(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued May 4, 1999 -- Decided July 15, 1999
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether a mistake of fact was a defense to a charge of reckless manslaughter.
Defendant, Ronald Sexton, was charged with and indicted for purposeful or knowing murder, possession of a
handgun without a permit, and possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. He and decedent, Matthews, had been
engaged in what was described by a witness as a “typical argument,” when Sexton pointed a gun at Matthews that Matthews
had earlier handed him to examine. The gun belonged to Matthews's grandmother. When Sexton pointed the gun at
Matthews, Matthews commented that the gun was not loaded. Sexton said to Matthews, “you think there are no bullets in
this gun?” Matthews replied, “yeah,” and the witness heard the gun fire. A single bullet killed Matthews.
Sexton's version of the encounter was that the gun simply went off while he was examining it. Matthews, he said,
had assured him that it was not loaded. Sexton, who had never before owned or shot a gun, never unloaded the gun or
checked to see if there were any bullets in it.
At trial, at the close of the State's case, Sexton's attorney moved to dismiss the murder charge because the victim
had told him that the gun was not loaded. The trial court denied the motion and charged the jury on the charges of murder
and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. The jury found Sexton not guilty of
murder, aggravated manslaughter, or possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, but guilty of reckless manslaughter
and unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit.
The Appellate Division reversed Sexton's conviction on two grounds. First, the court found that the trial judge
erroneously charged the jury on first degree murder, despite the absence of any credible evidence that Sexton intended to
kill or seriously injure Matthews. The court concluded that the unwarranted charge had the potential of leading the jury to a
compromise verdict on reckless manslaughter, instead of acquitting him entirely. The Appellate Division also held that the
trial court should have charged the jury that the State bore the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's
mistake-of-fact defense, and that the failure to do so was plain error.
Although the Appellate Division reversed the conviction on several other grounds, the Supreme Court granted the
State's petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether mistake of fact was a defense to the charge of reckless
manslaughter.
HELD: A mistake of fact can be a defense to a charge of reckless manslaughter if the mistake was reasonable and it
negates the culpable mental state required to establish the offense.
1. The 1979 New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) followed the mental-state formulation of the Model Penal
Code, which provides that no person should be guilty of an offense unless the person acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly
or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. (pp. 7-9)
2. The Model Penal Code expressly recognizes that the mistake of an accused need not be a reasonable mistake unless the
Legislature has expressly decided that the requisite culpable mental state was minimal. (pp. 9-10)
3. Under the Model Penal Code, a mistake of fact may negate criminal culpability. Whether a mistake negates a required
element of the offense depends on the nature of the mistake and the state of mind that the offense required. (pp. 10-12)
4. Most states require the state to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's mistake-of-fact defense. (pp. 14-15)
5. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4a allows a defense of ignorance or mistake if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion
underlying the mistake and the mistake either negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense or the law
provided that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. (pp. 15-16)
6. Of itself, a belief that the gun is loaded or unloaded does not negate the culpable mental state for the crime of
manslaughter. (pp. 16-17)
7. The jury charge in respect of liability should be tailored to the factual circumstances of the case and should explain
precisely how the offered defense plays into the element of recklessness. (pp. 19-20)
8. Evidence of an actor's mistaken belief relates to whether the State has failed to prove an essential element of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (pp. 21-22)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for
further proceedings in accordance with the Court's opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
23 September Term 1998
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RONALD SEXTON,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued May 4, 1999 -- Decided July 15, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
311 N.J. Super. 70 (1998).
Teresa A. Blair, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant (Peter
Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).
Judith L. Borman, First Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, argued the cause for
respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender,
attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
“Once again, we must reconcile anomalies and ambiguities
that inhere in the Code of Criminal Justice . . . occasioned by
the Legislature's selective inclusion and omission of provisions
of its conceptual source, the Model Penal Code (MPC).”
Richardson v. Nickolopoulos,
110 N.J. 241, 242 (1988).
The “anomalies and ambiguities” presented in this appeal
concern the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4, governing the so-called
mistake-of-fact defense to a criminal charge. Specifically, the
question is how to explain to the jury the effect of a mistake of
fact on a charge of reckless conduct. The context is that of an
accusation of aggravated or reckless manslaughter, after a gun
went off, killing the seventeen-year-old victim, Alquadir
Matthews. From the evidence, a jury could have found that the
then fifteen-year-old defendant had pointed a gun at another and
pulled the trigger. Defendant claims that he mistakenly believed
the gun was not loaded.
The facts of the case are more fully set forth in the opinion below. 311 N.J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1998). We repeat those facts essential to our ruling.
On May 10, 1993, Shakirah Jones, a seventeen-year-old friend of defendant and decedent, overheard the two young men having what she described as a “typical argument.” The two young men walked from a sidewalk into a vacant lot. Jones saw defendant with a gun in his hand, but she did not see defendant shoot Matthews.
Jones heard Matthews tell defendant, “there are no bullets in that gun,” and then walk away. Defendant called Matthews back and said, “you think there are no bullets in this gun?” Matthews replied, “yeah.” Jones heard the gun go off. A single bullet killed Matthews.
Acting on information received from Jones, police recovered a small caliber automatic pistol near the crime scene. The police did not trace the ownership of the gun, which may have been owned by Matthews's grandmother.
A ballistics expert testified that there was a spring missing from the gun's magazine, which prevented the other bullets from going into the chamber after the first bullet was discharged. In this condition, the gun would have to be loaded manually by feeding the live cartridge into the chamber prior to firing.
The expert later clarified that, if the magazine had been removed after one round had been inserted into the chamber, it would be impossible to see whether the gun was loaded without pulling the slide that covered the chamber to the rear. The expert agreed that, for someone unfamiliar with guns, once the magazine was removed, it was “probably a possible assumption” that the gun was unloaded.
