Find Laws Find Lawyers Free Legal Forms USA State Laws
Laws-info.com » Cases » New Jersey » Appellate Court » 2009 » STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. NORMA JIMENEZ
STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. NORMA JIMENEZ
State: New Jersey
Court: Court of Appeals
Docket No: a4836-06
Case Date: 10/07/2009
Plaintiff: STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Defendant: NORMA JIMENEZ
Preview:a4836-06.opn.html
Original Wordprocessor Version
This case can also be found at *CITE_PENDING*.
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
NOT  FOR  PUBLICATION  WITHOUT  THE
APPROVAL  OF  THE  APPELLATE  DIVISION
SUPERIOR  COURT  OF  NEW  JERSEY
APPELLATE  DIVISION
DOCKET  NO.  A-4836-06T4
STATE  OF  NEW  JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NORMA  JIMENEZ,  a/k/a  VILMA  VELIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted                                                                         September  15,  2009  -  Decided  October  7,  2009
Before  Judges  Fuentes  and  Simonelli.
On  appeal  from  the  Superior  Court  of  New
Jersey,      Law                                                                  Division,  Union    County,
Indictment  No.  02-06-0872.
Yvonne      Smith      Segars,      Public    Defender,
attorney  for  appellant  (William  J.  Sweeney,
Designated  Counsel,  on  the  brief).
Theodore                                                                          J.      Romankow,                                     Union      County
Prosecutor,  attorney  for  respondent  (Sara  B.
Liebman,  Assistant  Prosecutor,  of  counsel
and  on  the  brief).
PER  CURIAM
A  jury  convicted  defendant  of  third -degree  possession  of  a
controlled  dangerous  substance  (CDS)  (cocaine),
N.J.S.A.  2C:35 -7.1  (count  three).
The  trial  judge  merged  count  one  with  count  two  and  sentenced
defendant  to  a  fifteen-year  term  of  imprisonment  with  a  five-
year  period  of  parole  ineligibility,  and  to  a  concurrent  seven -
year      term                                                                    of      imprisonment                                  on      count                                three.        The            judge   also
imposed                                                                           the      appropriate      assessments,                                                             penalties                    and     fees,      and
suspended  defendant's  driver's  license  for  six  months.
On  appeal,  defendant  raises  the  following  contentions:
POINT  I  -  THE  FAILURE  OF  THE  TRIAL  COURT  TO
ORDER  THE  DISCLOSURE  OF  THE  CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT  DENIED  DEFENDANT  A  FAIR  TRIAL.
POINT  II  -  IT  WAS  ERROR  NOT  TO  SUPPRESS  THE
EVIDENCE  SEIZED  FROM  DEFENDANT  AFTER  AN
UNLAWFUL  ARREST  WITHOUT  PROBABLE  CAUSE.
POINT                                                                             III                                                   -                                            DEFENDANT     MARTINEZ'S
                                                                                  EAVESDROPPING      ON                                                                              DEFENDANT'S   TELEPHONE
                                                                                                                                        CONVERSATION      IN      THE      HOLDING                 CELL      IS
                                                                                                                                        TANTAMOUNT  TO  COVERT  COERCION  IN                       VIOLATION
                                                                                                                                        OF  DEFENDANT'S  DUE  PROCESS  RIGHTS                      UNDER  THE
FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT.
(NOT  EXPRESSLY  RAISED  BELOW  EXCEPT  THAT  IF
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
THE      ARREST      WAS    ILLEGAL,      THIS  ALLEGED
STATEMENT  WOULD  BE  POISONOUS  FRUIT)
                                                                                  POINT      IV                               -                                                                         DEFENDANT'S                                          SENTENCE                  WAS
                                                                                  EXCESSIVE.
We  affirm.
The                                                                               following                                   facts                                                                     are                            summarized            from                      the          record.
