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N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1). That trial followed a mistrial of the case in December 2005, which had ended with a hung jury on the second day of deliberations. Defendant was sentenced to a four-year prison term. "> Original

Wordprocessor Version This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*. (NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-6031-05T46031-05T4 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTONIO WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________________

Submitted October 1, 2007 - Decided October 23, 2007 Before Judges Graves and Sabatino. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 05-04-0917. Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Abby P. Schwartz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Luis A. Valentin, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patricia B. Quelch, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM After a three-day jury trial in January 2006, defendant Antonio Williams was found guilty of possessing heroin, in violation of 42 N.J. 97, 106 (1964) (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13, 53 S. Ct. 465, 469, 77 L. Ed. 993, 999 (1933)). As the trial judge aptly recognized, the law also seeks to "'promote the finality of jury verdicts'" by disfavoring efforts to summon jurors who have completed their service. State v. Bisaccia, 319 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 154 (1998)). The standard of good cause under R. 1:16-1 is therefore rigorous. A juror should not be called back for interrogation
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unless there is a "strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct." State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 962, 86 S. Ct. 1589, 16 L. Ed.2d 674 (1966); see also State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 503 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed.2d 898 (2005). On the other hand, the standard for making inquiry is not insurmountable. As the State acknowledges, the court must conduct an appropriate investigation when there are indicia that jurors were improperly affected by outside influences in their consideration of a case. See Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251-52; State v. Onysko, 226 N.J. Super. 599, 603 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Jasuilewicz, 205 N.J. Super. 558, 569 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 467 (1986). For example, in State v. Grant, 254 N.J. Super. 571, 580 (App. Div. 1992), the court found it necessary to conduct post-verdict interviews after receiving a letter from a juror who reported that another deliberating juror had consulted with her husband, a corrections officer, about the significance of weapons found in the defendants' possession. Similarly, in Bisaccia, supra, 319 N.J. Super. at 7-12, we concluded that the trial court was obligated to interview the jury after receiving information from an excused juror that the jury had been discussing newspaper articles about the case in the jury room, and after receiving two notes during deliberations indicating that at least one of the jurors was in fear for his safety. Here, we cannot tell from the limited record whether the "pressure" alluded to in T.S.'s telephone message to the judge's chambers stemmed from improper outside influences, or whether the juror was simply referring to forceful arguments that had been made in deliberations by other jurors about the merits of the prosecution's case. The latter kind of pressure would not provide sufficient cause to warrant juror interviews or other relief. See State v. Young, 181 N.J. Super. 463, 466-67 (App. Div. 1981), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 222 (1982) (holding that a juror's feeling of being pressured to return a verdict by other jurors who wanted to get back to work for fear of losing their jobs did not constitute "good cause" to conduct juror interviews under R. 1:16-1). Under these particular circumstances, we believe that the most prudent course would have been for the trial judge to follow up with T.S. and have her clarify what she meant by her allusion to "pressure." Consequently, we remand the case for that purpose, so that the court may make an appropriate inquiry. Depending upon the information that the judge obtains from T.S., additional interviews with the other deliberating jurors may be required. See State v. De Stefano, 339 N.J. Super. 153 (App. Div. 2001). We do not order that relief lightly. However, given the prior hung jury and the close nature of the competing proofs in this case, we are not comfortable in presuming that T.S.'s postweekend report to the trial judge was inconsequential.

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The matter is thus remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion, which shall be completed within forty-five days. Pending those proceedings, defendant's conviction and sentence remain unaltered. Jurisdiction is not retained, without prejudice to either party seeking appellate review of any further determinations made on remand.

At the first trial, defendant had presented testimony from another eyewitness at the scene, Kareem Davis, who was also an acquaintance. Davis's prior testimony was not read into the record at the second trial. We leave to the discretion of the trial judge the best means of renewing contact with T.S. The judge also has discretion to assess, with the input of counsel, whether a preliminary inquiry about what the juror meant by "pressure" might be effectively conducted through correspondence or some other less intrusive means. (continued) (continued) 11 A-6031-05T4 October 23, 2007 0x01 graphic

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