SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has
been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the
reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not
have been summarized).
(NOTE: This is a companion case to State v. B.H also decided today. )
Argued September 28, 2004 -- Decided April 13, 2005
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This case, like its companion, State v. B.H., decided today, concerns battered woman syndrome and how it may be used by a defendant claiming a duress defense under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9.
Joanne Brennan was employed as a tax collector for the City of South
Amboy for almost twenty-five years. She was accused of stealing more than $250,000
from her employer between January 1996 and December 2001. Allegedly, Brennan pocketed cash
payments of taxes made by homeowners. On June 5, 2002, in a statement
to investigators from the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, Brennan admitted to the theft.
She told investigators that she deposited some of the money in an account
with the Raritan Bay Federal Credit Union, but that she sent most of
the stolen money to her thirty-eight year old son, Francis, who lived in
Florida, because he had been blackmailing and harassing her for years. Brennan was
indicted for official misconduct and theft by failure to make proper disposition of
property received.
The defense retained Dr. Chester Trent to conduct a forensic psychiatric evaluation of
Brennan. She told Dr. Trent that she acquiesced to Francis’s demands for money
because he made her fear for her life and because she was afraid
that he would tell her husband that she had been sending money to
him. Brennan claimed that Francis had been terrorizing her for years, describing him
as a “difficult” child who had begun hitting her when he was a
freshman in high school. Brennan’s husband threw Francis out of the house when
he was sixteen. He quit school, got involved with drugs, and was incarcerated
for attempted robbery of a convenience store. After he was released, Francis returned
home where he continued to physically and verbally abuse his mother. Brennan obtained
a restraining order, fifteen or sixteen years prior to this current indictment. Francis
moved to Florida and lived there for more than fourteen years.
Brennan informed Dr. Trent that while in Florida, Francis would constantly call her
at her home and at work, demanding money. She described the harassing calls
as relentless and vulgar. When he came to New Jersey, Francis would seek
Brennan out and assault her. Brennan described Francis as a “stalker” and claimed
that it was because of his persistent abusive behavior that she acquiesced to
his demands for money. Brennan told Dr. Trent that she obtained money from
her savings, through credit card cash advances, and by embezzling from her employer.
She often wrote the word “duress” on the memo line of the checks
she sent to Francis.
Dr. Trent concluded that Brennan’s history and situation meet the requirements for categorization
as a battered woman. His conclusion was based on her relationship with her
son and her description of a few incidents of abuse by her husband
that she said took place at the beginning of her marriage. Dr. Trent
submitted his report to the court. The defense notified the State of its
intent to raise the defenses of necessity and duress based on this report.
The State filed a notice of motion to bar the psychiatric testimony in
support of both defenses. Relying on the Appellate Division opinion in State v.
B.H., the trial court held that the expert witness testimony was admissible to
support the duress defense, but barred its use in connection with the defense
of necessity. The State moved for leave to appeal before the Appellate Division,
which was granted.
The Supreme Court granted the State’s motion for direct certification.
HELD: As held in State v. B.H., in light of the particular requirements
of the duress statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9, courts must apply the standard of a
‘person of reasonable firmness” in determining whether duress excuses criminal conduct, and battered
woman syndrome expert testimony is not relevant to that analysis. Battered woman syndrome
evidence is relevant to a defendant’s subjective perception of a threat from her
abuser and, in that respect, can be relevant to her credibility. Such evidence
also aids the jury in explaining why the defendant would remain with her
abuser and, therefore, why she should not be perceived as acting recklessly.
Because of the Court’s decision in State v. B.H. affirming with modification the
Appellate Division decision in that matter, the order of the trial court is
VACATED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
The court should analyze anew all issues about Brennan’s duress defense in light
of B.H.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’S opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOANNE BRENNAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 28, 2004 – Decided April 13, 2005
On certification to the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County.
Simon Louis Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Bruce J. Kaplan,
Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney).
Steven D. Altman argued the cause for respondent (Benedict and Altman, attorneys; Mr.
Altman and Sue E. Young, on the brief).
