responsible
for receiving the bagged bundles of film, placing them in boxes,
and labeling and taping the boxes. In that capacity, she took
empty boxes of widths ranging from ten to fifty inches, placed
them on a table, labeled them in sequence, and placed the bundle
of bagged film inside. The labeling and boxing were performed at
waist level, although the empty boxes were sometimes located
overhead. Reinhart testified that the empty boxes were not
heavy, the largest weighing no more than five pounds.
Reinhart testified that on Friday, December 8, 1989, she
sustained an injury to her neck and shoulder while operating the
stacker on the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift. She claims that at
approximately 1:30 p.m., she removed a forty to fifty pound stack
of film, turned to place the film on the table, and felt a twinge
in her neck and left shoulder that radiated into her left leg and
foot. Reinhart described the feeling as a "spring action" that
was not actually painful, but felt like a clicking in her neck
and shoulder area. She testified that she had only a few bundles
left to complete before she had to shut down the machine at 2:00
p.m. and clean up. She therefore completed her work and went
home. She did not report the alleged accident to anyone at work,
but mentioned the injury to her husband. She did not feel any
pain at that time and thought the "clicking" feeling would go
away. Reinhart claims that on Saturday morning, December 9, she
awoke with a stiff neck and had difficulty moving her upper body.
She spent that day in bed and did not return to work until the
3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift on Tuesday, December 12, 1989, when
her stiff neck had somewhat subsided. She did not seek medical
attention or report the alleged accident at that time.
When Reinhart returned to work on Tuesday, December 12, she
was assigned to boxing. Approximately four hours into her shift,
she claims she picked up a stack of seven or eight empty boxes
and felt the same twinge running from her back through her left
leg. She said that she lost feeling in her leg and foot and
could not walk for several minutes. She stated that when the
feeling returned, she went to the office and sat for a few
minutes until the pain diminished. Reinhart testified that
because no foreman was working the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift,
she sent a letter through the computer system to the day-shift
foreman. She claims that in the letter she explained what had
happened and stated that she planned to see a doctor the
following morning. She believed the foreman would receive the
letter the next day. After writing the letter, Reinhart returned
to work and finished her shift with the assistance of co-workers.
She testified that she mentioned her injury to the chief operator
on duty, who is now deceased. The computerized letter was never
received by a foreman or supervisor.
Reinhart admitted on cross-examination that she was aware of
the procedure for reporting accidents and injuries, that she had
received training in utilizing Dupont's notification procedure,
and that she had used the procedure on several occasions in the
past. She admitted that she did not follow the standard
reporting procedure for the alleged December 1989 episodes.
The morning after the alleged reinjury, Reinhart saw Dr.
Luciano, her primary care physician at the Rutgers Community
Health Plan, and received a light duty slip. Reinhart testified
that when she returned to work that afternoon she presented Dr.
Luciano's slip to the plant hospital. It was her impression that
the hospital forwarded the slip to her supervisor who assigned
her to light office work. She eventually had surgery on her
upper back in November 1990. She was out of work until February
1991.
In denying that petitioner sustained a compensable accident
in December 1989, Dupont relies heavily on the facts and
circumstances surrounding petitioner's 1986 workers' compensation
hearing that involved a 1984 accident. That information was
presented in this case through cross-examination and the
admission of a transcript of the 1986 proceeding.
In the present litigation, counsel for Dupont cross-examined
petitioner in an effort to show that the complaints she gave in
the present case were almost identical to those she had given in
the 1986 hearing. During cross-examination petitioner testified
that the injuries she had sustained in the 1984 accident had
cleared up prior to the December 8, 1989 alleged accident and
then had reappeared after the 1989 episodes.
To enable the judge to compare her complaints at the 1986
hearing with the complaints at the trial regarding the 1989
episodes, Dupont's counsel offered into evidence the transcript
of the 1986 hearing. The judge concluded that the transcript was
admissible to attack petitioner's credibility.
When the judge rendered his decision, he pointed out several
inconsistencies in petitioner's testimony. He concluded that
petitioner had the tendency to be untruthful:
The [c]ourt concludes that Petitioner has
a proclivity to be untruthful which has a
direct bearing on her credibility. These
"fibs" caused people to rely upon and take
certain actions based on her statements. To
her, they may have had no dire consequences;
to the [c]ourt, it reveals a complete lack of
understanding and propensity to be
untruthful.
