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(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6279-07T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSE F. RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
December 8, 2009
Submitted September 30, 2009 - Decided
Before Judges Carchman, Parrillo and Lihotz.
On  appeal  from  Superior  Court  of  New  Jersey,  Law  Division,  Morris  County,
Indictment No. 06-05-0688.
Yvonne  Smith  Segars,  Public  Defender,  attorney  for  appellant                    (Gregory  P.
Jordan, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).
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Robert  A.  Bianchi,  Morris  County  Prosecutor,  attorney  for  respondent                                            (John
McNamara, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jose F. Rodriguez, along with co-defendants Alexis Martinez, Salvador Augustine, and Johanny
Guzman were charged under Morris County Indictment No.  06-05-0688 with third-degree possession of    a
controlled dangerous substance  (CDS), N.J.S.A.  2C:35-10a(1) (count one); first-degree possession of CDS
with intent to distribute (cocaine), N.J.S.A.  2C:35-5a(1), b(1) (count two); first-degree distribution    of    CDS,
N.J.S.A.                                                                                                                2C:35-5a(1)  and  N.J.S.A.  2C:35-5b(1)  (count three); and  second-degree conspiracy  to  possess
CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count four).
On October 20, 2006, co-defendant Salvador Augustine entered a guilty plea to first-degree distribution of
CDS.  Pursuant  to  the  plea  agreement,  Augustine  was  to  testify  truthfully  against  his co-defendants  in
exchange for a recommendation that he be sentenced as a second-degree offender, N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1f(2),
and receive a seven-and-a-half year term of imprisonment with a thirty-month period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant was tried with co-defendant Martinez. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty
on all counts. The court sentenced defendant to a four-year flat term of incarceration on count one, to run
concurrently to the sentence imposed on counts two, three and four; twelve years with a six- year period of
parole ineligibility on counts two and three, to run concurrently; and a seven-year flat term on count four,
to run concurrently to the sentence imposed on counts one, two, and three. Applicable fines and penalties
were imposed.
Appellant presents the following points on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
POINT II
THE  DEFENDANT  WAS  INDUCED  TO  COMMIT  THIS  OFFENSE  BY  A  POLICE
OFFICER WHICH CREATED A SUBSTANTIAL RISK THAT THE OFFENSE WOULD
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BE COMMITTED BY THE DEFENDANT RATHER THAN ONE WHO WAS READY TO
COMMIT IT; THE  DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS A DIRECT RESULT THEREOF.
(NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
THE  TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO  EVIDENCE THE  RESULTS OF
THE LAB TESTS WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY.
POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT GIVING THE JURY
A CLAWANS CHARGE.
POINT V
THERE  WAS A DISCOVERY  VIOLATION RELATING  TO THE  TESTIMONY THAT
THE  DEFENDANT  INDICATED TO THE  UNDERCOVER  OFFICER THAT  THE    CDS
WAS IN THE PACKAGE HE WAS HOLDING; THE TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN PERMITTED.1
POINT VI
IT  WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR  FOR THE  TRIAL COURT TO DENY DEFENDANT'S
MOTION  FOR  A  JUDGMENT  OF  ACQUITTAL  PURSUANT  TO RULE  3:18  AND
MOTION  FOR  A  NEW  TRIAL  PURSUANT  TO  RULE                                    3:20  AS  THERE  WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A CONVICTION.
POINT VII
THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERRED  IN  ALLOWING  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  REMARKS
DURING   HIS   SUMMATION  WHICH   WERE   IMPROPER   AND   DENIED  THE
DEFENDANT  A  FAIR  TRIAL;  A  REVERSAL  IS  WARRANTED.                           (NOT  RAISED
BELOW).
POINT VIII
THE  SENTENCE  IMPOSED  WAS  MANIFESTLY  EXCESSIVE  AND  SHOULD  BE
REDUCED.
POINT IX
THE    COURT    ERRED    IN    DENYING    DEFENDANT'S    MOTION    FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF HIS SENTENCE.
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After consideration of these arguments, review of the record, and applicable law, we affirm.
I.
On  April  1,  2005, the Morris  County Prosecutor's Office conducted an  undercover    narcotics   investigation.