Detective  Jose  Martinez  of  the  Union  County  Prosecutor's  Office,
a  thirteen  year  veteran  of  the  Narcotics  Strike  Force,  testified
A-4836-06T4
2
that  at  approximately  4:00  p.m.  on  November  1,  2001,  he  received
a  tip  from  a  confidential  informant  whose  previous  tip  to  him
led  to  the  seizure  of  cocaine,  thousands  of  dollars  in  currency
                                                                                                                              and  the  arrest  and  conviction  of  more  than  one  individual.                                                                                                               The
                                                                                                                              informant  disclosed  that  a  cocaine  transaction  would  occur  that
day                                                                               at      approximately                                                                                                 6:30                           p.m.                  at      a      specific                residence   in
Plainfield,                                                                                                                   later      identified                                                                                    as      defendant's                             residence.               The
informant  indicated  that  a  Hispanic  male  driving  a  black  pickup
truck  would  arrive  at  the  residence,  enter  the  driveway  and
deliver  cocaine  to  a  twenty-seven  year  old,  dark-haired  Hispanic
female  named  "Jenny."
After      receiving                                                              this                                        tip,                                                                      Detective                      Martinez,             Sergeant
Steven  Siegel  of  the  Narcotics  Strike  Force,  and  Sergeant  Wayne
Williams,  Detective  Bell  and  Detective  Robert  Henderson  of  the
Plainfield  Police  Department  Narcotics  Unit,  set  up  surveillance
near                                                                              defendant's                                 residence                                                                 to                             corroborate           the      confidential
informant's  information.
Detective  Martinez  testified  that  the  officers  arrived  at
the  scene  at  approximately  5:30  p.m.  in  three  unmarked  police
vehicles.                                                                         Two                                         vehicles                                                                  parked      at      opposite   corners               of                        the
residence  while  Detective  Martinez  drove  the  third  vehicle  back
and  forth  in  front  of  the  residence.                                        At  approximately  6:00
p.m.,  the  detective  saw  a  Hispanic  woman,  later  identified  as
A-4836-06T4
3
defendant,                                                                                                                    approach      an      African-American                                    man                            in                    front      of             her
                                                                                  residence  and  engage  in  conversation.                                                                             The  African-American  man
"was  looking  back  and  forth,  walking  back  and  forth  and  looking
around  as  if  waiting  for  somebody."                                          Defendant  walked  back
toward  the  rear  of  the  driveway,  and  the  African-American  man
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
continued  to  walk  back  and  forth.                                            Defendant  then  walked  from
the  driveway  to  the  front  of  her  residence  and  was  "looking  back
and  forth  as  if  she  was  waiting  for  somebody."
According  to  Detective  Martine,  at  approximately  6:45  p.m.,
he  saw  a  black  pickup  truck  arrive  at  defendant's  residence  and
pull  into  the  driveway.                                                        He  then  saw  a  second  Hispanic  woman
standing  outside  the  pickup  truck  speaking  with  defendant  and
the  African-American  male.                                                      Defendant  then  walked  toward  the
back  of  her  residence  carrying  a  brown  plastic  bag,  which  she
                                                                                  did  not  have  in  her  possession  before  this  interaction.                                                                                                                                                                              The
                                                                                  second  Hispanic  woman  then  climbed  into  the  passenger  side  of
                                                                                  the  pickup  truck  and  the  truck  departed  the  scene,  as  did  the
African-American  man.
Based                                                                             upon      his                                                              training,                                                  education   and                                                                          experience,
                                                                                  Detective  Martinez  concluded  that  the  informant's  information
had      been                                                                     corroborated                                                               and      that      a                                       narcotics   transaction                                                                                had
occurred.                                                                                                                                                    He  radioed  Sergeant  Siegel,  who  then  directed  the
A-4836-06T4
4
other  officers  to  go  to  the  back  of  defendant's  residence  to
detain      her.                                                                                                                                                                                                        Detective                                                                                Lynch         arrived                                                               at      the      scene                            and    saw
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    defendant  in  her  backyard  with  her  back  toward  him  and  her  arms
                                                                                                                                                             up  in  the  air  against  a  wooden  stockade  fence.
