Preview:

a0142-04.opn.html

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b, upon Melvin Parker and/or Katherine Forcellini for an incident allegedly occurring on September 6, 2002 (Count One); fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b, for violating an order restraining him from contact with Forcellini for an incident allegedly occurring on October 7, 2002 (Count Three); and fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10b, for the same incident (Count Four)."> Original Wordprocessor Version (NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) Original Wordprocessor Version

This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*. (NOTE: The status of this decision is unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0142-04T30142-04T3 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARK E. TOMPKINS, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________________

Submitted March 27, 2006 - Decided April 26, 2006 Before Judges Lintner and Parrillo. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, 03-06-0164. Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Andrew J. Shaw, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the brief). J. Patrick Barnes, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sean M. Foxe, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM On April 1, 2003, a Hunterdon County Grand Jury returned an indictment, No. 03-04-00081, charging defendant, Mark E. Tompkins, with third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b, upon Melvin Parker and/or Katherine Forcellini for an incident allegedly occurring on September 6, 2002 (Count One); fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b, for violating an order restraining him from contact with Forcellini for an incident allegedly
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

occurring on October 7, 2002 (Count Three); and fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10b, for the same incident (Count Four). On June 17, 2003, a Hunterdon County Grand Jury returned a second indictment, No. 03-06-00164, charging defendant with third-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10c (Count One), and fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9a (Count Two), arising out of an April 20, 2003, incident with Forcellini. On November 14, 2003, the court granted the State's unopposed motion to join the two indictments for the purpose of trial. A jury trial commenced on January 26, 2004. During trial, the judge dismissed the contempt and stalking charges in the earlier indictment. He also downgraded the stalking charge in the later indictment to a petty disorderly persons harassment, as well as the contempt charge in the same indictment to a disorderly persons offense. On January 29, 2004, the jury found defendant guilty of third-degree terroristic threats. The judge found defendant guilty of the disorderly persons contempt for violating a November 7, 2002, Final Restaining Order (FRO). The judge imposed 494 days time served in the county jail for the terroristic threats conviction and a concurrent sentence of three months on the contempt conviction. Appropriate penalties and fines were assessed. Defendant appeals and we affirm. Defendant and Katherine Forcellini were romantically involved from 1996 through April 2000, during which time they lived together at Forcellini's home in Lambertville. They also have a daughter, M., born on June 1, 1998. Forcellini has custody of M. and initially permitted defendant to visit her approximately every other weekend. In early 2002, Forcellini began a romantic relationship with Melvin Parker, during which time he lived with Forcellini at her home. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on September 6, 2002, while outside Charles Tiffany's home in New Hope, Pennsylvania, defendant used his cell phone to call Forcellini, allegedly to arrange a time to visit with M. the following day. He testified that it was his practice to leave a message on the answering machine at 1:00 a.m. to ask to see M. Defendant called five or six times, and hung up each time when Parker answered. Parker informed Forcellini that defendant was calling and asked her if she would like to speak with him, but she declined. As a result, Parker turned off the ringer on the telephone. Defendant then left two or three "angry" messages on the answering machine, during which he said, "pick up the phone you bald-headed mother fucker," referring to Parker. Parker complied, and defendant told Parker that he had a gun, that he had killed before, and that he was coming over to kill Parker and Forcellini. Parker then told defendant he was going to call the police and hung up the phone. Parker awoke Forcellini and called the police.

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

Although Parker did not know the location from which defendant had placed the call, defendant lived in Lambertville. As they waited for the police to arrive, Forcellini and Parker listened to the initial messages, as well as additional messages that defendant had left after Parker called the police, which were calmer. Forcellini began to cry because, according to Parker, she was "terrified of [defendant]." Both Forcellini and Parker identified defendant's voice on the messages and believed defendant would come to Forcellini's home. Defendant admitted at trial that it was his voice on the messages, but denied threatening to kill Parker or Forcellini. Also at trial, Parker testified that defendant "probably had been drinking." Lambertville Police Officer Sharon Polyak arrived less than two minutes after Parker's call. She listened to defendant's messages on the answering machine and recorded them as evidence. Polyak testified that both Parker and Forcellini seemed "very upset." The incident also awoke Charles Tiffany, who was sleeping with his windows open. He called 911 and reported to Hunterdon County Communications that someone was screaming obscenities and threatening somebody's life on a cell phone out on the street. He's uh, carrying on like a lunatic. .... At least once threatened. Whoever he's screaming at he said he's killed people before, and he could do it again. He's, some argument over a daughter. And he's been going on, and on, and on. I think he should be calmed down. Tiffany testified that he called the police because I thought that whoever he was talking to was in trouble, I mean, it was very clear that he was very angry and his language and the things he was saying was pretty frightening and I was afraid for whoever was on the other end of the phone. New Hope Police Officer Robert Forbes arrived and spoke to defendant, who denied making any threats. According to Forbes, defendant appeared "somewhat agitated" and he "got the distinct impression that [defendant] had been drinking" because "[h]e was somewhat unsteady on his feet [and] seemed to be using [his] bicycle for support." At Forbes' suggestion that defendant return home and cease using his phone until he got home, defendant left. Tiffany also gave a statement to Sergeant Michael O'Rourke at the Lambertville Police Department two days later. Later, on September 6, 2002, O'Rourke arrested defendant pursuant to a warrant and took him to headquarters where defendant was read his Miranda rights. Defendant, however, refused to sign a waiver card. Defendant first denied making any calls to the Forcellini residence, but when O'Rourke informed defendant that he had listened to

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

the messages, defendant admitted calling, but denied making threats and claimed that Parker was lying. He then asked the officer to sign a complaint against Parker, and the officer gave defendant an affidavit, which he completed. O'Rourke then contacted a judge with defendant's complaint, but the judge did not find probable cause to permit the complaint to proceed further. At a Miranda hearing, the trial judge allowed defendant's statement that Parker was lying finding that it was not made in response to a question by the officer. The judge, however, excluded defendant's admission that he called but did not threaten anyone because it was made after defendant was informed by O'Rourke that they were in possession of a tape of the conversation. On October 7, 2002, O'Rourke responded to a call that someone was trespassing in the woods near the old abandoned high school in Lambertville. He noticed an individual, who he later identified as defendant, "trying to see something through the woods . . . he was moving his head around, he was bending and raising up at the waist. It appeared to [O'Rourke] that the person was trying to find a vantage point to view something . . . ." O'Rourke determined that defendant was looking through the woods toward the Forcellini residence at the bottom of the hill. On November 7, 2002, the FRO was entered by default against defendant pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The FRO precluded defendant from the following: (1) committing any future acts of domestic violence; (2) being at Forcellini's residence; (3) having any form of contact or communication; (4) making or causing anyone else to make harassing communications; or (5) stalking, following, or harming Forcellini or Parker. It also precluded defendant from possessing any firearms, firearms ID cards, or purchaser permits and required him to submit to a psychological and substance abuse evaluation, as well as receive professional domestic violence counseling. Defendant was personally served with the FRO on the same day it was issued. On April 20, 2003, at approximately 8:00 p.m., while Forcellini was outside talking to her neighbor, she saw defendant about forty to fifty feet away in the woods behind her home and "crouching and looking" at her and her daughter. She testified, "[t]here was no question" it was him and that she "could see his face." She had just returned from Easter dinner at her former in-laws' home. She went inside to call the police, who arrived within five to ten minutes. Sergeant Robert Brown searched the woods with a flashlight for approximately one hour while Patrolman Weber interviewed Forcellini. Both officers then searched the woods again, which contain various footpaths that are occasionally used by pedestrians, but did not find defendant.

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

The following day, Patrolman Kenneth Housman served defendant with an arrest warrant at defendant's home. Defendant was advised of the charges against him and was read his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged that he understood, but did not waive. Defendant then stated, without being asked a question or prompted, "I can't help it, I went there to see my daughter, man." On appeal, defendant raises the following points: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING SUA SPONTE TO GRANT A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE TERRORISTIC THREATS OFFENSE AND THE CONTEMPT OFFENSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A CONVICTION FOR EITHER OFFENSE. (NOT RAISED BELOW.) II. THE JURY'S VERDICT ON THE TERRORISTIC THREATS OFFENSE AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON THE CONTEMPT OFFENSE WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. (NOT RAISED BELOW.) III. THE DEFENDANT'S DISORDERLY PERSONS CONTEMPT CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AS THE CONDUCT WAS DE MINIMIS AND THERE WAS NO HARM. (NOT RAISED BELOW.) IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE ANSWERING MACHINE MESSAGES BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED. V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE 911 RECORDING TO BE PLAYED FOR THE JURY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED AND WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY. VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY CHARGE THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENDANT'S OUT OF COURT STATEMENTS BEFORE THE JURY DELIBERATED ON THE TERRORISTIC THREATS OFFENSE. (NOT RAISED BELOW.) VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CHARGE THE JURY SUA SPONTE ON THE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN A DEFENSE TO THE TERRORISTIC THREATS OFFENSE. (NOT RAISED BELOW.) In defendant's first two points, he asserts that the judge should have sua sponte (1) entered a judgment of acquittal and (2) vacated his two convictions because there was insufficient evidence to convict. Initially, we note that defendant neither moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case, nor for a new trial following the verdict. The "broad test" for determining a motion to acquit "is whether the evidence at that point is sufficient to warrant a conviction of the charge involved." State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458 (1967). Specifically, the appellate court is constrained to sustain a trial judge's denial of a R. 3:18-1 motion to acquit at the close of the State's case if, "'viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all'" reasonable inferences, "'a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 80 (2002) (quoting Reyes, supra, 50 N.J. at 450).