Detective Earl Harrison Dillard, a detective working in the Special Enforcement Unit, met with a cooperating
witness,  Gregory  Fiorino, who agreed to  assist the police with a narcotics investigation.  Fiorino   informed
Dillard  he  had  previously  purchased  cocaine  from  an  individual,  identified  as  "Alex,"  who  was  in  the
business of distributing large quantities of cocaine. Fiorino believed he could arrange to introduce Dillard to
Alex for the purchase of a kilo of cocaine. Fiorino called Alex from his cell  phone. Dillard recorded  the
conversation.  The  deal  was  arranged  as  follows:  Dillard  and  Fiorino  would  purchase  and split  a  kilo  of
cocaine, with Dillard paying $12,000 for his half. The transaction was set to take place in the parking lot of
T.G.I. Friday's restaurant in Roxbury. Alex would be accompanied by "Sal" and "Van, or Vanilla."
Dillard held a pre-operational briefing  with approximately twenty officers  and  detectives. He  laid   out  the
operational plan and informed each officer of his responsibility. During the course of the meeting, Dillard
provided electronic equipment to assist the team and created a "take down" signal. It was established that
Fiorino would introduce Dillard, who would engage the parties in drug-related conversation and purchase
the  cocaine.  The  $12,000  was  placed  in  a  secure  location  in  the  event  Alex  asked to  see  the  money.
However, the transaction was not to be completed: Dillard planned to negotiate the transaction, ensure the
parties had the drugs, then give the take down signal, and call in the assisting officers.
Around  8:30 p.m., Fiorino placed a second call to determine Alex's location. Alex    revealed    he was coming
over the George Washington Bridge. Dillard did not record the call. Shortly thereafter, Dillard and his team
left to go to T.G.I. Friday's.
Dillard  instructed  Fiorino  to  place  another  call  to  Alex  at  approximately                                     9:30  p.m.  Around  10:00  p.m.,
Fiorino received a call from Alex stating he had exited Route 80 and was looking for T.G.I. Friday's. Fifteen
minutes later, Alex called Fiorino stating he had arrived.
As Dillard instructed, Fiorino greeted Alex and his associates, then returned to Dillard    and the    two   walked
toward Alex's  car, a Mitsubishi Montero.  Five individuals were inside the car. Martinez was sitting  in   the
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driver's seat, defendant in the front passenger seat, and Augustine sat in the rear passenger seat with two
women.
Fiorino introduced Dillard to the individuals, and they engaged in casual   conversation. Dillard    asked
about  the cocaine, and  Augustine reached  between  his legs  and  retrieved a black  plastic   bag,  which  he
then handed to defendant. The contents of the bag were not visible, so Dillard squeezed the bag to ensure
the object was consistent with a powdery substance and about the size of a kilo. Once Dillard was confident
the drugs were in the bag, he  dropped  the bag  onto defendant's lap, stepped back from the car, and
pretended to make a call to get the money.
After a few minutes, Martinez asked Fiorino if he would take the bag. Dillard testified, "[i]t seemed to
me that  [Martinez] wanted to get  . . . the cocaine out of his vehicle." At   that point, Dillard    gave    the    take
down signal. The arrest team came in and took Fiorino, along with the occupants of the Mitsubishi, into
custody. To maintain his cover, Dillard was also "arrested."
While  Dillard  was  being  led  away  by  Sergeant  Mike  Rogers,  he  told  Rogers  the drugs  were  inside  the
Mitsubishi in a black plastic bag. Rogers went to the car, recovered the bag and examined its contents. He
then took the black  bag  to  special enforcement headquarters  and  examined  its  contents    a   second   time.
Rogers observed  the black  plastic bag  contained two separate plastic bags  that held the   cocaine.   Based
upon the appearance, smell of the white powdery substance, and a chemical field    test, Rogers    confirmed
the bag, in fact, contained cocaine.
Rogers submitted the substance to  the New Jersey State Police for forensic examination. At  trial,   Lowell
Mark, a forensic chemist employed by the New Jersey State Police, was qualified as an expert    in    forensic
chemistry and related that his testing revealed the bag contained 1,005 grams of cocaine, a little more than
a kilogram.
Captain  Jeffrey  Paul,  of  the  Morris  County  Prosecutor's  Office,  was  qualified  as  an  expert  witness  in
narcotics investigation. Paul testified the amount of cocaine recovered had an estimated wholesale value of
between  $25,000  and  $32,000.  He  further  testified the amount of cocaine at issue   "would   be   consistent
with possession with intent [to distribute] versus personal consumption."
Defendant presented no witnesses. Martinez called Special Agent Miguel Carrera of the United States Drug
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Enforcement  Administration.  Carrera  assisted  the  Morris  County  Prosecutor's  Office  in  the  April  1,  2005
undercover  operation. Carrera  had  interviewed  Augustine at the time of arrest and  obtained his written
statement  in  Spanish.  The  translated  statement  was  entered  into  evidence,  pursuant  to  the parties'
stipulation. Augustine wrote that he was solely responsible for the drug sale, and the others present in the
car had no idea the sale was to occur.