                                                                                  Upon                                                                       arriving                                                               at                                                                           the           scene,                                                    Detective                            Martinez                        saw
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    defendant  in  her  backyard  by  the  fence  with  other  officers;
however,                                                                                                                                                     she                                                        did         not                                                                          have          the       brown                                                       plastic                             bag      in          her
possession                                                                                                                                                   and                                                        a           search                                                                       of            the       backyard                                                    did      not                        reveal               it.
Detective                                                                                                                                                    Martinez                                                               then                                                                         went          to        the                                             property                             next                     door   to
                                                                                  defendant's  residence.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                The  property  owner  advised  the  detective
that  defendant  had  been  on  his  property  by  a  tree  next  to  the
fence.                                                                            With  the  owner's  consent,  the  detective  searched  the
area  by  the  tree  and  found  a  black  plastic  bag  containing  two
boxes  of  plastic  baggies,  a  strainer,  a  pair  of  scissors,  a
digital  scale  and  a  white  powdery  substance  in  a  clear  plastic
bag,  which  he  believed  was  cocaine.                                          The  substance  was  later
determined  to  be  cocaine.
Detective  Martinez  then  read  defendant  her  Miranda  rights
in  Spanish.                                                                      Thereafter,  the  officers  escorted  defendant  into
her  residence,  where  Detective  Martinez  again  advised  defendant
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
of  her  Miranda  rights  utilizing  a  Miranda  form  translated  into
Spanish.                                                                          Defendant  read  the  form  aloud  in  Spanish,  initialed
and  acknowledged  her  understanding  of  each  right,  and  signed  the
A-4836-06T4
5
waiver.                                                                           Defendant                                                                                                                            also                                                                         signed                                                                           a      permission                                                           to            search          form
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       translated  into  Spanish,  indicating  her  consent  to  the  search  of
her  bedroom.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       The  search  revealed  nothing  incriminating.
                                                                                  Sergeant                                                     Siegel                                                                  searched                                                                                                                                       the            property                                  next                                            door      on    the
                                                                                                                                               other  side  of  defendant's  residence  with  the  property  owner's
consent.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            His  search  revealed  a  brown  plastic  bag  hanging  over
the                                                                               stockade                                                     fence                                                                   on                                                                           the      neighbor's                                                                                                        side                              near          the             area
defendant  was  standing  when  the  officers  first  encountered  her.
The  bag  contained  a  rectangular  shaped  brick  object  sealed  in
duct  tape  with  a  cut  V  in  the  middle,  containing  a  white  powdery
substance  which  the  officer  believed  was  cocaine.                           The  substance
was  later  determined  to  be  a  kilo  of  cocaine.
Defendant                                                                         was      arrested,                                           transported                                                             to                                                                           the                                                               Plainfield
Police  Department  and  placed  into  a  holding  cell  for  processing.
Defendant                                                                                                                                      made                                                                    a                                                                            telephone                                                                        call                                      from                              the           holding         cell.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Detective  Martinez,  who  had  come  into  the  processing  area  to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       pick  up  a  booking  sheet,  heard  defendant  say  in  Spanish  to  the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       person  to  whom  she  was  speaking  that  "I  got  arrested  on  a  deal
                                                                                  where  I  was  going  to  make  $500.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        I  need  money  to  get  bailed
out."
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     I.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Defendant  contends  that  the  trial  judge's  denial  of  her
motion                                                                            to      disclose                                                                                                                                                                                                  the                                                               confidential                                             informant                                       or        for   an      in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 A-4836-06T4
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    6
camera      voir                                                                                                                               dire                                                                    denied      her                                                              a                                                                 fair           trial.                                    She      argues      the
existence                                                                         of                                                           a                                                                       reasonable                                                                   belief                                                                           that      the      informant      could
identify  the  Black  male,  the  driver  of  the  pickup  truck  and  the
second  Hispanic  female,  and  that  these  individuals  may  provide
information  supporting  an  entrapment  defense.
