(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
(NOTE: This is a companion case to State of New Jersey in the interest of G.C., also decided
today.)
Argued November 30, 1993 -- Decided June 29, 1994
STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue on appeal is whether the Code of Juvenile Justice (Juvenile Code) should be construed to
authorize the sentencing of juveniles who have committed two or more acts of delinquency to consecutive
terms of incarceration.
On December 14, 1990, J.L.A., a juvenile, and a companion approached two men and attempted to
rob them at gunpoint. The two male victims fled. However, J.L.A. shot and wounded one of the victims.
Juvenile complaints were filed against J.L.A. in Camden County, charging him with acts of delinquency that,
if committed by an adult, would have constituted attempted armed robbery, second-degree aggravated
assault, first-degree armed robbery and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
After a hearing, the Family Court adjudicated J.L.A. a delinquent. The court merged the
adjudications of attempted armed robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose with the
armed robbery adjudication. The court ordered that J.L.A. serve an indeterminate term of incarceration, not
to exceed four years, for armed robbery and a consecutive indeterminate term, not to exceed three years, for
aggravated assault.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the adjudication of delinquency but reversed the Family
Court's imposition of a consecutive sentence, concluding that the Legislature, in enacting the Juvenile Code
did not intend to authorize the imposition of consecutive sentences on juveniles.
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification to address the consecutive
sentences imposed on the juvenile offender.
HELD: The Code of Juvenile Justice should not be construed to prohibit imposition of consecutive
sentences on juveniles who have committed two or more acts of delinquency.
1. New Jersey courts have recognized that trial courts may impose consecutive sentences on young
adult offenders even though such sentences are neither expressly permitted nor prohibited by statute. In
determining whether consecutive sentences are permitted by the Juvenile Code, courts must consider whether
such sentences are consistent with the Juvenile Code's rehabilitative and penal objectives. A construction of
the statute that best effectuates the legislative goals is preferred. (pp. 4-9)
2. Although rehabilitation is a primary goal, the Juvenile Code also reflects an emphasis on public
safety and deterrence. For instance, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Statement accompanying the Juvenile
Code demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the Juvenile Code serve the needs of public safety as
well as rehabilitation. (pp. 9-13)
3. Silence concerning consecutive sentences does not necessarily reflect a legislative intent to prohibit their imposition. Although there is an apparent inconsistency between extended-term and consecutive
sentencing, that inconsistency is diminished if the Juvenile Code is construed to permit consecutive sentences
so that a juvenile offender eligible for an extended term could alternatively be sentenced to consecutive
terms. Extended-term provisions are rarely used and are reconcilable with an interpretation of the Juvenile
Code that permits the Family Court to impose consecutive sentences in appropriate cases. Such sentences
will be used only in exceptional cases involving multiple offenses in which the court concludes that an
extended term is inapplicable or inappropriate and that the rehabilitative and public-safety objectives of the
Juvenile Code cannot be adequately addressed by concurrent terms. (pp. 14-16)
4. The statutory and regulatory provisions governing release of juveniles from incarceration are flexible
enough to ensure that the power to impose consecutive sentences can be harmonized with the Juvenile
Code's rehabilitative purposes. (pp. 16-18)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED to the extent that it set aside the sentences
imposed by the Family Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN and
GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
61 September Term 1993
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE INTEREST OF
J.L.A.
Argued November 30, 1993 -- Decided June 29, 1994
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
262 N.J. Super. 78 (1993).
Edward F. Borden, Jr., Camden County
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant,
State of New Jersey (Mr. Borden, attorney;
Norma R. Evans and Kathleen M. Delaney,
Assistant Prosecutors, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Diane Toscano, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent,
J.L.A. (Zulima V. Farber, Public Defender,
attorney).
Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Fred DeVesa, Acting
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether the
Code of Juvenile Justice, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20 to -91 (Juvenile
Code), should be construed to authorize the sentencing of
juveniles who have committed two or more acts of delinquency to
consecutive terms of incarceration. The Juvenile Code is silent
on the subject of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division
concluded that consecutive sentences are unauthorized. See State
in Interest of J.L.A.,
262 N.J. Super. 78 (1993). We granted the
State's petition for certification,
134 N.J. 477 (1993).
For purposes of this appeal the underlying facts are not contested, and we adopt essentially the version set forth in the Attorney General's amicus brief.