As  rebuttal,  the  State  introduced  that  portion  of  Augustine's  October                                            20,   2006  plea  colloquy  where  he
recanted the written statement previously provided to Carrera. Augustine explained he lied in his original
written statement because he "was scared." On sur-rebuttal, co-defendant Martinez   explained Augustine's
October 20, 2006 statement was made as part of his plea agreement, whereby he was promised favorable
treatment.  The jury  was informed Augustine pled guilty and  was sentenced to    seven-and-one-half  years
imprisonment,  with  a  thirty-month  period  of  parole  ineligibility.  The  trial  judge  instructed the  jury  that
consideration of Augustine's guilty plea and statement were for the purpose    of    determining credibility and
were not evidence of the other defendants' guilt.
The jury found defendant and Martinez guilty on all counts. Thereafter, the court denied defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, which argued the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt defendant knew the bag contained cocaine or that he had possession.
In  imposing  sentence,  the  trial  court  considered  applicable  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration of sentence was denied. This appeal ensued.
II.
Defendant first argues the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the    indictment   because the
State failed  to  present Augustine's  arrest statement to  the grand jury  as exculpatory  evidence.  The   trial
judge denied  the motion, determining  Augustine's  statement was not "clearly exculpatory," and  that    the
State had presented sufficient evidence to make the requisite prima face case against defendant. The court
stated:
[S]ince  all  the  Prosecutor  has  to  do  is  make  out  a  prima  facie  case  the
testimony, to synopsize it, and we can read the transcript into the record, but
there's no need to do so, is that there was an arranged meeting, that when the
meeting took place the vehicle pulled up into a handicapped parking spot. The
detective goes out, he sees five individuals in the vehicle later identified    as the
driver being Mr. Martinez and  the front seat  passenger being  [defendant].   We
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don't really need, for this purpose, to identify who the other passengers were,
but the package which later turned out to be a little over a kilogram of    drugs,
comes from the back seat passenger, it turns out Mr. Augustin[e], to the    front
seat passenger who was [defendant] who has the drugs in his lap, literally.
We agree.
A decision on whether to dismiss an indictment is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be
reversed only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.   State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super.  51, 59  (App.
Div. 1994), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995). An indictment should be dismissed only on the clearest and
plainest ground, where it is manifestly deficient or palpably defective. State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 228-29
(1996)(internal  citations  and  quotations  omitted).  Challenges  to  a  prosecutor's  decision on  instructing  a
grand jury, including what evidence to present, may be challenged when the prosecutor's error is    clearly
capable of producing an  unjust result. State v. Hogan, 336  N.J.  Super. 319,  344  (App.  Div.  2001). This
standard is satisfied upon a showing "that the grand jury would have reached a different result but for the
prosecutor's error." Ibid.
Generally, any defect in a grand jury proceeding affecting the decision to indict is cured or rendered moot
once a jury  convicts,  because a jury  verdict establishes  that  there was probable cause  to    indict. United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942, 89 L. Ed.2d 50, 56  (1986); Warmbrun, supra,
277 N.J. Super. at 60. Nevertheless, we will review defendant's challenge.
Augustine's written statement, made to Special Agent Carrera on April 1, 2005, was as follows:
I Salvador Augustine went to my friends and I asked them that they take me to
NJ. I was going to go to NJ to sell drugs and it was going to be sold for credit. I
brought one (1) kilo of cocaine. My friends did not know about this, only me.
I did this because I did not have work and I had to pay rent and other bills.    I
also had expenses of my family.
This was written by people from the DEA and I dictated it. It was not   done    by
force and was voluntary.
The grand jury  presentment was made  on May  20,  2006. On  October  20,  2006,  Augustine  retracted   his
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statement and testified defendant knew of the plan to sell the kilo of cocaine.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        On Martinez's motion, the court first reviewed the issue of whether the    exculpatory evidence should have
been  presented  on  October                                                                                            20,             2006.  On  February                                                             26,                                                                                                           2008,  defendant  moved  for  dismissal of  the
                                                                                                                                        indictment because Augustine's statement was not presented to the grand jury.
A prosecutor's duty to present exculpatory evidence arises only if the evidence directly negates guilt and is
"clearly  exculpatory."  Hogan,  supra,                                                                                 144  N.J.  at   237.  As  to  the  first  requirement,  "[c]onfining  the
prosecutor's duty to the presentation of evidence that directly negates the    guilt of    the    accused recognizes
that  the sole issue  before  the grand jury  is whether the State has made out a  prima facie case  of the
accused's  guilt." Therefore, this  duty  is not triggered "unless the exculpatory  evidence at issue   squarely
refutes an element of the crime in question." Ibid.  As to  the second requirement, "that the evidence    in
question be 'clearly exculpatory,'" the quality and reliability of the evidence must be evaluated. Ibid.
