SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-0346-96T1
RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH E. COLLINS,
Defendant.
____________________________________
EDWARD G. IOVINO, as Administrator
ad Prosequendum of the Estate of
Rhonda Collins, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.,
JOSEPH E. COLLINS, AND JAMES SPATARO,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________________________________________
Argued February 4, 1998See footnote 1 - Decided June 30, 1998
Before Judges D'Annunzio and A.A. Rodríguez and
Coburn
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Ocean County.
James M. Nardelli argued the cause for
appellant Edward G. Iovino (Parsons, Cappiello &
Nardelli, attorneys; Mr. Nardelli, on the brief).
Mitchell S. Rosenzweig argued the cause for
respondent Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co.
(Bruce M. Resnick, attorney; Mr.Rosenzweig, on the
brief).
Judith Moore argued the cause for respondent
Joseph Collins (King, Kitrick, Jackson & Troncone,
attorneys; (James Kane Record, on the brief).
Edward H. Lee argued the cause for respondent
James Spataro (Pitman, Pitman & Mindas, attorneys;
Stephanie O. Joy, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
D'ANNUNZIO, J.A.D.
On April 5, 1993, Joseph Collins was operating a Toyota
titled in the name of his stepfather, James Spataro. The car,
however, was considered to be Doris Spataro's personal vehicle.
Doris is Joseph's mother and James Spataro's wife. At that time,
Joseph's wife, Rhonda, was a passenger in the Toyota. Joseph was
drunk and was involved in an accident which killed Rhonda.
Joseph was convicted of vehicular homicide and served a prison
sentence.
The issue below was whether an automobile policy issued by
Rutgers Casualty Insurance Co. (Rutgers) to James Spataro,
insuring the Toyota and a Lincoln, also owned by James Spataro,
provided liability coverage to Joseph. The policy, under
Exclusion A.8, precluded coverage for "any person . . . [u]sing a
vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled
to do so." The trial court ruled that coverage was not available
because Joseph did not have a reasonable belief that he was
entitled to use the Toyota. Edward G. Iovino, Rhonda's father
and the executor of her estate, appeals from that determination.
Joseph and Rhonda have a child, Joshua, who, presumably, would
benefit from any damages recovered as a consequence of his
mother's death.
These are the uncontroverted facts. Joseph and Rhonda had
planned to attend a concert in New York on the night of April 4,
1993. They owned a Nissan automobile whose brakes were
malfunctioning. Joseph testified that he had to use the hand
brake to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, Joseph and Rhonda
determined that it would be dangerous to use the Nissan, and they
decided to borrow the Toyota while Doris and James Spataro were
out of town.
Joseph had a key to the Spataro house because he had been
living there for the past two weeks. Joseph testified that he
had separated from Rhonda to give him a better chance to deal
with his alcoholism. Joseph and Rhonda entered the Spataro
house, found the keys to the Toyota and took the vehicle; Rhonda
drove the Toyota while Joseph drove their Nissan. They did not
take the Toyota to New York, however. They used it to get to
Rhonda's brother's house in North Brunswick, using other
transportation to go from North Brunswick to New York. Later
that evening, after returning to New Jersey, Joseph was driving
the Toyota when it was involved in the accident.
In its letter opinion, the trial court stated that "[t]he
principal issue to be determined herein is whether Joseph Collins
and/or Rhonda Collins, his wife, had permission to drive the
[Toyota] Camry of Doris and James Spataro, (Joseph Collins'
mother and stepfather), on April 5, 1993."
Joseph, who was twenty-nine when the accident occurred,
testified at trial that he did not have a valid driver's license
at the time of the accident and had not had a valid driver's
license since it had been revoked approximately ten years
earlier. Rhonda did have a valid New Jersey driver's license.
