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(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3317-09T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERIC D. DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
February 20, 2013
Submitted September 19, 2012 - Decided
Before Judges Graves and Espinosa.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
Indictment No. 08-12-1096.
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Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Daniel Brown,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore J. Romankow, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent
(Travis H. Carter, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from his conviction for second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, and his sentence. We
affirm.
The events underlying this offense occurred on August 12 and 13, 2008 at the home of defendant's former
girlfriend, Tanya  Reeves.  Defendant  and  Reeves  had  lived together in Linden for a period   of  time.   After
their relationship ended, Reeves moved to another apartment on the same street with her son    in    August
2008. Reeves testified that, when they broke up, she made it clear    to defendant that she wanted    nothing
to do with him anymore. However, when she moved, she took clothing defendant had left behind with her
to  give him  an  opportunity to  retrieve it. Her arrangement with him  was that "he was   to    call    the   police
officer when he needed his belongings and they would escort him to [her] home to pick them up."
On August 12,  2008, defendant arrived at Reeves's residence in the    evening and rang   the    doorbell.
Reeves spotted him through her window blinds, but she did not answer the door. Reeves had not allowed
defendant  into  her  house  since  she  had  moved  and  was  afraid  to  let  him  into  the  house   because  he
appeared  "[a]  little  disturbed."  After  defendant  came  back  several  times,  Reeves  asked him  what he
wanted. He said he needed some things to wear. Reeves prepared a bag of his clothes and threw it out the
window.
The next morning,  August  13,  2008, at approximately  7:20, Reeves  was in her    bedroom   with  her
friend, John Hendricks. As the two prepared for work, Reeves opened the    bedroom    door,    which    had been
cracked  open, and  saw defendant  standing  right at the bedroom door. When defendant  saw there  was
another  man  there,  he  started  calling  Reeves  names,  such  as  a  "stinking  bitch[.]"  Defendant  struck
Hendricks  once  and  Reeves  once  or  twice,  knocking  Reeves  to  the  floor,  where she  "tussle[d]" with
defendant.  Reeves  yelled to  her  son to  get her  neighbor, Jacyn  McPhail,  a Linden police officer.  Before
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McPhail arrived, defendant asked Reeves to return a chain and a ring he had given to her while they were
dating.  Reeves  testified  that  she  "voluntarily"  returned  the  jewelry  to  prevent  the  situation  from
"elevat[ing]" further.
Officer  McPhail  testified  that  at  approximately                                                                    7  a.m.,  he  was  awakened  by  "loud  banging and
screaming"  coming  from  Reeves's  apartment,  which  was  attached  to  his  unit.  He  heard  a woman
screaming, "get off me, get off me, stop." McPhail instructed his wife to call  911. McPhail got    dressed in
street clothes and placed his police badge around his neck. As he was getting dressed, his doorbell began
to ring and he could hear Reeves's son yelling. He answered the door and Reeves's son directed him toward
Reeves's open apartment door.
When McPhail entered Reeves's unit, defendant had Reeves pinned against a wall. He held her up against
the wall with his left hand  around her  throat and  his right arm was drawn back "like  he was going  to
punch" her. Hendricks was "kind of in between them trying to shield [] Reeves from [defendant.]" McPhail
drew his duty weapon and yelled "Linden police." He told defendant to let Reeves go and get on the floor.
Defendant "smirked," looked at McPhail and said, "fuck that, fuck you." When he did not   release Reeves,
McPhail "rushed [defendant] and put him in a compliance hold down on the floor[.]" McPhail got on top of
him but defendant was "still very angry" and "still trying to get up and peel [McPhail's]   hands away    from
holding him down."
After  another  officer  arrived,  McPhail  had  an  opportunity  to  inspect  the  house. He  discovered  that   the
screen  on the basement window on Reeves's side  of the apartment was off and the window  was   open.
Among the items in defendant's possession at the time of his arrest were a diamond ring and a diamond
necklace, items  consistent with the description of items  Reeves  reported  defendant had  taken    from  her.
Photographs were taken of bruises Reeves had sustained on her arm and neck.
After being advised of his Miranda1  rights, defendant  gave a statement to Linden Police   Detective
Andrew  Spano.  Although  there  were  discrepancies  between  his  statement  and  the  version  of events
provided by Reeves, defendant admitted the following: He went to Reeves's home on the evening of August
12 and the morning of August  13,  2008. When he returned in the morning, he knew there    was a man    in
Reeves's bedroom. He kicked in Reeves's basement window. Although he knew his    belongings   were in the
basement, he  proceeded up two flights of stairs to  Reeves's bedroom on the second floor. Once  in   the
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bedroom, he called Reeves a "[b]itch" and a "sloppy pussy hoe[.]" He demanded that Reeves remove the
jewelry she was wearing, including the engagement ring he had given her. Defendant stated that Hendricks
jumped up from Reeves's bed and went to grab Reeves. Defendant responded by "mush[ing]" Hendricks
and "push[ing] him back on the bed." Defendant stated that when Reeves then "came at" him, his "anger
got the best" of him and he hit her. Hendricks "jump[ed] up" and defendant hit him too. Defendant stated
further  that  McPhail  was wearing a tee  shirt and  jeans,  did  not have a badge  on, and did  not  identify
himself as a police officer when he arrived. Defendant stated that McPhail only identified himself as a police
officer after pinning defendant on the bed.
Prior to defendant's testimony at trial, the court held a hearing pursuant to State v. Sands,  76 N.J. 127
(1978).  Over defendant's objection,  the court  ruled that  on cross-examination the State could   introduce
sanitized  versions  of  defendant's  four  most  recent  criminal  convictions:  two  third-degree drug  offenses
which occurred in  1992 and  2001, respectively, and for which defendant received four-year sentences; a
second-degree  robbery  conviction  in  1997,  which  resulted  in  another  four-year  sentence;  and  a  third-
degree  aggravated  assault  conviction  in                                                                           2002,  for  which  defendant  was  sentenced  to  three  years.
Defendant's pre-1992 convictions, a 1987 conviction for third-degree criminal trespass; 1988 convictions for
burglary, terroristic threats, and violating parole; 1989 convictions for criminal trespass and violating parole;
and  a                                                                                                                1990  conviction  for  third-degree  possession  of  a  controlled  dangerous  substance; were  ruled
inadmissible.
Defendant testified that he went to Reeves's apartment twice in an effort to retrieve his belongings, which
he described as "[e]verything [he] ever owned[,]" including his elderly mother's insurance and burial papers
and "pictures and stuff of [his deceased] father[.]" On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he had
four prior convictions, three third-degree offenses and  one  second-degree offense, for which he served
three four-year sentences and one three-year term.
At sentencing, the trial court found aggravating factors  (3) (risk    that defendant will    commit   another
offense);  (6)  (the seriousness  of defendant's prior record); and  (9)  (need to  deter  defendant   and   others
from violating the law). N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1(a).  The court  found no mitigating  factors. The court    sentenced
defendant to a seven-year term, with an  85% parole disqualifier under the No Early    Release Act (NERA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, a three-year period of parole supervision, and imposed appropriate fines and penalties.
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Defendant raises the following issues in this appeal:
POINT I
THE  ADMITTANCE  INTO  EVIDENCE  OF  [DEFENDANT'S]  REMOTE  CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
[DEFENDANT'S] RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
POINT II
THE  PROSECUTOR  IMPROPERLY  COMMENTED  ON                                        [DEFENDANT'S]  POST-
ARREST   SILENCE,   THEREBY   VIOLATING   HIS   RIGHT   AGAINST   SELF-
INCRIMINATION AND DEPRIVING HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL (NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT III
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN SUMMATION DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF    A
FAIR TRIAL (NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT IV
THE JURY'S GUILTY VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
(NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT V
CUMULATIVE  ERRORS  DENIED  []  DEFENDANT  THE  RIGHT  TO  A FAIR  TRIAL
(NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT VI
THE  TRIAL  COURT  IMPOSED  A  MANIFESTLY  EXCESSIVE  SENTENCE  ON
[DEFENDANT] (NOT RAISED BELOW)
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We are unpersuaded by any of defendant's arguments.
In Point I, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in permitting the State to question him
about two of his four most recent convictions because the convictions, one in 1992 and one in 1997, were
"patently remote." He does not contend that the court erred in permitting evidence regarding his 2001 and
2002 convictions for third-degree offenses.
