SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Roy M. Victor v. State of New Jersey (A-2-09)
Argued October 27, 2009 -- Decided September 13, 2010
HOENS, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether an adverse employment consequence is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim that his employer discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability.
Plaintiff Roy Victor, who is employed as a New Jersey State Trooper, sued defendants State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, and a group of separately-named individuals who were either his supervisors or medical personnel employed by the State Police, asserting discrimination claims based on race and disability pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.
Plaintiff began his career with defendant New Jersey State Police in 1986 and served uneventfully until he sustained a back injury while on duty in 1995. From then until late 2003, that injury, together with a stress-related disorder that plaintiff attributed to a racially-discriminatory job site transfer in 1998, resulted in lengthy periods of time during which plaintiff was on medical leave, was off-duty, or was on limited-duty status. Prior to the date that is the focus of this appeal, plaintiff complied with all of the regulations concerning his status and throughout his lengthy periods of medical leave, off-duty status, and limited-duty status, he received his full pay and benefits and he was awarded regularly-scheduled longevity promotions in rank.
After several extended time periods during which plaintiff was in off-duty status because of his back injury or because of a recurrence of his stress disorder, plaintiff returned to work in April 2003, at which time he was approved to be on limited-duty work status. He remained in that status until December 8, 2003, at which time he successfully completed a functional capacity test, was cleared medically by a worker’s compensation doctor and a division physician, and was returned to full-duty status by defendant Dr. Donald Izzi, who was the Director of Medical Services for the New Jersey State Police. Plaintiff reported for duty on December 11, 2003.
When plaintiff reported, he told the Assistant Station Commander, Sergeant O’Rourke, that he had injured his back at some point in time between December 8, when he was cleared for full-duty service, and December 10, the day before he reported. Although he said that he was injured, he had not called in and asked for medical leave, he had not consulted a personal physician, and he had not attempted to contact Dr. Izzi or any other Division medical personnel about a change in his duty status. Instead, he told Sgt. O’Rourke that he wanted to perform administrative tasks in the station rather than go on road patrol, because he thought that wearing the protective vest required of all full-duty officers while on road patrol would exacerbate his back injury. Sgt. O’Rourke agreed.
Lieutenant Warren Shakespeare, the Station Commander and the only officer authorized to alter a trooper’s duty status, told plaintiff that he could not remain at the station and directed plaintiff to perform the work of a full-duty road trooper by reporting for road patrol duty. In response, plaintiff did not request sick leave, ask that he be permitted to visit the division doctor, or produce anything to document his claim that he was injured, but instead put on his protective vest and went out on road patrol. He stayed out on road patrol for four of the six hours that remained of his shift. At that point, he returned to the station and took sick leave for the final two hours of his shift and for each of the following three days when he would otherwise have been required to report for full duty.
There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever produced any documentation to support his claim that he suffered from a back injury on the disputed day in December. Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim relates only to the four-hour period of time on December 11, 2003, when he was ordered to return to full duty as a road trooper after telling his supervisor that he had injured his back on one of the immediately preceding days.
The parties’ arguments about whether an adverse employment consequence is one of the required elements of a failure to accommodate claim were raised before the trial court both during the charge conference and in a post-verdict motion for a new trial. Both times the trial court refused. In essence, the trial court reasoned that an adverse employment consequence was merely the means through which plaintiff proved employment discrimination damages, with the result that if plaintiff could prove some other form of damages, it became unnecessary. As a result, the jury instructions did not include any reference to adverse employment consequence as an element of plaintiff’s proofs.
The jury returned a split verdict. The jury found for plaintiff only on his claims that defendant State Police had discriminated against him based on his disabilities through disparate treatment (other than in rankings and promotions), by retaliating against him because of complaints he filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity office of the State Police, and by failing to accommodate him on December 11, 2003, when he was sent out on the road. The jury awarded plaintiff a single lump sum of $65,000 as damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Defendants moved for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again raising, among other things, their argument about the required elements of a failure to accommodate claim. In denying that relief, the trial court reasoned “if you prove failure to accommodate, that failure is in and of itself an adverse employment action.”
Defendants appealed, arguing that the jury charge was flawed because it omitted adverse employment consequence as an element of a failure to accommodate claim. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, recognized that the issue is a novel one, and concluded that proof of an adverse employment action is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the LAD. The panel remanded for a new trial on all claims, noting that the jury’s lump sum award of damages could not be appropriately molded.
The Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s petition for certification limited to one issue: “whether a plaintiff must prove he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his employer’s failure to accommodate a physical disability under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.”
HELD: The Court concurs in the Appellate Division’s judgment that the verdict must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. The Court does so because, regardless of whether or not there is room in the Law Against Discrimination’s strong protective embrace of persons with disabilities to recognize that there may be circumstances in which a failure to accommodate in and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate cannot meet the proofs required on his prima facie case.
1. It is a frequent observation that we rely on the federal courts and their construction of federal laws for guidance in those circumstances in which our LAD is unclear. That general observation, however, cannot substitute for understanding the ways in which the long and rich history of our LAD and its interpreting regulations have repeatedly intersected with those federal laws and their related regulations. It is particularly true that understanding the Legislature’s intent as expressed in our LAD’s provisions relating to persons with disabilities requires an appreciation of its evolution in the context of the historical development of corollary rights on the federal level. The Court proceeds to trace and examine that history beginning with 1972 amendments to the LAD adding protections for the “handicapped” and enactment by Congress of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which has been the essential wellspring for the rights granted to persons with disabilities ever since. (Pp. 15-30)
2. All employment discrimination claims require the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the elements of a prima facie case, but there is no single prima face case that applies to all employment discrimination claims. Instead, the prima facie elements of a claim vary depending upon the particular employment discrimination claim being made. What they traditionally share, however, is the requirement that plaintiff endure an adverse employment consequence as a result of the discriminatory act. For claims of disability discrimination, the first element of the prima facie case, that plaintiff is in a protected class, requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she qualifies as an individual with a disability, or who is perceived as having a disability, as that has been defined by statute. The second element requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, or was performing those essential functions, either with or without a reasonable accommodation. Applying a literal reading to ADA provisions defining discrimination against person with disabilities suggests that a disability discrimination claim must include some form of adverse employment consequence. (Pp. 30-37)
3. Published decisions of New Jersey courts uniformly identify adverse employment consequence as one element of the prima facie case for disability discrimination. Those opinions do so, however, in part because they recite the familiar elements consistent with any employment discrimination case, and in part because the factual setting of each case included an adverse job consequence. Published opinions of New Jersey’s Appellate Division and trial courts also have included adverse employment consequence in reciting the prima facie elements of a cause of action for failure to accommodate. The Court proceeds to examine New Jersey and federal cases, in particular Seventh Circuit opinions, noting that the Seventh Circuit has followed its own path, coming close to explicitly recognizing failure to accommodate as a freestanding cause of action. (Pp. 37-49)
4. Although the question remains unsettled in the federal courts, our LAD’s broad remedial purposes and the wide scope of its coverage for disabilities as compared to the ADA support an expansive view of protecting rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace. The LAD’s purposes suggest that the Court chart a course to permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who have failed to reasonably accommodate their disabilities even if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that resulted. Although it is difficult for the Court to envision factual circumstances in which the failure to accommodate will not yield an adverse consequence, the Court cannot entirely foreclose the possibility of circumstances that would give rise to a claim for failure to accommodate even without an identifiable adverse employment consequence. However, the Court is constrained to refrain from resolving today the question of whether a failure to accommodate unaccompanied by an adverse employment consequence may be actionable. The Court does so because, in the end, this record is a poor vehicle in which to find the definitive answer to that important question. First, there is no evidence in this record that plaintiff was disabled on December 11, 2003, the only date when he asserts he was not accommodated. Second, there is no evidence that plaintiff sought a reasonable accommodation. The Court concurs in the Appellate Division’s judgment that the verdict must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. The Court does so because, regardless of whether or not there is room in the LAD’s strong protective embrace of persons with disabilities to recognize that there may be circumstances in which a failure to accommodate in and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate cannot meet the proofs required on his prima facie case. (Pp. 50-56)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as modified and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 2 September Term 2009
ROY M. VICTOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, SGT. ERIC ESTOK, DR. DONALD IZZI, CAPT. SALVATORE MAGGIO, and LT. PAUL WAGNER,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued October 27, 2009 – Decided September 13, 2010
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 401 N.J. Super. 596 (2008).
Eldridge Hawkins argued the cause for appellant.
Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Anne Milgram, Attorney of New Jersey, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).
Glen D. Savits submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae AARP (Green Savits & Lenzo, attorneys; Mr. Savits and Daniel B. Kohrman, a member of the District of Columbia bar, of counsel and on the brief).
Andrew Dwyer submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (The Dwyer Law Firm, attorneys).
