Preview:

a4200-03.opn.html
Original Wordprocessor Version
This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*.
(NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4200-03T44200-03T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANTHONY ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted September 14, 2005 - Decided
Before Judges Wefing and Fuentes.
On appeal from Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Salem County,
Docket No. 95-04-0114.
Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,
attorney for appellant (David A. Snyder,
Designated Counsel, of counsel and on
the brief).
John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Gregory G. Waterston,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Anthony Armstrong appeals from the denial of his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. In 1996,
defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b-(1)); fourth-
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4200-03.opn.html[4/20/2013 4:42:19 PM]




a4200-03.opn.html
degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b-(4)); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and
one count of fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (155 N.J. 589 (1998). Among the issues raised by
defendant on direct appeal was the trial court's failure to have instructed the jury "on the law of oral inculpatory
admission," otherwise known as a Hampton charge. State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250 (1972).
On January 4, 2000, defendant filed a PCR petition in the Law Division. On April 27, 2000, the trial court denied the
petition without the benefit of oral argument. Defendant filed an appeal of this denial in 2002. After reviewing the
record, we reversed the denial of the petition and remanded the matter, based only on the trial court's failure to
entertain oral argument. State v. Armstrong, A-3799-00T4 (June 18, 2002). See State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382
(App. Div. 2001).
After conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to State v. Preciose, the trial court once again denied defendant's
petition. 129 N.J. 451 (1992). Defendant now appeals raising the following argument.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF.
Defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3 (e)(2). We note only
that we rejected defendant's Hampton charge argument on direct appeal. He is thus barred from raising it again in
the context of a PCR petition. R. 3:22-5.
Defendant's contention that his trial counsel should have consulted with him before agreeing to stipulate to the
victim's testimony is equally without merit. Here, the victim could not identify his attacker. The stipulation was
limited to a description of the victim's injuries, and of the manner the attack was carried out. Thus, even accepting
defendant's contention (that defense counsel should not have agreed to the stipulation without consulting with
him first), as a matter of law defendant cannot satisfy the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, because
admission of this stipulation did not affect the outcome of the trial.
Defendant's last contention, that his trial counsel should have called a number of witnesses as part of his defense, is
also unavailing. As appellate counsel concedes in his brief before us, the record here does not reveal what, if
anything, these alleged witnesses would have testified about at trial.
Affirmed.
This refers to the two prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4200-03.opn.html[4/20/2013 4:42:19 PM]




a4200-03.opn.html
Under this test, a defendant claiming reversible error based on ineffective assistance of counsel must prove: (1) that
counsel's performance fell below a level of reasonable professional competence; and (2) that, but for counsel's
unreasonable performance, the results of the trial would have been different. State v. Castagna, 376 N.J. Super. 323,
359-60 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 185 N.J. 35 (2005).
(continued)
(continued)
4
A-4200-03T4
September 22, 2005
0x01 graphic
This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law - Camden.
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4200-03.opn.html[4/20/2013 4:42:19 PM]

Download a4200-03.opn.pdf

New Jersey Law