In  evaluating  the  quality  and  reliability  of  Augustine's  unsworn  written  statement,  the  motion  judge
determined  the issue  was one  of credibility  and,  therefore, the evidence was not  clearly   exculpatory.    As
stated in Hogan, "the  credible testimony of a reliable, unbiased  alibi  witness that  demonstrates  that    the
accused could not have committed the crime in question would be clearly exculpatory." Id. at 238. That is
not the case here. Certainly, when defendant presented his motion, Augustine's statement about the events
of April 1, 2005 had changed, and his testimony given under oath implicated defendant.
Based  upon  our  review  of  this  record,  we  cannot  state  the  prosecutor's  conduct  was  an  "'intentional
subversion' of the grand jury process." State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 360 (App. Div.) (quoting State
v. Murphy, 110 N.J. 20, 35 (1988)), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1991). Accordingly, we discern no basis to
overturn  the  trial  judge's  reasoned  exercise  of  discretion  in  denying  defendant's  motion to  dismiss   the
indictment.
III.
Defendant's second challenge addresses  the jury  charge. He  argues the trial court  should   have   included
instructions on an entrapment defense. There was no objection to the instruction given by    the    trial    judge
and no request for an entrapment instruction was made. Therefore, our review is guided by the plain error
standard, and  we  will not reverse unless  any  error was clearly  capable of producing  an   unjust  result.  R.
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2:10-2.
In making this determination, the possibility of an unjust result must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon,
57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). With respect to a jury charge, plain error is an impropriety "prejudicially affecting
the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and
to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust    result."
State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930, 90 S. Ct. 2254, 26 L. Ed.2d 797 (1970).
Defendant claims his criminal involvement resulted from police conduct, which induced him to commit   the
offense.  Entrapment  is  recognized  and  defined  in N.J.S.A.                                                         2C:2-12.2  If  a  defendant  proves  by  a
preponderance of the evidence that he was entrapped, he shall be acquitted. N.J.S.A.  2C:2-12b; State v.
Rockholt, 96 N.J. 570, 576-77  (1984). A defendant who intends to rely upon the defense of entrapment
must serve written notice upon the prosecutor, Rule 3:12-1, and allow a determination to be made by the
trier of fact. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12b.
Here,  defendant  gave no notice of the suggested defense,  submitted no evidence  of police   misconduct,
failed to show his conduct was a direct result of police actions, and cannot    establish he was not   ready to
commit the crime, as required by N.J.S.A.  2C:2-12a. His proclamation that "the conduct by    the    police    was
sufficient  to  entrap  the  average  person,"  is  inadequate.  Rockholt,  supra,                                      96  N.J.  at                                 577.  We  reject
defendant's contention that error occurred.
IV.
Defendant  also  urges  reversal  of  his  judgment  of  conviction  asserting  the  State  failed  to  establish  an
uninterrupted chain of custody for the cocaine, admitted as evidentiary exhibit S-15. See State v. Brunson,
132 N.J.  377,  393  (1993)  (stating that  a party  introducing tangible  evidence  has the burden   of  laying   a
proper foundation for its admission). Defendant contends the testimony offered by the State Police forensic
chemist was deficient in proving that the cocaine seized was the same substance tested and introduced at
trial.  We  disagree  and  conclude  defendant's  assertion  lacks  merit. R.                                           2:11-3(e)(2).  We  add  these brief
comments.
Mark reviewed the forensic testing identification numbers on the sealed sample he received from the police,
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which was the same number of the exhibit presented in court. Mark noted the    substance was returned to
the police once testing was complete, and he identified the evidence bag at trial, stating it appeared to be
in  the  same  condition  as  it  was  when  he  last  observed  it.  In  addition  to  Mark's testimony,  the  State
presented Sergeant Rogers, who recovered the bag containing the cocaine from the Mitsubishi at the scene,
examined  it, and  took it  to  his office  for processing. Rogers removed the cocaine from the plastic   bag,
preserved the outer  bag  for future examination, and  field tested the substance,  which confirmed   it    was
cocaine. Rogers placed the cocaine in an evidence bag, which he dated and signed, then    sent    the    bag to
the New Jersey State Police laboratory for forensic testing of its contents. Both officers dated    and signed
the evidence log accompanying the substance when received and returned.