JUSTICE HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal the Court is asked to consider whether an adverse employment consequence is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim that his employer discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his disability. The trial court concluded that the failure to accommodate was itself an adverse employment consequence, as a result of which plaintiff was only required to prove, as part of his prima facie case, that the employer failed to offer him a reasonable accommodation. The Appellate Division disagreed, reasoning that an adverse employment consequence is an essential element of all disability-based employment discrimination claims and concluding that plaintiff could not succeed on his failure to accommodate claim because he did not suffer any adverse employment consequence.
The question raised in this appeal, therefore, has been narrowly phrased in terms of whether there can be a “freestanding” failure to accommodate claim, that is, a claim based on a failure to accommodate a disability that does not result in any adverse employment consequence. Attempting to answer that question requires an understanding of the way in which protections for persons with disabilities have evolved through numerous state and federal statutes and their implementing regulations. Part and parcel of that understanding is an appreciation for the way in which the goals embodied in those statutes have been advanced by the protections that reasonable accommodations can and do afford persons with disabilities in the workplace. In the end, we conclude that plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim cannot succeed, but in doing so, we leave for another day a definitive answer to the question he sought to have resolved in this appeal.
I.
Plaintiff Roy Victor, who is employed as a New Jersey State Trooper, sued defendants State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, and a group of separately-named individuals who were either his supervisors or medical personnel employed by the State Police, asserting discrimination claims based on race and disability pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Plaintiff’s specific allegations,1 which spanned the time period from 1995 through July 2004, included claims of failure to promote, disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation, all based on race and disability, as well as a claim that defendants failed to accommodate plaintiff when he sustained a back injury.
We need not recite in detail the factual assertions that were the subject of plaintiff’s proofs at trial because they are fully set forth in the published decision of the Appellate Division, see Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 602-05 (App. Div. 2008), and because the issue before this Court rests on events that occurred on a single day during plaintiff’s employment. For those reasons, except to the extent that a fuller factual explanation is required, we focus our recitation of the facts on the events of that day.
Plaintiff began his career with defendant New Jersey State Police in 1986 and served uneventfully until he sustained a back injury while on duty in 1995. From then until late 2003, that injury, together with a stress-related disorder that plaintiff attributed to a racially-discriminatory job site transfer in 1998, resulted in lengthy periods of time during which plaintiff was on medical leave, was off-duty, or was on limited-duty status.
The undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that there are regulations governing how and under what circumstances a trooper is eligible to be classified as off-duty or limited-duty, and the manner in which a trooper is returned to full-duty status. In summary, a trooper who is injured while on full duty is entitled to sick leave, which a trooper can access simply by calling his or her assigned station and informing a supervisor. After taking an initial period of three sick days, the trooper is required to be examined by a division doctor and to produce medical documentation supporting the claimed injury or illness. In addition, the trooper is required to be seen by the same division doctor until the injury or illness is resolved and only the division doctor is authorized to change a trooper’s duty status. A trooper who is on medical leave, or who is placed on off-duty or limited-duty status, receives full pay and benefits, and there is no pre-determined limit on the number of days that a trooper may be on leave or in a status other than full-duty. Prior to the date that is the focus of this appeal, plaintiff complied with all of the regulations concerning his status and throughout his lengthy periods of medical leave, off-duty status, and limited-duty status, he received his full pay and benefits and he was awarded regularly-scheduled longevity promotions in rank.
At all times relevant to this appeal, plaintiff was a Trooper I, for whom full-duty status meant that the trooper was deemed able to perform all of the physical and other duties of that position, including being on road patrol and wearing a protective vest. Throughout plaintiff’s medical and stress-related periods of leave, he was seen regularly by defendant Dr. Donald Izzi, who was the Director of Medical Services for the New Jersey State Police. Dr. Izzi supervised the regional division doctors and essentially acted as plaintiff’s division doctor during the times that are relevant to this dispute.
After several extended time periods during which plaintiff was in off-duty status because of his back injury or because of a recurrence of his stress disorder, plaintiff returned to work in April 2003, at which time he was approved to be on limited-duty work status. He remained in that status until December 8, 2003, at which time he successfully completed a functional capacity test, was cleared medically by a worker’s compensation doctor and a division physician, and was returned to full-duty status by Dr. Izzi. He used December 10, 2003, as an approved holiday and reported for duty on December 11, 2003.
