(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued September 28, 1999 -- Decided October 28, 1999
PER CURIAM
Paul Collier was convicted by a jury of first-degree robbery, third-degree attempted theft, first-degree
attempted murder, second-degree aggravated assault, fourth-degree aggravated assault, and second-degree
possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. Collier was sentenced to two concurrent twenty-year terms of
imprisonment with ten years of parole ineligibility.
During Collier's trial, the State sought to prove that his motive for attempted murder and robbery of the
victim was retaliation for the victim's having implicated Collier in the burning death of a pit bull belonging to the
victim's cousin.
Collier appealed his conviction, arguing, among other things, that: 1) he was denied a fair trial because the
trial judge allowed the prosecutor to both adduce evidence of and comment on summation concerning street rumors
relating to Collier's motive, which were inadmissible hearsay; and 2) the judge erred by allowing the State to
introduce evidence of Collier's alleged involvement in the dog burning and by failing to give an adequate limiting
instruction to the jury.
The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that where other-crimes evidence is
otherwise admissible but involves inflammatory and other unduly prejudicial facts, the judge is obliged to require the
evidence to be sanitized to the extent necessary to accommodate both the State's right to establish a fact in issue and
the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court found that, while some evidence of the dog burning was admissible to
prove motive, the gruesome details surrounding the dog's death should not have been admitted because those details
were unnecessary to establish motive and were unduly prejudicial to Collier in terms of the crimes for which he was
standing trial.
The Appellate Division, while unwilling to conclude that the trial judge abused her discretion in concluding
that the dog-burning incident was admissible to prove motive, was satisfied that its great potential for prejudice
required the judge to confine the incident's admissibility to those facts reasonably necessary for that probative
purpose. The evidence should have been presented to the jury in a more neutral fashion, with much less detail. The
Appellate Division found that the evidence, as admitted, was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
As for the judge's limiting instruction, the Appellate Division found that the charge, as a whole, clearly and
unambiguously explained the limited purpose of the admissibility of the dog-burning evidence. However, the other
crimes evidence, as admitted, was too prejudicial to be subject to cure by any limiting instruction.
Lastly, the Appellate Division concluded that street-rumor evidence was inadmissible hearsay and
immaterial.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: The Court affirms the decision of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Steinberg's written opinion below. Where other-crimes evidence is otherwise admissible but involves
inflammatory and otherwise prejudicial facts, the judge must require the evidence to be sanitized to the
extent necessary to accommodate both the State's right to establish a fact in issue and the defendant's right
to a fair trial.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG
and VERNIERO join in this PER CURIAM opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
68 September Term 1998
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL COLLIER, a/k/a PUFF,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 28, 1999 -- Decided October 28, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
316 N.J. Super. 181 (1998).
Charles Ouslander, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Daniel G.
Giaquinto, Mercer County Prosecutor,
attorney; Mr. Ouslander and Kimberly M.
Lacken, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the briefs).
Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney).
Bennett A. Barlyn, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr.,
Attorney General, attorney).
Eric Tunis argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of
New Jersey.
PER CURIAM
The judgment is affirmed, substantially for the reasons
expressed in Judge Steinberg's opinion of the Appellate Division,
reported at
316 N.J. Super. 181 (1998).
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN,
COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in the Court's opinion.
NO. A-68 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAUL COLLIER, a/k/a PUFF,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED October 28, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY