(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
(NOTE: The Court wrote no full opinion in this case. Rather, the Court's affirmance is based substantially for the reasons expressed in per curiam opinion of the Appellate Division.)
Argued March 1, 1999 -- Decided April 7 , 1999
PER CURIAM
John H. Rogers is the owner of a two-story building located in the B1 retail zone of the Village of
Ridgewood (Ridgewood). For many years, the building had been occupied by Allstate Insurance Company
(Allstate) for use as offices. A free-standing sign in front of the building had carried Allstate's business
message for approximately twenty-seven years. The Village adopted a sign ordinance in 1991 causing,
Allstate's sign structure to be non-conforming in various dimensional respects. Specifically, the ordinance
requires free-standing signs to be located forty feet from the building. The sign in question was positioned
only about twenty-eight feet away. In addition, the ordinance limits the height of a free-standing sign to ten
feet and its area to twelve square feet. The sign in question is 13.9 feet high and has an area of 31.5 square
feet.
Allstate vacated the building several years after the adoption of the sign ordinance. Rogers entered
into a lease with a new tenant for use of the property as a nail salon, a permitted use. Rogers and his tenant
sought to keep the Allstate sign, changing its business message to one that would be appropriate for the nail
salon. The local zoning officer denied permission to do so. Rogers then applied to the Zoning Board of
Adjustment (Board), seeking either an interpretation that the sign was a protected non-conforming use
whose business message could be changed to reflect the new business on the property or, in the alternative, a
variance permitting Rogers to change the message. Both applications were denied. Rogers then filed an
action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division.
While the matter was pending before the Law Division, the Village adopted an amendment to its
sign ordinance that provided, among other things, that when there is a change in the occupancy of a building
or premises, the message of any sign or signs that identify or advertise an individual, business, service,
product or other item that is no longer present or available in the building or on the premises shall be
removed. Another amendment provides that neither the sign structure nor the sign message shall be altered
unless the alteration will result in both the message and the sign structure conforming in all respects with the
provisions of the ordinance. The effect of the amendments was to prohibit a change of message on a non-conforming sign.
The Law Division reversed the Board's interpretation of the sign provisions of the local zoning
ordinance and the denial of Rogers' application for a variance permitting the message on a non-conforming
business sign to be changed in accordance with the new business use of the new tenant.
The Board and the Village appealed the decision of the Law Division. The Appellate Division
affirmed, finding that the amendments prohibiting the change of the business message on a non-conforming
sign impairs the right that the Municipal Land Use Law gives property owners to maintain non-conforming
uses.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: Judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division
in its opinion. A commercial sign cannot lose its protected non-conforming status simply because its
message is changed to advertise the new permitted business to which it is ancillary.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN
and COLEMAN join in this per curiam opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
205 September Term 1997
JOHN H. ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
OF THE VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD,
Defendant,
and
THE VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued March 1, 1999 -- Decided April 7, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
309 N.J. Super. 630 (1998).
Sydney V. Stoldt, Jr., argued the cause for
appellant (Stoldt, Horan & Kowal, attorneys;
Mr. Stoldt and Dorothy A. Kowal, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
The judgment is affirmed, substantially for the reasons
expressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division, reported at
309 N.J. Super. 630 (1998).
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in this per curiam opinion.
NO. A-205 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOHN H. ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
OF THE VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD,
Defendant,
and
THE VILLAGE OF RIDGEWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED April 7, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY