(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 12, 1994 -- Decided November 30, 1994
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The question on appeal is whether the tort of intrusion on seclusion is an "injury to the person"
governed by a two-year statute of limitations or is an "injury to the rights of another" governed by a six-year
statute of limitations.
John Rumbauskas was romantically involved with a fellow worker, Sally Jamieson. In November
1982, Jamieson began working for a business managed by Edward A. Cantor. Cantor made romantic
overtures toward Jamieson but she did not reciprocate. Cantor pressured Jamieson to marry him and was
extremely jealous of Rumbauskas' relationship with her. Eventually, Cantor began threatening and harassing
both Jamieson and Rumbauskas. In December 1984, Cantor told Jamieson that if she continued to see
Rumbauskas, Cantor would hire someone to kill both of them. Cantor's agents also stalked Jamieson's
home.
Jamieson terminated her work with Cantor's organization in January 1985 and Cantor continued to
harass and threaten Jamieson, telling her that he would make sure that she was never employed again.
Cantor's threats in respect of killing Rumbauskas also escalated. Between 1986 and 1988, anonymous
telephone threats were made to Rumbauskas directing him to stay away from Jamieson or suffer bodily
harm. Cantor sought the help of a reputed member of organized crime to "persuade" Rumbauskas to stop
seeing Jamieson and have her return certain jewelry and gifts he had given her. During that time,
Rumbauskas observed automobiles continually parked across the street from his home.
The New Jersey State Police, pursuant to a separate criminal investigation of Cantor, confirmed that
Rumbauskas was under surveillance and that there was a "contract murder" out on him that was financed by
Cantor. Cantor was arrested and, thereafter, the telephone threats and other intimidation tactics ceased.
Rumbauskas sued Cantor alleging that Cantor's outrageous conduct constituted an invasion of his
right to privacy. Rumbauskas sought compensatory and punitive damages. He later limited his
compensatory damage claim to economic loss and did not seek damages for physical or emotional injuries.
Cantor moved for dismissal of the complaint based on the statute of limitations. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that intrusion on seclusion is an action for personal injury because
mental distress constitutes part of the measure of damages for such a claim. Therefore, the court held that
the matter was governed by the two-year statute of limitations, which had already expired.
On appeal, Rumbauskas argued that the trial court had confused the nature of the injury with the
nature of the resultant damages and, therefore, had overlooked the distinction between an injury to the
person and a tortious injury to the rights of another. Rumbauskas claimed that he had suffered damages
unrelated to any "injury to the person." The Appellate Division agreed, finding that the right to damages for
the harm to Rumbauskas' interest in privacy does not relate to any physical or emotional injury and,
therefore, is not an injury to the person governed by the two-year statute of limitations. The Appellate
Division reinstated the complaint.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: An action for intrusion on seclusion that is based on conduct such as the stalking or threats of
violence presented in this case constitutes a claim for "injury to the person" and is governed by the
two-year statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
1. The Court in Montells v. Haynes cited with approval the case of Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., in
which the six-year statute of limitations was applied to an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the problems
with applying Canessa to this case is that the invasion of privacy is a complex of four torts: 1) intrusion; 2)
public disclosure of private facts; 3) placing plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation,
for the defendant's benefit, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Any confusion stems from the failure to
separate and distinguish the four forms of invasion of privacy and to realize that they call for different
treatment. Therefore, to conclude that Canessa is applicable to the circumstances is premature. (pp. 6-9)
2. Courts in other jurisdictions are divided with regard to whether invasion of privacy premised on
intrusion on seclusion is governed by the personal-injury statute of limitations. Nonetheless, in this case,
Cantor's conduct struck directly at the personhood of Rumbauskas. Thus, the appropriate statute of
limitations is for "injury to the person," which is governed by a two-year period. (pp. 9-12)
3. The limitations period applicable to actions involving other types of invasion of privacy are not
before the Court. Of course, invasion-of-privacy actions based on appropriation are governed by the six-year
statute of limitations. Regarding actions for public disclosure of private facts or placing one in a false light,
caselaw in other jurisdictions indicate that such claims are subject to the limitations period for defamation
claims, which is one year in New Jersey. (pp. 12-13)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the Law Division is
REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN
join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
5 September Term l994
JOHN RUMBAUSKAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD A. CANTOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued September 12, 1994 -- Decided
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
266 N.J. Super. 369 (1993).
Shalom D. Stone argued the cause for
appellant (Walder, Sondak & Brogan,
attorneys; Justin P. Walder and John A.
Brogan, of counsel).
