APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6162-01T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
December 20, 2006
APPELLATE DIVISION
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
BREANE STARR BLAKNEY,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
_______________________________________
January 24, 2006
Argued September 28, 2005 - Decided
Before Judges Conley, Weissbard and
Sapp-Peterson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County,
Indictment No. 99-11-1806.
Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Yvonne
Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Ms. Aiello, of counsel and on the brief).
Robyn M. Mitchell, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (Peter C.
Harvey, Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Mitchell, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, Breane Starr Blakney, appeals her conviction for murder, second degree aggravated assault,
third degree child abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child. We affirm
defendant's convictions. We also affirm the sentence imposed on the murder and aggravated
assault charges but vacate the sentences imposed on the child abuse and endangering
the welfare of a child convictions.
The convictions arise out of the tragic death of defendant's six-month-old son, S.B.,
on September 18, 1999. The cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries
due to battered child syndrome.
On October 20, 1999, defendant was charged in Hudson County Indictment No. 1806-11-99
with first degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count one); second degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(1) (count two); third degree child abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 and 9:6-3 (count three);
and endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count four).
On May 10 and May 24, 2000, a hearing was conducted to determine
the admissibility of taped statements defendant made to the police. On June 6,
2000, the trial court ruled the statements were admissible.
The trial took place between January 15 and January 30, 2002. On February
1, 2002, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts.
On May 24, 2002, defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and
she was subsequently sentenced. Defendant received thirty years imprisonment with thirty years of
parole ineligibility on count one, murder; five years imprisonment on count three, child
abuse; and ten years imprisonment with an eighty-five percent No Early Release Act
(NERA) parole disqualifier on count four, endangering the welfare of a child. The
court merged the conviction on count two, aggravated assault, with the sentence imposed
on count four. All the sentences were run concurrently.
The evidence presented at trial, if credited, disclosed the following. On September 14,
1999, at approximately 3:30 a.m., defendant brought S.B. to the Jersey City Medical
Center (JCMC) Emergency Room because of persistent vomiting. S.B. was examined by Dr.
Victor Uduaghan. He noted that S.B. appeared to be sleepy, had a muscular
rash, and had a scar on his abdomen. He also found that S.B.
did not seem to be dehydrated. S.B. was also examined by Dr. Andrew
Sapiro, who diagnosed him as being overfed. The hospital observed S.B. for approximately
an hour and twenty-five minutes, during which time he did not vomit. S.B.
was sent home with instructions for defendant to decrease feeding and to continue
giving him Pedialyte.
When defendant returned home with S.B., she changed his diaper and gave him
a bottle. He vomited. Approximately two hours later, defendant gave S.B. Pedialyte, which
he also vomited. She again gave him Pedialyte an hour later, which he
was able to retain. Defendant called S.B.'s pediatrician, Dr. Carmelita Malalis, and left
a message on her answering service. Dr. Malalis denied receiving a phone call.
However, testimony by a representative from the doctor's answering service confirmed defendant called
the doctor to report that her son's eye would not close, his arm
would not move, he was unable to keep anything down and he was
six months old.
Later that morning, defendant's friend, Miriam Jones, came to see how S.B. was
doing. Jones testified that S.B. was calm, like a baby that wasn't feeling
well. She also testified that he had "crust" in his eye as if
he had a cold. Jones offered to take defendant and S.B. to her
pediatrician, which she did after arriving home from work. While at the office,
the pediatrician called an ambulance. The ambulance arrived at approximately 5:30 p.m. and
the technicians, Michael Carrig and Jennifer Fragel, found S.B. unconscious, unresponsive, and in
marked respiratory distress. Carrig testified that S.B. had one dilated and one small
pupil, which indicated swelling of the brain. The technicians then took S.B. back
to JCMC.
S.B. was treated by Dr. Isabel Belem, the physician in charge of the
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU). She testified that S.B.'s right pupil was wide
open and the left pupil was very small. She also testified that S.B.
was lethargic and that his eyes were not reacting to light in the
proper way. Dr. Belem stated that she noticed several external injuries, including old
burns and scars on his chest and arms, an older lesion on his
right ear, bruises on his lower abdomen, a lesion on his left foot
and its big toe, and other superficial lacerations.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., a CAT scan was performed on S.B. revealing increased
intracranial pressure and herniation syndrome. Dr. Belem concluded that S.B. had suffered a
severe head injury. She also conducted a full body X-ray, which revealed several
rib fractures and an old fracture on S.B.'s lower left leg. S.B. was
pronounced dead on September 18, 1999, at approximately 10:40 a.m.
Prior to S.B.'s death, Dr. Belem testified that she questioned defendant about the
injuries found on S.B., but defendant was not forthcoming. Defendant, however, did tell
Dr. Belem that the burn on S.B.'s chest and bruises on his arms
were caused when an upright vacuum fell on S.B. when he pulled on
the cord. Defendant told Dr. Belem the leg fracture happened during day care.
Regarding the burn, Dr. Belem testified that a normal four-month-old baby does not
have the motor skills or strength to grab a cord or pull a
vacuum over. Dr. Belem also testified about shaken baby syndrome. She stated it
is a condition that develops in babies when they are shaken by the
head or chest. Dr. Belem explained a young child's neck muscles are not
developed enough to fully control head movement. Thus, when the child is shaken,
the movement of the head, especially acceleration and deceleration, also causes movement to
the brain which begins to bruise or hemorrhage from hitting the inside of
the skull.
Dr. Belem testified that within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the injuries
behind the ear were consistent with those a child would suffer if he
had been grabbed by the ears and shaken. She stated most people who
shake babies do so out of frustration or anger at whatever is happening
with the baby at that particular moment.