Thus, the judge concluded that Reinhart had not reported her
injury and had not established a compensable injury:
I'm satisfied that the petitioner was well
aware of the reporting requirements of the
respondent, that she did not report the
alleged accidents, and as a result, the
respondent was severely prejudiced. . . .
Beyond that, it is this [c]ourt's opinion
that the petitioner has failed to sustain the
burden of proving an accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment with the
respondent.
Based on those findings, Reinhart's claims were dismissed.
The Appellate Division reversed in an unpublished opinion.
Although the court recognized that the Rules of Evidence do not
apply to workers' compensation proceedings, it asserted that a
judge relying on those rules must apply them consistently with
their general application. The court noted that the Rules of
Evidence limit the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove
character or a trait of character by allowing only evidence of
reputation, evidence of opinion, or evidence of conviction of a
crime. N.J.R.E. 405. The court also noted that evidence of a
person's character or a trait of the person's character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving the person acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion except under
circumstances that are not pertinent to this case. N.J.R.E.
404(b).
The court concluded that the admission of the 1986
transcript was error, noting that the judge specifically relied
on the instances of untruthfulness contained therein. The court
held that the admission of the transcript directly violated the
Rules of Evidence. It reversed the decision below and remanded
for redetermination by a new judge.
Dupont argues that the Appellate Division erred in holding
that the 1986 transcript was inadmissible. It also argues that
the court below violated its scope of review in overturning the
judge of compensation's finding that petitioner failed to
establish liability by a preponderance of the evidence.
It is clear that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to
workers' compensation proceedings. N.J.S.A. 34:15-56 provides
that when deciding a contested case, a judge of compensation
"shall not be bound by the rules of evidence." Case law has
consistently reiterated that proposition. Andricsak v. National
Fireproofing Corp.,
3 N.J. 466, 471 (1950); Helminsky v. Ford
Motor Co.,
111 N.J.L. 369, 373 (E. & A. 1933); Friese v. Nagle
Packaging Co.,
110 N.J.L. 588, 588 (E. & A. 1933); Paco v.
American Leather Mfg. Co.,
213 N.J. Super. 90, 93 (App. Div.
1986); Gunter v. Fischer Scientific Am.,
193 N.J. Super. 688, 691
(App. Div. 1984).
Although the Rules of Evidence do not control the admission
of evidence in workers' compensation proceedings, it is well-settled that a judge of compensation's determination must be
based on competent evidence. Gilligan v. International Paper
Co.,
24 N.J. 230, 236 (1957); Andricsak, supra, 3 N.J. at 471;
Helminsky, supra, 111 N.J.L. at 373; Friese, supra, 110 N.J.L. at
588; Gunter, supra, 193 N.J. Super. at 691; Fagan v. Newark, 78
N.J. Super. 294, 307-08 (App. Div. 1963). The purpose of not
requiring strict compliance with the Rules of Evidence is to
simplify the nature of proofs that can be offered in workers'
compensation proceedings. Gunter, supra, 193 N.J. Super. at 691.
Viewed in that context, the real issue presented is not whether
evidence was admitted in violation of the Rules of Evidence, but
whether there is substantial credible evidence in the record to
support the judgment when the proofs are considered as a whole.
Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc.,
48 N.J. 401, 410, cert. denied,
387 U.S. 944,
87 S. Ct. 2077,
18 L. Ed.2d 1331 (1967); Close v.
Kordulak Bros.,
44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965); Goyden v. State
Judiciary, Superior Court of New Jersey,
256 N.J. Super. 438, 446
(App. Div. 1991), aff'd o.b.,
128 N.J. 54 (1992); Manzo v.
Amalgamated Indus. Union Local 76B,
241 N.J. Super. 604, 609
(App. Div.), certif. denied,
122 N.J. 372 (1990). Due regard
must be given to the opportunity of the one who heard the
witnesses to judge their credibility. Szumski, supra, 48 N.J. at
410; Close, supra, 44 N.J. at 599; Goyden, supra, 256 N.J. Super.
at 446.
Despite the inapplicability of the Rules of Evidence, they
are still relevant in determining whether evidence is competent.
The Rules of Evidence provide that all relevant evidence should
be admitted unless otherwise excludable. N.J.R.E. 402. Relevant
evidence is broadly defined to mean "evidence having a tendency
in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the
determination of the action." N.J.R.E. 401; see also State v.
Cavallo,
88 N.J. 508, 515 (1982) (noting that evidence is
relevant when it "`renders the desired inference more probable
than it would be without the evidence'" (quoting State v.
