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N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 if such defendant received a Brimage2 waiver of an extended term or reduction of a
mandatory minimum term under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12? From our review of the record in these cases, we find
that such a defendant is eligible to apply for resentencing, but the ultimate result of that reconsideration
process is not determined by this opinion. I. "> Original Wordprocessor Version
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.) Original Wordprocessor Version
(NOTE: The status of this decision is Unpublished.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5851-09T1
A-0593-10T1
A-1505-10T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT W. OLIVER,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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v.
KEITH D. CLARKE, GILES BROOME,
ROBERT BOYD, FLOYD A. CARROLL,
ERIK CRUZ, SHADEED DOTSON,
RAHMEER EDWARDS, JAVIER GONZALEZ,
GARY HOBJEN, WILTON KEARNEY,
ANTHONY LEWIS, AARON D. LOFLAND,
RAFAEL MARRERO, ELPIDIO MOLINA,
ERNESTO RAMOS, ELIECER A. REYES,
CRISTOBAL RIVAS, LAMAR ROLAX,
EMANUEL ROMERO, MICHAEL SAUNDERS,
ANTHONY SEALY, JOSEPH D. SEWELL,
LANDES C. SMITH, TRAVIS STANBACK,
HARRY STEVENS, ERNESTO TORRES,
JUAN VEGA, JESSIE VELASQUEZ, AND
ROBERT WASHINGTON,
Defendants-Appellants.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
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RUDELL ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
August 18, 2011
Argued August 10, 2011 - Decided
Before Judges J. N. Harris and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
Indictment Nos.  09-01-00222 and  09-03-00662  (Docket Nos. A-5851-09T1 and
A-1505-10T2); Camden County, Indictment Nos.  08-12-3796,  08-10-3186, Acc.
09-08-2658,                                                                                                       09-07-2490,                                                                  08-09-2747,                       10-04-1093,   08-09-2989,  Acc.  08-07-
2193,  09-05-1681,  09-05-1922, 09-04-1220,  09-05-1727, Acc.  09-02-771, Acc.
09-10-3427,  09-04-1557,  09-04-1639,  Acc.                                                                       09-09-3238,  Acc.  08-04-1278,  09-
04-1427,  09-03-1039,  Acc.                                                                                       09-07-2499,  Acc.                                                            09-01-0142, 09-05-1876,  07-08-
2521, 09-05-1650, 08-10-353, 08-05-1798, 07-02-0511 and 09-04-1561 (Docket
No. A-0593-10T1).
Stephen  P.  Hunter,  Assistant  Deputy  Public  Defender,  argued  the  cause  for
appellants                                                                                                        (Joseph  E.  Krakora,  Public  Defender,  attorney;  Mr.  Hunter,  on  the
briefs).
Theodore F. L. Housel, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent in A-
5851-09T1  (Courtney M.  Cittadini,  Assistant County Prosecutor, of counsel    and
on the brief).
Mary E. McAnally, Deputy  Attorney  General,  argued  the cause  for   respondents
(Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney for respondents in    A-0593-10T1 and
1505-10T2; Ms. McAnally, of counsel and on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
These back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of this opinion, all implicate the same legal
question: is a defendant eligible to apply for resentencing pursuant to the 2010 amendments1 to N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7 if such defendant received a Brimage2 waiver of an extended term or reduction of a mandatory
minimum term under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12? From our review of the record in these cases, we find that such a
defendant is eligible to apply for resentencing, but the ultimate result of that reconsideration process is not
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determined by this opinion.
I.
A.
Defendant Robert W. Oliver (A-5851-09T1) was convicted of third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of school property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. In connection with
an agreed-upon plea arrangement, the State waived a motion for enhanced sentencing under N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(f) pursuant to the Brimage Guidelines. Oliver was sentenced to five years incarceration, with thirty-
three months to be served before becoming eligible for parole.