N.J.R.E.  609  provides,  in pertinent part,  that  "[f]or  the purpose of affecting  the credibility   of  any
witness, the witness' conviction of a crime shall be admitted unless excluded by the judge as remote or for
other  causes."  The  rule  affords  the  trial  judge  discretion  to  admit  a  prior  conviction for  impeachment
purposes  "'despite  the  obvious  prejudice  that  flows  from  such  evidence,  particularly  for a  criminal
defendant.'" State  v. Harris,  209  N.J.                                                                              431,  442  (2012)  (quoting State  v. Hamilton,  193  N.J.   255,  256
(2008)).  Generally, evidence  of prior convictions "should be  admitted  and  the burden of proof    to    justify
exclusion rests on the defendant." Ibid.
Although remoteness is the key to exclusion under N.J.R.E. 609, it "cannot ordinarily be determined
by the passage  of time alone." Sands, supra,  76 N.J.  at  144.  Rather, as the trial judge noted here, an
important consideration is whether the defendant  witness has "intervening  convictions between  the   past
conviction and the crime for which the defendant is being tried." Id. at 145. The Sands Court explained,
When a defendant has an extensive prior criminal record, indicating that he has
contempt for the bounds of behavior placed on all citizens, his burden should be
a heavy one in attempting to exclude all such evidence. A jury has the    right to
weigh whether one who repeatedly refuses to comply with society's rules is more
likely  to  ignore  the  oath  requiring  veracity  on  the  witness  stand  than  a law
abiding citizen. If a person has been convicted of a series of crimes through the
years,  then  conviction  of  the  earliest  crime,  although  committed  many years
before, as well as intervening convictions, should be admissible.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
Defendant's  criminal  history  presents  an  example  of  the  principle  articulated in Sands.  The                  1992 drug
offense was committed in April 1992, while defendant was on parole for a prior 1990 drug conviction. After
defendant was paroled in April  1994, he committed second-degree robbery in    March    1997.    Then, after he
was released in April  2000, he committed a drug offense in  2001 and aggravated assault in  2002.    Thus,
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although defendant is correct that the 1992 conviction occurred seventeen years prior to the his trial in the
case at bar, the trial judge correctly found that defendant executed a "regular and continuous    course of"
criminal conduct,  such that  his earliest and  intervening convictions were admissible.  We  are   satisfied   the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in reaching this conclusion.
The issues raised in Points II through VI are raised for the first time on appeal. This court does not
entertain exceptions raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009); State v.
Summers, 176 N.J. 306, 316 (2003); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). Our review
is therefore limited to "a search for plain error, Rule 2:10-2[,]" State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504, 516 (2006),
that  is, error "sufficient  to  raise a reasonable doubt as to  whether  [the error] led the   jury   to    a   result   it
otherwise might not have reached." State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004).
In  Points  II  and  III,  defendant  argues  that  a  comment  made  by  the  prosecutor  in  summation
constituted  an  improper  comment  on  his  right  to  remain  silent  and  also  requires reversal  because  it
improperly shifted the burden of proof to him. We are satisfied that these arguments lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond these limited comments.
The defense to the burglary charge was that, although defendant was in Reeves's apartment, he did
not enter the apartment with the intention to  commit an  offense. See N.J.S.A.  2C:18-2. The challenged
prosecutor's  statement  was  part  of  her  argument  that  defendant  entered  Reeves's  apartment  with  the
intent to assault Reeves, "not to get his belongings back," as he argued at trial. To support that claim, the
prosecutor stated,
[E]vidence of the fact that [defendant] was not there to get his own belongings
is  the  testimony  of  Officer  McPhail.  Officer  McPhail  said  he  came into  the
bedroom and he saw the defendant with his hand on the victim's throat and he
had his gun drawn. He pointed the gun at the defendant, a loaded weapon. Did
defendant stop and say  -- I'm just here to get my belongings back. I'm in    the
right. I -- I don't -- no. . .                                                                                                  . Is this a man who was there to get his [belongings]
back? I don't think so.
"'[A] defendant is under no obligation to volunteer to the authorities at the first opportunity the exculpatory
story  he  later  tells  at  his  trial  and  cannot  be  penalized  directly  or  indirectly  if he  does   not.'" State  v.
Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 115 (1976)). As a result, the
prosecutor may not use a defendant's silence at trial "when that silence arises at or near the time of arrest,
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during  official  interrogation,  or  while  in  police custody." Id.  at                                                 569  (internal  quotation  marks omitted).
However,  "a  defendant's  pre-arrest  silence  can  be  used  for  impeachment  purposes  (1)  'if  that  silence
significantly' preceded his arrest and did not arise in a custodial or interrogation setting,'   and (2)   if    a jury
could infer that  a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have come forward   and   spoken."
State v. Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 455 (2008) (quoting Muhammad, supra, 182 N.J. at 571-72).
In  this  case,  defendant's  failure  to  announce  his  exculpatory  motive  did  not  occur  in  a custodial  or
interrogation setting. It  might  be  inferred that  a reasonable person found in Reeves's apartment under
other  circumstances  would  explain  to  McPhail  upon  his  arrival  that  he  was  present  for a  non-criminal
purpose. However, when McPhail arrived, defendant was in the process of attacking Reeves, rendering such
a disclaimer essentially futile. Defendant was arrested shortly thereafter.
Although  the  circumstances  here  did  not  warrant  the  use  of  defendant's  failure to  announce  his
purportedly  lawful  motive  for  entering  the  apartment,  we  are  mindful  that  "not  every  prosecutorial
misstatement warrants a new trial." State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 312 (2008). This is especially true where a
defendant fails to object to a challenged statement "and thus deprives the trial judge of the opportunity to
ameliorate any perceived errors[.]" Ibid.
In this  case,  the prosecutor's comment was a fleeting reference to  defendant's failure to  volunteer  his
purportedly  lawful  motive  for  entering  the  apartment.  In  light  of  the  facts  that  defendant  did  give a
statement  to  the  police  and  testified  at  trial,  the  comment  did  not  suggest  that  the  jury should  infer
defendant's guilt because he exercised his right to remain silent. Rather, the comment was surgically limited
to the issue raised by defendant's trial strategy  -- whether or not he had the    intent    to commit   an offense
when he entered the apartment.2
Moreover,  the  evidence  of  defendant's  guilt  was  compelling.  The  testimony  of  his victim  was
corroborated by that of McPhail, who had to wrestle defendant to the ground to subdue him.    Defendant
admitted kicking in the basement window to gain entry, bypassing his possessions in the basement to go up
two  flights  of  stairs  to  Reeves's  bedroom,  where  he  knew  she  was  with another  man.  And,  defendant
admitted  striking  Reeves  and  Hendricks.  We  are  therefore  satisfied  that  any  error  in  the prosecutor's
comment was harmless.
In challenging his sentence, defendant argues that the trial court's finding of aggravating factors was
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not supported by credible evidence. He does not, however, explain why the aggravating factors found by
the trial judge do not apply. He also does not argue that the trial judge erred in finding that no mitigating
factors apply.
The standard of review applied to the court's sentencing decision is one of deference. "[A]s long as
the trial court  properly identifies  and  balances  aggravating and  mitigating  factors that are supported  by
competent credible evidence in the record[,]" we will not disturb the sentence. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J.
210, 215 (1989).
Defendant  was forty years old  at the time of this  offense. He  had  an  extensive  criminal record,
which, as the sentencing judge observed, included seven prior State prison sentences, eight violations of
parole, and six violations of probation. Although the sentencing judge could have given    a more expansive
qualitative analysis  of defendant's record, there is ample support for the judge's  findings  regarding the
aggravating factors here. The judge did not fail to consider any mitigating factor that was supported by the
record.  It  is  possible  "in  the  context  of  this  record  to  extrapolate  without  great difficulty  the  court's
reasoning."  State  v. Bieniek,  200  N.J.  601,                                                                           609  (2010)  (quoting State  v. Pillot,  115  N.J.   558,  565-66
(1989)). We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence.
Defendants remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).
2 Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's reference to his silence impermissibly    shifted the    burden    of
proof to defendant to disprove his intent. Specifically, he asserts that the prosecutor "suggested that the
jury should reject [defendant's] claim of right defense because the defense [had] not proven it." We discern
no rational basis for this argument in the prosecutor's challenged comment.
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