Joseph testified that neither he nor Rhonda was permitted to use
either of his parents' cars, the Toyota or the Lincoln. Joseph
denied that his mother had ever permitted Rhonda to use the
Toyota. This testimony was inconsistent with his deposition
testimony where he stated that Rhonda had driven the Toyota
before April 1993. He also testified on deposition that Rhonda
had driven James Spataro's Lincoln. During his deposition,
Joseph testified that on occasion, Rhonda would be permitted to
use the Toyota or the Lincoln "if we needed something from the
store, if we were over at my parents' house, my mother would say,
here take my car. My father would say, here come take the car.
You know, it was just to the store or so."
During the trial, Joseph explained that his deposition
answers were the result of confusion and he was really talking
about a Volkswagen Rabbit his mother had owned which Rhonda had
been permitted to drive occasionally. In fact, Joseph testified
that around 1990, his mother gave the VW Rabbit to Joseph and
Rhonda for a nominal price; in essence, a gift.
In his trial testimony, Joseph did admit that at no time did
his mother or James ever tell Rhonda that she could not drive
their cars.
Doris Spataro testified that she and her husband acquired
the Toyota in October 1990, and during the period they owned the
Toyota, they had never given Joseph or Rhonda permission to drive
it. Joseph had never driven the Toyota or the Lincoln. Doris
testified that Rhonda had never driven the Toyota or the Lincoln
and did not have permission to drive either of those vehicles.
However, on cross examination, she conceded that she had never
told Rhonda or Joseph that they could not use her vehicles
because they had never asked her for permission. Doris Spataro
further testified that her relationship with Rhonda, her
daughter-in-law, was good. She stated that "she was like a
daughter. I loved her dearly."
James Spataro testified that to his knowledge, Joseph had
never operated the Toyota or the Lincoln and he never gave
permission to Rhonda to operate either of those cars. He further
testified that to the best of his knowledge, Rhonda had never
operated either the Toyota or the Lincoln. He recalled that on
one occasion either Rhonda or Joseph or both of them together
asked to borrow his Lincoln to go to Trenton, but he did not
permit it.
Based on this evidence, the trial court made the following
findings:
Joseph knew he was prohibited from using
either of the Spataro vehicles.
Under the test set forth in St. Paul Ins Co.
v. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co.,
232 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1989) the question is whether
the person using the vehicle, (here Joseph)
has a "reasonable belief that (he) was
entitled to do so.["]
Based on the circumstances of this case I
find that Joseph had no reasonable belief
that he was entitled to use the vehicle
either on his own or by giving the car to his
wife who later "allowed" him to drive.
The record supports the trial court's determination that
Joseph, whose license had been revoked, did not have a reasonable
belief that he was entitled to use the Toyota. Cf. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
62 N.J. 155, 168
(1973) (hereinafter Zurich) (stating that absence of a license to
drive is not conclusive regarding implied permission, but it is
an "influential" factor).
The major flaw in the court's determination, however, is the
absence of any consideration regarding the reasonableness of
Rhonda's belief that she was entitled to use the Toyota to travel
from Holmdel to North Brunswick, in light of the unsafe brakes of
the Nissan.
Rhonda's reasonable belief in her entitlement to use the
Toyota is a critical issue because Joseph and Rhonda had to
appreciate that the Spataros would not have made any of their
vehicles available to Joseph because of his problematic driving
history and the revocation of his driving privileges. The fact
that Rhonda took the Toyota and drove it from the Spataro
residence probably reflects Rhonda and Joseph's understanding of
the Spataros' attitude regarding Joseph's use of their vehicles.
The "reasonably believed" entitlement standard is much broader
than the "permissive" standard. Zurich, supra, 62 N.J. at 169-70. The "reasonably believed" standard "focuses . . . on the
state of mind of the claimed permittee. Did [she] in fact
believe, with reason, that the owner was thus willing, whether or
not the fact-finder would conclude from the circumstances that
the owner was actually willing." Id. at 171. This determination
must be made based on the "reaction of a reasonable [woman] of
[Rhonda's] age, personality and social milieu, subject to such
attendant influences on [her] judgment and mind as may be
credibly discerned from the proofs." Id. at 172.
