SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-425-99T3
STATE IN THE INTEREST OF K.O.,
Juvenile-Respondent.
________________________________
Argued: November 30, 1999 Decided: January 31, 2000
Before Judges Skillman, D'Annunzio and Newman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Morris County.
Catherine M. Brown argued the cause for
appellants J.O. and K.O.See footnote 11
Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for juvenile
respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public
Defender, attorney; Ms. Aiello, on the brief).
Pamela Adams Doughterty, Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for
respondent State of New Jersey (John B.
Dangler, Morris County Prosecutor,
attorney; Angela M. Rich, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NEWMAN, J.A.D.
J.O. and K.O., the parents of K.O. (hereinafter referred to
as "the parents"), appeal from the orders of September 3 and 14,
1999, extending K.O.'s term of probation entered by the Family
Court judge arising out of a juvenile delinquency adjudication.
The parents also appeal from paragraph three of the order of
August 6, 1999, requiring the parents "to contact Jennifer
Smedburg at [Juvenile Evaluation and Treatment Services (JETS)]
to arrange for whatever meetings or counseling is recommended as
a first step toward joint counseling sessions and ultimate
reunification." We affirm.
The history leading up to the entry of the orders being
appealed from is lengthy, but is necessary to place the issues
raised in context. In May 1998, K.O., a fifteen-year-old
juvenile, was arrested and charged with possession of heroin. On
August 19, 1998, K.O. appeared before Judge Friend and pled
guilty to the charge. She was adjudicated delinquent and placed
on probation for one year. The following "conditions of
disposition" were also ordered: house arrest; obey custodian;
attend school daily; obtain part-time employment; no association
with co-defendant; driver's licence suspended for six months upon
turning seventeen; perform forty hours of community service; pay
a $1000 DEDR penalty and a $30 VCCB penalty; and complete JETS
evaluation and follow recommendations.
On October 12, 1998, JETS evaluated K.O. and recommended
that she continue drug treatment, submit to weekly urinalysis,
and that her parents become involved in her treatment.
On February 7, 1999, K.O. attempted to sneak out of her home
with the aid of a friend who provided a ladder for K.O. to use.
When K.O.'s father went to investigate, he found her bedroom door
to be locked. According to K.O.'s father, when K.O. refused to
unlock the door, he forced the door open, and the door struck
K.O., giving her a bruise to the eye and a bloody nose.
According to K.O., however, her father broke through the locked
door and "smashed her head against the wall and floor, causing a
blackened eye and [a] bloody nose."
On February 16, 1999, a student counselor at K.O.'s high
school noticed the bruise on K.O.'s eye and told K.O. to contact
the Department of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). Although
DYFS could not substantiate K.O.'s claim of abuse, it found that
"the risk of violence in the home between father and [K.O.] is
high." DYFS recommended that K.O. be placed in a shelter "for
her own protection" and that she be evaluated by JETS. K.O. did
not return home on February 16, 1999, and, with the consent of
her mother, spent the following night at a friend's house.
According to DYFS, K.O.'s family refused to allow her back into
the home, and K.O. refused to return home.
On February 22, 1999, K.O.'s probation officer filed a
complaint alleging that K.O. had violated her probation by
failing to attend several classes at her vocational school and by
remaining away from home on February 16, 1999. K.O. pled not
guilty to this alleged violation of probation. The court
remanded K.O. to a local shelter and ordered another JETS
evaluation. The court also stated that K.O. and her parents were
to "cooperate with any and all therapy ordered."
After evaluating K.O., JETS recommended that K.O.
participate in weekly outpatient therapy; that the caregiver with
whom K.O. is placed attend counseling with K.O.; that K.O. enter
into a home contract with her future caregiver; and that the
court address K.O.'s parents' refusal to provide consent for
medical treatment of K.O.