In  denying  defendant's  motion,  the  trial  judge  concluded
that      it      was                                                             mere                                                         speculation                                                             that                                                                         the      informant                                                possessed
knowledge  of  the  identity  of  the  other  individuals  or  could
provide  additional  information  essential  to  defendant's  defense.
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
We  review  the  denial  of  defendant's  motion  under  an  abuse  of
discretion  standard.                                                             State  v.  Milligan,
71  N.J.  373,  384  (1976)
(citing  Roviaro  v.  United  States,
353  U.S.  53,  56,  61  n.9,
77  S.
Ct.  623,  628  n.9,
1  L.  Ed.  2d  639,  642,  645  n.9  (1957).
"Under  most  circumstances,  .  .  .  an  informer's  identity
will  be  kept  secret  and  will  not  be  revealed  for  insignificant
State  v.  Foreshaw,
245  N.J.  Super.  166,
or  transient  reasons."
181  (App.  Div.),  certif.  denied,
126  N.J.  327  (1991)  (citations
omitted).                                                                         Disclosure  is  required  "where  the  defendant  can  show
that  the  testimony  of  the  informer  is  essential  to  preparing  his
defense  or  to  assuring  a  fair  determination  of  the  issues."
State  v.  Milligan,
71  N.J.  373,  390  (1976).                                                      To  satisfy  this
requirement,  the  defendant  must  provide  "[s]omething  more  than
speculation[,]"  and  courts  "should  not  honor  frivolous  demands
A-4836-06T4
7
for  information  on  unsubstantiated  allegations  of  need."                    Id.  at
393.
Disclosure                                                                        is                                                            also                                                        required                                                                  where                                       the              identity   of          the
informer  has  already  been  otherwise  disclosed,  N.J.R.E.  516,  or
"where  the  informer  is  an  active  participant  in  the  crime  for
which  the  defendant  is  prosecuted,  where  a  defense  of  entrapment
seems  reasonably  plausible,  or  where  disclosure  is  mandated  by
                                                                                                                                                fundamental  principles  of  fairness  of  the  accused."                                                                                                                                                                            Foreshaw,
supra,
                                                                                                                                                245  N.J.  Super.  at  180-81  (citations  omitted).                                                                                                                                                                      However,
"'absent                                                                          a                                                             strong                                                      showing                                                                                                               of      need,    courts     generally                          deny
                                                                                                                                                                                                            disclosure  where  the  informer  plays  only  a  marginal  role,  such
as                                                                                providing                                                     information                                                                                                                                                                       or      'tips'   to         the         police                 or
participating                                                                                                                                   in                                                          the                                                                       preliminary                                                  stages     of          a          criminal
investigation.'"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Id.  at  181  (quoting  Milligan,  supra,
71  N.J.
at  387-89  (footnote  omitted)).
Based  upon  our  review  of  the  record,  we  are  satisfied  that
defendant  failed  to  justify  disclosure  of  the  identity  of  the
confidential  informant.                                                          Defendant's  claim  that  disclosure  is
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
essential                                                                         to                                           assure                                                            a                     fair      determination         of          the            issues     is
grounded  on  her  speculation  that  the  informant  knew  the  identity
of  the  other  individuals  Detective  Martinez  saw.                            To  be  sure,
the  informant  never  mentioned  these  individuals  in  his  call  to
Detective  Martinez.
A-4836-06T4
8
                                                                                  Additionally,                                                                                                  there                 is        no                    evidence                              that      the      informant
participated                                                                                                                                                                                     in      defendant's                                   criminal    activity,                 contacted
defendant,                                                                                                                     accompanied                                                                             the       police,               or          participated              in                             the
search.                                                                                                                        The                                                               informant             merely                          played      a              marginal   role                                 by
providing  information  about  his  or  her  personal  knowledge  of
defendant's  criminal  activity.                                                  Milligan,  supra,
71  N.J.  at  387;
Foreshaw,  supra,
245  N.J.  Super.  at  181  (citations  omitted).
II.