"[T]he  State  is  not  obligated  to  negate  every  possibility  of  substitution  or  change  in  condition  of the
evidence." Brunson, supra, 132 N.J. at  393. "Such evidence generally should be admitted if    the    trial    court
'finds  in  reasonable  probability  that  the  evidence  has  not  been  changed  in  important  respects or  is  in
substantially  the  same  condition  as  when  the  crime  was  committed.'" Id.  at  393-94                             (quoting State  v.
Brown, 99 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 51 N.J. 468 (1968)).
The  trial  testimony  laid  a  proper  foundation  for  the  admission  of  the  plastic  bag  and  the  lab  results
confirming its contents to be cocaine. In addition, the testimony established a "reasonable probability" the
bag  and  its  contents  were  in  the  same  condition  as  they  were  on  the  night  of  April  1,  2005,  further
supporting the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence. Thus, we discern no error, let alone one clearly
capable of producing an unjust result. Defendant's claim is rejected. R. 2:10-2.
V.
Next,  defendant  argued  the  trial  court  erred  by  denying  his  request  for  an  adverse  inference  charge
because the State did not call Fiorino or Augustine as witnesses. See State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 171-72
(1962)  (setting  forth  guidelines  concerning  inferences  that  may  be  drawn  from  a  failure  to produce  a
witness).  Although  the  trial  court  declined  inclusion  of  a Clawans  charge,  it  permitted  defendants to
comment  in  summation  that  neither  Fiorino  nor  Augustine  testified.  Defendant  argues  if  comment  was
permitted, the charge was applicable. State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 128 (1982). We disagree.
Under Clawans, supra, it must be shown that a party had the power to produce the witness at trial and
that the witness' testimony would have been superior to that already utilized in respect of the fact to be
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proved. 38 N.J. at 171; see also State v. Hickman, 204 N.J. Super. 409, 414 (App. Div. 1985) (citing Carter,
supra, 91 N.J. at 127), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 495 (1986). "[W]hen it is more reasonable to infer that the
litigant's decision to  do without the testimony is explained  by factors other  than the litigant's   fear   of  its
content, the inference  is not properly drawn." State v. Velasquez,  391  N.J.  Super.  291,  306  (App.  Div.
2007). Moreover, the failure to call a witness available to both parties poses
a possible inference against both, the questions of the existence and strength of
the  inference  against  either  being  dependent  upon  the  circumstances  of  the
case, including whether one party has superior knowledge of    the    identity of    the
witness  and  what  testimony  might  be  expected  from  him,  as  well  as the
relationship of the witness to the parties.
[Clawans, supra, 38 N.J. at 171-72 (citations omitted).]
The trial court denied defendant's request for a Clawans charge because the witnesses were available to
both parties, not specifically under the control of the State, and the State had presented tactical reasons
not to call either witness. The prosecutor asserted the existence of Augustine's prior inconsistent statements
lessened his effectiveness as a credible witness,  and  Fiorino's  testimony would add  little  to    that    already
provided by Dillard and could raise a significant N.J.R.E. 404(b) issue regarding the witness's past dealings
with Alex, as well as his own criminal activities.
The Supreme Court in State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 178 (1961), held:
A prosecutor may sensibly decide for various reasons not to use evidence which
could advance the State's case. . .                                                                                      . We have suggested enough to demonstrate
the need for discretion in the prosecutor. He does not have a peremptory duty to
use all available evidence  to  support the charge. And surely, if a   court    should
undertake to review the prosecutor's decision in such matters, it must know the
reasons for his decision and  weigh them  against the contribution    the   evidence
could make in the case.
The trial court's analysis of these issues was soundly supported. Additionally, the    court's    decision    to allow
this argument in the defense's summation even though the charge request was denied was proper and not
inconsistent. "'[I]t is one thing for counsel in his summation to point to the absence of particular witnesses;
it is quite another when the court puts the weight of its authority behind such a summation by telling the
jury it may draw an adverse inference from their absence.'" State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 562 (2009) (quoting
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Wild v. Roman, 91 N.J. Super. 410, 415 (App. Div. 1966). Defendant is "entitled to an adequate instruction
on the law[,]" which he received. State v. Pleasant, 313 N.J. Super. 325, 333  (App. Div.  1998),  aff'd, 158
N.J. 149 (1999). There was no error.
VI.
sserts  the  State  violated  its  discovery  obligations.  The  circumstances  surrounding  the  omitted evidence
center on Dillard's trial testimony, which we examine.
with the prosecutor, Dillard described his interaction with defendant:
Q. Can you please describe what happened at that point?
A. After  a general conversation  I basically  inquired  to  where the drugs were,
asking where it was, if they had it.