On December 14, 1990, at about 11:00 p.m., J.L.A., a juvenile, and his companion approached David San Flippo and George Ingram, who were walking on Mt. Ephraim Avenue in Camden. J.L.A. demanded that San Flippo and Ingram give him "everything they had," pointing a sawed-off shotgun at them and stating, "we're not kidding." Ingram responded by pushing J.L.A.'s associate into him and running away. San Flippo hesitated, and then also turned and ran, pursued by J.L.A. J.L.A. then stopped and fired the shotgun at San Flippo, wounding him in the arm. J.L.A. fled. San Flippo was hospitalized for five days, and sustained nerve damage in his arm and wrist. J.L.A. was eventually apprehended, and identified by San Flippo and an eyewitness as the shooter.
Juvenile complaints were filed against J.L.A. in Camden
County charging him with acts of delinquency that, if committed
by an adult, would have constituted attempted armed robbery, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; second-degree aggravated assault,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1); first-degree armed robbery, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and second-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a.
After a hearing the court adjudicated J.L.A. a delinquent.
The Family Court merged the adjudications of attempted armed
robbery and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose with
the armed robbery adjudication. The court ordered that J.L.A.
serve an indeterminate term of incarceration, not to exceed four
years, for armed robbery and a consecutive indeterminate term,
not to exceed three years, for aggravated assault.
The Appellate Division affirmed the adjudications of
delinquency but reversed the Family Court's imposition of
consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division observed that the
Legislature, in enacting the Juvenile Code, had established "in
painstaking detail, a comprehensive scheme, essentially complete
as written," finding "hard to imagine that the Legislature
intended its silence as to [consecutive sentences] to stand for
more than [their] omission." 262 N.J. Super. at 89. In support
of its conclusion that the Legislature had not intended to
authorize imposition of consecutive sentences on juveniles, the
Appellate Division specifically noted the provision of the
Juvenile Code, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(4), authorizing imposition of
an extended term of incarceration on a juvenile who commits three
or more unrelated offenses at different times. The Appellate
Division observed that because the authorized extended term
cannot exceed the maximum permissible term of the most serious
offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated plus two
years, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for three unrelated
offenses that would be first-degree offenses if committed by an
adult would be subject to a statutory maximum sentence of
incarceration of six years. 262 N.J. Super. at 90 (construing
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(1), (4)).
The Appellate Division explained that if consecutive
sentences were authorized, a less culpable juvenile who committed
"several offenses * * * in a single, isolated, aberrant criminal
event would be subject to significantly greater punishment than a
juvenile who undertook three separate and distinct criminal
transactions." Ibid. Expressing doubt "that it could have been
the Legislature's intent to expose the more culpable juvenile to
a lesser penalty," the Appellate Division determined that
imposition of consecutive sentences conflicted with the Juvenile
Code provision authorizing extended terms: "While we might
enforce what we would otherwise view as an unwise or an anomalous
result if the Legislature had clearly expressed its will, we will
not supply, by implication, a term [that] conflicts in spirit
with another provision of the Code." Id. at 91.
By framing the issue as whether the Legislature's enactment of the Juvenile Code reflected an intention to prohibit Family Courts from imposing consecutive sentences on juvenile offenders under all circumstances, we necessarily recognize the inherent power of the judiciary, absent a statutory prohibition, to impose consecutive sentences for separate offenses. That power is derived from the common law, and has consistently been recognized by our courts. In State v. Maxey, 42 N.J. 62 (1964), we acknowledged that "[t]he judicial power to impose consecutive sentences in this State is not founded upon statute but rather upon our common law, derived from the common law of England. * * * Consequently, our courts have the discretion and power to impose consecutive sentences for terms of years." Id. at 64, 66. In Maxey, the Court also observed that the inherent power of courts to sentence consecutively could be abrogated by statute: "In the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting the sentencing judge from exercising such discretion, we find that the power to impose consecutive life sentences resides in the trial judge." Id. at 69; see also State v. Mahaney, 73 N.J.L. 53, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1905) ("[T]he great weight of authority in this country is that, without any statutory provision for consecutive sentences, the power to impose them resides in the court."), aff'd, 74 N.J.L. 849 (E. & A. 1907).
