(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued February 14, 2000 -- Decided March 8, 2000
PER CURIAM
In this appeal, the Court considers the propriety of the admission of evidence of defendant's prior assaults on the
victim's mother and the sufficiency of the limiting instructions given on other-crimes evidence.
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on January 10, 1995, Rosalind Davis left her twenty-month-old daughter, Atiana
Davis, with defendant Sanders, who was Atiana's natural father. Sanders lived in the home with Davis and her daughter.
When Davis left the home, Atiana appeared physically well. When she returned approximately an hour later, Davis found
Atiana lying on a bed and appearing ill. According to Davis, Sanders told her that Atiana had diarrhea and had vomited and
that he had placed the child in bed to nap. Later that afternoon, Atiana arose, went to her mother, and sat on her lap. She
was whining. Although Davis wanted to take Atiana to a hospital emergency room, Sanders refused to do so and instead
gave the child a glass of juice and returned her to bed.
Both Davis and Sanders periodically checked on Atiana. At approximately 4:00 p.m., Davis again suggested that
they should take Atiana to the emergency room. Sanders again rebuffed her suggested. At 6:30 p.m., Davis found Atiana
lying on the couch again looking ill. Sanders placed her on a blanket on the floor and moved her into a playpen in the
bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Sanders returned to the bedroom and emerged shaking Atiana, explaining that she was not
breathing. Davis immediately called 911. According to a responding paramedic, the child's stomach was distended and
bruised, her face was swollen near her eyes, and she was in cardiac arrest. Atiana was dead on arrival at the hospital. She
was pronounced dead at 10:07 p.m.
That same night, Sanders gave the police the first of three different versions of the events of the day. In that
version, Sanders denied that neither he nor Davis left the apartment that day. Further, he indicated that the child had been
sick with a flu since Christmas. In his second version, given later that evening, Sanders admitted that Davis had left the
apartment for a short while during the day and that he and Davis had engaged in a physical fight on the preceding day
during which Atiana may have been struck accidentally. Ultimately, in his last version, Sanders admitted that while Davis
was shopping, he had wrapped his fists with pillowcases and “play-boxed” with Atiana, hitting her more than ten times over
a fifteen-minute time span while she stood in a corner. He further indicated that she struck her head on the wall as she stood
in the corner while he “play-boxed” with her.
The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy found that Atiana had sustained severe internal injuries,
including bruises on the lungs, the inferior vena cava, and the tissue surrounding the kidneys, the colon, and the bladder. In
addition, the child suffered a two-inch laceration of the liver. The medical examiner concluded that the child's injuries had
been caused by multiple blunt force impacts as would be inflicted by a fist. He also opined that the type of force required to
inflict the types of injuries he observed would be a minimum of eight to ten “very substantial or forceful impacts” to the
abdominal region.
Sanders was charged with causing Atiana's death. Prior to trial, the State requested a pre-trial ruling to determine
if evidence of Sander's prior assaultive behavior toward Davis would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). At that hearing,
Davis testified that Sanders had been violent toward her on several occasions prior to Atiana's death and further that on one
of those occasions, he had punched her in the stomach while she was holding the child. She further testified that on the
evening prior to Atiana's death, Sanders had punched Davis in the stomach and face because she refused to give him money
for beer.
The trial judge concluded that the evidence of Sander's prior assaultive behavior would be admissible. Thus, at
trial, the State elicited testimony consistent with Davis's pre-trial testimony. In his instructions regarding that testimony, the
judge told the jury that that evidence was not submitted to it to show that Sanders was a bad person or that he had a
disposition for committing bad acts or the crime with which he was charged. Rather, the judge told the jury that it could be
considered only if the jury found it to be relevant to the issue of whether the defendant acted knowingly , purposely, or
recklessly. The judge further told the jury that it could consider that evidence if it found it relevant as to whether the death
of the child was inadvertent or accidental. The jury found Sanders guilty of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, and
second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. He was acquitted on the first-degree murder charge.
Sanders appealed his conviction, raising several grounds, including the trial court's decision to allow the State to
introduce evidence of Sander's previous assaults against Davis. In its decision, reported at
320 N.J. Super. 574, a majority
of the Appellate Division concluded that the admission of that evidence violated N.J.R.E. 404(b), finding no valid reason
why the evidence should have been admitted. The panel specifically noted that the evidence was not relevant to any
material issue, was not similar in kind to the offense charged, and that its probative value was clearly outweighed by its
apparent prejudice. In addition, the panel found that even if that evidence were properly admitted, the limiting instructions
given by the trial judge were inadequate. Specifically, the panel found that the judge did not adequately explain why
evidence of Sander's assaults on Davis had been admitted and for what probative purpose that evidence might have been
admitted. Rather, the panel found that the trial judge simply had restated the general provisions of N.J.R.E. 404(b). Thus,
the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.
Judge Steinberg filed a separate opinion dissenting in part from that portion of the majority's opinion finding that
the trial court committed error in admitting the evidence of Sander's prior assaultive behavior toward Davis.
The matter is before the Supreme Court as of right, based on the dissent in the Appellate Division.
HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Kleiner in his
written opinion. The trial court committed error by allowing evidence of defendant Sander's past assaultive behavior
toward the mother of the victim, as that evidence violated N.J.R.E. 404(b); the limiting instructions given the jury in respect
of the evidence of Sander's prior assaultive behavior did not adequately explain the limited purposes for which the evidence
could be considered.
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and
LaVECCHIA join in the opinion of the Court.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
24 September Term 1999
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OSCAR M. SANDERS,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued February 14, 2000-- Decided March 8, 2000
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinions are reported at
320 N.J. Super. 574 (1999).
Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General
argued the cause for appellant (John J.
Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).
Alison Stanton Perrone, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, argued the cause for
respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public
Defender, attorney).
PER CURIAM
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed,
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Kleiner's
majority opinion, reported at
320 N.J. Super. 574 (1999).
Chief Justice Poritz and Associate Justices O'Hern, Stein, Coleman, Long, Verniero, and LaVecchia join in the Court's opinion.
NO. A-24 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OSCAR M. SANDERS,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED March 8, 2000
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY