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N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2), a second degree offense, pursuant to a plea agreement. He appeals from the denial of his suppression motion and his sentence. We affirm. "> Original Wordprocessor Version (NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3549-07T43549-07T4 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DIRON WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Submitted November 12, 2009 - Decided Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 06-07-1614. Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alison Perrone, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Luis A. Valentin, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patricia B. Quelch, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Diron Wright pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (count three); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count four); and resisting arrest, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003). "An officer does not need a warrant to make [an investigatory] stop if it is based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126-27 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). "[Reasonable suspicion requires] some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 511. An "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch" is insufficient. State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 357 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490

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U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). The 'articulable reasons' or 'particularized suspicion' of criminal activity must be based upon the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of circumstances with which he is faced. Such observations are those that, in view of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonabl[y] warrant the limited intrusion upon the individual's freedom. [State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986)]. In assessing the weight of the information known to the police, the first factor to be considered is its source. A tip from an anonymous source, standing alone, "seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity[.]" Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L. Ed.2d 254, 260 (2000) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415, 110, L. Ed.2d 301, 308 (1990)). In contrast, a known informant's "reputation can be assessed and [he/she] can be held responsible if [his/her] allegations turn out to be fabricated." Ibid.; see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L. Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972). It is significant that the source here was an informant who was known personally to Detective Nuccio and who had provided information that led to convictions in the past. The level of detail in the information provided is also a significant factor as the details afford police the ability to evaluate the information through independent corroboration. As the analysis turns on the totality of the circumstances, more information will generally be required to establish reasonable suspicion where the source has a "relatively low degree of reliability," such as an anonymous tip, than is required if the source is more reliable. See Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. at 127. The level of tested reliability and detailed information in this case is strikingly similar to that in State v. Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. 552 (2006), where a reliable informant provided a defendant's name, the make, model and license of his car, a description of a bag containing drugs and the time defendant would be leaving his home. The Supreme Court found that these facts, corroborated by police observation, constituted reasonable suspicion that justified an investigative stop of defendant. Id. at 562. Facts that might seem innocent when viewed in isolation can sustain a finding of reasonable suspicion when considered in the aggregate, so long as the officer maintains an objectively reasonable belief that the collective circumstances are consistent with criminal conduct. [Ibid. (quoting Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 511).] See also State in Interest of A.R., 216 N.J. Super. 280 (App. Div. 1987) (tip from reliable informant of imminent criminal activity coupled with suspects' presence in high-narcotic-activity area justified stop of suspects).

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In contrast, the vagueness of the informant's tip in State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452 (1999) was evident. The informant advised police that a black male standing in front of a multi-unit apartment building was wanted on an outstanding warrant. The apartment building was located in a predominantly African-American community. No distinguishing characteristics such as height, weight or clothing were provided. Because this information could "theoretically [be used to] conduct wide-ranging seizures on the basis of vague general descriptions," id. at 460, the tip was too vague to justify an investigative stop. Under these circumstances, the inability to independently evaluate the informant's knowledge and veracity rendered the source of the information no more reliable than an anonymous tip. See, e.g., J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at 271-72, 120 S. Ct. at 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261 (finding no reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory stop based on uncorroborated tip from anonymous caller that young black male standing at bus stop and wearing plaid shirt was carrying gun); Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. at 121-25, 131 (finding that police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory stop based on anonymous phone tip describing drug couriers expected to arrive at bus terminal because tip was solely corroborated by "innocent details of defendant's appearance" at terminal). The facts provided by the informant here did not suffer from such vagueness. The informant identified defendant by name, place of employment, residence, and the type and color of vehicle that he drove. That the informant had access to details personal to defendant was evident from his knowledge that defendant's plans for the evening included the innocent and mundane chore of taking his son for a haircut. The informant also advised that defendant would travel to Bergh Street to "set up shop" to sell drugs. Moreover, as in Birkenmeier, the police were able to corroborate all of these facts. It was as defendant arrived at Bergh Street that they initiated the investigative stop. At that point, the police had corroborated every detail of the information short of an actual drug sale. In sum, the totality of the circumstances facing the police officers here included the knowledge that a search warrant at defendant's residence had resulted in the recovery of drugs in the past; facts provided by the informant regarding defendant's ongoing drug activity as well as the location of such activity and defendant's plan to sell drugs that evening; and the officers' corroboration of defendant's anticipated movements prior to defendant's arrival on Bergh Street. These facts and the rational inferences to be drawn from them constituted articulable reasons to support objective justification for making the stop. See Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 511; Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 504; Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. at 127-28 ("[C]ourts have found no constitutional violation when there has been independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer's predictions[.]"). We need not address whether the information could have justified any further investigative conduct in light of defendant's conduct when the police effected a stop of the cab. Defendant's flight added weight to the already
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existing, reasonable articulable suspicion. See State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 26 (2004); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 281 (1998). Additional police action was warranted based upon his flight and conduct in discarding items, including a scale with a white powdery residue, as he fled from the police presence. Defendant's attempt to disassociate himself from the scale upon the arrival of the police supports a rational inference that the scale, a device commonly used in weighing drugs for distribution, was not possessed for any innocent reason. These facts provided compelling corroboration for the informant's statement that defendant was en route to a residence on Bergh Street with a quantity of cocaine to "set up shop" and sell the cocaine. The totality of the circumstances, including the details provided by the informant, the corroboration provided through surveillance and investigation and defendant's conduct at the scene constituted probable cause to arrest defendant. Therefore, the motion to suppress was properly denied. Defendant was sentenced pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement. He acknowledges that he was eligible for sentencing to an extended term for his second drug offense, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966). State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998). Defendant did not have a constitutional right to jump out of the cab and run "even though a judge [might] later determine the stop was unsupported by reasonable and articulable suspicion." State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 458, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1078, 127 S. Ct. 740, 166 L. Ed.2d 563 (2006). The constitutional protection afforded to a defendant following an invalid stop is the suppression of evidence seized in the absence of subsequent facts that would justify such a seizure. State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 11 (2007); Crawley, supra, 187 N.J. at 458. (continued) (continued) 13 A-3549-07T4 February 22, 2010 0x01 graphic

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