Kenneth K. Lehn argued the cause for
respondent (Franzblau Dratch, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
In an earlier time, the great Judge Wilfred Jayne might have
written of this case: "In several of its aspects this cause is
an unfashionable one to be introduced to a court * * * for
determination." Tami v. Pikowitz,
138 N.J. Eq. 410, 410 (Ch.
1946). An innocuous rivalry between two suitors of a woman is
ordinarily not the business of the law. In this case, however,
what began as mere harassment of a rival suitor escalated into
stalkings and threats to kill. Fortunately, the processes of
criminal law intervened to save plaintiff from physical violence.
This civil action seeks monetary damages for invasion of privacy. The legal issue presented by this appeal is whether the tort of intrusion on seclusion is an "injury to the person" barred by the two-year limitation period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 or is an "injury to the rights of another" barred by the six-year limitation period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Because this case arises on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, we must accept as true plaintiff's version of the events.
Several years prior to defendant's alleged conduct, plaintiff, John Rumbauskas, had become friendly with a fellow worker to whom we shall refer as "Sally Jamieson." A romantic relationship developed between them. In November 1982, Jamieson went to work for businesses owned and managed by defendant, Edward A. Cantor. Cantor made romantic overtures toward her. These advances were particularly intense throughout 1984. Cantor showered Jamieson with lavish gifts in his effort to convince her to engage in an intimate relationship with him. He pressured Jamieson to wed him and was intensely jealous of Rumbauskas' relationship with her. Rumbauskas knew that, yet he remained romantically involved with Jamieson during that time.
Cantor's unsuccessful attempts to establish a sexual
relationship with Jamieson led to physical threats and harassment
directed at both Jamieson and Rumbauskas. In December 1984,
Cantor showed a $50,000 roll of money to Jamieson and told her
that if she ever saw Rumbauskas again, he would use the $50,000
to hire someone to kill both her and Rumbauskas. Additionally,
Cantor later staged a meeting, in Jamieson's presence, with an
asserted accomplice and intimated to Jamieson that he had hired
the accomplice to kill Rumbauskas. Further, agents of Cantor
stalked Jamieson's premises. Cantor later told Jamieson that
Rumbauskas was lucky he had not been at her home on that occasion
because his agents had been waiting for him.
Even after Jamieson quit working for Cantor's organization
in January 1985, Cantor continued to harass her. He told
Jamieson that he would make sure she was never employed again.
He posted encoded signs on his property deriding Rumbauskas and
escalated his threats against Rumbauskas, again suggesting to
Jamieson that Rumbauskas might be killed.
Between 1986 and 1988, anonymous telephone threats were made
to Rumbauskas directing him to stay away from Jamieson. He was
told that if he did not follow that directive, his legs would be
broken and his relatives would have a funeral to attend. Cantor
also enlisted John Riggi, a reputed member of organized crime, to
"persuade" Rumbauskas to stop seeing Jamieson and have her return
certain jewelry and gifts she had received from Cantor.
During that time, Rumbauskas noticed automobiles continually
parked across the street from his home, the same vehicles that
had followed him. In fact, in 1987, an unidentified vehicle
forced Rumbauskas off the road.
The New Jersey State Police intervened, pursuant to a
separate criminal investigation of Cantor, and confirmed that
Rumbauskas was indeed under surveillance. Moreover, he was the
intended victim of a "contract murder" financed by Cantor. Once
Cantor was arrested, the telephone threats and other intimidation
tactics ceased.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the foregoing outrageous
conduct constituted "an unreasonable intrusion into [plaintiff's]
right to live free of [defendant's] interference, threats,
surveillance, extortion or duress, and constitute[d] an invasion
of [plaintiff's] right to privacy." Plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages. He later limited his
compensatory damage claim to economic loss and did not seek
damages for physical or emotional injuries. (Plaintiff also
asserted a cause of action against Cantor for his involvement in
"racketeering activity" in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(a) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1(d), but those issues are not before us.) The
trial court dismissed the complaint for invasion of privacy. It
reasoned that such an action, specifically an intrusion on
seclusion, is an action for personal injury because mental
distress constitutes part of the measure of damages for such a
tort. Therefore, the trial court concluded that this case
involved an action for "an injury to the person" governed by the
two-year limitation period set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court had
confused the nature of the injury with the nature of the
resultant damages and therefore had overlooked the distinction
between "an injury to the person," as set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:14-2, and "tortious injury to the rights of another," as set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. Plaintiff alleged that he had taken
circuitous routes to and from work to avoid harassing
surveillance. Thus, plaintiff claimed that he had incurred
additional expenses for fuel and had subjected his car to wear
and tear. Plaintiff also alleged that he had purchased a
baseball bat for protection and had missed several days of work
due to threats and intimidation. Further, plaintiff alleged that
his livelihood had been jeopardized by defendant's threats to
purchase the company for which he worked. The point of those
allegations was to demonstrate that plaintiff had suffered
damages unrelated to any "injury to the person."