Acknowledging that whether the Juvenile Code prohibits consecutive sentencing is a question of first impression, the State argues by analogy to cases holding that in sentencing young adult offenders to indeterminate terms at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex or Correctional Institution for Women pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5, courts may impose consecutive sentences even though the relevant sentencing statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-148, does not specifically authorize them to do so. Beginning in 1957 with State v. Horton, 45 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 1957), our courts have recognized that trial courts may impose consecutive sentences on young adult offenders even though such sentences are neither expressly permitted nor prohibited by statute. In Horton, the defendant was initially sentenced concurrently on two counts of larceny. After escaping from the New Jersey Reformatory at Bordentown, he committed another larceny. When he was finally apprehended, he pled guilty to the larceny committed while at large. The trial court imposed a sentence on that larceny count "'to run consecutively to any existing sentence.'" Id. at 45. Horton challenged the sentence, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-148 did not authorize consecutive sentences. Rejecting his argument, the Appellate Division held, "The statute before us contains no restrictive provision against consecutive reformatory sentences; had the Legislature so intended, it could have explicitly so provided. We are of the opinion that the result arrived at by the trial judge was
correct." Id. at 48. In State v. Bono,
128 N.J. Super. 254,
certif. denied,
65 N.J. 572 (1974), the Appellate Division upheld
the consecutive sentence of the defendant under the same
statutory section at issue in Horton. The defendant had been
sentenced consecutively on rape and lewdness charges. He
contended that that disposition was not authorized by N.J.S.A.
30:4-148 and ran counter to the legislative policy of
rehabilitation. Following Horton, supra, the Appellate Division
concluded:
Our court in State v. Horton,
45 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 1957), expressly declared that
the imposition of consecutive reformatory
sentences is not repugnant to the legislative
policy of rehabilitation, and that the court
has the power to impose consecutive terms
under N.J.S.A. 30:4-148 * * * .
While there may be some reservation as
to the appropriateness of the imposition of
consecutive indeterminate sentences in a
particular case, nevertheless, such sentences
are not repugnant to the theory of
rehabilitation. Parole from an indeterminate
term in the Youth Correctional Institution
Complex is under the control of the Board of
Trustees of the institution and parole
release may occur at any time.
In State v. Carroll, 66 N.J. 558 (1975), the defendant had been sentenced to consecutive indeterminate terms at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex for robbery and receiving stolen property. The Appellate Division, concluding that consecutive sentences were inconsistent with the rehabilitative objective of indeterminate reformatory sentences, modified the sentence by
imposing concurrent indeterminate terms. State v. Carroll,
128 N.J. Super. 234, 237-38 (1974). Although this Court affirmed the
Appellate Division's disposition, noting that the defendant had
already been released under both sentences, 66 N.J. at 561, we
reaffirmed the legality of consecutive indeterminate sentences,
and disagreed with the Appellate Division's conclusion that such
sentences were inconsistent with a sentencing scheme that
emphasized rehabilitation:
The legality of consecutive
indeterminate sentences has been consistently
upheld in this State, State v. Prewitt,
127 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div. 1974); State v.
Horton,
45 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 1957);
see State v. Bono,
128 N.J. Super. 254, 264
(App. Div. 1974). However, routine use of
this kind of sentence as a sentencing
mechanism is undesirable and should be
avoided.
* * * *
* * * [U]nder certain circumstances, the
imposition of consecutive indeterminate
sentences serves a valid penological purpose.
It enables the sentencing judge to indicate
on the record that while a sentence to State
Prison carrying a minimum term of confinement
is not appropriate, the particular commitment
to the Youth Complex is not routine and the
board of trustees should be alert to special
circumstances as outlined by the sentencing
judge which the board should take into
consideration in exercising its statutory
power to terminate the confinement. Also,
where necessary and proper, it permits an
increase in the maximum term for which a
defendant can be held should he fail to
respond to the institutional therapy, or
should he violate his parole after release.