After S.B. was admitted to PICU, JCMC contacted the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office
Sex Crime/Child Abuse Unit (SAVA). Sergeant Honey Spirito and Investigator Ryan Hadfield responded
to the call and were assigned to conduct the investigation. The officers proceeded
to the hospital. While waiting to speak to the doctors, who were still
intubating S.B. and trying to get him on life support, they introduced themselves
to defendant. She agreed to accompany the officers to their office, which was
located next door to the medical center, for a taped interview. Spirito testified
defendant was advised of her Miranda rights prior to taping her statement and
that a pre-tape interview was conducted.
In her statement, defendant discussed S.B.'s various injuries and hospital visits. She told
the officers S.B. was first brought to Bayonne Hospital because of a white
discharge around the circumcision of his penis. He then was brought back to
Bayonne Hospital for his fractured leg. Defendant stated she was told he could
have been born with the fracture or that someone could have dropped him.
Defendant next discussed the burns. She stated that she was vacuuming and S.B.
was in his car seat near the vacuum. As she went to get
a bottle, S.B. grabbed the vacuum and pulled it down on himself. She
stated that the cord was still in J.B.'s hand when she found him.
Defendant never took S.B. to the hospital because he was already scheduled for
a doctor's visit the following month. When questioned further as to why she
did not take S.B. to the hospital, defendant explained she was scared the
Department of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) would take S.B. from her.
Defendant told the officers many people had cared for S.B. the week preceding
his September 14, 1999, hospitalization. On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, a friend babysat
S.B. while defendant was at work. Defendant was with S.B. all day Thursday
and Friday. Defendant's father watched S.B. on Saturday from approximately 2:30 p.m. to
11:30 p.m. On Sunday, S.B.'s biological father, Courtney Hymes, watched him from 8:30
a.m. to midnight. Hymes' mother brought S.B. home, which is when defendant first
noticed S.B. was acting differently.
The next day defendant left S.B. with her boyfriend, Rolando Morrison, at about
7:00 p.m. and went to work. She said she called at about 7:30
p.m. to check on S.B. and was told he threw up but that
he was sleeping. Defendant arrived home around 11:00 p.m. Morrison told defendant that
when he tried to play with S.B., the baby did not respond as
he usually did.
Defendant stated she then bathed S.B. and placed him in the bed next
to her. Defendant indicated she did not sleep but kept watching S.B. all
night. She would call his name and S.B. would open both eyes, look
at her, but then "go right back to sleep." Defendant stated things did
not feel right to her so she got up and took S.B. to
the hospital at 3:30 a.m. She explained that she took S.B. to JCMC
because she heard it was a better hospital for children and because she
was afraid Bayonne Hospital would call DYFS. She gave her name as Tina
Smith and S.B.'s as Sean Smith so DYFS would not become involved.
Defendant told Spirito and Hadfield she did not notice any bruises, cuts, or
scratches on S.B. after Hazel, her father, and Hymes had watched him. She
indicated she noticed the marks on S.B.'s feet after Morrison had watched him.
When she asked Morrison about the marks, he told her that he had
seen them when he changed S.B.'s socks and was going to ask her
what they were. Finally, defendant stated she did not know what caused the
injuries to S.B.'s ears but that it may have been caused by peeling
because S.B. had peeled in the past. The interview concluded with defendant acknowledging
the statement was true and voluntary.
Following defendant's statement, Spirito and Hadfield continued their investigation. They spoke with the
people defendant had mentioned and on September 15, 1999, took pictures at defendant's
home. In their judgment, there were numerous inconsistencies and lies so they decided
to pick defendant up on September 17, 1999, to conduct another interview. At
this point, defendant had become a target of the investigation. Although defendant was
not arrested or in handcuffs, Spirito acknowledged they had decided to change the
tone of the second interview and "take it from an interview to [an]
interrogation to see why she's lying." Defendant was brought to the SAVA office
and was advised of her Miranda rights. Spirito testified that at the time
of the interrogation, defendant was cooperative, had eaten, and was wearing different clothes
from when she was interviewed three days earlier. The jury received copies of
the transcript of the interview and the tape was played. The tape was
approximately twelve minutes long.
Prior to the recorded statement but after defendant signed the Miranda waiver form,
Spirito and Hadfield conducted a pre-tape interview which lasted approximately an hour and
twenty minutes. Spirito discussed with defendant the inconsistencies in defendant's statement. During the
pre-tape interview, Spirito discussed various ways in which the injuries to S.B. could
have been sustained, at which time defendant informed them that it was possible
the injuries occurred from the way in which S.B. was placed in his
car seat. Spirito testified that during the pre-tape interview, defendant told them she
had dropped S.B. into his car seat numerous times. Defendant also demonstrated how
she had dropped S.B. into his seat from waist-high. Spirito indicated that according
to defendant's demonstration, she did not throw S.B. into the seat.
The transcript of the taped interrogation reveals that defendant was again advised of
her rights and the waiver that she had previously signed. Defendant indicated that
she understood her rights and the waiver, and wished to speak to the
investigators. Defendant was given an oath and swore to tell the truth. When
asked if she knew how S.B. might have sustained some of his injuries,
defendant stated:
Um, now that I'm talking to ya, and you've explained things to me,
and I've told you things. I'm aware that the injuries that my son
gotten could of been by me just trying to place him nicely into
his car seat but not knowingly that I placed him a little bit
hard.
. . . .
A lot anger with my father, by being mad that Courtney not there,
by happening to know I got to go work the next day or
knowing I don't have a babysitter, knowing I'm trying my best and I
don't know who else I can turn to what else I could so,
not purposely.
. . . .
I could have been angry at the fact that I couldn't get a
minute to myself for a few minutes. But, it's na, never directly I
was mad at him. I could of been mad at his father, I
could been by Rolando not responding to me, I could of mad at
plenty different things my father yelling at me for something different, my job
talking about if I don't come to work I won't have a job
it's different things but it's never directly towards [S.B.] that I was angry
with.
During this questioning, defendant again stated she did not
know what caused the marks on S.B.'s ears, but she speculated she might
have caused them from drying his ears too roughly.
After defendant gave the second statement, she was arrested and charged with aggravated
assault, child abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child. After S.B.'s death,
the murder charge was subsequently added.
Dr. Kenneth Hutchins performed S.B.'s autopsy on September 19, 1999. Dr. Lyla Perez,
an expert in forensic pathology, testified as to the autopsy results. She stated
that the autopsy revealed a crusted abrasion on the back of the ear,
a healed burn mark on S.B.'s abdomen and the lower part of his
chest, two healed skin lesions consistent with burns on the right forearm, a
healing abrasion or laceration on the cuticle of the first left toe, and
marks on the middle of the foot. Although S.B. had no visible marks
on his scalp, there were small and scattered bruises on the top of
his head. The skull was not fractured, but the right side of the
brain had a subdural hematoma or bleeding. Additionally, bleeding was found in the
right cerebral hemisphere and hemorrhages on the optic nerves and eyeballs indicating that
the baby had been shaken. Finally, there were hemorrhages on the armpit area
and chest wall, several healing rib fractures, several recent rib fractures, and a
healing leg fracture.
Dr. Perez testified she agreed with the opinion expressed by Dr. Hutchins in
his report that within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, S.B. died from
"multiple blunt-force trauma due to battered-child syndrome," and that the death was a
homicidal death. On cross-examination, Dr. Perez explained that the use of the terminology
“battered-child syndrome” instead of “shaken baby syndrome” in Dr. Hutchins’ report was a
matter of semantics and that in the death certificate that Dr. Hutchins prepared,
shaken baby syndrome was mentioned in the description of how the injuries occurred.
Dr. Perez further testified that in her opinion, within a reasonable degree of
scientific and medical certainty, there had only been one fatal brain injury and
it had occurred within one or two days prior to S.B.’s admittance into
the hospital on September 14, 1999.
There was also testimony from Dr. Carmelita Malalis, a pediatrician who had seen
S.B. on two occasions for vaccinations. On S.B.’s July 8, 1999, visit to
Dr. Malalis, the doctor noticed a burn scar on the baby’s abdominal quadrant
and right arm. Dr. Malalis testified that when she asked defendant how S.B.
had obtained the burns, “she told me that she doesn’t know, you know,
how the boy sustained those injuries because at the time the boy was
with the father but that’s -- but that the boy was brought to
Medical Center for treatment.” Dr. Malalis also testified that she had spoken to
an emergency room doctor on July 26, 1999 in regard to S.B.’s leg
injury (distal tibia and fibula fracture) and had noted that the emergency room
doctor and the orthopedic doctor did not think the injury appeared to be
the result of abuse.
Latonia Finley, a friend of defendant who babysat S.B. and had known her
for approximately ten years, testified that defendant had told her a vacuum had
caused S.B.’s burn and that defendant had told her that S.B.’s broken leg
was the result of her placing him on her lap wrong, but later
told her that it was the result of her putting his shoe on
wrong. She also testified that ”[y]ou could tell she loved him. But she
was very impatient. She didn’t have no patience.”
Debra Hymes (also called Yvonne), S.B.’s paternal grandmother, testified that when she went
with Marcia LaCue to pick up S.B. for their first visit, defendant told
her that the burn S.B. had on his stomach had occurred at the
Prodigy Day Care Center. However, later on defendant told her it had been
caused by a vacuum cleaner. Hymes testified that when she picked up S.B.
for their second visit, defendant told her S.B.’s leg injury occurred when "the
nurse at the hospital laid him down the wrong way and broke his
leg when she was giving him a X-ray.” She also testified that defendant
told her that DYFS was handling it and that because of the injury,
she was going to sue the nurse or the hospital. According to Hymes,
defendant also mentioned she was going to sue the day care center where
S.B. had been burned. Hymes indicated she did not notice any new injuries
during her third visit with S.B., which occurred in August. She also stated
she offered to baby-sit S.B., but defendant declined because she did not want
to give Courtney more visitation time.
LaCue confirmed defendant told her and Debra Hymes that S.B. sustained his burn
at the day care center.
Joseph Palella, the director and owner of the Prodigy Learning Center, a day
care center located in Bayonne, testified that S.B. was never enrolled at the
center.
Defendant called Syed Shah, Miriam Jones (also referred to as Marcia or Mimi),
Denatrice Patten, Anna Towarewicz, Rolando Morrison, Vera Coples, and John Gilmore as witnesses
on her behalf. Shah was the general manager of the KFC where defendant
worked and testified that defendant brought S.B. to the KFC once or twice
and appeared happy to have a baby, and that according to payroll records,
defendant worked on September 13, 1999.
Patten testified she had known and been friends with defendant since high school
in 1994 and that she saw defendant a few times a week after
S.B. was born. Patten further testified that she saw defendant with S.B. and
described the manner in which defendant acted towards S.B. as “very loving, caring;
she showed a lot of respect; she was a good mother.” Patten explained
she thought defendant was a good mother because “[s]he took care of him.
He was always fed, clean, happy. He was never sad, nothing like that.
And I also trusted her with m[y children]." Patten testified she never saw
defendant get angry at S.B., strike him, or act in an abusive way
towards him. On cross, Patten testified that defendant told her that Rolando had
been with S.B. when the vacuum cleaner fell and burned S.B.
Towarewicz testified she was a switchboard operator and performed answering service duties for
doctors, including Dr. Malalis, S.B.’s pediatrician. She testified she took a message from
defendant on September 14, 1999, at 10:13 a.m. regarding S.B.’s condition, that the
doctor did not return her beeps, that she called defendant, who indicated Dr.