Q. And in response to that, what did [defendant] do?
A. Well, initially Mr. Augustine reached between his legs and -- we retrieved the
black  -- a black bag and I said, well, can I touch it,    at    which    time    the    males in
the  vehicle  started  talking  in  Spanish  again  and  seconds  later [defendant]
reached over his left shoulder and Mr. Augustine handed him that black plastic
bag. It was a pretty big plastic bag.
Q. And upon receipt, what did [defendant] do with that -- that black plastic bag?
A. He put it on his lap.
Q. What did you do once this black plastic bag was [o]n [defendant's] lap?
A. He  indicated it's in there. I reached  my hands  -- rested my elbows   on   the
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windowsill of the door, reached in and grabbed the    package and squeezed it to
see  what  the  contents  were  and  it  seemed  to  be  consistent with  a  powdery
substance and  about  the size  -- approximate size  of what a kilo would be,    at
which time I put it back into his lap.
No objection was lodged. On cross-examination, when Dillard was asked about what conversations he had
with defendant, he stated: "When he's holding the package he's indicating it's in here, yes, it's in here."
Additional  cross-examination  elicited  Dillard's  acknowledgment  that  he  failed  to  include defendant's
admission in his report prepared immediately after the arrests or mention the statement during   his    grand
jury testimony.
Defendant  argues reversal is warranted because the incriminating statement attributed to    defendant   was
not disclosed by the State prior to trial to allow him "to prepare for trial or to, perhaps  [] accept a plea
offer."  Further,  defendant  contends  at  the  very  least,  "the  trial  should  have  been  adjourned  to   permit
preparation of a rebuttal."
A prosecutor's obligation, with respect to discovery, is set forth in Rule 3:13-3(c), which provides:
The prosecutor shall permit defendant  to  inspect and  copy or photograph  the
following relevant material if not given as part of the discovery package under
section (b):
(2) records of statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, by    the    defendant
or  copies  thereof,  and  a  summary  of  any  admissions  or declarations  against
penal interest made by the defendant that are known to the prosecution but not
recorded[.]
[R. 3:13-3(c)(2).]
The duty to disclose is a continuing one. R. 3:13-3(g). When seeking a reversal of a conviction, due to the
State's alleged  failure to  disclose a defendant’s statement against interest, defendant   must  "demonstrate
manifest injustice due  to  the State’s discovery violation." State v. Harris  (Harris III),  181  N.J.                  391,  519
(2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed.2d 898 (2005).
Defendant relies on State v. Blake, 234 N.J. Super.  166  (App.  Div.  1989), suggesting Dillard's  testimony
was both "a surprise" and crucial to link defendant to the drug transaction. In Blake, supra, the defendant
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was on trial for robbery and elected to testify in his own defense. Id. at 167, 170. The defendant denied he
knew  the  victim  and  stated  he  was  not  at  the  location  of  the  crime. Id.  at  170.  Over  the  defense's
objection, ibid., the State presented a rebuttal witness, the victim's mother, who testified to a conversation
with  the  defendant  wherein  he  admitted  being  at  the  location  and  firing  a  gun in  the  air. Id.  at  172.
Although the State had  the witness' statement prior to  trial, it was not  disclosed. Id. at  171.  This  court
reversed the denial of the defendant's request for mistrial. We determined the discovery violation impacted
the  defendant’s  decision  to  testify  and  concluded  the  State's  "failure  to  disclose  defendant's  alleged
inculpatory statements before he took the stand deprived [the] defendant of a fair trial." Id. at 175.
Unlike Blake, defendant,  in this  matter, did  not object  to  or express surprise at Dillard's testimony. He
neither sought an adjournment nor a mistrial. Defendant's silence deprived the trial court of    the    ability to
implement  curative action to  protect defendant's rights, such as striking  the testimony or   employing   the
other remedies outlined in Rule 3:13-3(g).
A more important distinction between this matter    and Blake is that defendant has not articulated how the
omission altered his trial decisions or strategy. In Blake, supra, the undisclosed admission was utilized after
the defendant testified.  234 N.J. Super. at  170-71. Therefore, the defendant's decision to take the stand
was made without knowledge of all the evidence against him gathered by the State. Ibid. Here, defendant
discloses no similar manifest injustice or even what "different trial strategy would have been employed" had
he had Dillard's statement ahead of time. Harris III, supra, 181 N.J. at  519  (internal citations omitted).    In
fact, the defense later used this evidence to impeach Dillard.
Reversal  of  a  conviction  will  be  granted  only  when  it  is  demonstrated  that  the  trial  error  was  "clearly
capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Defendant has failed to satisfy this standard.
