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N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The decision also concluded that claimant is liable to refund the sum of $298, which was received for the weeks ending November 20, 2004 and November 27, 2004, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d). We affirm."> Original Wordprocessor Version (NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) Original Wordprocessor Version

This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*. (NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0100-05T50100-05T5 RHONDA L. HOLLAND, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and SEA OAKS COUNTRY CLUB and MS. AMY LOMBARDO, Respondents. ___________________________________________________________

Submitted August 29, 2006 - Decided October 24, 2006 Before Judges R. B. Coleman and Holston, Jr. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor. Rhonda L. Holland, appellant pro se. Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Michael J. Haas, of counsel; John C. Turi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Claimant, Rhonda L. Holland, appeals from a Final Decision of the Board of Review which adopted the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, concluding that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work and is disqualified for benefits as of October 3, 2004, in accordance with 152 N.J. 197, 214 (1997) (citations omitted).

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Based upon our review of the testimony presented at the hearing and the applicable law, we are satisfied that claimant failed to satisfy her burden of showing that she left work for good cause attributable to the work. In Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962), we noted the limited scope of our review: The statutory scheme entrusts the determination of the question whether a claimant quit work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, in the first instance, to the administrative agency and its appeal tribunals. In reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether we would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was ours to make, but rather whether the fact-finder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs. [Ibid. See also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999); Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.] We will not upset the determination of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, that it lacked fair support in the evidence, or that it violated legislative policies. In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); Campbell v. Dep't. of Civil Service, 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). We may not vacate an agency's decision because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. See generally, Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); De Vitis v. New Jersey Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J. Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 102 N.J. 337 (1985). An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency unless the agency's determination is "so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction[.]" Clowes v. Terminix Int'l Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Applying these well-established standards to the facts of this case, we are constrained to affirm. Affirmed.

(continued) (continued) 5 A-0100-05T5 October 24, 2006

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