When plaintiff reported for duty that day, he told the Assistant Station Commander, Sergeant O’Rourke, that he had injured his back at some point in time between December 8, when he was cleared for full-duty service, and December 10, the day before he reported. Although he said that he was injured, he had not called in and asked for medical leave, he had not consulted a personal physician, and he had not attempted to contact Dr. Izzi or any other Division medical personnel about a change in his duty status. Instead, he told Sgt. O’Rourke that he wanted to perform administrative tasks in the station rather than go out on road patrol, because he thought that wearing the protective vest required of all full-duty officers while on road patrol would exacerbate his back injury. Although Sgt. O’Rourke had no authority to alter any trooper’s duty status, he was willing to agree to plaintiff’s request.
Lieutenant Warren Shakespeare, the Station Commander, was the only officer authorized to alter a trooper’s duty status. When he arrived, he spoke with Dr. Izzi and confirmed that plaintiff had been cleared for full duty and had not sought medical authorization for a change in duty status. Shakespeare then told plaintiff that he could not remain at the station and directed plaintiff to perform the work of a full-duty road trooper by reporting for road patrol duty. In response, plaintiff did not request sick leave, ask that he be permitted to visit the division doctor, or produce anything to document his claim that he was injured, but instead put on his protective vest and went out on road patrol. He stayed out on road patrol for four of the six hours that remained of his shift. At that point, he returned to the station and took sick leave for the final two hours of his shift and for each of the following three days when he would otherwise have been required to report for full duty.
At the end of that period of time, plaintiff was seen by two different division physicians and was subsequently placed on off-duty status based on a complaint relating to his pre-existing depression and stress disorder that was supported by a report from his treating psychologist. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever produced any documentation to support his claim that he suffered from a back injury on the disputed day in December.
II.
Although plaintiff’s disability discrimination complaints are intertwined to some extent with his racial discrimination complaints, and although his disability complaint has components relating to his psychological and physical disorders, his failure to accommodate claim is narrowly focused. That claim for relief relates only to the four-hour period of time on December 11, 2003, when plaintiff was ordered to return to full duty as a road trooper after telling his supervisor that he had injured his back on one of the immediately preceding days. It is therefore against that limited factual background that we must consider plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim.
The parties’ arguments about whether an adverse employment consequence is one of the required elements of a failure to accommodate claim were raised before the trial court both during the charge conference and in a post-verdict motion for a new trial. When defendants requested a charge that included adverse employment consequence as an element of plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court refused, commenting,
[Plaintiff] says he sustained psychological injury as a result of the treatment of him when he came back on December 11th and they refused to accommodate his handicap by allowing him to stay in the station.
So he’s claiming that he was injured as a result of the . . . failure to accommodate his handicap. So that, to me, I mean, I don’t need to get into an adverse employment action. He has to prove his damages.
In essence, the trial court reasoned that an adverse employment consequence was merely the means through which plaintiff proved employment discrimination damages, with the result that if plaintiff could prove some other form of damages, it became unnecessary. When defendants reiterated their charge request after closing arguments, the trial court again refused, continuing to treat adverse consequence as a form of damages, and explaining that
usually the failure to accommodate comes up in the context of terminations or transfers, demotions and that sort of thing. But as I explained on the record yesterday, the claim here is that he suffered psychological injury by the failure to accommodate him and the stress that was attendant with that day on December 11th and to me that was sufficient under the circumstances.
In charging the jury, the trial court explained the failure to accommodate in terms of a failure to engage in an interactive process to accommodate, instructing as follows:
When an employee seeks an accommodation for a disability, the employer is required to engage in an interactive process as part of a good faith effort to identify the precise limitations resulting from a disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. A failure to accommodate is demonstrated when the employer fails to engage in this interactive process in good faith.
Moreover, when a disabled employee requests an accommodation and the employer contends that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s business, the employer has the burden of proving that the requested accommodation would constitute an undue burden on the employer’s business.
As a result, the jury instructions2 did not include any reference to adverse employment consequence as an element of plaintiff’s proofs. Instead, the court charged the jury that plaintiff only needed to prove that he was disabled on December 11, 2003; that defendants knew about his disability; that he requested an accommodation; that defendants did not make a good faith effort to accommodate him; and that he “could have been reasonably accommodated but for the lack of [defendant’s] good faith.”
The jury returned a split verdict, rejecting all of plaintiff’s race-based discrimination claims, all of his claims that he was subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race or his disabilities, his claim that he was treated disparately in ranking or promotions because of his disabilities, and all of his claims that were directed to any of the individual defendants.