On March 18, 1999, a review was conducted before Judge Susan
Scott, discussing possible placement for K.O. K.O.'s assigned
attorney from the Public Defender's Office indicated that there
were a number of concerns regarding K.O.'s parents; namely, they
did not participate in K.O.'s JETS evaluation, they refused to
sign consents for emergency medical treatment of K.O. or for K.O.
to attend any therapy, and they refused to assume financial
responsibility for K.O.
On April 26, 1999, K.O. appeared before Judge Scott and pled
guilty to violating her probation by failing to attend several
classes at her vocational school and by remaining away from home
on February 16, 1999. K.O.'s probation was continued, and she
was released to the custody of P.A.W., the mother of one of
K.O.'s friends. P.A.W. was present in court and indicated that
she wished to take custody of K.O. She was approved by DYFS, the
prosecutor, the court, and K.O. The court ordered that K.O.
cooperate with the terms of the home contract prepared by her
youth shelter counselor and that she follow the recommendations
of JETS.
K.O.'s parents were not present at the hearing despite the
fact that they were notified that they had to be present. K.O.'s
attorney stated that K.O.'s parents "have basically refused to be
involved." A bench warrant was issued for K.O.'s parents to be
executed on April 26 or 27, 1999 or May 5, 1999 and thereafter,
and only during court hours.
On May 5, 1999, K.O. and her attorney and K.O.'s mother
appeared before Judge Scott. The judge indicated that the reason
for the appearance was "there were numerous prior proceedings in
which the parents were required to attend and they did not
attend; and at the last review, a request was made for an arrest
warrant in order to get the parents to appear." Initially,
K.O.'s mother stated that she had not appeared on prior occasions
because, although she had received a letter from K.O.'s probation
officer, she had never received any "summons" to appear in court.
When asked again why she had not "been involved with any of the
reviews or the proceedings involving [K.O.,]" K.O.'s mother
responded:
Because [K.O. is] looking to get herself
out of the house. [K.O. is] running around
crazy. ... I mean, I just want her to wake
up. I don't want to go through any more
therapy. I've had therapies [sic]. I've had
psychologists. I've had psychiatrists. She
needs to have something put in her face that
she has to grow up now.
The judge answered that "it's very hard for juveniles to get back
on the right track without parental cooperation."
Judge Scott told K.O.'s mother that, as natural parents, she
and her husband have an "obligation" to be involved. The judge
stated further that K.O. "will remain in the custody of [P.A.W.],
as long as she consents and as long as that's working out, unless
and until [her parents] make an application" objecting to K.O.'s
placement. Judge Scott continued:
[If] you have reason to think [K.O. is]
better someplace else, then present the court
with whatever information, then we'd have a
hearing and review that. But without the
parents' participation and cooperation, the
Division of Youth and Family Services and the
various other agencies involved make
investigations and do what they think is best
for the child. It's without parental input.
They have to go with what their investigation
suggests.
K.O.'s mother was released upon the condition that she
attend all future court hearings and provide any requested
information. Upon K.O.'s mother's suggestion, the court
requested that DYFS follow up on the possible placement of K.O.
with her aunt. Judge Scott concluded the proceedings by telling
K.O.'s mother, "The problem is, when you bring children into the
world, that even if they're a problem, you can't just wash your
hands. You [have] got to try to cooperate with all [of] the
support agencies and see it through."
On May 12, 1999, K.O.'s father was brought before Judge
Scott. He was told that his presence was required at any court
review involving K.O., and he agreed to be present at any future
hearing.
On June 22, 1999, the parents moved for a modification of
the court's order of April 26, 1999, requesting, among other
things, that K.O. be placed back in their home and that her
probation be extended. On July 23, 1999, the parties appeared
before Judge Scott. The judge denied, without prejudice, the
parents' request and ordered that the parents participate in
counseling with a view toward family reunification. Judge Scott
stated that she would not order that K.O. be placed back with her
parents against the recommendation of a professional who was
dealing with K.O. who thought that was not in K.O.'s best
interest at that time. The judge said that "[t]he goal is
reunification[,]" and that the judge needed "more than a court
application from the parents in light of the history of this
matter to convince [her] that it's in the best interests of the
child to bounce her back at this point." The judge continued:
[T]he fact that [K.O.'s parents] are
interested and want to get involved certainly
is a major first step, and I think that the
counseling and working toward some
reunification is the major second step, and
I'm certainly going to provide for that.
The parents argued that "the State's ability to regulate or
interfere with [the family] relationship is limited and coupled
with an even greater adherence to procedural due process." Judge
Scott disagreed, stating that the overriding consideration was
the best interests of the child. The parents immediately
requested a stay of the judge's order. The judge denied their
request, stating that a stay of the order would result in an
immediate transfer of custody because the judge's order "is just
keeping things the way they are."
On August 6, 1999, the parents moved for reconsideration of
the court's order denying their motion to change K.O.'s
placement. The parents argued that, since K.O. had been placed
with P.A.W., she was absent from school six days, late twelve
days, and under disciplinary detention another four or five days.
Judge Scott decided that, on the basis of what was presented to
her, she did not "see anything that warrant[ed] removal from the
current situation ...." The judge stressed that her decision did
not mean that K.O.'s current custodial situation would be
indefinite. The judge also required that an investigation be
made regarding conflicting absentee records previously presented
to the court.
The order denying the parents' application was entered on
August 6, 1999. Paragraph three of the order required that the
parents "contact Jennifer Smedburg at JETS to arrange for
whatever meetings or counseling is recommended as a first step
toward joint counseling sessions and ultimate reunification[.]"
On September 3, 1999, the parties again appeared before
Judge Scott. The parents objected to extending K.O.'s probation
until her fines were paid off. K.O. herself had consented with
the advice of counsel to the extension of probation. The parents
contended that, under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47c, upon the termination of
an order of disposition, "the balance of the fine can be reduced
to a judgment recorded as a priority lien." The parents also
challenged the court's retention of jurisdiction, arguing that
the disposition order, entered on August 19, 1998, for a one-year
probationary term, "terminated by its terms because the probation
term was never extended during the probation period."
Judge Scott indicated that it was her understanding that the
disposition order required that certain conditions be met.
Because those conditions had not been met, the judge considered
the court to have two options; namely, finding the juvenile in
violation of probation and imposing the necessary penalties or
extending the probationary term. The judge explained that, in
cases like this one, in which the juvenile is working with the
system, probation chooses to "give her a break and do what's best
for everybody and extend the probation." The parents countered
that, while that "may be the practice in Morris County," such was
not provided for in the statute.
By an order dated September 3, 1999, Judge Scott modified
the original disposition order and extended K.O.'s probation to
August 28, 2000, her eighteenth birthday, or until fines were
paid in full.
On September 9, 1999, after paying K.O.'s fines, the parents
moved for a termination of K.O.'s probation before Judge Scott.
The judge spoke at length with K.O. to determine what K.O.
thought was in her best interests, staying with P.A.W. or
returning home. K.O. questioned her parents' motives behind
paying her fines and indicated that she was doing "absolutely
great" with P.A.W. K.O. did not think that returning home to
live with her parents would "work." K.O. explained that she had
not spoken to her parents or had much contact with any member of
her family for some time. K.O. also stated that she wished to
attend P.A.C.E., an alternative high school which is located
within walking distance of P.A.W.'s house.
Judge Scott stated, "I haven't seen anything from the
parents which gives me any comfort that they are able to
determine what the best interests of the child are and follow
through." The judge retained jurisdiction, finding that the
court had jurisdiction based on the "existing status and the lack
of complete compliance with prior orders[.]"
On appeal, the parents raise the following points for our
consideration.
POINT I
ONCE THE PROBATION TERM IMPOSED BY THE
ORIGINAL DISPOSITION ORDER IS SERVED, THE
TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
ACTION, UNLESS A PROBATION VIOLATION
COMPLAINT, FILED ON NOTICE TO THE PROSECUTOR
DURING THE PROBATIONARY TERM, IS PENDING.
POINT II
MR. AND MRS. ["O"] WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS ONCE THE FOCUS OF THE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDING SHIFTED FROM THEIR DAUGHTER'S
CONDUCT TO THEIR CONDUCT.
We address the arguments in the order raised.
I.
The parents contend that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to extend K.O.'s probation "after the probation term
expired on August 19, 1999[.]"
As an initial matter, K.O. argues that her parents do not
have standing to challenge the court's order extending her
probation. According to K.O., her parents "have failed to
demonstrate that they were aggrieved by the lower court's order
extending [her] probation." We disagree.
Parents, as the guardians of their children, have standing
to be heard. In D.Y.F.S. v. D.T.,
171 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (J. &
D.R. Ct. 1979), the court recognized that "foster parents should
have standing in court on matters affecting their foster
children." We would not afford foster parents greater
opportunity to be heard on matters relating to their foster
children than we would biological parents on matters relating to
their biological children. We, therefore, will address the
parents' challenge to the continuation of their daughter's
probation.
In challenging the Family Court's jurisdiction, the parents
argue that the court lost jurisdiction once the probationary term
of one year expired; the court could not extend the term of
probation because it did not follow the guidelines set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45; and the double jeopardy clauses of the state
and federal constitutions prohibited the extension of K.O.'s
probationary period because the extension was not based on a
violation of probation.
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47a provides that an order of disposition
entered in a juvenile delinquency case "shall terminate when the
juvenile who is the subject of the order attains the age of 18,
or three years from the date of the order whichever is later
unless such order ... is sooner terminated by its terms or by
order of the court." The disposition order in this case was
entered on August 19, 1998, and, by its terms, the length of the
probationary term imposed was one year.
With regard to jurisdiction, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45b provides:
Except as provided for in subsection a.,
the court shall retain jurisdiction over any
case in which it has entered a disposition
under [2A:4A-43] and may at any time for the
duration of that disposition, if after
hearing, and notice to the prosecuting
attorney, it finds violation of the conditions
of the order of disposition, substitute any
other disposition which it might have made
originally.
All parties agree that the disposition in this case was entered
under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43. The parents argue, however, that, under
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45, once the probationary term of one year
expired, the court lost its jurisdiction. We disagree.See footnote 22
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43 provides an expansive array of
dispositions for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. In
determining an appropriate disposition, the court had to weigh
the following factors:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the
offense;
(2) The degree of injury to persons or damage
to property caused by the juvenile's offense;
(3) The juvenile's age, previous record,
prior social service received and out-of-home
placement history;
(4) Whether the disposition supports family
strength, responsibility and unity and the
well-being and physical safety of the
juvenile;
(5) Whether the disposition provides for
reasonable participation by the child's
parent, guardian, or custodian, provided,
however, that the failure of a parent or
parents to cooperate in the disposition shall
not be weighed against the juvenile in
arriving at an appropriate disposition;
(6) Whether the disposition recognizes and
treats unique physical, psychological and
social characteristics and needs of the child;
(7) Whether the disposition contributes to
the developmental needs of the child,
including the academic and social needs of the
child where the child has mental retardation
or learning disabilities; and
(8) Any other circumstances related to the
offense and the juvenile's social history as
deemed appropriate by the court.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43a.]
It is obvious from the factors which the court must consider
that the juvenile is not divorced from his or her family in
formulating the appropriate disposition. To the contrary, the
family is an integral part of the process.
The goal of the juvenile law is to rehabilitate the
delinquent. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21b. While the juvenile law seeks to
"preserve the unity of the family whenever possible[,]" N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-21a, it will not hesitate to separate juveniles from their
own families when necessary for their safety. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A
21c. Because friction can develop between the juvenile and his
or her own parents in this fragile period of adolescence,
especially where drug use may be involved, the court is equipped
with the widest array of dispositional tools to fulfill the goals
set forth in the Code of Juvenile Justice. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21 and
-43b.
In response to the problems of K.O. and her parents, the
court developed a comprehensive treatment plan designed to
rehabilitate K.O. and reunite her with her family. Probation was
a part of this plan, but was not the only element involved.
Under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43b, the court may order one or more of
twenty dispositions, including
(3) Plac[ing] the juvenile on probation to
the chief probation officer of the county or
to any other suitable person who agrees to
accept the duty of probation supervision for a
period not to exceed three years upon such
written conditions as the court deems will aid
rehabilitation of the juvenile;
(4) Transfer[ing] custody of the juvenile to
any relative or other person determined by the
court to be qualified to care for the
juvenile;
. . . .
(14) Plac[ing] the juvenile in a suitable
residential or nonresidential program for the
treatment of alcohol or narcotic abuse,
provided that the juvenile has been determined
to be in need of such services;
(15) Order[ing] the parent or guardian of the
juvenile to participate in appropriate
programs or services when the court has found
either that such person's omission or conduct
was a significant contributing factor towards
the commission of the delinquent act, or,
under its authority to enforce litigant's
rights, that such person's omission or conduct
has been a significant contributing factor
towards the ineffective implementation of a
court order previously entered in relation to
the juvenile;
. . . .
(18) Order[ing] that the juvenile satisfy any
other conditions related to the rehabilitation
of the juvenile[.]
The Family Court also has broad jurisdictional power over
any disposition it imposes. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43 and -45. Under
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24a, the Family Court has "exclusive jurisdiction
in all cases where it is charged that a juvenile has committed an
act of delinquency[.]" Such jurisdiction extends not only over
the juvenile but also over his or her "parent, guardian, or any
family member found by the court to be contributing to a
juvenile-family crisis." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24a.
Indeed, when K.O. pled guilty to violating her probation,
the Family Court fashioned a rehabilitation treatment plan with a
number of conditions, including: continued probation; release to
P.A.W.; comply with home contract; and follow recommendation of
JETS. JETS recommended that K.O. return to the drug counseling
program at Group Therapy Alliance or, in the alternative, enroll
in the aftercare program at Day Top Outreach.
Moreover, K.O.'s placement with P.A.W. and participation in
drug counseling were not enumerated as express conditions of
probation. The order of April 26, 1999, does not include this
placement and rehabilitative treatment alternative as conditions
of probation as opposed to separate dispositions.
Under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43b, the Family Court had the authority
to order placement, compliance with a home contract, and
participation in drug counseling as separate dispositions. The
April 26, 1999 order contains a number of provisions which were
not conditions of K.O.'s probation. The order also provided that
DYFS remain in the case and that a bench warrant for K.O.'s
parents be issued.
Thus, the placement of K.O. with P.A.W. was sufficient,
without more, to enable the court to retain its jurisdiction,
which was part of the adaptability of the Family Court to
accommodate to the ebbs and flows of the juvenile's adjustment
while under the court's jurisdiction. Even if the court did not
extend the probation within the one-year period that was
initially imposed, the court still retained its jurisdiction
through the other dispositions that were very much in force and
effect.
Here, the court could have initially imposed a maximum term
of probation until K.O. attained the age of eighteen, or three
years from the date of the order whichever is later. N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-47a. Since the initial probation was for one year, the
court still had the legal authority to impose an additional two
years of probationary time upon an appropriate showing of cause
or consent, which would run beyond the date upon which the
juvenile became eighteen, August 28, 2000. Judge Scott, however,
limited the period until the juvenile turned eighteen.
The parents also contend that the court could not extend the term of probation because it did not hold a hearing and provide notice to the prosecuting attorney as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45b. The court was relieved of the obligation to do so because the juvenile consented with the advice of counsel to the extension of probation. It therefore would be unnecessary to follow the procedure laid out in N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45b when the juvenile willingly agreed to continued monitoring under probation.
Moreover, the extension of the probationary period was ancillary to the juvenile's placement outside of the family. The Family Court would be in a better position to track the juvenile's progress if probation was still in place while the juvenile was living outside of the family environment. The Family Court has an obligation to insure that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent will receive effective rehabilitation treatment, one of the primary goals of the Code. In re B.F., 138 N.J. Super. 383, 390 (J. & Dr. Ct. 1975), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 260 (1977).
In State v. S.T., 254 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1991), we held that the Family Part retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions for probation violations after the expiration of the jurisdictional period prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-47. We said:
[T]he interpretation of [N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-45] rendered by the Family Part judge leaves the court system powerless to insure compliance by juvenile offenders with the provisions or conditions of an order of disposition entered pursuant to the Code of Juvenile Justice where the juvenile is eighteen years of age and his term of probation is at or near its end. The Legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.
[Ibid.]
We then made reference to In re Smigelski,
30 N.J. 513, 521-22
(1959), in which the Court stressed:
Our statutes make it clear that the
Legislature did not intend the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court to be terminated or turned
off like a faucet the moment a person who has
committed an offense attains his 18th
birthday, or that that event would necessarily
preclude the acquisition and exercise of
jurisdiction thereafter.
[S.T., supra, 254 N.J. Super. at 4.]
If the court could exercise its jurisdiction over a juvenile
more than eighteen years old, it certainly should not lose its
jurisdiction over a juvenile who is under the age of eighteen.
If, upon the expiration of the probationary term, the conditions
of disposition have not been satisfied, and the juvenile is in
need of continuing treatment or rehabilitation, it runs counter
to the entire philosophy of the Family Court that the court would
be without jurisdiction to help the juvenile by extending her
probation. We, therefore, conclude that the Family Court
retained jurisdiction after the expiration of the probationary
term to extend that probationary term with the consent of the
juvenile for the purpose of insuring compliance with the
conditions of its disposition order and to promote the
rehabilitation of the juvenile.
The parents argue that the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions prohibit an extension of a probationary period not based on a violation of probation. The parents also recognize that their daughter consented with the advice of counsel to the extension of the probation. The challenge to their daughter's consent is meritless. While the parents may have standing to challenge the jurisdictional aspect of the extension of probation, they lack standing to raise the double jeopardy bar argument. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 34, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S. Ct. 319, 50 L. Ed.2d 289 (1976) (stating that, generally, litigants may not assert the constitutional rights of another).
II.
The parents argue in Point II that, even if the court had jurisdiction, the orders of September 3 and 14, 1999, and paragraph three of the August 6, 1999 order, must be vacated because the focus of the delinquency proceeding improperly shifted from K.O.'s conduct to their conduct; they were denied fundamental due process; and the court improperly applied the best interests standard in the context of a delinquency matter.
The parents assert that "once the basis for the court's orders was the conduct of the parents ... the parents were entitled to a hearing, after notice and other appropriate safeguards, before their child was removed from their custody."
According to the parents, K.O. was placed in the custody of P.A.W. because of their conduct, and the court has continued that placement based on their conduct.
The parents contend that the Legislature "has created several causes of action that authorize the removal of a child from a parent because of the parents conduct[,]" namely, "termination, abuse and neglect, and family and crisis." They maintain that the court should have afforded them the procedural safeguards "set forth in these causes of action[.]"
The court, in placing K.O. in the custody of P.A.W. and in ordering that K.O. remain in P.A.W.'s custody, was not acting under any of these statutes. Rather, the court was acting pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43 of the Code of Juvenile Justice. That statute specifically authorizes the court to "[t]ransfer custody of the juvenile to any relative or other person determined by the court to be qualified to care for the juvenile[.]" N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43b(4).
Furthermore, to the extent that the parents rely on the criteria that must be met before parental rights may be terminated, this was not a proceeding to terminate parental rights. The termination of parental rights, in contrast to the loss of custody, permanently ends the relationship between biological parents and their children. In re Adoption of L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 132 (1993). In fact, the court's order of August 6, 1999, was crafted to promote reunification of parent and child, the exact opposite of termination of parental rights.