Malalis had not called her, and that she had delivered the message to
Dr. Malalis.
Morrison, a drug dealer who was incarcerated at the Bordentown Youth Correction Facility
at the time of the trial, testified he had known defendant for six
years and that they had “a little involvement,” “a relationship, basically,” “I wouldn’t
say [she was my girlfriend], but, you know, yeah,” “[s]he was my partner,”
“[s]exual partner.” Morrison denied knowing S.B., but then admitted he had seen him.
He proceeded to testify he had been sexual partners with defendant in September
of 1999 and had babysat S.B. “[o]nce or twice.” Morrison testified the prosecutor's
office interviewed him twice in connection with S.B.’s death; once on September 15,
1999, and later in August 2000 (also referred to as the August 2001
statement). He testified that on the evening of September 13, 1999, he babysat
S.B. and was “[g]etting my rest in.” He testified defendant only called once
during the evening. However, he conceded that in his statement to the investigators
on September 15, 1999, he stated she was calling him every five or
ten minutes. When defendant returned home, Morrison left the apartment and went to
deal drugs.
Morrison next saw defendant and S.B. at some point during the early morning
hours when she came looking for him. Morrison testified that when defendant found
him, “[s]he said something, something was wrong with the baby and she was
scared. She didn’t want to take the baby to the hospital.” Morrison denied
defendant asked him what he had done to S.B.
When asked if he had ever picked up S.B., Morrison stated "sometimes." When
questioned further as to how he would do that, Morrison responded, "It was
basically how any male would treat a child.” He explained he picked up
S.B. “[l]ike a baby” and from under S.B.’s armpits. Morrison told the prosecutor's
office he witnessed defendant pick up S.B. from his crib by his head
on one occasion. Morrison acknowledged he gave an earlier statement to the prosecutor's
office where no reference to this incident was made. According to Morrison, he
was trying to protect defendant.
Morrison also testified that when defendant returned from work on the night of
September 13, 1999, they had a "discussion" after he was beeped. Defendant thought
it was another woman and did not want him to go out.
Morrison indicated that when he was incarcerated, defendant visited him and they exchanged
letters. He found out that Gilmore and defendant were having an affair and
acknowledged that he wrote letters to defendant containing threatening language. He claimed the
threatening language was simply a figure of speech and that he never harmed
defendant. He admitted hitting her once while in the visiting area of the
prison, but maintained it was just a “tap,” noting they were surrounded by
correction officers, so it could not have been “big.” Morrison also testified defendant
was a habitual liar.
On cross, Morrison indicated he often stayed at defendant's place, but he went
to his home to change. He testified he gave defendant money to buy
things. Morrison denied breaking S.B.’s leg. According to Morrison, defendant told him S.B.’s
burn occurred at the day care center and that she broke S.B.'s leg
while she was putting on his shoe. At one point, defendant asked him
if he had ever hurt S.B. He responded, by letter, asking why would
he hurt S.B., as he was a father himself.
Morrison also testified about his relationship with Gilmore, how Gilmore was angry with
him, and how they got into a fight while both were incarcerated in
the same institution.
Coples testified that she worked with defendant at KFC before S.B. was born
and that she became friends with her. She testified on direct that she
visited defendant at her home after S.B. was born and that Rolando lived
there at the time. However, on cross, Coples testified that the last time
she went to defendant’s apartment was in April of 1999, and afterward only
saw S.B. when defendant brought him to visit at the KFC in Journal
Square where Coples worked. Coples testified that “[defendant] treated him good. She made
sure, you know, he eat and he had clean clothes and she made
sure he had everything that he needed.” She described defendant's demeanor at the
hospital on September 14, 1999 as “[v]ery upset, crying, um, coming to me
crying, telling me, um, something is wrong with the baby.”
Gilmore, a convicted drug dealer incarcerated at Northern State Prison at the time
of the trial, testified he met defendant through Morrison, and that Morrison was
living with defendant around the time of S.B.'s hospitalization. He stated in the
early morning hours of September 14, 1999, he saw defendant carrying S.B. and
looking for Morrison. When Morrison approached, Gilmore overheard defendant ask Morrison “what happened
to her son, what he did to her son?” Gilmore indicated he went
to the hospital with Morrison, defendant and S.B. in a car driven by
his friend. After dropping off Morrison, defendant and S.B. at the hospital, he
returned to the area he had just left. Gilmore testified that he asked
Morrison whether he had "something to do with" S.B.’s death and Morrison told
him he had caused the injury to S.B.’s leg when “him and [defendant]
was playing and he had picked her up and threw her on top
of [S.B.] by accident.” Morrison also told Gilmore he had been with S.B.
when the vacuum fell on S.B. causing the burn.
On cross, Gilmore conceded he had a “beef” with Morrison over drug money.
Gilmore gave Morrison money to bring to his lawyer, but Morrison did something
else with the money. Gilmore testified this made him angry. He also testified
he got into a fight with Morrison while in prison. Gilmore denied having
an affair with defendant and said Morrison was “[l]ying” if he had said
that.
Defendant did not testify.
On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING BLAKNEY'S SEPTEMBER 17, 1999, TAPED STATEMENT INTO
EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS INVOLUNTARILY GIVEN, AND BECAUSE BLAKNEY ALLEGED THAT DURING A
PORTION OF THE INTERROGATION, WHICH WAS NOT ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED, SHE WAS VERBALLY ABUSED
AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY COERCED INTO ADOPTING A VERSION OF EVENTS THAT WAS FED TO
HER BY HER INTERLOCUTORS (PARTIALLY RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
BLAKNEY SUFFERED EXTREME PREJUDICE FROM THE COURT'S FAILURE TO SEVER THE MURDER COUNT
FROM THE COUNTS WHICH INVOLVED PRIOR ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE THAT WERE UNRELATED
TO THE MURDER. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BLAKNEY'S MURDER CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE PERMISSIBLE USE
OF THE PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR'S TRIAL TACTICS GROSSLY EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF PROPRIETY, THEREBY DEPRIVING BLAKNEY
OF A FAIR TRIAL (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT IV
BLAKNEY WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO JURY UNANIMITY ON THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COUNT
WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO ALLEGE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY WITH PARTICULARITY, AND WHERE
THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF SEVERAL SEPARATE AND DISTINCT INJURIES, ALL OF WHICH WERE
ARGUABLY SERIOUS (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT V
BLAKNEY'S CONVICTION FOR ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD MUST BE REVERSED WHERE
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH THE DEFINITION OF "KNOWINGLY"
-- THE REQUISITE MENTAL STATE FOR THAT OFFENSE (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE BLAKNEY'S CONVICTIONS FOR CHILD ABUSE
AND ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD (NOT RAISED BELOW).
We conclude the errors alleged in Points IV and V are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion and therefore confine our discussion
to the remaining points and the State's cross-appeal. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Defendant contends the statement she gave to SAVA on September 17, 1999, was involuntary and a product of psychological coercion.
Two witnesses testified at the suppression hearing. Sergeant Spirito testified on behalf of the State while defendant testified on her own behalf. Following the hearing, the trial judge found that the statement had "remarkable clarity" and that it was given without coercion. She stated:
The court has had the opportunity to listen to both of the tapes. The court has also had the opportunity to read the text of the tapes and to hear the testimony of Miss defendant.
Certainly the court would be aware, and it would not be unlikely that
Miss Blakney certainly at the time of the taking of the second statement,
. . . . [w]ould have certainly had little or no sleep. Would
have also had an emotional crisis occurring throughout this period of time.
The court must decide whether in fact that was of such a magnitude
to have caused her, number one, to be easily coerced, to put her
into a mindset that would have then resulted in her answering questions inappropriately,
not correctly, not truthfully, answering questions with answers that were given to her
by somebody else and on and on.
If you listen to the two statements, interestingly enough, Miss Blakney does not
sound very different except at the end of tape two in which she
certainly does cry and does have an emotional few moments which are certainly
understandable.
She answers the questions, I believe, in both instances with remarkable clarity. And
under the circumstances, I do not feel after reading and listening that there
was any attempt by members of the Prosecutor's Office to coerce her and
nor any attempt by them to put words into her mouth.
Clearly when they were asking questions and there was some hesitation with regard
to some of the answers what was done on a few occasions was
to suggest variable scenarios.
It appears both from the text and from her tone of voice on
the tape that she picked up on those variable scenarios and in some
instances chose one that may have fit what her answer was going to
be or in some cases didn't choose any of them or corrected the
Prosecutor's investigator and said something entirely different or something similar, but not the
same.
So the idea that, of coercion here, I think is misplaced. Yes, she
was tired. Yes, I am sure she was emotionally strained, but then, again,
is not every statement that's taken under these circumstances after a person is
arrested and after a person has had some sort of a traumatic event?
I mean, I can't think of any statements that would not have built
within them some nervousness, some strain, some emotional output by the person who's
giving the statement.
We are dealing in the criminal law here. We are dealing with scenarios.
Many, many instances that occur, either you take the statements from people who
have been alleged victims. We take statements from people who are going to
be charged with crimes and they are never without stress in my opinion.
So, if we would use that as a criteria for whether something would
be voluntary or not voluntary or knowing or not knowing, I feel that
we would probably eliminate all statements. I don't think that is what the
case law says.
It is clear that the State can use a statement like this against
a defendant, whether that defendant testifies or not, as long as it is
voluntary, it is knowing, it was not coerced, she was not unduly influenced.
And, in fact, in this particular case was given her full Miranda Rights.
Not once, more than once, was certainly made aware under the circumstances that
she was being questioned, anything that she said would be used and could
be used against her. She was given the opportunity to have an attorney
and on and on.
And in my opinion Miss Blakney knew what she was saying and what
she was doing and the emotional aspects, as I said before is real.
Yes, I do believe that and I am sure the Jury will as
well. But under the circumstances there is nothing involuntary. Nothing coercive or nothing
of an undue influence that I can gleam from the statement either by
reading it or by hearing it.
In reviewing the results of the Miranda hearing, we defer to the credibility
determinations of the trial judge. State v. Locurto,
157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).
We may not "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or
make conclusions about the evidence." State v. Barone,
147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997).
The State must prove the voluntariness of any statement with proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Cook,
179 N.J. 533, 552 (2004) (citing State v.
Bey,
112 N.J. 123, 134 (1988) (Bey II)).
Although the use of psychologically-oriented techniques to conduct custodial interrogations is not inherently
coercive, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the statement given was the product of a knowing, voluntary waiver of
the right against self-incrimination or "derived from ‘very substantial’ psychological pressures that the
will.” Cook, supra, 179 N.J. at 562-63. Relevant factors to consider in making
this determination include the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights,
length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and
whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved.
State v. Galloway,
133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.
Ct. 2041, 2047-48, 36 L. Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973); State v. Miller,
76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)).
While the September 17, 1999, interview was less congenial than the September 14,
1999, interview, applying the Galloway factors, the record does not support a finding
that the nature of the interrogation caused defendant's will to be overborne resulting
in a statement that was the product of substantial psychological pressures. Cook, supra,
179 N.J. at 563. Defendant was nineteen years old at the time she
gave the statement. She was a graduate of Bayonne High School and had
attended Berkeley College for two months where she took marketing courses. She was
a supervisor at Kentucky Fried Chicken. She acknowledged receiving Miranda warnings prior to
giving a formal statement, that she understood the questions presented and understood where
and why she was being questioned. The judge noted that defendant's demeanor in
the taped statements was the same on both September 14, 1999, and September
17, 1999, notwithstanding defendant's complaint during the latter questioning that she was tired
and that an unidentified officer spent approximately fifteen minutes yelling at her while
the tape recorder was off. Thus, the record of the suppression hearing, coupled
with the judge's credibility determination, does not support defendant's contention that her statement
was the product of impermissible psychological coercion. We therefore conclude the trial judge
did not err in her ruling that defendant's September 17, 1999, statement was
admissible.
In addition, defendant contends we should adopt the holdings of the Alaska and
Minnesota Supreme Courts and find that the entire custodial interview must be electronically
recorded for any part of the interview to be admissible. See State v.
Scales,
518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994); Stephan v. State,
711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska
1985). We disagree. Our Supreme Court has previously declined to adopt a similar
rule. Cook, supra, 179 N.J. at 559-60.
See footnote 1
Defendant next contends that evidence of defendant's prior abusive acts against S.B. would have been inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) if the murder count had been tried separately; consequently, she suffered extreme prejudice from the trial court's decision to join the murder charge with the other offenses. Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial court did not give proper limiting instructions to the jury as to how they could use the prior bad acts evidence.
Rule 3:7-6 provides for the joinder of offenses as follows:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
Pursuant to R. 3:15-2, a defendant may move for severance of offenses upon a showing of prejudice that would result from the joinder of such offenses. Defendant did not move for severance of the murder count before trial as required by R. 3:15-2(c) and R. 3:10-2(c). Thus, her claim must be reviewed under the plain error standard, namely, "whether under the circumstances of [this] case the alleged error possessed a clear capacity for producing an unjust result." State v Keely, 153 N.J. Super. 18, 22 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 613 (1978).
"[A] key factor in determining whether prejudice exists from joinder of multiple offenses is whether the evidence of these other acts would be admissible in separate trials [under N.J.R.E. 404(b)]. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 274 (1988).
N.J.R.E. 404(b), provides:
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.
The list of exceptions set forth in the rule, however, is not exclusive. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 300 (1989). "A necessary corollary to the principle that other-[wrongs, or acts] can be admitted to prove any fact in issue -- whether or not included among the specific examples set forth in [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] -- is the requirement that the 'issue' be genuine, and that the other-crime evidence be necessary for its proof." Id. at 301. "That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof." State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 385 (1996) (quoting Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 308).
Prior acts of child abuse unconnected to an underlying charge of murder are relevant to show intent, absence of mistake or accident. State v. Moorman, 286 N.J. Super. 648, 662 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Elmore, 205 N.J. Super. 373, 384 (App. Div. 1985). Defendant claims, however, that she never raised the defense of mistake or accident. Therefore, in a separate trial on the murder count, the evidence of prior abuse would have been irrelevant. Although defendant did not affirmatively claim "accident" or "mistake," that her actions were accidental or mistaken was clearly implied.
In his opening statement, defense counsel remarked, "[m]y client was 19 years old when this happened. She was a single mother doing the best that she could to raise a child." In his closing statement, defense counsel made the following remarks:
Whoever it was that you find shook this baby, whether it was my client, or whether it was Rolando Morrison or somebody else, I submit to you did not kill the baby on purpose, I submit to you did not know that what was going to happen would kill this baby, whoever it was.
. . . .
Is there evidence in this case that she knowingly or purposely killed her child or that anyone did? I submit to you that there isn't.
. . . .
Remember you're judging at the time a 19-year-old single mother.
Defendant gave the following explanation for S.B.’s injuries:
I’m aware that the injuries that my son gotten could of been by me just trying to place him nicely into his car seat but not knowingly that I placed him a little bit hard[.]
* * * *
[H]e’s the one that I, put put [sic] down too hard not even
realizing that I was doing it.
Merely because the words "accident" or "mistake" were never expressly used by the
defense does not mean that the defense was not raised. Moreover, the evidence
of prior bad acts was separately admissible to prove defendant's intent. See State
v. Compton,
304 N.J. Super. 447, 482-83 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied,
153 N.J. 51 (1998). There was sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that
defendant, over the course of six months following the birth of S.B., became
so overwhelmed with her circumstances that she purposely took out her frustrations on
S.B. In her statement on September 17, 1999, defendant explained her frustration:
Q. [s]o about how many times do you think, you might have put him
in the car seat too roughly, or slammed him. . .
A. Could be numerous. . .
Q. Into the car seat.
A. Numerous of times he's six and a half months I could of did
it a, I say like ah, 50 or 60 times, probably more.
Q. And some of those times you might have been angry?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you angry at [S.B.]?
A. No.
Q. Just, okay.
Q. (Inv. Hadfield) Who were you angry at?
A. I could have been angry at the fact that I couldn't get a
minute to myself for a few minutes. But, it's na, never directly I
was mad at him. I could have been mad at his father, I
could been by Rolondo not responding to me, I could of mad at
plenty of different things my father yelling at me for something different, my
job talking about if I don't come to work I won't have a
job it's different things but it's never directly towards [S.B.] that I was
angry with.
Q. But, [S.B.] got sort the. . .
A. But [S.B.] the one that. . .
Q. blunt to this anger?
A. That got the blame for it, he's the one that I, put down
too hard not even realizing that I was doing it.
This evidence was clearly probative of defendant's intent. Thus, the trial judge did
not commit plain error in permitting the joinder of the child abuse counts
and the murder count for purposes of trial.
Defendant also argues that the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury
as to the limited purpose for which evidence of prior abuse could be
used. She first argues that the court's instructions were stated in generalities and
were vague, confusing, and failed to focus the jury on the relevant issues.