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

R. 3:20-1 entitles a defendant to move for a new trial to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence following a guilty verdict. It states: The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. . . . The trial judge shall not, however, set aside the verdict of the jury as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law. The object of the new trial motion is to "correct clear error or mistake by the jury." Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969). The trial judge is directed to evaluate the "tangible factors relative to the proofs" and the "intangible 'feel of the case . . . .'" Ibid. In such a review, an appellate court must determine whether a jury could have rationally found that the elements of the crime were presented beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 512 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 476 (1993). Where the jury reaches a verdict based on witness credibility, such a verdict must be upheld absent clear evidence of mistake or prejudice. Ibid. A jury is free to accept or reject the testimony of a witness based on credibility. State v. DiFerdinando, 345 N.J. Super. 382, 399 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002). N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b provides: A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out. The three essential elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) defendant made a threat to kill another person; (2) the threat was made with the purpose to put the person in imminent fear of death under circumstances which reasonably caused the person to believe the threat was immediate; and (3) the threat was made under circumstances that reasonably caused the threatened person to believe it was likely to be carried out. See Smith, supra, 262 N.J. Super. at 516. Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. He asserts that there was no evidence proffered as to the second and third elements. We need not dwell on defendant's assertion to any great extent. The evidence established that the threat was made with the purpose to put the victims in imminent fear of death. Indeed, defendant told Forcellini and Parker that he was coming over with a gun to kill them and that he had killed before. The contents of the threat itself amounted to "words . . . of such a nature as would reasonably convey the menace or fear of death to the ordinary hearer." State v. Nolan, 205 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1985). Equally without merit is defendant's contention that because the threat was made over a cell phone call

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

from New Hope while he had been drinking, a reasonable person would not believe that he intended to carry it out. Defendant lived in Lambertville. New Hope is located just across the Delaware River from Lambertville. Not only did Parker react as if he believed the threat would be carried out, Tiffany was also convinced of its viability, thus causing him to call the police because he was afraid for the person on the other end of the line. We come to the same conclusion respecting the judge's finding on the contempt charge. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 governs contempt and provides: a. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or hinders, obstructs or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing or controversy by a court, administrative body or investigative entity. b. Except as provided below, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1990," P.L. 1991, c. 261 (C. 2C:25-17 et al.) when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense. In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of this act. Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8) and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L. 1991, c. 261 (C. 2C:25-29) shall be excluded from the provisions of this subsection. Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that (1) he knew of the existence of the November FRO and (2) he knowingly violated the provisions of that order. The FRO precluded any form of contact, as well as following and stalking. The proofs established that defendant was personally served with the FRO and that he was about forty to fifty feet away in the woods behind Forcellini's home "crouching and looking" at her and M., thus violating the FRO's restraints against following and stalking. The evidence amply supported the result reached by the jury and trial judge. Moreover, the jury and judge resolved the issues of credibility against defendant. See State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438, 446-47 (1956). The verdict reached by the jury was neither against the weight of the evidence nor did it constitute a manifest denial of justice. Further, the judge's findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). Defendant raises, for the first time on appeal, the contention that the contempt charge should be reversed because any violation was de minimis. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11 provides: The assignment judge may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct: a. Was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negated by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

b. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or c. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense. The assignment judge shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without giving the prosecutor notice and an opportunity to be heard. The prosecutor shall have a right to appeal any such dismissal. Defendant argues that his crouching and looking at M. from the position described in the woods behind Forcellini's home was trivial and no harm was caused. Again, no motion was made before the Assignment Judge to dismiss the contempt charges. Generally, an appellate tribunal need not consider questions not properly presented to a trial court, unless the issue raised concerns a matter of great public interest. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). That being said, we are nonetheless satisfied that the offense was not de minimis when viewed in the context of the underlying circumstances, specifically the type of threats made on September 6, 2002, and the similarity of defendant's October 7, 2002, behavior in the woods behind Forcellini's home that gave rise to the FRO. We see no reason to intervene. Defendant next argues that the trial judge erred by permitting the answering machine and 911 recordings into evidence without proper authentication. He also asserts that the 911 recording was inadmissible hearsay. N.J.R.E. 901 states, "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims." When considering whether a telephone call that has come from a defendant is properly authenticated, the rule requires sufficient evidence to support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims." State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super. 619, 62829 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 132 (1999). It "does not require absolute certainty or conclusive proof." Id. at 628. A "prima facie showing of authenticity" is all that is necessary for admission. Ibid. The jury is then left with the ultimate question of authenticity. Ibid. Authentication can be shown by direct evidence of the identity of the telephone caller by recognition of the caller's voice or through circumstantial evidence. Id. at 628-29. Both the unanswered telephone messages and the 911 tape were played to the jury based upon the representations of the prosecutor, which were accepted by defense counsel that they would be later authenticated. The tape messages were indeed identified as defendant's voice by Forcellini and Parker. Moreover, defendant admitted that the voice on the answering machine was his, and Officer Polyak testified that the messages she recorded using the machine at headquarters were identical to the original messages left on the answering machine. The 911 tape was identified by Tiffany as his voice. Sergeant O'Rourke testified that after he obtained the 911 tape from Bucks County Communication he placed it in the evidence locker. The tape-recorded evidence was sufficiently