As suggested by our opinion in Carroll, supra, in
determining whether consecutive sentences are permitted by the
Juvenile Code courts must consider the critical factor of the
extent to which such sentences are consistent with the Juvenile
Code's rehabilitative and penological objectives. We note that
the Juvenile Code authorizes the Family Court, after determining
that a juvenile has committed an act of delinquency, to "impose
such disposition or dispositions over those persons subject to
its jurisdiction [as are] consistent with the purposes of this
act." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24a. In construing the Juvenile Code to
ascertain whether consecutive sentences are permissible, we rely
on the settled principle that "[t]he construction that will best
effectuate the statute's ultimate objectives is to be preferred."
Cedar Cove, Inc. v. Stanzione,
122 N.J. 202, 213 (1991); see also
State v. Maguire,
84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980) ("In resolving * * *
questions of statutory construction, we are mindful that our task
is to effectuate the legislative intent in light of the language
used and the objects sought to be achieved.")
Section 2 of the Juvenile Code, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21, sets
forth the legislative purposes:
This act shall be construed so as to
effectuate the following purposes:
a. To preserve the unity of the family
whenever possible and to provide for the
care, protection, and wholesome mental and
physical development of juveniles coming
within the provisions of this act;
b. Consistent with the protection of
the public interest, to remove from children
committing delinquent acts certain statutory
consequences of criminal behavior, and to
substitute therefor an adequate program of
supervision, care and rehabilitation;
c. To separate juveniles from the
family environment only when necessary for
their health, safety or welfare or in the
interests of public safety;
d. To secure for each child coming
under the jurisdiction of the court such
care, guidance and control, preferably in his
own home, as will conduce to the child's
welfare and the best interests of the State;
and when such child is removed from his own
family, to secure for him custody, care and
discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his
parents;
e. To insure that children under the
jurisdiction of the court are wards of the
State, subject to the discipline and entitled
to the protection of the State, which may
intervene to safeguard them from neglect or
injury and to enforce the legal obligations
due to them and from them.
The Appellate Division characterized the stated purposes of the Juvenile Code as "fundamentally rehabilitative." 262 N.J. Super. at 80. We agree that rehabilitation traditionally has been regarded as the overarching objective of statutory schemes addressing juvenile delinquency, see In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 224 (1953), and that rehabilitation remains a primary goal of the Juvenile Code. Nevertheless, the Juvenile Code also reflects a correlative emphasis on public safety and deterrence. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21b (stating that "[c]onsistent with the protection of the public interest," courts may substitute an
adequate program of supervision for "certain statutory
consequences of criminal behavior"); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21c
(providing for separation of juveniles from their families "in
the interests of public safety"); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21e (providing
that juveniles under jurisdiction of Family Court are "subject to
the discipline" of State) (emphases added).
The Senate Judiciary Committee Statement accompanying the
Juvenile Code demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the
Juvenile Code serve the needs of public safety as well as the
rehabilitative needs of juvenile offenders:
This bill recognizes that the public
welfare and the best interests of juveniles
can be served most effectively through an
approach which provides for harsher penalties
for juveniles who commit serious acts or who
are repetitive offenders, while broadening
family responsibility and the use of
alternative dispositions for juveniles
committing less serious offenses. Moreover,
the provisions of this bill and the other
accompanying bills reflect a philosophy which
is pragmatic and realistic in nature rather
than bound to any particular ideology.
[Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to
Assembly Bill No. 641 (1982) (emphasis
added).]
Explaining the significance of section 2 of the Juvenile Code (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-21), the Committee Statement emphasizes that the legislative purposes encompassed public safety as well as rehabilitation: "Section 2 states general purposes of the act. The language in this section combines the purpose sections in the current juvenile statutes and stresses such concepts as the
preservation of the family unit and the rehabilitation of
juveniles consistent with the protection of the public." Ibid.
(emphasis added).