VII.
ext asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, pursuant to Rule 3:18-1, or a new trial,
pursuant to Rule 3:20. Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with    an intent    to distribute   and
conspiracy. He argues the State "failed to prove the possessory counts of the complaint" and that there was
inadequate evidence of a conspiracy. Viewing the State's direct and circumstantial evidence in    its entirety,
and giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we disagree and conclude the    evidence was
sufficient such that "a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge    beyond    a reasonable    doubt."  State v.
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Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967).
"Criminal '[p]ossession signifies intentional control and dominion, the ability to affect physically and care for
the item during a span of time[.]'" State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 597 (1979) (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J.
69, 82  (1975)). To prove conspiracy, the State must show defendant, with the purpose of    facilitating the
commission of a crime, made an agreement with another person to engage in conduct constituting a crime.
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2.
The uncontroverted evidence  showed the police, with the aid of a cooperating witness,   arranged   for   the
purchase of a kilo of cocaine. Defendant,  along with the co-defendants,  traveled from  New  York   to    New
Jersey and  arrived on the date  and  at the designated meeting  spot  for the narcotics   transaction.  In  the
vehicle  was  a  kilo  of  cocaine.  Defendant  was  present  during  conversations  that  expressly  discussed
inspection of and payment for the CDS. At Dillard's request, defendant held the bag of cocaine for Dillard's
inspection. Taken together, it was reasonable for the jury to infer from these facts defendant, together with
the co-defendants, intended to take part in a significant drug transaction. We determine that, based on the
evidence presented, the facts "coalesce sufficiently to enable a rational jury to infer beyond    a reasonable
doubt knowledge and  control on the part  of defendant  justifying  his convictions for the crimes of  .  . .
possession with an intent to distribute[.]" Brown, supra, 80 N.J. at  599. It is not fatal to the State's   case
that  other  possible explanations  of defendant's conduct could be  argued  or that  the evidence  failed to
"exclude every other conceivable hypothesis except guilt." Ibid.
Turning  to  his  request  for  a  new  trial,  defendant  alleges  relief  was  warranted  due  to  prosecutorial
misconduct during summation. In support of this claim, defendant cites four improper references.
The first remark relates to the prosecutor's reference to the amount of cocaine recovered, as follows:
First,  there's testimony before  you, and  there's no real  dispute  that  this    is,   in
fact,  cocaine.  That's  a  quantity  approximately  seven  times  more  than it  is
necessary for the State to prove here in this case. You    will    hear testimony   that
the State will show that it's five ounces or more. That bag contains more than
seven times the amount of cocaine necessary.
Defendant claims the statements "were an attempt on the part of the prosecutor to, with irrelevant
information, overwhelm the jury making the implication that [he] was guilty because of the sheer amount
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of cocaine" and to display the prosecutor's belief of defendant's guilt.
Second, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's recitation that three distinct people, defendant,
Martinez and Augustine arrived at T.G.I. Friday's, which he maintains is a fact not in evidence, as Dillard
testified five people were in the vehicle when it pulled into T.G.I. Friday's.
Next, defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly vouched for Dillard's credibility by referring to
Dillard's experience as a trained detective. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
Okay, ladies and gentlemen, this is a situation where you    have    a trained police
officer see the package in the hands of the defendants. This is not a situation
where there's a dead body and a gun sitting next to the    body and you    need    to
find out who touched that gun. We have a trained detective who's had six years
in narcotics who saw who touched the gun.
I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that is all you need.
In a related comment, the prosecutor stated:
Ladies and gentlemen, you heard from Detective Dillard and while you deliberate
it will be your job to determine Detective Dillard's credibility. The    State submits
that his credibility is unassailable.
It is unclear whether any of these comments evoked objection. During the State's summation, defendant
requested  a  sidebar,  which  was  not  recorded.  Therefore,  we  review  defendant's  claims to  determine
whether the alleged "misconduct . . . was so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State
v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322 (1987).
Prosecutors  must be  "afforded considerable  leeway in closing  arguments  as long  as their    comments  are
reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 82  (1999) (citing
Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 559). It is expected that the State's summation should be "vigorous and forceful"
but tempered by a prosecutor's primary duty "to see that justice is done." Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, in our review, we "must take into account the tenor
of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties." Harris, supra,
141 N.J. at 559.
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hese standards, we reject defendant's contentions of alleged misconduct. First, the amount of a controlled
substance relates to the offense of possession with intent to distribute. State v. Zapata, 297 N.J. Super.