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

authenticated. Defendant next argues that playing the 911 tape constituted inadmissible hearsay because it was not properly used to refresh Tiffany's recollection. As we previously pointed out, the 911 tape was played to the jury with defendant's consent subject to it being later authenticated. Defendant now raises, for the first time on appeal, that the proper procedure was not followed under the doctrines of present recollection refreshed or past recollection recorded, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5). Defendant correctly points out that the proper procedure under present recollection refreshed would have been for Tiffany to listen to the tape and then have him testify as to what he heard defendant say, on condition that the taped message refreshed his recollection. See Kazanjian v. Atlas Novelty Co., 34 N.J. Super. 362, 370-71 (App. Div. 1955). N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5) is generally known as past recollection recorded. State v. Hacker, 177 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div.) (discussing prior Evid. R. 63(1)(b)), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 364 (1981). The rule provides that a statement previously made by a witness is admissible (provided it would have been admissible if made by him while testifying) if it: (1) concerns a matter about which the witness has insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately; (2) is contained in a writing made contemporaneously or when the events were fresh in the witness's mind and made for the purpose of recording the statement at the time it was made; and (3) concerns a matter of which the witness had knowledge at the time it was made. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5). The rule also provides that if a witness remembers only part of a writing's contents, "the portion the witness does not remember may be read into evidence but shall not be introduced as an exhibit over objection." Ibid. Again, defendant correctly points out that the conditions precedent for playing the tape under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5) were not present. Ordinarily, trial error, which is induced, encouraged, acquiesced in, or consented to by defense counsel does not form a basis for reversal on appeal. State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 574 (1974) (citing State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457 (1955); State v. Roscus, 16 N.J. 415 (1954)). We are convinced, however, that any error in playing the 911 tape was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Prior to playing the tape, Tiffany testified concerning the statement he made to O'Rourke and that he thought that he recalled that defendant stated that he had people killed. Defendant's next contention, also raised for the first time on appeal, that the jury instructions on defendant's oral statements fell short of the requirements of State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250 (1972), and State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400 (1957), lacks merit. Hampton dealt with out of court inculpatory confessions given to the police, while Kociolek
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

concerned admissions made by the defendant to a third party. Hampton, supra, 61 N.J. at 259-60; Kociolek, supra, 23 N.J. at 421. Neither circumstance is implicated here.

Equally lacking merit is defendant's final contention that the judge should have charged the jury with voluntary intoxication. Self-induced intoxication is a defense to a crime where it negates the intent element of the offense. 104 N.J. 42, 54 (1986). "[T]he intoxication must be of an extremely high level," Cameron, supra, 104 N.J. at 54, and an intoxication instruction is warranted "when the facts 'clearly indicate' a rational basis that the defendant suffered from a 'prostration of faculties' to render him incapable of forming the requisite" intent, State v. Johnson, 309 N.J. Super. 237, 266 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 418-19 (1990)), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 387 (1998). "The mere intake of even large quantities of alcohol will not suffice." State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 495 (1979). Here, the evidence concerning alcohol use came from Officer Forbes' testimony that his impression was that defendant had been drinking because he was somewhat unsteady and leaning on his bicycle for support and Parker's testimony that defendant had probably been drinking. Simply stated, the requisite evidence of intoxication was not present. Affirmed. The indictment contained a typographical error mistakenly stating the statutory reference as 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966). Although the FRO does not mention M. by name, the section relating to visitation mandates, "[p]rior order of the court shall be followed." No prior order, however, is included in the appellate record. Prior to dating defendant, Forcellini was married for seven years. (continued) (continued) 20 A-0142-04T3 April 26, 2006 0x01 graphic

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]

a0142-04.opn.html

This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law - Camden. This archive is a service of Rutgers School of Law - Camden.

file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a0142-04.opn.html[4/20/2013 1:11:15 PM]



Download a0142-04.opn.pdf

New Jersey Law