Deatore,
70 N.J. 100, 116 (1976)); Deatore, supra, 70 N.J. at 116
(noting that the "test is broad and favors admissibility").
Rule 402, allowing the admission of relevant evidence, is
the "keystone of the Rules of Evidence." State v. Dixon,
125 N.J. 223, 248 (1991). Unless the opponent of the proffered
evidence can point to a specific rule of exclusion, or the judge
exercises discretion to exclude the evidence based on
countervailing concerns pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403, relevant
evidence is admissible. Biunno, Current New Jersey Rules of
Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 402 (1996); see also Reilly v.
Keswani,
137 N.J. Super. 553, 555 (App. Div. 1975) (asserting
that "all evidence relevant to the issues in controversy [should]
be admitted, unless its admission would transgress some paramount
policy of society and the law").
The transcript was introduced into evidence in the present
case to attack the petitioner's credibility. Rule 607 permits
the use of the transcript for that purpose. We hold that the
transcript was introduced into evidence because it was relevant
to attack petitioner's credibility.
Although the transcript was not admissible to prove a
specific instance of bad character, N.J.R.E. 405 and 608, the
Rules of Evidence permit evidence that is inadmissible for one
purpose to be admitted for another purpose. N.J.R.E. 105; State
v. DiRienzo,
53 N.J. 360, 382-84 (1969); Delgaudio v. Rodriguera,
280 N.J. Super. 135, 142-43 (App. Div. 1995). Indeed, the
Appellate Division in the present case found that "there [was] no
error in the use of claimant's prior testimony in 1986 to test
her present complaints to parts of her body injured in 1989, as
well as her physical complaints and limitations of activities
related to her accidents." See also Allendorf v. Kaiserman
Enters.,
266 N.J. Super. 662, 674 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that
in a personal injury action, evidence that plaintiff had prior
episodes of passing out was admissible for purposes of impeaching
credibility of her testimony that she had no health problems
prior to the accident); Gunter, supra, 193 N.J. Super. at 695
(permitting judge of compensation to allow introduction of
additional proofs concerning the effects of an earlier workplace
accident to assess compensability of claim); Arthur Larson,
Workmen's Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Death
§ 79.71(c) (desk ed. 1996) (stating that evidence of prior
workers' compensation claims is admissible only where the prior
injuries have bearing on whether current injury is the cause of
claimant's incapacity).
It is clear from the record that Dupont's counsel did not
present the transcript as extrinsic evidence of past acts of
untruthfulness. Counsel used the information contained in the
transcript to impeach Reinhart's testimony regarding her
condition by demonstrating that her complaints overlapped those
for which she had received compensation in the 1986 proceedings.
Notwithstanding the fact that the transcript was properly
admitted to attack petitioner's credibility, the judge of
compensation exceeded the proper scope of its permissible use.
He also used the transcript to buttress his conclusion that
petitioner had been untruthful on more than one prior occasion
and that she had the tendency to be untruthful.
The judge's improper use of the transcript was "overkill."
However, where, as here, there is sufficient credible evidence,
independent of improper evidence, that supports the findings made
by a trial court, the improper use of some evidence does not
require a reversal. Weston v. State,
60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972);
Larson, supra, § 79.11.
We find substantial credible evidence in the record that
supports the finding that petitioner was not credible. The judge
of compensation disbelieved Reinhart's claim that there was no
foreman to whom she could have reported her injury at the time of
the accident. In making that finding, the judge relied on
petitioner's cross-examination testimony that there was a foreman
on duty on each shift, and that she had on other occasions
reported workplace accidents in accordance with Dupont's
reporting requirements. He also found Reinhart's testimony that
she was harassed by co-workers because of her inability to work
inconsistent with her testimony that her job had become
significantly easier after the installation of air tables, and
that co-workers had been tremendously helpful to her. Reinhart's
cross-examination also revealed that she had not complained to
her superiors of any problems performing her work or dealing with
co-workers after returning to full duty. That testimony also
casts doubt on the validity of her complaints of physical
limitations and workplace harassment. Finally, Reinhart's
testimony on cross-examination that she recovered from her 1984
injuries after she was paid money and then again began to
experience similar symptoms following the 1989 incident, has the
capacity to persuade a factfinder that the witness is not
credible. Consequently, we find the error to be harmless. R.