Moreover, because the trial court focused on Joseph's
reasonable belief, the court did not analyze the inconsistencies
in the record regarding Rhonda's prior use of Spataro vehicles as
bearing on Rhonda's reasonable belief. In this regard, we note
Chief Justice Weintraub's warning in a similar context that "[a]
named insured untutored in law and fearful that his consent might
lead to his own liability for the damages in excess of the policy
limits . . . may well be tempted to invent a claim that he
prohibited others to drive or to convert a precatory request into
a binding prohibition." Baesler v. Globe Indem. Co.,
33 N.J. 148, 159 (1960) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting). The trial court
should have been cognizant of Joseph's and Doris' testimony that
neither Doris nor James had expressly prohibited Rhonda from
driving their cars. The trial court must also consider a
distinction between the Lincoln, which James prized, and the
Toyota, which Doris used.
The case must be remanded for consideration of Rhonda's
reasonable belief regarding use of the Toyota. If the court
determines that Rhonda had a reasonable belief that she was
entitled to use the Toyota, then the court must decide whether
the initial permission rule would apply to Joseph's operation of
the Toyota with Rhonda's permission. See Odolecki v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co.,
55 N.J. 542, 549-50 (1970) (holding that
once initial permission is given, person operating vehicle with
consent of initial permittee is covered despite owner's
instruction to initial permittee not to let anyone else use
vehicle); see also Martusus v. Tartamosa,
150 N.J. 148, 158-59
(1997) (holding that initial permission rule applies to
automobile coverage under excess liability umbrella policy).
The more interesting issue, not presented or considered
below, is whether Exclusion A.8, precluding coverage for a
vehicle used "without a reasonable belief that [the driver] is
entitled to do so," applies to a family member of the named
insured operating a covered automobile. A subsidiary issue is
whether Joseph was a "family member."
The Rutgers insurance policy was introduced into evidence.
James Spataro was the sole named insured, and the policy covered
the Toyota and the Lincoln, both titled in James' name. The
policy's "Definitions" section states that "[t]hroughout this
policy `you' and `your' refer to: 1. The `named insured' shown
in the Declarations; 2. The spouse if a resident of the same
household."
The "Definitions" section does not define the word
"insured." That definition is found in the insuring agreement
for liability coverage. It states in relevant part:
A. We will pay damages for "bodily
injury" or "property damage" for
which any "insured" becomes legally
responsible because of an auto
accident.
. . . .
B. "Insured" as used in this Part
means:
1. You or any "family member" for
the ownership, maintenance or use
of any auto or "trailer."
2. Any person using "your covered
auto."
Subsection F. of the "Definition" section provides: "Family
member means a person related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a
ward or foster child."
The policy also contains exclusions. The relevant exclusion
is:
Exclusions
A. We do not provide Liability Coverage for any
person:
. . . .
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable
belief that that person is entitled to do so.
There is evidence that Joseph may have been a "family
member." If so, then the issue is whether Exclusion A.8 applies
to family members while operating a covered automobile and who
are provided coverage under the insuring agreement, B.1.
The principles governing the construction and application of
insurance policies are well-established. We reviewed them in
detail in Sinipoli v. North River Ins. Co.,
244 N.J. Super. 245
(App. Div. 1990), certif. denied,
127 N.J. 325 (1991), and we now
summarize them. Liability policies should be construed liberally
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. They
should be construed to provide full coverage of the risk rather
than to narrow protection. The rule of liberal construction,
however, cannot be used to authorize a perversion of the policy's
language, and the court cannot rewrite the contract. If
unambiguous, limitations are to be construed and enforced as
expressed. But in the event of ambiguity a court must resolve
ambiguity in favor of coverage. The reasonable expectations of
an insured should be fulfilled so far as the policy's language
permits. Finally, the burden is on the insurer to bring a case
within an exclusion. Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted).
Another panel of this court has determined that the
exclusion applies to family members operating a covered
automobile without permission. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rutgers
Casualty Ins.,
232 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1989). In that
case, the insured's teenage son took the insured family vehicle
without permission and was involved in an accident. The St. Paul
panel held that the exclusion applicable to "any person" was
"plain and unambiguous" and precluded coverage for the insured's
family member. Id. at 586.See footnote 2
We disagree with St. Paul. We conclude that the context and
the reasonable expectations of an insured combine to render
Exclusion A.8 ambiguous.
A seemingly unambiguous clause may, nevertheless, generate a
"sense of ambiguity" "because of a feeling of unease about the
policyholder's reasonable expectations." Di Orio v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
79 N.J. 257, 268 (1979). Our Supreme Court
defined the relevance of an insured's reasonable expectations in
Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.,
34 N.J. 475 (1961).
There, Justice Jacobs explained:
When members of the public purchase policies
of insurance they are entitled to the broad
measure of protection necessary to fulfill
their reasonable expectations. They should
not be subjected to technical encumbrances or
to hidden pitfalls and their policies should
be construed liberally to the end that
coverage is afforded "to the full extent that
any fair interpretation will allow."
[Id. at 482 (citations omitted).]
More recently, in Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
100 N.J. 325
(1985), Justice Stein explained a rationale behind the
enforceability of an insured's reasonable expectations:
The interpretation of insurance contracts to
accord with the reasonable expectations of
the insured, regardless of the existence of
any ambiguity in the policy, constitutes
judicial recognition of the unique nature of
contracts of insurance. By traditional
standards of contract law, the consent of
both parties, based on an informed
understanding of the terms and conditions of
the contract is rarely present in insurance
contracts. Because understanding is lacking,
the consent necessary to sustain traditional
contracts cannot be presumed to exist in most
contracts of insurance. Such consent can be
inferred only to the extent that the policy
language conforms to public expectations and
commercially reasonable standards. In
instances in which the insurance contract is
inconsistent with public expectations and
commercially accepted standards, judicial
regulation of insurance contracts is
essential in order to prevent overreaching
and injustice.
[Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted).]
See also Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
271 N.J. Super. 340, 347 (App. Div. 1994) (stating that a "corollary of the
reasonable-expectation doctrine, at least in respect of the
consumer market, is that reasonable expectations will, in
appropriate circumstance, prevail over policy language to the
contrary").
The liability element of a family automobile policy protects
the family treasury from the costs of defending a claim and the
expense of satisfying a judgment. The present case involves an
alleged "family member" using a covered automobile. Typically,
the issue arises when a child of the named insured, frequently
underage and unlicensed, operates a family vehicle without
permission, or even in the face of an express prohibition. That
was the case in St. Paul, supra. In the event of an accident and
coverage disclaimer based on the absence of permission or
reasonably believed entitlement, the child will be left without a
defense to the personal injury claim unless the parent pays for
it. In the event of an adverse result, the child will begin his
adult life as a judgment debtor, unless the parent satisfies the
judgment. We are persuaded, therefore, that a reasonable
expectation of an insured is that family members will be
protected when operating a covered family vehicle even in the
absence of permission, the family member's disobedience being a
family matter to be dealt with internally.
The present case presents a test of the hypothesis. If
Exclusion A.8 applies literally to "any person," then James' wife
Doris would not be covered if she drove James' prized Lincoln
without his permission. In that event, the marital assets would
be at risk. Does that comply with the insured's reasonable
expectations? We don't think so, and neither did the late Chief
Justice Weintraub. In his dissenting opinion in Baesler, supra,
the Chief Justice posed the following hypothetical and his
response to it:
Or suppose the named insured, for the purpose
of disciplining his erring son . . . denies
him the use of the car for 30 days or during
certain hours of the day. I think it would
be absurd to hold the son who violated the
prohibition was beyond the protection of the
policy. That is the last thought the father
would have had in mind. In brief the named
insured may deny or restrict `permission' for
reasons wholly foreign to insurance coverage
and with no intention whatever to deny the
policy protection he bought. The carrier
should not be permitted to make capital of
such privately motivated actions.
[33 N.J. at 157-58 (Weintraub, C.J.,
dissenting).]
The Supreme Court overruled Baesler in Odolecki, supra, 55 N.J.
at 550, adopting Chief Justice Weintraub's view regarding the
initial permission rule at issue in that case.
Against the background of an insured's reasonable
expectations, let us examine the policy's structure. Our first
observation is that it creates two classes of insureds. The
first class, B.1, consists of the named insured, his spouse, "if
a resident of the same household," and family members who are
residents of the named insured's household. The second class of
insureds, B.2, consists of "any person using" the covered auto.
If a family member does not occupy a special position with regard
to the coverage of this policy, then there is no reason to
include a family member in the first class of insureds. That is
because a family member would be included as a B.2 insured, i.e.,
any person using the covered auto. Our second observation is
that Exclusion A.8 uses the same language as B.2; it excludes
coverage for "any person."
The dissent relies, in part, on Exclusion A.6 because that
exclusion, by its terms, specifies that it does not apply to
"family members." The dissent's reference to A.6 is a valid tool
of contract construction used by lawyers and judges, but probably
not by a typical insured untrained in legal method. Reliance on
Exclusion A.6 does not, however, preclude ambiguity; the need to
resort to it suggests the existence of ambiguity. Moreover, A.6
may lead a lay person to believe that "any person" does not
always include "family members."
In light of the reasonable expectations of an insured, the
dual-class of defined insureds, and language in the A.8 exclusion
mimicking the B.2 definition of an insured, we conclude that the
policy is ambiguous.See footnote 3 Other jurisdictions have held that the
coverage exclusion applicable to "any person" operating without a
reasonable belief in entitlement does not apply to a covered
"family member" using a covered automobile. Those cases found
ambiguity in their policies' creation of two distinct classes,
"family members" and "any person." See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Cox,
541 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "any
person" exclusion did not preclude coverage of a family member,
insureds' son, who took vehicle without permission because "the
creation of different classes by distinguishing between
descriptive terms can create an ambiguity . . . even though the
words, by themselves, are not ambiguous."); accord American
States Ins. Co. v. Adair Indus., Inc.,
576 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Jackson,
564 N.E.2d 906 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990); Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kubik,
492 N.E.2d 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also Paychex, Inc. v. Covenant Ins.
Co.,
549 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1989).
Consistent with this court's decision in St. Paul, some
jurisdictions have applied the "any person" exclusion to family
members. See Annotation, Application of Automobile Insurance
"Entitlement" Exclusion to Family Member,
25 ALR 5th 60, 72-77
(1994).
Having determined that Exclusion A.8 is contextually
ambiguous, we would resolve the ambiguity in favor of coverage,
i.e., the non-applicability of the A.8 exclusion to a "family
member," if Joseph qualified as a "family member" when Rhonda was
killed.
This analysis also promotes a major public interest in the
interpretation of liability policies, the compensation of
innocent victims. Odolecki, supra, 55 N.J. at 549; Property
Casualty Co. v. Conway,
284 N.J. Super. 622, 627 (App. Div.
1995), aff'd,
147 N.J. 322 (1997).
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion, including a determination regarding Joseph's
status as a "family member."
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-0346-96T1
RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH E. COLLINS,
Defendant.
____________________________________
EDWARD G. IOVINO, as Administrator
ad Prosequendum of the Estate of
Rhonda Collins, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.,
JOSEPH E. COLLINS, AND JAMES SPATARO,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________________________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, A.A., J.A.D., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority's decision to reverse and remand
for factfinding, "including a determination regarding Joseph's
status as a `family member.'" I would affirm.
The majority concludes that, "[t]he major flaw in the
court's determination, however, is the absence of any
consideration regarding the reasonableness of Rhonda's belief
that she was entitled to use the [Camry]." I disagree that the
judge did not consider that issue.