The Juvenile Delinquency Commission, a commission created by
the Juvenile Code itself (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-49) to study the impact
of the Juvenile Code and to make recommendations regarding the
implementation and effectiveness of the Juvenile Code's
provisions, shares the view that the Juvenile Code combines the
need for the punishment of juveniles with the rehabilitative
aspects of juvenile justice. In its 1988 Annual Report, the
Commission offered this interpretation of the purposes of the
Juvenile Code:
Another explicit purpose of the Code,
however, is to "enforce the legal
obligations" of juveniles. The Code
specifies that "the nature and circumstances
of the offense" and "the degree of injury to
persons or damage to property caused by the
juvenile's offense" are factors to be
considered in a disposition. These offense-specific characteristics are typically the
measures of blameworthiness or culpability
employed in "just deserts" sentencing laws to
determine the commensurate level of
punishment. The delineation of these
factors, along with the statement of purpose
and the Senate Judiciary Committee's
statement indicating that one of the law's
objectives is to provide "harsher penalties
for juveniles who commit serious acts or who
are repetitive offenders," are indications
that the Legislature also viewed retributive
sentencing goals as legitimate.
[Juvenile Justice -- Toward Completing the
Unfinished Agenda: 1988 Annual Report of the
Juvenile Delinquency Commission 42
(hereinafter 1988 Annual Report).]
In signing the Juvenile Code into law, then-Governor Thomas
Kean endorsed the view of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
Code's objectives included both rehabilitation and deterrence:
"It recognizes very clearly the need to deal
swiftly and sternly with violent young
criminals and it tempers that recognition
with the understanding that there are cases
in which counseling and rehabilitation will
be an adequate and appropriate response."
* * * *
"This program achieves a balance between
the need for law-abiding society to be
protected from the violent acts of young
persons and the need for that same society to
rehabilitate juveniles and turn them away
from a career of crime."
[Governor's Message on Signing Assembly Bill
No. 641 (July 23, 1982).]
In State v. R.G.D.,
108 N.J. 1 (1987), Justice O'Hern also
acknowledged the Legislature's objective to authorize more severe
punishment for juveniles who commit serious offenses, focusing on
the revised waiver provisions of the Code:
The goal of the new legislation in this
regard was to deal more strictly with serious
offenders. In keeping with that pragmatic
philosophy, the newly revised Code contained,
among many others, a change concerning the
prosecutor's motion for referral of a case to
adult court without the juvenile's consent.
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26. The Act broadened the
class of offenders eligible for waiver and
revised the standards for waiver in certain
cases.
The basic question we must resolve is whether the Legislature's silence concerning consecutive sentences in the Juvenile Code necessarily reflects an intent to prohibit their imposition. We decline to attribute to the Legislature a determination to preclude courts from imposing consecutive sentences on juveniles who commit multiple offenses.
We acknowledge the persuasiveness of the Appellate Division's observation that in enacting the Juvenile Code, the Legislature provided "in painstaking detail, a comprehensive scheme, essentially complete as written," 262 N.J. Super. at 89, and that omission of consecutive sentences from the Juvenile Code's elaborate specification of alternative dispositions meant that the Legislature intended to prohibit such sentences. Ibid. However, much the same observation could be made about the Legislature's failure to authorize consecutive sentences for young adult offenders, see N.J.S.A. 30:4-148, and yet the Legislature apparently has acquiesced to the long-standing judicial interpretation of that statute, which permits imposition of consecutive sentences. Supra at ___ (slip op. at 6-7).
The Appellate Division also found persuasive one of the Juvenile Code's provisions authorizing extended-term sentencing,
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(4). Under that section, a juvenile facing sentencing for three or more unrelated crimes can be sentenced to the maximum term for the most serious offense plus two years. In
the Appellate Division's view, an interpretation of the Juvenile
Code that permitted consecutive sentences would expose a juvenile
who had committed multiple offenses in a "single, isolated
aberrant criminal event" to "significantly greater punishment
than a juvenile who undertook three separate and distinct
criminal transactions." 262 N.J. Super. at 90.