160,                                                                                                                        178  (App.  Div.   1997), certif.  denied,                                                                                156  N.J.   405  (1998).  Therefore,  the  prosecutor's remarks
regarding the quantum of cocaine were not improper. The second example, suggesting the State offered
facts not in evidence, lacks merit. R. 2-11-3(e)(2). It was never disputed that five individuals were present
in the car  -- three of whom were men, as Fiorino stated. Finally, although a prosecutor may not offer a
personal opinion, as to a particular witness's veracity    or credibility, State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 457-58
(1998), or suggest that police officers are believable due to the nature of their office, Frost, supra, 158 N.J.
at  85,  the prosecutor's remarks here do not violate  these  principles; rather, they were examples  of  fair
comment on the evidence, particularly in light of defendant's attack on Dillard's credibility. Morton, supra,
155 N.J. at 457-58; State v. Perry, 65 N.J. 45, 48 (1974); State v. Di Paglia, 64 N.J. 288, 297 (1974).
defendant was not denied a fair trial. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied his request for a new trial.
VIII.
Finally, defendant advances two arguments to support his claim that his    sentence   was excessive. Our role
in  reviewing  the  trial  judge's  sentence  is  a  limited  one.  "[A]n  appellate  court  should not  substitute   its
judgment for that of the lower court, and  . . . a sentence imposed by a trial court is not   to be upset    on
appeal unless it represents an abuse of the lower court's    discretion." State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 516
(1989).  However, "'appellate courts  are expected to  exercise  a vigorous and  close  review for abuses  of
discretion by the trial courts.'" State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180  (2009)  (quoting State v. Jarbath, 114
N.J.                                                                                                                        394,               401  (1989)).  When  the  judge  has  followed  the  sentencing  guidelines,  and  his  findings  of
aggravating  and  mitigating  factors  are  supported  by  the  record,  we  will  only  reverse if  the  sentence
"shock[s] the judicial conscience" in light of the particular facts of the case. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-
65 (1984).
In imposing  an  aggregate  sentence of twelve years with a six-year period  of parole  ineligibility,  the   trial
judge properly elevated the offense to first-degree, based on the quantity of CDS involved. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5a(1). Also, the judge properly found applicable aggravating factors one  (the    nature    and circumstances of
the offense), N.J.S.A.  2C:44-1a(1); seven  (defendant  committed the offense, pursuant  to  an agreement
that he either pay or be paid for the commission of the offense and the pecuniary incentive    was beyond
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that inherent in the offense itself), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(7); and nine (the need to deter defendant and others
from violating the law), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9). The court provided the factual basis supporting application of
factor one, determining "[o]ne kilogram of cocaine can be cut so many times that literally hundreds of lives
could have been or would have been affected had these drugs hit the street." In applying factor seven, the
court  noted  the drugs were to  be  sold,  and  the need for deterrence is easily  inferred from the court's
comments.
Mitigating  factor  seven, N.J.S.A.                                                                                  2C:44-1b(7),  was  also  applicable  as  this  was  defendant's  first
conviction.  On  appeal,  defendant  suggests  additional  mitigating  facts  should  have  been  considered.
However, these assertions are unsupported and must be rejected.
The trial court found the aggravating factors preponderated over the mitigating factor, see N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6b; State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 290-91 (1987), and the sentence was properly within the statutory range
for the offenses. State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 387-89 (1989); Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 362-64. We discern
no basis for modification, as the trial judge correctly exercised his broad discretion and did not impose a
sentence that shocks the judicial conscience. Roth, supra, 95 N.J. at 364-66.
Additionally,  defendant  argues  fundamental  fairness  alone  requires  a  reduction  in  his  period  of parole
ineligibility. He compares his six-year parole ineligibility period on a twelve- year sentence to that imposed
on co-defendant Martinez, who received a period of approximately six years, eight months and twenty-one
days before being parole eligible on his twenty-year sentence. Defendant argues this disparity of treatment
requires his period of parole ineligibility be shortened.
"'A sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant's
sentence is lighter.'" State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232 (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021, 117 S. Ct. 540, 136 L. Ed.2d 424 (1996). Although a sentence imposed upon a
defendant may fall within the mandatory statutory limits, "there is an obvious sense of unfairness in having
disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators." Roach, supra, 146 N.J. at 232 (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Thus, the question to be determined by an appellate court "is whether the disparity
is justifiable or unjustifiable." Id. at 233. We have no basis to interfere with the sentence imposed.
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Affirmed.
1 Defendant suggests this claim was partially raised below. Our review of the record reveals defendant
made no mention of a discovery violation at trial and raises the argument for the first time on appeal.
2 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12a provides:
A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such
an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official
perpetuates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result,
causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it.
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