Defendant  next  contends  that  the  judge  erred  in  denying  her
motion  to  suppress  evidence,  arguing  that  the  informant's  tip
did  not  establish  probable  cause  for  the  police  to  arrest  her
and  search  her  residence.                                                      The  trial  judge  denied  the  motion,
concluding  that  an  anticipatory  warrant  was  not  required  because
the  transaction  was  not  a  controlled  delivery,  and  because  the
confidential  informant's  tip  alone  did  not  establish  probable
cause.1      The  judge  also  found  the  confidential  informant  reliable
and  concluded  that  the  information  he  or  she  provided,  coupled
with  the  police  officers'  observations  at  defendant's  residence,
established  probable  cause  to  arrest  defendant  and  search  her
residence.                                                                        Citing  State  v.  Burgos,
185  N.J.  Super.  424  (App.
1
Defendant  did  not  address  the  anticipatory  warrant  issue  in
her  merits  brief.                                                               The  issue  therefore  is  deemed  waived.
Pressler,  Current  N.J.  Court  Rules,  comment  4  on  R.  2:6-2
(2008).
A-4836-06T4
9  Div.                                                                           1982),                                       the                                                               judge                 further   concluded      that   defendant                  had
                                                                                                                               abandoned  the  narcotics  for  search  and  seizure  purposes.
                                                                                  Our      review                              of                                                                a      trial          judge's   findings              is          "exceedingly
narrow."                                                                                                                       State  v.  Locurto,
157  N.J.  463,  470  (1999)  (citing
State  v.  Johnson,
42  N.J.  146,  161-62  (1964)).                                                  We  give  great
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
deference  to  the  trial  judge's  factual  findings  and  will  not
"engage  in  an  independent  assessment  of  the  evidence  as  if  [we]
were  the  court  of  first  instance.                                            Id.  at  471.                                          We  also  give
deference  to  the  trial  judge's  credibility  determinations.                                                                         Id.
at  474;  Johnson,  supra,
42  N.J.  at  161.
In  reviewing  a  motion  to  suppress,  we  "must  uphold  the
factual  findings  underlying  the  trial  court's  decision  so  long
as  those  findings  are  'supported  by  sufficient  credible  evidence
State  v.  Elders,
192  N.J.  224,  243  (2007)
in  the  record.'"
(citing  Locurto,  supra,
157  N.J.  at  474);  see  also  State  v.
Alvarez,
                                                                                  238  N.J.  Super.  560,  562-64  (App.  Div.  1990).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      We  will
                                                                                                                                         reverse  only  if  we  are  convinced  that  those  findings  are  "so
clearly                                                                           mistaken                                                                                                                         'that                                                                the                                 interests                    of                                 justice    demand
intervention  and  correction.'"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Id.  at  244  (quoting  Johnson,
supra,
42  N.J.  146,  at  162).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               "In  those  circumstances  solely
                                                                                                                                         should  [we]  'appraise  the  record  as  if  [we]  were  deciding  the
matter                                                                            at                                                     inception                                                                 and                                                                  make                                [our]                        own                                findings   and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   A-4836-06T4
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         10
conclusions.'"                                                                                                                                                                                                     Ibid.                                                                                                    (quoting  Johnson,  supra,
42  N.J.  at  162).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Applying  these  standards,  we  address  defendant's  contention.
                                                                                  We                                                     first      emphasize                                                                                                                                                               that                         the                                police                                      did   not                  find
the
                                                                                  narcotics  in  defendant's  residence.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Rather,  they  found  them  in
the                                                                               next-door                                                                                                                        neighbors'                                                                                               yards.                                                          Because                                           the                  neighbors
voluntarily                                                                                                                              consented                                                                                                                                      to                                  the                          search                             of         their                                  property,                                   the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        State  v.  Maristany,
                                                                                  133  N.J.  299,  305  (1993).
search  was  valid.
                                                                                  Additionally,                                                                                                                                                                                         "[f]or                                                           purposes                           of                                                search-and-seizure
analysis,"                                                                                                                               a                                                                         defendant                                                                                                who                          abandons                                      property                                                    "no           longer
retain[s]  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  with  regard  to  it
at  the  time  of  the  search."                                                  State  v.  Carroll,
386  N.J.  Super.
143,  160  (App.  Div.  2006)  (citations  omitted).                              "In  the  context
of  the  Fourth  Amendment  a  defendant  'abandons'  property  when  he
voluntarily  discards,  leaves  behind  or  otherwise  relinquishes
his  interest  in  the  property  in  question[.]"                                State  v.  Farinich,
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
179  N.J.  Super.  1,  6  (App.  Div.  1981)  (citing  United  States  v.
Colbert,
474  F.2d  174,  176  (5th  Cir.  1973)),  certif.  denied,  88
497                                                                               (1981),                                                      aff'd                                            o.b.,
89  N.J.                                                                          378                                                          (1982);                                          see                                                                      also
N.J.
Carroll,  supra,
386  N.J.  Super.  at  160;  State  v.  Gibson,
318  N.J.  Super.  1,  11  (App.  Div.  1999).
                                                                                  The      evidence                                                                                             in                                                                       the                                                    record                             establishes                 that      defendant
abandoned                                                                         the                                                          narcotics                                                                                                                 before                                                                                    the      search   of        the       neighbors'
property.                                                                                                                                      Thus,      she                                                                                                            had                                                    no           expectation                             of        privacy   in           the
A-4836-
06T4
11
narcotics,  making  the  search  and  seizure  reasonable  within  the
limits  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.                                               Burgos,  supra,
185  N.J.  Super.
at  427.                                                                          Nevertheless,  we  extend  our  inquiry  to  consider  the
merits  of  defendant's  contention  that  the  police  lacked  probable
cause  to  arrest  her  and  search  her  residence.
Under  the  Fourth  Amendment,  warrantless  searches  are  per  se
unreasonable  and  thus  presumptively  invalid.                                  Arizona  v.  Gant,
___  U.S.  ___,
129  S.  Ct.  1710,  1716,                                                        (2009)  (citing  Katz  v.
United  States,
389  U.S.  347,  357,
88  S.  Ct.  507,  514,
19  L.  Ed.
2d  576,  585  (1967));  State  v.  Frankel,
179  N.J.  586,  598,  cert.
denied,
543  U.S.  876,
125  S.  Ct.  108,
160  L.  Ed.  2d  128  (2004).
However,                                                                          courts                                                                                                        recognize                                                                certain                                                exceptions                         to      the       warrant
requirement.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             One  such  exception  occurs  when  police  officers
                                                                                                                                                                                                search  incident  to  a  lawful  arrest  founded  on  probable  cause.
State      v.                                                                     Eckel,
185  N.J.                                                                         523,                                                         528-37                                           (2006)                                                                   (detailing                                             the
                                                                                                                                                                                                history  of  New  Jersey's  treatment  of  the  "search  incident  to
                                                                                  lawful  arrest"  warrant  exception).
                                                                                                                                                                                                Probable  cause  exists  when  there  is  a  well-grounded  belief
                                                                                                                                               that  a  crime  was  or  is  being  committed.                                                                                                                                                State  v.  Nishina,
175  N.J.                                                                         502,                                                         515                                              (2003);                                                                  State      v.                                          Johnson,     171                   N.J.              192,      214
(2003);                                                                           State                                                        v.                                               Sullivan,
169  N.J.                                                                         204,                                                         211                                              (2001).                                                                  When
evaluating                                                                                                                                     whether                                          probable                                                                 cause                                                  exists,      courts                employ                      a
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
"totality  of  the  circumstances"  test,  meaning  that  a  the  trial
A-4836-06T4
12
judge  must  make  "'a  practical,  common-sense  decision  whether  .  .
.  there  is  a  fair  probability  that  contraband  or  evidence  of  a
Johnson,  supra,
crime  will  be  found  in  a  particular  place.'"