At the same time, however, the jury found for plaintiff on his claims that defendant State Police had discriminated against him based on his disabilities through disparate treatment (other than in rankings and promotions), by retaliating against him because of complaints he filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity office of the State Police, and by failing to accommodate him on December 11, 2003, when he was sent out on the road. Because the jury had rejected plaintiff’s claims relating to rankings and promotion, it made no back pay or front pay award, but it awarded plaintiff a single lump sum of $65,000 as damages for all of the claims on which he had succeeded. Following a bifurcated trial immediately after the compensatory verdict was announced, the jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in punitive damages as well.
Defendants moved for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again raising, among other things, their argument about the required elements of a failure to accommodate claim. In denying that relief, the trial court crystallized its essential holding:
I believe that the jury charge was correct and it’s consistent with New Jersey law. In my view . . . if you prove failure to accommodate, that failure is in and of itself an adverse employment action. I mean the case law doesn’t say that specifically but to me that’s implicit in the failure to accommodate charge.
If you don’t accommodate someone, that is an adverse action to them if they can prove all the elements of failure to accommodate.
Defendants appealed, arguing that the jury charge was flawed because it omitted adverse employment consequence as an element of a failure to accommodate claim. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, recognized that the issue is a novel one, commenting that it was “at a loss to locate a state court decision addressing whether plaintiff must prove an adverse employment action occurred as a result of a failure to accommodate a claimed disability.” Id. at 611. Concluding, however, that proof of an adverse employment action is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the LAD, id. at 617, the Appellate Division rejected the trial court’s reasoning that an adverse employment consequence “is presumed by the failure to accommodate or that plaintiff’s claimed psychological suffering unequivocally qualifies.” Ibid. Having concluded that the jury charge was in error, the panel remanded for a new trial on all claims, noting that the jury’s lump sum award of damages could not be appropriately molded. Ibid.
Plaintiff’s petition for certification was granted, but was limited to one issue: “whether a plaintiff must prove he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his employer’s failure to accommodate a physical disability under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49.” Victor v. State, 199 N.J. 542 (2009).
III.
Plaintiff urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and to reinstate the jury verdict in his favor, arguing that the panel erred in two ways. First, plaintiff asserts that its decision conflicts with federal court precedents construing disability discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 to 12213. More particularly, he contends that it is contrary to a decision in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit construed the ADA to mean that a plaintiff in a failure to accommodate case need not demonstrate an adverse employment impact because the failure to accommodate is itself the adverse employment consequence. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Adverse employment decisions in this context include refusing to make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961, 125 S. Ct. 1725, 161 L. Ed.2d 602 (2005). He urges this Court to do likewise in interpreting the LAD.
Second, plaintiff asserts that the appellate panel erred by overlooking relevant administrative regulations promulgated in New Jersey pursuant to the LAD. He argues that the Appellate Division did not fully consider, and failed to correctly apply, the New Jersey regulation, see N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), that is a corollary to the ADA’s reasonable accommodation protection for disabled persons, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A). He argues that the Appellate Division should have considered this regulation to be persuasive and urges this Court to correct its erroneous interpretation.
Defendants assert that because plaintiff suffered no change in rank, no loss of pay or benefits, and no other adverse employment consequence, he cannot demonstrate one of the required elements for a failure to accommodate claim and cannot recover. Moreover, they argue that the Appellate Division correctly applied all of the relevant New Jersey and federal precedents and that plaintiff’s reliance on Williams is misplaced. They contend that because the plaintiff in Williams was terminated, she did suffer an adverse employment consequence and that the Third Circuit did not directly consider or decide whether her claim could have succeeded without that element of her proofs. Therefore, they argue that anything in the Williams opinion that might be read to support plaintiff’s position is dicta that does not bind and should not persuade this Court.
Echoing plaintiff’s assertions in their separately submitted briefs, amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey and AARP offer similar arguments in support of a reversal of the Appellate Division’s judgment. They assert that the Third Circuit, in Williams, equated the failure to make a reasonable accommodation with an adverse employment action, and they urge this Court to find that reasoning to be persuasive. In addition, they contend that the Court should look to the LAD’s interpretative regulation, N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), to find support for the conclusion that an adverse employment consequence is not part of plaintiff’s required proofs. Finally, amici urge this Court to reject the judgment of the Appellate Division as being in conflict with the essential purposes of the LAD.
IV.