Oliver appealed his sentence pursuant to Rule 2:9-11, and the matter was submitted as part of the
Excessive Sentencing Oral Argument (ESOA) program. The ESOA panel heard the matter within one month
following the effective date of L. 2009, c. 192. It issued an order for remand stating:
This  matter  is  remanded  to  the  trial  court  for  reconsideration  of  the  parole
ineligibility  bar  in  light  of  the  amendments  to  N.J.S.A.                                                2C:35-7  that  became
effective on January 12, 2010, L. 2009, c. 192, § 1 (specifying four factors to be
considered by the sentencing court in determining whether the parole ineligibility
bar otherwise required by N.J.S.A.  2C:35-7(a) should be waived). Jurisdiction    is
not retained.
Pursuant to the mandate of the remand, the Law Division conducted a resentencing hearing in which it
determined that because Oliver had been eligible for the imposition of a mandatory extended term under
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), "the waiver of the parole ineligibility under the new statute does not kick into play
because of defendant's prior record." Accordingly, the sentencing court imposed "the exact same sentence
as was [previously] imposed," writing on the judgment of conviction:
Motion for appellate remand denied.
Sentence reaffirmed.
This appeal followed.
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B.
In July 2010, defendant Keith D. Clarke and twenty-eight others (A-0593-10T2) filed motions for
resentencing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a. The Law Division consolidated the matters and framed the
common question as whether defendants who were the beneficiaries of waivers of extended terms under
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) are eligible to seek reconsideration of their sentences pursuant to revised N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7. The court indicated that
[t]he  defendants  seeking  reconsideration  are  those  who  were  serving  a
mandatory minimum sentence on January  12,  2010, the date of the    enactment
of the amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, and who were eligible at sentencing for
an extended term sentence under N.J.S.A.  2C:43-6(f) on account of a previous
conviction  for  distribution  or  possession  with  intent  to  distribute  a controlled
dangerous substance.
After considering the views of the parties, the court ruled that such defendants, because of the Brimage
waivers, were not eligible to apply for reconsideration of their sentences under the 2010 statutory
amendments. This appeal followed.
C.
Defendant Rudell Anderson (A-1505-10T2) was convicted of third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of school property. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. As part of a plea
arrangement, the State agreed to a Brimage waiver of a mandatory extended term under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6(f), and Anderson was sentenced to a five-year term of incarceration, with twenty-seven months to be
served before becoming eligible for parole.
Anderson moved for resentencing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a. Having previously noted that "[t]his is a
Brimage case with a Brimage stip," the Law Division held that Anderson was not eligible for resentencing
because she had previously been convicted of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1). The court explained,
[w]hat  we're  trying  to  explain  to                                                                     [defendant]  is  that  they  did  pass some
modifications to the Brimage Act  [sic], but excepted or exempted    from   that are
people who have prior distributions. In other words, if  [defendant is]  Brimage[-
eligible]  because  of  a  prior  record                                                                   [defendant]                                   [does  not]  come  under  the
confines of the new law.
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Accordingly, the court entered an order denying Anderson's motion. This appeal followed.
II.
As noted, we consolidated these appeals for purposes of this opinion because they present nearly
identical issues. In the Clarke and Anderson matters, defendants argue the following:
POINT  I:  BECAUSE  THE  TRIAL  COURT  FAILED  TO  APPLY  THE  CORRECT
STANDARDS OF N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a IN RULING ON DEFENDANTS' RESENTENCING
MOTIONS AND  MISCONSTRUED  THE  PLAIN  LANGUAGE OF N.J.S.A.  2C:35-7B,
THIS  COURT  SHOULD  REVERSE  AND  REMAND  THE  MOTIONS  FOR  FULL
CONSIDERATION ON THE MERITS.
Oliver's appellate argument echoes the foregoing, but adds a specific claim relating to the remand by the
ESOA panel:
POINT  I:  BECAUSE  THE  TRIAL  COURT  FAILED  TO  APPLY  THE  CORRECT
STANDARDS OF N.J.S.A.  2C:35-7a,  MISCONSTRUED  THE  PLAIN  MEANING  OF
N.J.S.A.  2C:35-7B, AND DISREGARDED THE APPELLATE DIVISION'S PREVIOUS
ORDER TO RECONSIDER THE PAROLE INELIGIBILITY TERM IN THIS MATTER,
THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION AND REMOVE DEFENDANT'S
PAROLE INELIGIBILITY TERM.
A.
Effective January 12, 2010, the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to 36A-1
(CDRA), was supplemented with the addition of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a, which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any court rule limiting the time period within which a motion to
reduce or change a sentence may be filed, any person who, on the effective date
of this act, is serving a mandatory minimum sentence as provided by section 1 of
P.L.1987,  c.101  (C.2C:35-7) and  who has not had  his sentence suspended or
been paroled or discharged  may move to  have his sentence reviewed  by the
court.  If  the  court  finds  that  the  sentence  under  review  does  not  serve  the
interests  of  justice,  the  judge  may  re-sentence  the  defendant  pursuant to
subsection  b.  of  section                                                                                 1  of  P.L.1987,  c.101                                             (C.2C:35-7).  In  determining
whether the sentence under review serves the interests of justice, the court shall
consider  all  relevant  circumstances,  including  whether  the  defendant  pleaded
guilty  pursuant  to  a  negotiated  agreement,  and  whether  the prosecution  has
agreed  to  dismiss  one  or  more  charges  which,  upon  conviction,  would have
subjected the defendant to the presumption of imprisonment under subsection d.
of  [N.J.S.A.]                                                                                              2C:44-1. The determination by the court  shall not be  subject to
appeal.
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[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a.]
The purpose of the amendatory statute has been to enable individuals who were sentenced pursuant to the
stricter, pre-2010 provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 to seek the benefit of lenity provided by the Legislature's
contemporaneous implementation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b):
b.  (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of    [N.J.S.A.]  2C:35-12 or subsection a. of
this  section,  the  court  may  waive  or  reduce  the  minimum  term  of  parole
ineligibility required under subsection a. of this section or place the defendant on
probation pursuant to paragraph  (2) of subsection b. of  [N.J.S.A.]  2C:43-2. In
making this determination, the court shall consider:
(a)  the  extent  of  the  defendant's  prior  criminal  record  and  the
seriousness  of  the  offenses  for  which  the  defendant  has  been
convicted;
(b)  the specific location of the present offense in relation to the
school  property,  including  distance  from  the  school  and  the
reasonable likelihood of exposing children to drug-related activities
at that location;
(c) whether school was in session at the time of the offense; and
(d) whether children were present at or in the immediate vicinity of
the location when the offense took place.
(2) The court shall not waive or reduce the minimum term   of    parole    ineligibility
or sentence the defendant to probation if it finds that:
(a) the offense took place while on any  school property used   for
school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or
secondary school or school board, or while on any school bus; or
(b) the defendant in the course of committing the    offense    used or
threatened violence or was in possession of a firearm.
If the court at sentencing elects not to impose a minimum term of imprisonment
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and  parole  ineligibility  pursuant  to  this  subsection,  imposes  a  term of  parole
ineligibility  less  than  the  minimum  term  prescribed  in  subsection  a.  of  this
section, or places the defendant on probation for a violation   of    subsection a. of
this section, the sentence shall not become final for  10 days in    order to permit
the  prosecution  to  appeal  the  court's  finding  and  the  sentence imposed.  The
Attorney  General  shall  develop  guidelines  to  ensure  the  uniform  exercise  of
discretion in making  determinations regarding whether to  appeal a decision   to
waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or place    the    defendant
on probation.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to establish a basis for overcoming
a  presumption  of  imprisonment  authorized  or  required  by  subsection  d.  of
[N.J.S.A.]  2C:44-1, or a basis for not imposing a term   of    imprisonment or term
of  parole  ineligibility  authorized  or  required  to  be  imposed  pursuant  to
subsection f. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-6 or upon conviction for a crime other than the
offense set forth in this subsection.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b).]
For purposes of this appeal, the parties focus their attention upon the final paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
7(b). The State claims that the reference to "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to establish . . .
a basis for not imposing a term of imprisonment or term of parole ineligibility authorized or required to be
imposed pursuant to subsection f. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-6" serves as an insurmountable bar —— an eligibility
disqualifier —— to defendants' motions for resentencing. The State suggests that "[t]he lenity afforded by
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7[(b)] was not meant to apply to repeat-drug dealers, who are subject to a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility under a separate and distinct portion of the
Comprehensive Drug Reform Act." Said another way, the State contends that defendants "should not be
able to get a double reduction in sentence when [defendants have] already gotten . . . the benefit of a
Brimage recommendation and sentence. The legislature certainly didn't intend them to get a second benefit
in view of the fact of their prior history."
Contrariwise, defendants assert that the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b) does not act as a
resentencing disqualifier, but rather is "intended to affect other sentencing provisions in the criminal code
that authorize or require a sentencing judge to impose a term of imprisonment or a term of parole
ineligibility." They argue that the separate provision for resentencing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a —— without an
express bar aimed at repeat drug offenders —— mandates that those moving for resentencing at least be
heard on the merits. Thus, according to defendants, being a beneficiary of a Brimage waiver is but one of
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the "relevant circumstances" that a resentencing court must take into account "[i]n determining whether
the sentence under review serves the interests of justice." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a.
B.
The question presented to us is one of statutory interpretation, which we consider de novo. In re
Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94 (2007). Because the statute is a penal statute, we construe
it strictly. State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 200 (1992). "[O]ur primary goal in interpreting a statute is to
discern the meaning and intent of the Legislature, which is generally best indicated by the statutory
language." Bank of New York v. Laks, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2011) (slip op. at 11). "'[I]t is
not the function of this Court to rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or [] presume that
the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" State v.
Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 332 (2009) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (alteration in
original)).
Employing these principles, we find no ambiguity in the statute. We further conclude that the 2010
statute's explicit provision allowing incarcerated defendants to apply for resentencing was intended to
extend to any person "who, on the effective date of [L. 2009, c. 192], is serving a mandatory minimum
sentence as provided by [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7] and who has not had his sentence suspended or been paroled
or discharged," N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a, including defendants who had already benefited from the largess of the
State in the various prosecutors' waivers of the effect of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).
In State v. Hill, 327 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 188 (2000) we noted
the following:
The mandatory extended-term statute for repeat drug offenders, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(f), was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987
(Drug Act). N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to -23 and N.J.S.A. 2C:36-1 to -9; see State v. Kirk,
145 N.J. 159, 166 (1996). The articulated objectives of the Drug Act, set out in
its "Declaration of Policy and Legislative Findings," include the "imposition of a
uniform,  consistent and  predictable sentence for a given offense  .  .  .  [as] an
essential  prerequisite  to                                                                                      [a]  rational  deterrent  scheme  designed  ultimately to
reduce the incidence of crime."  N.J.S.A.  2C:35-1.1(a); Kirk, 145 N.J. at 166-67.
The  Drug  Act  focuses  on  the  punishment  and  deterrence  of  serious  and
dangerous offenders and thus "target[s] for expedited prosecution and enhanced
punishment  those  repeat  drug  offenders  and  upper  echelon  members of
organized  narcotics  trafficking  networks  who  pose  the  greatest  danger to
society."  N.J.S.A.                                                                                              2C:35-1.1(c);  Kirk,                                        145  N.J.  at   167.  By  providing  strict
punishment for repeat offenders, the Legislature sought to reduce the demand
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for illegal drugs and the incidence of drug-related crime. Ibid.
Therefore, "[t]he  legislative  objective  of section  6f is to impose  lengthy
prison terms on repeat drug offenders as 'the norm rather than the exception.'"
Kirk, 145 N.J. at 174, (quoting State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32 (1992)). . .