Second, she argues that the judge spoke only in vague generalities about the
potential for prejudice that exists when claims are tried together. Finally, defendant argues
that the court did not explain that the prior acts were relevant only
to whether she acted purposely or knowingly. The relevant instructions were as follows:
[I]f I gave a limiting instruction as to how to use certain evidence,
that evidence must be considered by you for that purpose only. You cannot
use it for any other purpose.
. . . .
There are four offenses charged in this indictment. They are separate offenses by
separate counts of the indictment and the defendant is entitled to have her
guilt or innocence separately considered in each count by the evidence which is
relevant and material to that particular charge based on the law that I
have given to you.
During the course of the trial, you heard testimony about certain acts that
were allegedly done to and other injuries allegedly inflicted upon [S.B.] on occasions
prior to September 14, 1999. You must determine those particular incidents individually and
decide whether, in fact, they were inflicted by this defendant.
Evidence like that is inadmissible under our Rules of Evidence to show the
disposition of an individual to commit a certain act. Our Rules of Evidence
specifically state that evidence that a person committed acts on prior or subsequent
occasions is inadmissible, that is, not admissible to prove a person's disposition to
commit the crimes for which she is currently charged. The thought being if
you found, for instance, that she was responsible for the acts prior to
September 14, you cannot then presume because you have found that she may
have been responsible for those acts that automatically means she must have committed
the crime on September 14th.
Therefore, you may not take this evidence and conclude from it that defendant
Breane Blakney is a bad person and, thus, has a disposition which shows
that she is likely to have done the act with which she is
charged, that is, the homicide of [S.B.].
Evidence of other acts may not be used to show a general predisposition
of the defendant to commit a crime. That is not the purpose of
allowing the testimony and it should not be considered by you as such.
So when I said before that each of the charges need to be
dealt with separately, that is what I mean. You cannot say because a
person is guilty of one, that they are then, in fact, guilty of
another charge. They each have to be dealt with separately.
. . . .
Now, one further thing before we conclude. Now, I indicated to you previously
about the fact that there were four different charges in this case and
that they are separate offenses and that they certainly have to be considered
separately and, also, that the finding by you of certain facts having to
do with one particular charge do not necessarily mean that they would carry
over to your finding in a second charge; in other words, because someone
may have or you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt one certain charge here does not necessarily mean that this defendant would
have then done all of the others or any one of the others.
Because each of them has to be done separately.
Such testimony is really permitted where the evidence may relate to some other
fact in issue, including motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident or some
other issue.
Here the evidence was admitted because it may bear on the issue of
whether it was the defendant's intent to commit the crime charged and it
may bear on the defendant's assertion that the acts were committed by accident
or by mistake. Whether such testimony is true and whether it does, in
fact, bear on such issues is for you to decide.
. . . .
But what you may not do under the circumstances is to consider such
evidence as indicative of a general disposition of this defendant to commit the
crimes of murder, aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. You may, however, consider such evidence
in its entirety when considering whether Breane Blakney committed the crimes of aggravated
assault, child endangerment or child abuse.
Defendant did not object to this instruction, and when the trial judge asked
whether counsel had "any problem with the charges," defendant's counsel stated "No." Thus,
we must consider whether this instruction was clearly capable of producing an unjust
result. State v. Bunch,
180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004).
"Recognizing the special dangers posed by the conflicting impacts of other-crime evidence [the]
Court has required that when a trial court admits such evidence, the court
must specifically instruct the jury about that evidence's limited relevance." State v. G.S.,
145 N.J. 460, 469 (1996). The Court proceeded to admonish that "[o]n admission
of other-crime evidence, the court must not only caution against a consideration of
that evidence for improper purposes, it must through specific instruction direct and focus
the jury's attention on the permissible purposes for which the evidence is to
be considered." Id. at 472. Here, the trial judge's instructions to the jury
specifically told them how they may use the N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence by specifically
directing the jury, "what you may not do under the circumstances is to
consider such evidence as indicative of a general disposition of this defendant to
commit the crimes of murder, aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter." Earlier in the charge,
the judge had identified the evidence which constituted the prior bad acts.
These instructions were not confusing or vague as defendant asserts. Furthermore, defendant's claim
that the judge erred by stating she had asserted a defense of accident
or mistake is without merit. As noted earlier, while not specifically using the
term "accident" or "mistake," S.B.'s accidental or mistaken death at the hands of
defendant was clearly implied. Therefore, the judge's instruction that the N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence
"may bear on the issue of whether it was the defendant's intent to
commit the crime charged and it may bear on the defendant's assertion that
the acts were committed by accident or by mistake," did not constitute error,
let alone plain error, requiring the reversal of the murder conviction. Finally, while
the trial judge did not specifically instruct the jury that the prior evidence
of abuse may also be considered to rebut a claim of recklessness, we
note that if such an instruction had been given, it would have been
as a result of the State's proffer to admit the evidence to rebut
a claim of recklessness. During the charge conference the prosecutor specifically advised the
court that the State introduced the evidence to prove "specific intent and to
rebut the inference of accident or mistake" on the murder charge and requested,
without objection, that the jury be so instructed. Throughout the trial, the theme
advanced by the defense was that S.B. was not killed "on purpose" or
"[I]t is done out of frustration. That is the trigger that makes it
happen." Thus, it was the defense that introduced the theory of reckless conduct
to the jury, presumably to rebut the State's claim of purposeful conduct. The
trial court's response to this contention was a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of aggravated manslaughter. State v. Savage,
172 N.J. 374, 396. "Evidence
tending to establish defendant's state of mind while the victim was in [her]
custody sheds light on whether the injuries were incurred either purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly and would be extremely helpful to the jury in its fact-finding mission."