The Appellate Division agreed. It reasoned that
[t]he two-year limitations statute does
not apply to injury to a person, but to
injury to the person. Because the right to
damages for the harm to plaintiff's interest
in privacy * * * does not relate to any
physical or emotional injury, it is not "an
injury to the person" and is therefore not
governed by the two-year limitations period.
[
266 N.J. Super. 399, 405 (1993).]
We granted defendant's petition for certification,
134 N.J. 565 (l993), to review the reinstatement of the claim.
Recently, in Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993), we determined the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to actions under N.J.S.A. 10:5-13, the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The case had arisen from a sexual-harassment claim filed by Montells against her supervisor, employer, and various company managers. Finding that injuries under LAD are most like personal injury claims, we concluded that the two-year personal-injury statute of limitations applied. Id. at 292.
In analyzing whether injuries under LAD are like "an injury to the person" under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 or like injuries under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 that arise from "any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in section[] 2A:14-2 * * * ," we reasoned that the Legislature "essentially distinguished personal injuries involving physical or emotional harm from those involving economic harm." Id. at 291. We concluded that "[a]lthough LAD similarly vindicates economic rights and some rights that sound in contract, the statute strikes directly at conduct that injures the personhood of another. A discrimination claim cuts most deeply at the personal level." Id. at 293.
In Montells, however, we cited with approval Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327 (Law Div. 1967), which held that
the six-year statute of limitations applied to an invasion-of
privacy claim. Montells, supra, 133 N.J. at 292. Canessa had
encountered serious difficulties in finding an apartment or house
to rent because he and his wife had eight children. Canessa
therefore employed the services of the J.I. Kislak Corporation
(Kislak) to assist him in procuring housing via the G.I. bill.
In the course of that relationship, a newspaper ran the story
about Canessa's plight. Kislak reprinted that news account,
accompanied by a photograph, on its commercial stationery. It
distributed those reprints to its customers to show the good
efforts that it had made for a veteran, for the purpose of
advancing its commercial interest. Canessa, supra, 97 N.J.
Super. at 331-32.
The Canessa court, after analyzing numerous cases attempting
to clarify the concept of the tort of invasion of privacy,
concluded:
Entirely apart, however, from the
metaphysical niceties, the reality of a case
such as we have here is, in the court's
opinion, simply this: plaintiffs' names and
likenesses belong to them. As such they are
property. They are things of value.
Defendant has made them so, for it has taken
them for its own commercial benefit.
In an exhaustive and scholarly analysis of what statute of limitations should apply to actions for an invasion of privacy, the Canessa court took note of historic case-law discussions of the differences between the two-year statute of limitations and
the six-year statute of limitations, specifically, the common-law
distinctions between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the
case. Id. at 354-55. It reflected on the distinctions that have
been made in a series of cases involving suits for malicious
prosecution and suits for alienation of affections. Id. at 353-54. In such suits, some of the major elements of damages are
humiliation, embarrassment, mental suffering, and wounded
sensibilities. Id. at 353. Nonetheless, courts have concluded
that such actions do not involve injuries to the person because
their "`gist * * * is for an injury to the personal rights as
distinguished from injuries to the person.'" Ibid. (quoting
Kearney v. Mallon Suburban Motors, Inc.,
23 N.J. Misc. 83, 88
(Essex Cty. Ct. 1945) (emphasis added)).
The problem with applying Canessa to this case is that
invasion of privacy
"is not one tort, but a complex of four. The
law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds
of invasion of four different interests of
the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost
nothing in common except that each represents
an interference with the right of the
plaintiff `to be let alone.'"
[Id. at 334 (quoting William L. Prosser,
The Law of Torts § 112 (3d ed. 1964)).]
The four classifications that Dean Prosser propounded are: (1) intrusion (e.g., intrusion on plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion, as by invading his or her home, illegally searching, eavesdropping, or prying into personal affairs); (2)
public disclosure of private facts (e.g., making public private
information about plaintiff); (3) placing plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye (which need not be defamatory, but must
be something that would be objectionable to the ordinary
reasonable person); and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's
benefit, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. W. Page Keeton, et
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
In his explanation of the four types of invasions of
privacy, Prosser has noted:
It should be obvious at once that these
four types of invasion may be subject, in
some respects at least, to different rules;
and that when what is said as to any one of
them is carried over to another, it may not
be at all applicable, and confusion may
follow.
[William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 Cal. L. Rev.
383, 389 (1960).]