Based  on  the  articulated  objectives  of  the  Legislature,  the  enhanced
sentencing provision of the Drug Act, N.J.S.A.  2C:43-6(f), is, by its very terms,
deterrence-oriented,  directed  at  defendants  who  have  "demonstrat[ed]  an
escalating pattern of drug activity." See Kirk, 145 N.J. at  166-167,  171; Haliski,
140 N.J. at 9; State in the Interest of M.G., 307 N.J. Super. at 354.
[Id. at 40-42.]
Accordingly, we place much weight in the argument advanced by the State regarding a plausible basis to
find repeat drug offenders ineligible for resentencing, notwithstanding the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
7a.
However, we also note that once a prosecutor has waived the parole disqualifier of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, its
mandatory imposition is no longer applicable, as a matter of law, upon resentencing for a violation of
probation. Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 200. Finding that the Legislature did not make clear its intention to
have the mandatory parole disqualifier apply at violation of probation sentencing, the Court was unwilling to
impute that intention to lawmakers. Id. at 201. Although we understand that the sentencing scheme for
violations of probation3 may not be identical to resentencing under newly-minted N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a, the
express legislative directives concerning how and when a stern N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 sentence should be
adjusted do not exempt those defendants for whom a prosecutor waived the sanctions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6(f).
Clearly, a defendant who appears for initial sentencing having either entered a guilty plea to a
violation of a crime outlined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a), or having been convicted of such a crime by a jury, and
for whom the prosecutor has moved to enhance the sentence pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), is not
affected by the new sentencing options available under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b). Upon the application of the
prosecutor, and subject to competent proof of the predicate prior conviction, the sentencing court must
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grant the motion for an extended term and include a minimum term. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f); State v. Thomas,
188 N.J. 137, 150 (2006); Brimage, supra, 153 N.J. at 11; State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 31 (1992). The
2010 statute continues this scheme: "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to establish . . . a basis
for not imposing a term of imprisonment or term of parole ineligibility authorized or required to be imposed
pursuant to subsection f. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:43-6." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b).
The State argues that the word "authorized," followed by the disjunctive "or" in the same sentence
means that as long as a defendant was eligible for enhanced sentencing under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f), even if
a prosecutor deployed a Brimage waiver and did not seek such enhanced sentencing, such a defendant is
likewise unaffected by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(b), and cannot apply for resentencing under the 2010 law. The
State's argument essentially transforms the word "authorized" —— relating to the authority of the court to
sentence a defendant —— into the word "eligible," which refers to the status of a defendant. We view this
position as untenable and contrary to the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a, which expressly provides for
resentencing and contains no bar to resentencing based upon previous Brimage-validated waivers of an
extended term.
Although we do not necessarily subscribe to defendants' interpretation of the "authorized or
required" language in the context of resentencing (equating "authorized" with "required," at least for
purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f)), we find that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a trumps N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7(b), and is not inconsistent with the overall goals of the CDRA. Merely permitting incarcerated
defendants who satisfy the contours of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a to seek resentencing does not guaranty that
resentencing judges will, in fact, reduce their minimum terms of incarceration. Indeed, we fully expect that
a defendant's receipt of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) waivers will be considered by a resentencing judge as part of
"all relevant circumstances" relating to whether defendant's sentence should be adjusted.
Accordingly, we reverse the determinations made in the Law Division with respect to defendants'
motions for resentencing.4 We remand the matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Our
opinion is not intended to foretell the ultimate outcome of defendants' motions, which must be decided on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with the statutory standards of the CDRA as amended and supplemented.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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1 See L. 2009, c. 192, § 1, effective on January 12, 2010. The 2010 legislation resulted in the renumbering
of  N.J.S.A.                                                                                                   2C:35-7  into  several  subsections  and  the  creation  of  a  separately  numbered  provision  for
resentencing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7a.
2 See State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998) (holding that plea-bargaining guidelines for drug offenses then in
existence were inconsistent from county to county, and directed the Attorney General to develop    uniform
statewide guidelines, now known as the Brimage Guidelines).
3 See State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169 (1989); State v. Molina, 114 N.J. 181 (1989).
4 Because of this determination, we need not address Oliver's separate claim that the Law Division violated
the mandate of the ESOA remand.
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