The parties and amici in this matter call upon us to identify the elements of the prima facie case for a claim sounding in failure to accommodate pursuant to the LAD and, more specifically, to address whether proof of an adverse employment consequence is essential to that cause of action. In responding to that question, the trial court and the Appellate Division relied on similar precedents, but reached contrary conclusions. We begin, therefore, with an explanation of some of the fundamental tenets that inform our analytical approach.
It is a frequent observation that we rely on the federal courts and their construction of federal laws for guidance in those circumstances in which our LAD is unclear. See Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 200 (1999) (“To the extent the federal standards are ‘useful and fair,’ they will be applied in the interest of achieving a degree of uniformity in the discrimination laws.”) (quotation omitted); Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 606-07 (1993) (referring to United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in considering elements of hostile work environment claim); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97 (1990) (“In a variety of contexts involving allegations of unlawful discrimination, this Court has looked to federal law as a key source of interpretive authority.”).
That general observation, however, cannot substitute for understanding the ways in which the long and rich history of our LAD and its interpreting regulations have repeatedly intersected with those federal laws and their related regulations. It is particularly true that understanding the Legislature’s intent as expressed in our LAD’s provisions relating to persons with disabilities requires an appreciation of its evolution in the context of the historical development of corollary rights on the federal level.
Our examination need not trace the history of the LAD as far back as its origin in 1945, because references of any kind3 to handicaps or disabilities are of far more recent vintage. Protections for the handicapped were first added to the LAD in 1972. See L. 1972, c. 114 (eff. Aug. 1, 1972). That enactment created an entirely new subsection to the LAD and generally extended the statute’s reach, id. at § 2 (creating N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1), but only applied to persons with a physical handicap, id. at § 1(q) (adding definition of physical handicap). Moreover, the new statutory language limited the LAD’s protections for the handicapped somewhat by including an exception for circumstances in which “the nature and extent of the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment.” Id. at § 2. The Committee Statement that accompanied the bill simply expressed an intention to address the failure of existing law to prohibit discrimination against physically handicapped people. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 486, (Mar. 23, 1972). It therefore does not explain why the Legislature chose not to add persons with disabilities as a protected class, but created a separate statutory section for their protection instead. Presumably, however, the new provision’s exception for a handicap that “reasonably precludes” performance reflects the recognition that, unlike other protected classes, a person’s physical disability might interfere with full and unfettered equal treatment.
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 to 796l, which has been the essential wellspring for the rights granted to persons with disabilities ever since. Although the Rehabilitation Act was limited in scope to employers operating as federal contractors and recipients of federal funding, the impact of two of its provisions, known as Sections 503 and 504, see id. at §§ 793, 794, has been far-reaching. Section 503 basically required government contractors to assist in ending discrimination against employees with disabilities by requiring them to “take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals.” Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 393 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 793). Likewise, Section 504 prohibited federal grant recipients from discriminating against people with disabilities, using general language that has elicited descriptions of the law such as the “civil rights bill of the disabled,” Ams. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc), and that soon became the basis for expansive federal regulations, see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(1) (providing that “[n]o qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be subjected to discrimination in employment under any program or activity to which this part applies”); 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(3) (requiring recipients of federal funding to make all employment decisions for applicable programs “in a manner which ensures that discrimination on the basis of handicap does not occur” or “in any way that adversely affects their opportunities or status because of handicap”).
Our Legislature did not amend the LAD as a direct result of the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but our statute continued to evolve by expanding the sections that define what qualifies as a disability and who is considered to be a disabled person entitled to the statute’s protections. In 1977, for example, the Legislature amended the LAD to define “blind person,” “guide dog” and “guide dog trainer,” and to add protections for blind persons, see L. 1977, c. 456, §§ 1-2, similar to the pre-existing employment protections for other persons with disabilities, see id. at § 2 (adding N.J.S.A. 10:5-29.1).
In 1978, the Legislature acted again, expanding the definition of handicapped well beyond those with physical disabilities, see L. 1978, c. 137, § 3 (adding “mental, psychological or developmental disabilit[ies]”), including persons who have “been at any time handicapped,” see id. at § 2, and amending the employment protections correspondingly, see, e.g., ibid. (deleting qualifier “physical” from N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1). Throughout the years that followed, the LAD was repeatedly amended to add protections for a variety of disorders, illnesses, and conditions. See, e.g., L. 1980, c. 46, §§ 4, 5 (extending protections to deaf persons); L. 1981, c. 185, § 1 (extending protections to persons with blood traits for numerous disorders); L. 1991, c. 493, § 1 (amending definition of handicapped to include persons with AIDS and HIV).