171  N.J.  at  214  (2002)  (quoting  State  v.  Demeter,
124  N.J.  374,
380-81  (1991)).                                                                  In  making  this  determination,  the  trial  judge
must  look  to  all  the  evidence,  including  the  veracity  and  basis
of      knowledge                                                                 of      an      informant                             supplying                                                        hearsay                                                                  information.
State  v.  Smith,
155  N.J.  83,  93,  cert.  denied,
525  U.S.  1003,
119  S.  Ct.  576,
142  L.  Ed.  2d  480  (1998).
We  are  satisfied  that  the  record  contains  ample  credible
evidence                                                                          establishing                                                                                                           the                                                                      reliability                                                of                the     confidential
                                                                                                                                        informant  and  the  accuracy  of  the  information  provided.                                                                                                                                                                                               This,
along  with  evidence  of  the  police  officers'  observations,  which
corroborated                                                                                                                            the                                                              information                                                                                                                         provided,                 established                               sufficient
                                                                                                                                                                                                         probable  cause  to  arrest  defendant  and  search  her  premises.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             III.
                                                                                  Defendant                                                                                                              contends                                                                 for                                                        the               first   time                                      on      appeal   that
                                                                                                                                                                                                         Detective  Martinez's  eavesdropping  on  her  telephone  conversation
                                                                                                                                                                                                         constitutes  entrapping  her  into  an  admission  of  guilt.                                                                                                                                                            This
contention                                                                                                                              is                                                               subject                                                                  to                                                         review            under                                 the         "plain           error"
standard.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Under  this  standard,  we  will  not  reverse  a  trial
                                                                                                                                                                                                         court's  error  unless  it  is  shown  that  the  error  is  "clearly
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       R.  2:10-2;  see  State  v.
                                                                                                                                        capable  of  producing  an  unjust  result."
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  A-4836-06T4
13
Daniels,
182  N.J.  80,  95  (2004)  (citing  State  v.  Macon,
57  N.J.
325,  333  (1971)).
                                                                                  Admission                                             of                                                               a      confession                                                                                                                   violates      a           defendant's                               due
process                                                                           rights                                                when                                                             obtained                                                                 by                                                         police            from    the                           defendant
                                                                                                                                                                                                         Withrow  v.  Williams,
                                                                                  507  U.S.  680,  688-89,  113
                                                                                  involuntarily.
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
S.  Ct.  1745,  1751,
123  L.  Ed.  2d  407,  417  (1993);  Colorado  v.
Connelly,
479  U.S.  157,  167,
107  S.  Ct.  515,  522,
93  L.  Ed.  2d  473,  484  (1986).                                               The  court  must  look  to  the  totality  of  the
circumstances  in  order  to  determine  if  a  confession  was  obtained
by  the  police  voluntarily.                                                     Connelly,  supra,
479  U.S.  at  163-67.
However,                                                                          without                                                          "police                                                     conduct                                                        casually                       related           to                                 the
confession,  there  is  simply  no  basis  for  concluding  that  any
state  actor  has  deprived  a  criminal  defendant  of  due  process  of
Id.  at  164;  see  also  State  v.  Smith,
307  N.J.  Super.  1,
law."
15  (App.  Div.  1997).
The  evidence  reveals  that  Detective  Martinez  was  not  in  the
                                                                                                                                                   holding  cell  area  to  obtain  defendant's  confession.                                                                                                                                                                         Indeed,
defendant                                                                         admits                                                                                                                       in      her      merits                                                                       brief      that                                      the                detective's
presence                                                                          in                                                               the                                                         holding                                                        cell                           area              during                             her                telephone
                                                                                  conversation  was  "by  coincidence."                                                                                                                                                                                                        The  record  is  devoid  of  any
evidence                                                                          that                                                             defendant's                                                                                                                statement                                        during                             her                telephone
conversation  resulted  from  police  action.
A-4836-06T4
14
IV.
                                                                                                                                                                                                               We  now  address  defendant's  challenge  to  her  sentence.                                                                                                          Our
role                                                                              in                                                               reviewing                                                                                                                  a      sentence      imposed   by                a                                  trial      judge   is
limited.                                                                                                                                           We  only  determine:
(1)  whether  the  exercise  of  discretion  by
the  sentencing  court  was  based  upon  findings
of  fact  grounded  in  competent,  reasonably
credible                                                                          evidence;                                                        (2)                                                         whether      the
sentencing  court  applied  the  correct  legal
principles  in  exercising  its  discretion;  and
(3)  whether  the  application  of  the  facts  to
the  law  was  such  a  clear  error  of  judgment
that  it  shocks  the  conscience.
[State  v.  Megargel,
143  N.J.  484,  493  (1996)
(citing  State  v.  Roth,
95  N.J.  334,  363-365
(1984)).]
It                                                                                is      well      settled      that      we      "may      not   substitute                                                  [our]
State  v.  Johnson,  118
judgment  for  that  of  the  trial  court,"
N.J.  10,  15  (1990),  but  may  modify  a  defendant's  sentence  when
we  are  convinced  the  sentencing  judge  was  "clearly  mistaken."
State  v.  Jabbour,
118  N.J.  1,  6  (1990).                                                         We  may  not  reach  this
file:///C|/Users/Peter/Desktop/Opinions/a4836-06.opn.html[4/20/2013 5:55:16 PM]




a4836-06.opn.html
conclusion  unless  "the  facts  of  th[e]  case  makes  the  sentence
clearly  unreasonable  so  as  to  shock  the  judicial  conscience."
Ibid.                                                                             (quoting  Roth,  supra,
95  N.J.  at  364-65);  see  also  State
v.  Cassady,
198  N.J.  165,  181  (2009).
In  sentencing,  consideration  of  aggravating  and  mitigating
factors  must  be  part  of  the  deliberative  process,  provided  such
factors  are  supported  by  credible  evidence.                                  State  v.  Dalziel,
A-4836-06T4
15
182  N.J.  494,  505  (2005);  accord  State  v.  Cassady,
198  N.J.  165,
180  (2008)  (citing  State  v.  O'Donnell,
117  N.J.  210,  215-16
(1989)).                                                                                                                 Indeed,  "a  trial  judge  is  required  to  consider  all  of
the                                                                               aggravating               and          mitigating                                                       factors            and      to   find             those
                                                                                                                                                                                          Dalziel,  supra,
182  N.J.  at  505.
supported  by  the  evidence."
Error  by  the  trial  court  in  determining  the  existence  of  any
aggravating                                                                       or                        mitigating   factors                                                          will               "nullif[y]    the              weight
accorded  to  such  factors  and  materially  alter  []  the  calculus  in
the  ensuing  balancing  of  aggravating  and  mitigating  factors."
State  v.  Jarbath,
114  N.J.  394,  406  (1989).
                                                                                  Defendant                 does         not                                                              challenge          the           judge's          findings      of
                                                                                                                                                                                          2C:44 -1a(3)                     (the      risk   that          the
aggravating                                                                       factors                                N.J.S.A.
defendant  will  commit  another  offense),
N.J.S.A.  2C:44 -1a(9)
(the  need  for  deterring  the  defendant  and  others  from  violating
the  law)  and
N.J.S.A.  2C:44 -1a(11)  (the  imposition  of  a  fine,
penalty  or  order  of  restitution  without  also  imposing  a  term  of
imprisonment                                                                      would                     be                                                                            perceived                        by      the      defendant     or    others
merely      as                                                                    part                      of           the                                                              cost               of            doing            business,     or    as       an
acceptable  contingent  business  or  operating  expense  associated
with      the                                                                     initial                   decision     to                                                               res
Download a4836-06.opn.pdf

New Jersey Law

New Jersey State Laws
New Jersey Tax
New Jersey Labor Laws
New Jersey Agencies
    > New Jersey DMV

Comments

Tips