2:10-2.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the
judgment of the Division of Workers' Compensation dismissing the
petition is reinstated.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, and
GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN
filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE STEIN
joins.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
38 September Term 1996
TOBY EASTON REINHART,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS,
Respondent-Appellant.
O'HERN, J., dissenting.
In this workers' compensation case, the Appellate Division
has correctly concluded that this compensation proceeding was
indelibly tainted by an error of law by the compensation judge
and has ordered a remand of the petitioner's claim. The Court
has characterized the error as one of overkill and sustains the
dismissal of petitioner's claim for workers' compensation
benefits. I disagree.
The appeal concerns a work-connected neck injury in 1989
that has left Ms. Reinhart with a herniated disk that has
required a discectomy. During the hearing on this 1989 accident,
DuPont introduced evidence of a 1984 work-related injury to
petitioner's pelvis. DuPont argued that some of claimant's
present complaints concerning restraint on her activities
duplicated complaints from her earlier injuries.
DuPont was successful in persuading the trial court to
consider a transcript of the earlier 1986 proceedings and sought
to prove that petitioner had a propensity for lying, in part
because she had exaggerated her running skills in a 1986
interview given to the Woodbridge Home News, her local newspaper.
Ms. Reinhart had met the reporter at her health club and had
described to him the beneficial effects of exercise during her
recent pregnancy. The reporter was interested in the story and
called her for an interview. Based on that telephone interview,
he reported that the petitioner had "a marathon tucked under her
belt." During cross-examination in the 1986 proceedings about
how she could run so well despite having suffered the 1984
injury, the petitioner had to admit that she had somewhat
embellished on her running skills and that she had not run a
complete marathon. She also admitted to other "fibs," such as
jogging with her newborn baby, in order to enhance the account of
her athletic endeavors.
In its letter brief to the trial court seeking to admit the
transcript of the 1986 hearing into evidence on the 1989
accident, DuPont's counsel suggested to the court that N.J.R.E.
607 enlarges the ability of parties to introduce evidence
affecting the credibility of witnesses, even so far as to allow
the use of extrinsic evidence as an acceptable method of showing
"a defect of character affecting credibility." What DuPont
sought to show was that because Toby Reinhart had exaggerated her
prowess as a weekend athlete or jogging mom, she would have been
likely to have been untruthful as well in this matter.
The compensation court accepted the reasoning of DuPont,
concluding in its opinion:
[Petitioner] also conceded that she was
not truthful with the interview in the Home
News entitled, "Pregnancy Doesn't Have to
Stop Exercise." She characterizes her falses
[sic] as merely "fibs."
The Court concludes that the petitioner
has a proclivity to be untruthful, which has
a direct bearing on her credibility. These
"fibs" caused people to rely upon and take
certain actions based on her statements. To
her, they may have had no dire consequences;
to the Court, it reveals a complete lack of
understanding and propensity to be
untruthful.
This Court agrees it was error for the judge of compensation
to rely on the transcripts concerning the newspaper interview to
show a propensity in the claimant to lie.
The error, is not, however, as the Court characterizes it, a
matter of "overkill," ante at _____ (slip op. at 11). Rather,
the error displayed a gross misunderstanding of the Rules of
Evidence. If every weekend athlete had to account in civil
trials for exaggerated accounts of his or her accomplishments,
trials would become a bit longer in New Jersey. The
stereotypical reasoning left standing by the Court would provide
material for a satire on the legal process if the compensation
judge's error were not of such grave consequences to the injured
worker. The Appellate Division correctly concluded that although
there was no error in the use of claimant's 1986 testimony to
test her present complaints to the parts of her body injured in
1989, as well as other residual complaints related to her
accidents,
[e]vidence of [a prior untruthfulness] is not
admissible to prove the [disposition] of a
person . . . [for untruthfulness]. While
such evidence may be admitted for other
limited purposes, it may not be used to prove
that because claimant lied in a previous
proceeding that she is lying in this
proceeding.
The compensation judge did exactly what he is not permitted
to do. He accepted proof that claimant had lied about her
jogging in the newspaper interview as proof that she was lying in
the compensation proceeding. We should not regard such error as
harmless. The Appellate Division felt that flaw so tainted the
court's analysis that it would have ordered a rehearing before a
new judge had the judge not already retired. I agree and would
order a new hearing.
Justice Stein joins in this opinion.
NO. A-38 SEPTEMBER TERM 1996
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
TOBY EASTON REINHART,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS,
Respondent-Appellant.
DECIDED December 16, 1996
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice O'Hern