In 1984, the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights, acting pursuant to its statutory authority, see N.J.S.A. 10:5-8(g), proposed regulations relating to persons with disabilities. See 16 N.J.R. 838 (Apr. 16, 1984). Those regulations are the direct predecessors to the regulations addressing reasonable accommodation in employment, see N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.1 to -2.8, that bear upon the issue in this appeal. In proposing the regulations, the Division specifically relied on the federal regulations adopted pursuant to Section 504 and expressed its intent to “bring the New Jersey law into conformity with existing federal regulations pertaining to discrimination against the handicapped.” 16 N.J.R. 838.
Two of the regulations, both as proposed and as currently in force, relate to reasonable accommodation, with the first, N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5, setting forth the requirement that there be a reasonable accommodation, and the second, N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.8, identifying exceptions that excuse an employer from complying with that requirement. In explaining the meaning of the proposed reasonable accommodation regulation, see N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5, the Division followed the Section 504 approach, noting that the employer had an “obligation to make reasonable changes in the work environment that will enable a handicapped employee or applicant to perform the particular job sought,” subject to an exception if “the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.” 16 N.J.R. 839.
After the notice and comment period, the Division revised the proposed regulations, modifying the original version of N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5 in two notable ways. The first change was designed “to make clear that employers are required to conduct all aspects of their employment procedures in a nondiscriminatory manner.” 17 N.J.R. 672 (Mar. 18, 1985) (explaining revision to N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(a)). The second clarified that all claims of discrimination would be evaluated individually and “that employers must consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation when making employment decisions about handicapped persons.” Ibid. (explaining clarification to N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)). Following the notice and comment period for the proposed revised regulations, the Division set forth further explanations and clarifications. In response to one comment, the Division clarified that requiring employers to consider reasonable accommodations before taking negative employment action, see N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(2), “was not intended to lessen the requirement of reasonable accommodation. Rather, the rule is intended to encourage employers to engage in a certain thought process whereby they consider reasonable accommodation before refusing to hire, promote, etc. a handicapped person.” 17 N.J.R. 1575 (June 17, 1985).
Finally, the Division rejected a criticism aimed at the entirety of the regulations, pointing out that the reasonable accommodation requirement was “implicit in the statutory standard that a person may not be refused employment on account of handicap unless the nature and extent of the handicap ‘reasonably precludes’ job performance.” Ibid. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S., 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. Ed.2d 158 (1971)). Although the regulations have been re-adopted regularly without significant substantive alteration4 ever since their original promulgation in 1985, they do not shed light on whether a failure to accommodate, absent an adverse employment consequence, is actionable.
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA, long regarded as an important source of guidance in matters relating to rights of persons with disabilities, in which it identified four purposes. Those purposes are: “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities[,]” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1); “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities[,]” id. at (b)(2); “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities[,]” id. at (b)(3); and “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . . . to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities[,]” id. at (b)(4). See 101 Pub. L. No. 336, 104 Stat. 329 (1990) (same).
Although in enacting the ADA, Congress broadly5 attacked discrimination against persons with disabilities, our focus is solely on Title I, which targets employment. The ADA’s employment rights provisions are both expansive in scope and specific in detail. The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual because of a disability “in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a).
In addition to that sweeping charge, the ADA includes a list of acts and practices that are prohibited. Of particular relevance to this dispute, that list specifically includes the failure to make reasonable accommodations for an applicant’s or employee’s disabilities, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s business operations. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Moreover, the meaning of that phrase is not left to chance, because “reasonable accommodation” is also defined, and includes “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” as well as “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(A), (B).
The specific mandate requiring reasonable accommodations was not a new right for persons with disabilities, but instead reflected the fact that the ADA was drafted with intentional fidelity to Section 504 and its implementing regulations. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a) (specifying that ADA shall not be construed to apply lesser standard than Rehabilitation Act); S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 26, 34, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 247, 325-26.