The judge issued a written opinion finding that neither
Joseph nor Rhonda had a "reasonable belief that [they were]
entitled to use" the Camry. The judge began his opinion by
stating, "the principal issue to be determined herein is whether
Joseph Collins and/or Rhonda Collins his wife, had permission to
drive the Camry." The judge then discussed whether Joseph had a
reasonable basis to believe that he had permission to drive the
Camry. The judge expressly found that Joseph did not. In doing
so the judge credited and cited the testimony of Doris that
"nobody will ever drive any of my cars ever." The judge also
found, "the only time permission to drive a Spataro vehicle was
asked, it was denied in no uncertain terms." This was a
reference to an occasion when Rhonda asked James for permission
to drive his Lincoln to Trenton and was denied.See footnote 4
I must emphasize that whether or not Joseph or Rhonda had a
reasonable belief that they had permission to use the Camry is a
factual determination. The judge resolved that factual dispute
by finding that neither Joseph nor Rhonda had reason to believe
they could drive the Camry. Although the judge made an express
finding as to Joseph, it is implicit from the testimony that the
judge accepted as credible that neither James nor Doris had given
permission to Rhonda to drive the Spataro vehicles. Because the
judge's finding is supported by the proofs, it is binding on us.
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.,
65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974).
I also disagree with the majority's decision not to follow
the holding in St. Paul Ins. v. Rutgers Cas. Ins.,
232 N.J.
Super. 582 (App. Div. 1989). In St. Paul, another panel of this
court held that clause A.8 applies to any person using the
vehicle without permission including a family member because,
"[o]f all the exclusions enumerated, [in Exclusion A], only
paragraph 6 explicitly states that it does not apply to the named
insured or any family member." Thus, "[t]he exclusion at issue
here is plain and unambiguous." Id. at 586. See also Ryan v.
LCS, Inc., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. May 21, 1998), State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
62 N.J. 155
(1973); Campbell v. New Jersey Auto Ins.,
270 N.J. Super. 379
(App. Div. 1994) (upholding the identical exclusion when applying
it to deny coverage when a vehicle was stolen and ultimately
involved in an accident injuring a victim).
Moreover, an analysis of the policy language reveals no
ambiguity. Exclusion A.8. reads:
A. We do not provide Liability Coverage for any
person (emphasis added):
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable
belief that that person is entitled to do so.
"Any person is not defined by the policy. In the absence of a definition in a policy, a term must be given its plain, ordinary and popular meaning. Daus v. Marble, 270 N.J. Super. 241, 251 (App. Div. 1994). Where there is no ambiguity, a strained or
distorted construction will not be applied. Yannuzzi v. U.S.
Casualty Co.,
32 N.J. Super. 373, 377 (App. Div. 1954), reversed
on other grounds
19 N.J. 201 (1955). In fact, when the language
of a provision is clear, rules of construction cannot be applied
to disregard an exclusion. We find no ambiguity in the language
of the A.8. exclusion. Last v. West American Ins. Co.,
139 N.J.
Super. 456, 460 (App. Div. 1976).
In addition to the language we look to the design and
purpose of the policy. Any exclusion must be examined and
interpreted in light of its own design and intent as well as in
view of objects and purposes of the policy as a whole. Capece v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
88 N.J. Super. 535, 541 (Law Div. 1965).
There are nine exclusions in Exclusion section A of the
Exclusions to Liability Coverage of the Rutgers policy. By the
express language of the introductory sentence, this group of
exclusions applies to "any person." I find no support for the
proposition that "any person" excludes family members. Exclusion
A.6. expressly excludes family members, among others, from the
full exclusion otherwise applicable to any person.See footnote 5 If family
members were not subject to the exclusion because they are not
any person, then it would be unnecessary to expressly note they
are not subject to Exclusion A.6. By implication we may conclude
that family members are included in "any person" for purposes of
Exclusion A.8.
I would therefore affirm the judgment in favor of Rutgers.
Footnote: 1This appeal, originally scheduled October 16, 1997 was
a. you;
b. any "family member;" or
c. any partner. . .