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like its companion, State v. B.H., ___ N.J. ___ (2005), decided
today, concerns battered woman syndrome and how it may be used by a
defendant claiming a duress defense under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9. Briefly, we summarize the facts
and procedural posture of this appeal.
Joanne Brennan was employed as the tax collector for the City of South
Amboy for almost twenty-five years. Brennan was accused of stealing from her employer
more than $250,000 between January 1996 and December 2001. Allegedly Brennan pocketed cash
payments of taxes made by homeowners.
On June 5, 2002, in a statement to investigators from the Middlesex County
Prosecutor’s Office, Brennan admitted to the theft. She told the investigators that she
deposited some of the funds in an account with the Raritan Bay Federal
Credit Union, but that she sent most of the purloined funds to her
thirty-eight year old son, Francis, who lived in Florida, because he had been
blackmailing and harassing her for years. She was indicted for official misconduct, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, and theft by failure to make proper disposition of
property received, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-9.
The defense retained Dr. Chester L. Trent to conduct a forensic psychiatric evaluation
of Brennan. Brennan told Dr. Trent that she acquiesced to her son’s demands
for money because Francis made her fear for her life and because she
was afraid that he would tell her husband that she had been sending
money to him. She stated that Francis had been terrorizing her for years.
She described him as a “difficult” child who had begun striking her when
he was a freshman in high school. By the time he was sixteen,
Brennan’s husband threw him out of their home because his behavior was uncontrollable.
Francis quit high school, got involved with drugs, and drifted from job to
job until he was incarcerated for attempting to rob a convenience store. Upon
his release, Francis returned home to live with his parents. Because he persisted
in attacking his mother physically and verbally,
Brennan
obtained a restraining order. She
told Dr. Trent that she obtained the order approximately fifteen or sixteen years
earlier and, therefore, could not recall its specific details. Francis moved to Florida
once she got the restraining order and he has resided there for more
than fourteen years.
While in Florida, Francis would telephone his mother at her home and job
to demand money. The harassing calls were described as relentless and vulgar. When
Francis traveled to New Jersey for visits, he would seek her out and
assault her. Brennan described Francis as a “stalker” and claimed that it was
because of his persistent abusive behavior that she acquiesced to his demands for
money. Brennan told Dr. Trent that she obtained money for Francis from her
personal savings, through credit card cash advances, and by embezzling from her employer.
She often wrote the word “duress” on the memo line of the checks
she sent to Francis.
After conducting several interviews with Brennan and her family, Dr. Trent concluded that
her “history and situation fully meet the requirements for her being categorized as
a battered woman, a victim of physical and psychological abuse on repeated occasions
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights.” Dr. Trent cited our decision
in State v. Kelly,
97 N.J. 178 (1984), as well as Lenore Walker’s
1980 treatise The Battered Woman. His conclusion was based on Brennan’s relationship with
Francis and her description of a few incidents of abuse by her husband
that she said took place at the beginning of their marriage. In a
psychiatric report submitted to the court pre-trial, Dr. Trent opined that “the psychological
impact of being battered can cause women in many instances to feel trapped,
demoralized and unable to deal with their abusive coercive relationships except by submission
or compliance to the man’s demands, in this case, for money.” The defense
notified the State of its intent to raise the defenses of necessity and
duress based on Dr. Trent’s report.
The State filed a notice of motion to bar the psychiatric testimony in
support of both of these defenses. Relying on the Appellate Division’s decision in
State v. B.H.,
364 N.J. Super. 171 (2003), the trial court held that
the expert witness testimony was admissible to support the duress defense, but barred
its use in connection
with
a defense of necessity. The State moved for
leave to appeal, which was granted, and then moved for direct certification, which
we granted. State v. Brennan,
180 N.J. 446 (2004).
Because of our decision in B.H. affirming with modification the Appellate Division decision
in that matter, supra, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at 38-40), we vacate
the order of the trial court below and remand for further proceedings. The
court should analyze anew all issues about defendant’s duress defense in light of
B.H.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-16 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOANNE BRENNAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED April 13, 2005
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
CHECKLIST