Although the Rehabilitation Act did not use the phrase “reasonable accommodation,” federal courts had interpreted that statute to require it, see Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining Section 501 imposes obligation on federal employers to reasonably accommodate); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining Sections 501 and 504 require federal employers to provide reasonable accommodation to handicapped), as did the statute’s implementing regulations, see 45 C.F.R. § 85.53 (1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a); see also Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining history of federal regulations). The ADA’s reliance on the Rehabilitation Act sets it apart from other anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (prohibiting employers from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)).6
After the ADA was enacted, protections for persons with disabilities that mirror its reasonable accommodation provisions continued to be found in the LAD’s implementing regulations rather than in the statute itself. And it was not until 2003 that the LAD’s more general prohibitions on discrimination were extended to persons with disabilities through the addition of “disability” to the list of those accorded protected status. See L. 2003, c. 180 § 4 (eff. Jan. 1, 2004) (amending N.J.S.A. 10:5-4). The legislative history makes plain that the intent of that amendment was to make our law comply with the Federal Fair Housing Act and to access Housing and Urban Development funding from the federal government. See, e.g., Assembly Housing and Local Government Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 3774 (June 16, 2003) (expressing intention “to provide substantially equivalent protections against discrimination to those provided under the Federal Fair Housing Act[,] . . . to achieve certification by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)[,] . . . and thereby to receive federal reimbursement”); Senate Community and Urban Affairs Committee, Statement to Bill S. 2454 (June 9, 2003) (expressing intention “to provide substantially equivalent protections against discrimination to those provided under the Federal Fair Housing Act”). Because the focus was on achieving consistency with the Federal Fair Housing Act, the bill not only amended the LAD to include references to disabilities, but made numerous other changes to the LAD relating to nationality and housing rights. See, e.g., L. 2003, c. 180, § 12 (amending N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(i)(1), (2) to prohibit discrimination based on disability in securing loans or extending credit; adding subsection N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(o) on practices of multiple listing services, real estate brokers, and similar entities in housing sales and rental); id. at § 16 (amending N.J.S.A. 10:5-17 to add remedy for emotional distress for housing violations).
Significantly, the 2003 amendment marked the first time that persons with disabilities were included in the section of the LAD which is the heart of all employment discrimination claims, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, and which identifies unlawful employment practices. See L. 2003, c. 180, § 12 (amending N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 to add disability as protected category). In explaining its purpose, the Legislature added the following comments about the effect of its amendment generally:
[u]nder current law, the provisions of the “Law Against Discrimination” that enumerate the categories of protection under the statute do not specifically include “handicap.” Instead, [the existing statute] generally provides that it is unlawful to discriminate against any person because such person is or has been handicapped. This bill would add “disability” to each portion of the statute in which the protected categories are listed, thereby providing consistency and clarity to this area of the law.
[Senate Community and Urban Affairs Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 2454 (June 9, 2003).]
The 2003 addition of persons with disabilities as a protected class, however, left intact both statutory sections that created limitations on the employment rights of disabled persons. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, -29.1. That is, for persons with disabilities, there remained exceptions if an employer could show that the disability “reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, or “would prevent such person from performing a particular job,” N.J.S.A. 10:5-29.1. Those exceptions, however, had long been understood to function as interpreted by the regulations embracing the reasonable accommodation paradigm created under Section 504 and the ADA.
We can infer, since the Legislature has never amended the LAD to afford rights to the disabled that are different from those found in Section 504 and the ADA, that the regulatory interpretation matches the Legislature’s intent. And we find further support for that understanding in a subsequent amendment to the LAD. In enacting a bill in 2007,7 see L. 2007, c. 325 (eff. Jan. 13, 2008) (amending N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 to add subsection (q)), the Legislature referred to reasonable accommodations, but only in the context of religious discrimination. In doing so, the Legislature created a framework that balances the rights of employers, employees seeking to avoid having to violate or forgo a sincerely held religious practice or observance, and other employees who might be affected thereby.
The significance, however, of that amendment is not that it created reasonable accommodation rights for people of faith when it had not done so for people with disabilities. Instead, it is that the amendment gave people of faith rights that exceeded those afforded them through the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII.8 The fact that the Legislature saw the need to correct that imbalance suggests strongly that it regards the reasonable accommodation rights for people with disabilities to be appropriately protected by the extant published decisions and the regulations interpreting those rights found in the LAD in accordance with the sweeping protections of the ADA.
V.
The foregoing historical analysis sets the stage for our consideration of whether the LAD’s failure to accommodate cause of action includes adverse employment consequence as one of the elements of the prima facie case.
A.
All employment discrimination claims require the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the elements of a prima facie case. Although most employment discrimination claims proceed in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas9 burden-shifting paradigm, see Goodman v. London Metals Exch., 86 N.J. 19, 31-32 (1981) (utilizing McDonnell Douglas framework); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 82-83 (1978) (embracing McDonnell Douglas framework), the first step in that analysis requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she can meet each of the elements of the prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677. We have referred to that burden as “rather modest,” Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005) (quoting Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996)), but it remains the plaintiff’s burden nonetheless.