Prosser adds that almost all the confusion in the area is caused
by the failure to separate and distinguish the four forms of
invasion of privacy and to realize that they call for different
treatment. Id. at 407. Thus, to conclude that Canessa, supra,
which involves the fourth form of invasion, i.e., appropriation
for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or
likeness, is applicable to the circumstances of this case would
be premature.
Jurisdictions throughout the country have struggled with the
classification of actions for invasion of privacy. One of the
most familiar difficulties is determining whether placing one in
a false-light in the public eye should be regarded as defamatory
in nature, thereby subjecting causes of action to the specific
statutes of limitations applicable to defamation claims. For
example, because of the inherent similarities between false-light
and defamation claims, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded
that the same statute of limitations applies to both types of
claims. Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co.,
722 P.2d 1295,
1299 (1986). Similarly, the Supreme Court of California
recognized the inherent similarities between false light invasion
of privacy and defamation in Fellows v. National Enquirer, Inc.,
721 P.2d 97, 106 n.12 (1986). See also Covington v. The Houston
Post,
743 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
personal injury statute of limitations applied to false light
defamation).
In Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment
Authority,
423 S.E.2d 547, 551 (W.Va. 1992), the court
categorized invasion of privacy as a personal action that dies
with the holder and therefore impliedly concluded that invasion
of privacy is not a personal injury. However, in Canino v. New
York News, Inc.,
96 N.J. 189, 198 (1984), we noted that "at
common law an action for libel or slander was considered a
trespass to the person * * * ." Therefore, we determined that
such an action survives the death of the person claiming injury.
Ibid.
Regarding the question of whether invasion of privacy
premised on intrusion on seclusion is governed by a personal-injury statute of limitations, the courts throughout the country
are similarly divided. See Annotation, Limitation of Actions:
Invasion of Right of Privacy,
33 A.L.R.4th 479, 481 (1984 & Supp.
1994). For example, in Jones v. Hudgins,
295 S.E.2d 119, 122
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982), the court determined that an action for
invasion of privacy based on intrusion on seclusion premised on
recordation of telephone conversations was governed by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries rather than the
four-year statute of limitations for property rights.
The court in Jones relied on Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
125 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956), which said that
[a]s Roscoe Pound has written * * * : "A
man's feelings are as much a part of his
personality as his limbs. The actions that
protect the latter from injury may well be
made to protect the former by the ordinary
process of legal growth."
[Id. at 649 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Interests
of Personality,
28 Harv. L. Rev. 343, 363-64
(1915)).]
See also Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp 817, 825 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945, 77 S. Ct. 267, 1 L. Ed.2d 239 (1956) (finding that injury affecting sensibilities is as much an injury to person as injury to body). Concededly, those aphorisms are difficult to apply in the many contexts in which an invasion by intrusion may arise. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B),
comment b, illustrations 1-5 (1977), provides five examples of
invasion by intrusion. Briefly, those are: a reporter takes the
plaintiff's picture in a hospital room against the plaintiff's
wishes; a private detective looks into the plaintiff's windows
and takes intimate pictures with a telescopic lens; a private
detective wiretaps the plaintiff's phones; the defendant examines
the plaintiff's bank records for evidence in a civil action; and
the defendant, a professional photographer, telephones the
plaintiff repeatedly to convince her to have her picture made.
Some of those examples contain elements of trespass to
property. However, in most circumstances, the plaintiff's
complaint is for the invasion of privacy, not the trespass on
property. See Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc.,
798 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (filming of police raid on
plaintiffs' property was asserted basis for claim of invasion of
privacy).
Entirely apart from metaphysical niceties, the reality of a
case such as this is simply that defendant's conduct struck
directly at the personhood of plaintiff. Canessa, supra, 97 N.J.
Super. at 351. Here, like the claim in Montells, supra, 133 N.J.
at 293, defendant's conduct "cuts most deeply at the personal
level." Accordingly, we hold that an action for intrusion on
seclusion that is premised on conduct such as the stalkings or
threats of violence present here constitutes a claim for "injury
to the person" of the plaintiff and is governed by the two-year
statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
The limitation periods applicable to actions involving other
types of invasion of privacy are not before us. Invasion-of
privacy actions based on appropriation remain governed by the
six-year statute of limitations period set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:14-1. See Canessa, supra, 97 N.J. Super. at 395. Regarding
actions for public disclosure of private facts or placing one in
a false light, case law in other jurisdictions indicates that
such actions are subject to the limitations period for defamation
claims, which is one year in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. In
this case it is regrettable that plaintiff did not institute his
action within two years of the injury complained of.
We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and
reinstate the judgment of the Law Division.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Pollock, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion. Justice Handler did not participate.
NO. A-5 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOHN RUMBAUSKAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD A. CANTOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED November 30, 1994
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY