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N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. Defendant was tried to a jury and found guilty. He appeals from the conviction and the sentence
imposed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. "> Original Wordprocessor Version
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
The status of this decision is unpublished
Original Wordprocessor Version
This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*.
(NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1917-06T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AHMAD JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted December 18, 2007 - Decided
Before Judges Skillman and Yannotti.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County,
Indictment No. 04-12-2798.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for plaintiff (Stephen A. Caruso,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Luis A. Valentin, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R.
Juliano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Carey J. Huff, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ahmad D. Jones was charged under Monmouth County Indictment No. 04-12-2798 with second-degree
eluding, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. Defendant was tried to a jury and found guilty. He appeals from the
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conviction and the sentence imposed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
At trial, the State presented testimony from Officer Steven Adams of the Red Bank police department. Adams stated
that on October 4, 2004, he was working the shift from 2:45 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. At around 5:45 p.m., Adams was
traveling south on Leighton Avenue and he observed an older model Nissan Pathfinder with an expired inspection
sticker traveling northbound. Adams activated the lights on his police vehicle and made a U-turn. Adams followed
the Pathfinder but the vehicle did not pull over and increased its speed.
Adams activated his siren. He testified that the area of Leighton Avenue is a residential area, where houses are close
together, and parking is allowed on both sides of the street. Adams stated that along that street, people are
constantly getting into and out of their cars, and there are people on bicycles. He said when he was pursuing the
Pathfinder, there were people on the sidewalk.
Adams testified that the speed limit on Leighton Avenue is twenty-five miles per hour and the Pathfinder
was traveling at least sixty-five miles per hour. The vehicles rapidly approached a "T" intersection where Leighton
meets Locust Avenue. There is a stop sign at the intersection and the vehicles must turn right or left. According to
Adams, the Pathfinder was traveling at a high rate of speed, and turned left onto Locust Avenue, where the driver
temporarily lost control of the vehicle, and drove up on the curb, onto the sidewalk, and back down into the street.
Adams continued in pursuit. He made the left turn onto Locust and caught up to the Pathfinder.
Adams stated that the Pathfinder slowed significantly and the driver started to open the side door of the
vehicle. Adams also slowed down. Adams said that he was going to exit his vehicle when the door of the Pathfinder
closed and continued along Locust Avenue. Adams noted that that part of Locust Avenue is a residential area,
although it is not as crowded as Leighton Avenue. There are two large apartment complexes in the area. The
Pathfinder pulled into the complex at 105 Locust. Adams' lights and siren were still on.
According to Adams, the Pathfinder stopped abruptly. Adams positioned his vehicle about seven to ten feet behind
the Pathfinder. He ordered the driver to exit the vehicle and show him his hands. The driver did not comply. Adams
said that he opened the door of the Pathfinder and put the driver "into a hold to get him out of the vehicle." The
driver stated that he would not go to jail for Adams or anyone else. Adams gained control of the driver and placed
him on the ground. Adams ascertained that the driver was defendant, Ahmad Jones. He identified him in court as
the person who was driving the Pathfinder on October 4, 2004.
Defendant did not testify at trial but called Joshua Meekings as a witness in his defense. Meekins testified that he
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has known defendant for about seven years and he considers him a friend. Meekins said that on October 4, 2004, he
was exiting a liquor store on the corner of Leighton and Catherine Avenues. He saw defendant drive by in his
vehicle. Defendant was traveling "pretty fast." Meekins saw defendant's vehicle pass over a speed bump and he
heard "a loud sound."
Meekins stated that the police officer made a U-turn on Leonard Street and sped off in the same direction as
defendant. Defendant and the officer headed towards Locust Avenue, where defendant turned left. Meekins said
that the police car did not have its lights on. Meekins also stated that he did not hear a siren. He did not see the
vehicles after they turned left onto Locust Avenue.
On this appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:
POINT I:
THE DEFENADNT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED AS THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (Not raised below).
POINT II:
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE, UNDULY PUNITIVE AND NOT IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THE CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
We first consider defendant's contention that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Defendant
argues that the evidence supporting the charge was insufficient because the State relied entirely upon Adams'
testimony. Defendant contends that Adams' testimony was uncorroborated and the officer's credibility was
undermined by Meekins' testimony. Defendant maintains that reasonable doubt "clearly existed" as to his guilt. He
therefore argues that the verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered.
We note initially that defendant did not move before the trial court for a new trial. Because that motion was
not made, the issue of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is not properly before us. R. 2:10-1.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we have decided to consider defendant's argument. State v. Smith, 262 N.J.
Super. 487, 511-12 (App. Div. 1993).
Rule 3:20-1 provides that a jury verdict will not be set aside "as against the weight of the evidence unless, having
due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly
appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law." In determining whether a defendant is entitled to
a new trial under that standard, "[w]e must sift through the evidence 'to determine whether any trier of fact could
rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the crime were present.'" Smith,
supra, 262 N.J. Super. at 512 (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 96 (1982)). Furthermore, "[w]here the jury's verdict
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was grounded on its assessment of witness credibility, a reviewing court may not intercede, absent clear evidence
on the face of the record that the jury was mistaken or prejudiced." Ibid. (citing State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438, 446-47
(1956)).
Here, defendant was charged with second-degree eluding. The Code of Criminal Justice provides in
pertinent part that:
Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State . . .
who knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after
having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle . . . to a full stop
commits a crime of the third degree; except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the
second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any
person. . .
[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b.]
We are satisfied that the State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of second-degree
eluding. As we pointed out previously, Adams and Meekins testified that defendant was driving his vehicle at a high
rate of speed. Adams stated that he activated the lights and siren on his police vehicle. Adams also said that
defendant did not bring his vehicle to a stop but continued to drive away from the police car at speeds of up to
sixty-five miles per hour. In addition, Adams testified that during the chase, members of the public were at risk of
injury. Adams said that, while he was pursuing the Pathfinder, he observed pedestrians entering or exiting their
vehicles, walking on the sidewalk, and riding bicycles.
Although defendant maintains that Adams' testimony was not credible, that was an issue for the jury. See Ferdinand
v. Agric. Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 494 (1956) (noting that credibility is a jury question when people "of reason and
fairness may entertain differing views as to the truth of testimony"); State v. DiFerdinando, 345 N.J. Super. 382, 399
(App. Div. 2001) (holding that the jury may accept or reject any testimony on credibility grounds). We are satisfied
that the jury in this case had the discretion to accept Adams' testimony and his testimony provided a rational basis
for the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree eluding.
Defendant additionally argues that his sentence is excessive and was not imposed in conformity with the Code of
Criminal Justice. At sentencing, the judge found aggravating factors under 117 N.J. 210, 215-16 (1989); State v.
Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).
Affirmed.
Defendant pled guilty to resisting arrest, wvWare/wvWare version 1.0.3
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