We understand the Appellate Division's concern about the
apparent inconsistency between extended-term and consecutive
sentencing. That inconsistency is diminished if the Juvenile
Code is understood to permit consecutive sentences, in that the
juvenile offender eligible for the extended term could
alternatively be sentenced to consecutive terms. We also note,
however, that in 1986 the Juvenile Delinquency Commission
acknowledged that the extended-term provisions were rarely used,
speculating that the restrictions on the applicability of
extended terms limit their relevance as a sentencing option:
[O]ur analysis indicates that extended terms
are not being used. From July to December,
1984, fewer than five extended terms were
utilized. Several factors may account for
limited use. Some have suggested that both
Prosecutors and Judges are unfamiliar with
this provision. Additionally, there is
evidence suggesting that the provision as
currently drafted has practical limitations.
[1 The Impact of the New Jersey Code of
Juvenile Justice: 1986 Annual Report of the
Juvenile Delinquency Disposition Commission
86.]
In its 1988 Annual Report, the Commission once again found that
the use of extended terms of incarceration was infrequent. See
1988 Annual Report, supra, at 64. We conclude that the extended
term provisions are reconcilable with an interpretation of the
Juvenile Code that permits the Family Court to impose consecutive
sentences in appropriate cases. We infer that such sentences
will be used only in exceptional cases involving multiple
offenses in which the court concludes that an extended term is
inapplicable or inappropriate and that the rehabilitative and
public-safety objectives of the Juvenile Code cannot be
vindicated by concurrent terms.
Consistent with our observations in Carroll, supra, 66 N.J.
at 562, consecutive sentences for juvenile offenders should be
the exception and not the rule, but they may in certain
circumstances complement and reinforce both the rehabilitative
and penological purposes of the Juvenile Code. We note that the
Juvenile Code authorizes maximum terms of incarceration ranging
from one to four years for offenses that would constitute crimes
of the fourth, third, second and first degrees (except murder) if
committed by an adult. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(1). The presumptive
parole release terms for those same offenses range from five
months for a fourth-degree crime to twenty months for a first-degree crime. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.23(a). An interpretation of the
Juvenile Code that guarantees to juvenile offenders ineligible
for an extended term that they will not be punished more severely
for multiple offenses than for one offense breeds disrespect for
law and implies that juvenile offenders will not be held
accountable for multiple acts of unlawful conduct. In certain
circumstances, the availability of consecutive sentences may
permit the Family Court to advance a juvenile's rehabilitation by
demonstrating that those who commit crimes can be punished
separately for each instance of misconduct. That a juvenile has
received concurrent or consecutive sentences is considered an
aggravating factor in the determination of a juvenile's parole
release date. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.23(c)(2)(viii). (Because
that regulation pre-dates the Juvenile Code, it does not
influence our conclusion that the statute should be construed to
permit consecutive sentences.) Thus, the parole authorities can
evaluate the significance of the juvenile's commission of
multiple offenses and the Family Court's decision to impose
consecutive sentences in determining whether the Code's
rehabilitative purposes have been satisfied.
Nevertheless, a fully-rehabilitated juvenile should not
languish unnecessarily in a correctional facility because the
court sentenced the juvenile to consecutive terms. Unlike
multiple sentences of imprisonment for adult inmates, see
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51h, multiple sentences for juveniles are not
aggregated in determining the juvenile's primary parole
eligibility date. The relevant regulation provides that if a
juvenile is incarcerated for several acts of delinquency, "the
act of delinquency [that] represents the most serious act of
delinquency shall be considered in determining the tentative
parole release date." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.23(b). Moreover, the
Juvenile Code authorizes the sentencing court on motion to return
a juvenile from a correctional institution at which the juvenile
has been incarcerated prior to parole and to provide for an
alternative disposition not exceeding the time remaining to be
served in the institution. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44d(2). Accordingly,
we are satisfied that the statutory and regulatory provisions
governing release of juveniles from incarceration are
sufficiently flexible to ensure that the power to impose
consecutive sentences can be harmonized with the rehabilitative
purposes of the Juvenile Code.
Because we conclude that the Juvenile Code should not be interpreted to prohibit imposition of consecutive sentences, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it set aside the sentences imposed by the Family Court.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Garibaldi join in this opinion.