The parents maintain that the court's April 26, 1999 order transferring custody to P.A.W. violated their constitutional rights to due process. They argue that the State failed to put them "on notice and afford them constitutionally adequate procedure before the placement occurred." The parents also argue that the court was not impartial in making its determinations. They contend that "[t]he State's unfortunate misguided handling of K.O.'s probation supervision resulted in a gross violation of the [parents'] right to procedural due process." We find no basis to support the parents' arguments.
The parents were given notice of the proceedings and told that they were required to attend. In order to insure their attendance at the proceedings and to hear their version of the events, the court issued bench warrants for their arrest, to be executed only during court hours. The parents' claim that they were denied the opportunity to be heard is moot. Since April 26, 1999, the parents have appeared at three hearings and had the opportunity to voice their objection to K.O.'s placement and request that K.O. be returned to their custody. Furthermore, the purported violation of the parents' due process rights by the April 26, 1999 order has no bearing on the August 6, 1999 order which is the subject of this appeal.
The parents contend that the trial court "misapplied the best interests standard when ordering the continued placement of K.O. outside the family home."
"When a court determines it likely that a juvenile has committed an offense, the juvenile is then subject to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the State." In re S.T., 273 N.J. Super. 436, 448 (App. Div. 1994). This is evidenced by N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24c, which states: "Juveniles who appear before the court in any capacity shall be deemed to be wards of the court and protected accordingly." "A court's disposition of a juvenile matter is meant to protect the juvenile," and this may be accomplished by separating the juvenile from his or her family environment when necessary for the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare. In re S.T., supra, 273 N.J. Super. at 448; N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21c.
Prior to the placement of K.O. in P.A.W.'s custody, DYFS had determined that "the risk of violence in the home between father and [K.O.] is high," and recommended that K.O. be placed in a shelter "for her own protection." Judge Scott considered the recommendation of a professional who was dealing with K.O. who thought that it was not in K.O.'s best interest to return home at that time. The judge also heard argument from the parents; spoke with K.O. personally; and inquired as to K.O.'s progress since her placement with P.A.W. Additionally, the record discloses that the parents refused to allow K.O. back into the home as of February 18, 1999; the parents refused to appear at hearings relating to K.O. and disputed court notice that their attendance was required; the parents made little or no attempt to contact K.O. when she was at the shelter or since she has been in P.A.W.'s custody; and the parents have not participated or made attempts to participate in court ordered counseling aimed at reunification.
The Family Court has the authority to order the parent of a delinquent child to attend counseling. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43b(15). The imposition of family counseling was deemed to be in the best interest of K.O. As of August 6, 1999, the court did not have reason to believe that the immediate reunification of K.O.'s family was in K.O.'s best interest. In the time between DYFS's findings in February 1999 and the parent's July 23, 1999 motion for return of custody, nothing occurred to indicate that K.O.'s relationship with her parents had lost its volatility. The court had no reasonable basis to conclude on the record before it that the situation was ripe for family reunification.
Lastly, while the parents appeal from paragraph three of the court's order of August 6, 1999, requiring them "to contact Jennifer Smedburg at JETS to arrange for whatever meetings or counseling is recommended," they have not presented an argument why this order was in error other than to state that it is unenforceable.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43 the Family Court judge can require that parents or guardians participate in counseling, therapy, substantive abuse programs, "or any other reasonable programs designed to correct family dysfunction." State v. H.B., 259 N.J. Super. 603, 607 (Ch. Div. 1992) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:4A 43b(4) and (15)). "In New Jersey the emphasis is on the family, rather than the juvenile, in developing a total rehabilitative plan." Ibid. The court acted within its power in ordering that K.O. and her parents attend counseling sessions. The court's express purpose in doing so was the ultimate reunification of K.O. and her parents, a goal for which the parents claim they are striving.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1 1K.O. (appellant) is actually the mother of the juvenile K.O. Footnote: 2 2There is a reference in the record that Judge Scott was on vacation when the order extending probation was presented, and therefore, she was not available to sign the extension within the one-year probation period initially imposed. Because we are convinced of the court's jurisdiction on other grounds, we have not remanded to develop the record on this alternate ground.