State v. Sanders,
320 N.J. Super. 574, 592 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd
163 N.J. 2 (2000). Therefore, we find no error in the trial judge's instructions
regarding the limited purpose for which prior abuse evidence could be considered.
Defendant argues that she was deprived of a fair trial due to the prosecutor's trial tactics, which defendant claims grossly exceeded the bounds of propriety. This point was not raised below and defendant did not object to any of the comments.
In assessing whether prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal, a reviewing court must determine whether the conduct "was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999) (citing State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322 (1987), cert. denied, sub nom, Ramseur v. Beyer, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S. Ct. 2433, 124 L. Ed.2d 653 (1993); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 262 (1956)). This determination is reached by considering such factors as: (1) whether defense counsel made a timely objection, and if so, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly; (2) whether the trial judge ordered the remarks stricken; (3) whether the judge instructed the jury to disregard them; (4) whether the remarks constituted legitimate inferences from the facts; and (5) whether the remarks went beyond the facts before the jury. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23; State v. Perry, 65 N.J. 45, 47-48 (1974); State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 103 (1972); State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043, 89 S. Ct. 673, 21 L. Ed.2d 593 (1969).
In State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed.2d 89 (2001), the Court acknowledged:
Criminal trials are emotionally charged proceedings. A prosecutor is not expected to conduct himself in a manner appropriate to a lecture hall. He is entitled to be forceful and graphic in his summation to the jury, so long as he confines himself to fair comments on the evidence presented.
[Id. at 587 (quoting State v. DiPaglia,
64 N.J. 288, 305 (1974) (Clifford,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).]
Likewise, we have acknowledged that "[a] criminal trial is a swiftly moving dramatic
contest which often evokes strong emotions in the participants." State v. Marks,
201 N.J. Super. 514, 534 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting State v. Bucanis,
26 N.J. 45, 56 (1958), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 910,
78 S. Ct. 1157,
2 L. Ed.2d 1160 (1958)), certif. denied,
102 N.J. 393 (1986). "It is,
thus, unreasonable to expect that criminal trials will be conducted without some show
of feelings." Ibid.
Defendant’s counsel failed to object to any of the purportedly improper statements made
by the prosecutor during summation or during examination of the witnesses. However, defendant
argues on appeal that the aggregation of these improprieties raises them to egregious
prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. To support this position, defendant cites to State v.
Sherman,
230 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1988) and State v. Pindale,
249 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied
142 N.J. 449 (1995).
In Sherman, supra, we reversed the defendant's convictions because an examination of the
prosecutor's summation revealed blatant attacks on defense counsel. 230 N.J. Super. at 16-17.
We concluded, “[b]y the vehemence of his attack the assistant prosecutor converted the
proceedings from a trial of issues by which a fact-finder may weigh the
evidence fairly into a vehicle for exacting personal revenge upon defense counsel.” Id.
at 19.
Similarly in Pindale, supra, we held that the prosecutor’s improper comments constituted an
attempt to impugn the integrity of the defense counsel and thus impute guilt
to the defendant. 249 N.J. Super. at 286. Further, the prosecutor suggested to
the jury that there was an impropriety in affording defendant his rights and
gave the jury a “not doing your job” warning, which we noted “as
[historically] among the most egregious forms of prosecutorial misconduct.” Ibid. (citations omitted). However,
of greatest significance was our ultimate holding:
Although, in the absence of objection by defense counsel, the excesses of the
prosecutor might be considered harmless error and insufficient to qualify as plain error
amounting to a miscarriage of justice under the law, when coupled with the
admission of the evidence of defendant’s conduct after the collision, which we find
was improperly admitted especially without any limiting instruction, the aggregate of those errors
clearly warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions of aggravated manslaughter.
[Id. at 286-87 (citation omitted).]
An analysis of the prosecutor's conduct here does not require the results reached
in Sherman and Pindale.
Defendant first alleges that during his summation, the prosecutor made the following remarks
designed to inflame the jury:
You don't have the luxury of looking at these photographs and feeling the
sorrow and the anger and rage that I feel when I look at
them, and if during the course of this trial I let those feelings
out because I yelled too loud or because I threw a doll into
that seat, forgive me. Every once in awhile I can't remain distant anymore.
It just gets the better of you. So I'm sorry if I offended
you.
What I suggest is most offensive are these injuries here. The cuticle of
the big toe. Not these two puncture marks down here. But these right
here. These injuries had to have been purposely inflicted. Doctor Perez said this
injury was caused by pinching, it is consistent -- Strike that. It is
consistent with pinching.
You take a -- You take that tiny foot, you grab it underneath
by the sole and you jab your thumb into the cuticle, you are
going to leave marks on the cuticle and right there from the fingers.
Why the hell would you do that to a child? Why?
Because you're frustrated? Because you don't want to be a mother anymore? I
mean, what is most repulsive about this entire case is that we are
confronted with the notion that a mother can do this to her child.
We are repulsed by that. Motherhood, a more noble avocation you can't find.
It is 24/7, all the time. And if you are a single parent,
it is worse. It is far worse because you don't even have anybody
that you can go to and say: Time out. I need some help.
But there are -- there are thousands and millions of single parents of
-- Stay-at-home parents face the same problems, but at least when the spouses
come home they have the opportunity for a break.
But they don't kill their children. They don't burn them. They don't throw
them into car seats. They don't grab them by the ears and twist
them. They don't punch them in the head or on top of the
head. They don't slap them. They don't do that.
She did. And I suggest to you that there is nothing special or
nothing so unusual about her situation that gives her the right to take
her frustrations out on her child. Nothing.
That is life. Which is why being a single parent is tough. But
we don't have a rash of single parents killing their children, now, do
we?
I'm done. I could probably go on for, go on to lunch, maybe
longer, but I can't look at these photos anymore. I just can't.
Defendant claims that these remarks served no legitimate purpose and were