Defendant's version was that when the two young men were in the lot, Matthews showed defendant a gun and “told me the gun was empty.” Defendant “asked him was he sure,” and “he said yes.” When Matthews asked if defendant would like to see the gun, defendant said “yes.” Defendant “took the gun and was looking at it, and ”it just went off.” He never unloaded the gun or checked to see if there were any bullets in the gun. He had never before owned or shot a gun.
A grand jury indicted defendant for purposeful or knowing murder, possession of a handgun without a permit, and possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the murder charge because the victim had told him that the gun was not loaded. The court denied the motion.
The court charged murder and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. Concerning defendant's version of the facts, the court said:
Defense contends this was a tragic accident. That Alquadir [Matthews], says the defense, handed the gun to Ronald [defendant]. Alquadir told Ronald, you know, the gun was not loaded. Ronald believed the gun was not loaded. Ronald did not think the gun was pointed at Alquadir when it went off. But the gun went off accidentally and, says the defense, that is a very tragic and sad accident but it is not a crime.
If, after considering all the evidence
in this case, including the evidence
presented by the defense as well as the
evidence presented by the State, if you have
a reasonable doubt in your mind as to whether
the State has proven all the elements of any
of these crimes: murder, aggravated
manslaughter, or reckless manslaughter, you
must find the defendant not guilty of those
crimes.
The jury found defendant not guilty of murder, aggravated
manslaughter, or possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose,
but guilty of reckless manslaughter and unlawful possession of a
handgun without a permit.
On the charge of reckless manslaughter, the court sentenced
defendant to the presumptive term of seven years, three of which
were parole ineligible. For possession of a handgun without a
permit, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent four-year
term with no period of parole ineligibility. The court
recommended that defendant serve his sentence at the Youth
Correction and Reception Center.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed defendant's
conviction on multiple grounds. The court found that the trial
judge erroneously charged the jury on first degree murder,
despite the absence of any credible evidence that defendant
intended to kill or seriously injure Matthews. The court
concluded that the unwarranted charge had the potential of
leading the jury to a compromise verdict on reckless manslaughter
instead of acquitting him entirely. 311 N.J. Super. at 81-82
(citing State v. Christener,
71 N.J. 55 (1976)).
The Appellate Division also held that the trial court should
have charged the jury that the State bore the burden of
disproving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's mistake-of-fact
defense, and that the failure to do so was plain error. The
Appellate Division relied on Wilson v. Tard,
593 F. Supp. 1091
(D.N.J. 1984), in which Judge Stern, applying New Jersey law,
reversed a conviction of aggravated manslaughter because the
trial court had charged the jury that defendant carried the
burden of establishing his mistake-of-fact defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Appellate Division noted that
“[t]he critical holding of Wilson is that once the defendant, as
here, presents evidence of a reasonable mistake of fact that
would refute an essential element of the crime charged, the
State's burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt
includes disproving the reasonable mistake of fact.” 311 N.J.
Super. at 83.
The Appellate Division also held that, by failing to
disclose material evidence that the gun was owned by Matthews's
grandmother, the State had violated its obligation under Brady v.
Maryland,
373 U.S. 83,
83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Finally, the Appellate Division found that defendant's counsel
was ineffective for failing to have requested the ownership
information from the prosecutor.
We granted the State's petition for certification, limited
to the issue of whether “mistake of fact was a defense to the
charge of reckless manslaughter.” __ N.J. __ (1998).
The 1979 New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1 1 to -104-9 (the Code), followed the mental-state formulation of the MPC. The Code provides generally that no person should be guilty of an offense unless the person “acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2a. The precise delineation of these four states of criminal culpability, each drawn from the MPC and each defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b, represented an effort, as a framer of the Code described it, “to achieve greater individual justice through a closer relation between guilt and culpability, requiring workable definitions of the various culpability factors. These factors must be related precisely to each element of an offense, defense, or mitigation, and all unnecessary limitations upon individual culpability should be eliminated.” Robert E. Knowlton, Comments Upon the New Jersey Penal Code, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 2 (1979) (footnote omitted). “[T]he material elements of an offense vary in that they may involve (1) conduct per se, (2) the attendant circumstances of conduct, or (3) the result of conduct. The MPC attempts to define culpability status for each.” State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 201 n.7 (1986).
The MPC also contains an express provision for mistake-of fact defenses.See footnote 1 “Its mistake of fact provision, while creating potential for conceptual confusion by continuing the common law characterization of the doctrine as a 'defense,' in fact sought to clarify the common law.” Holley, supra, 27 SW. U. L. Rev. at 232. The MPC expressly recognized that the doctrine did not sanction a true defense, but rather was an attack on the prosecution's ability to prove the requisite culpable mental state for at least one objective element of the crime. Hence, unlike enactments in many pre-MPC states, “the MPC expressly recognizes that the mistake of an accused need not be a reasonable mistake unless the Legislature has expressly decided that the requisite culpable mental state was minimal - 'negligence' or perhaps, 'recklessness.'” Id. at 232-33.
The MPC provides that, “Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.” Model Penal Code § 2.04 (1962).
Whether a mistake would negate a required element of the offense, depended, of course, on the nature of the mistake and the state of mind that the offense required. This led commentators to observe:
Technically, such provisions [for a mistake of fact defense] are unnecessary. They simply confirm what is stated elsewhere: 'No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' If the defendant's ignorance or mistake makes proof of a required culpability element impossible, the prosecution will necessarily fail in its proof of the offense.
[Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 726-27 (1983) (quoting Model Penal Code § 1.12(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).See footnote 2]
See also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive
Criminal Law, § 5.1a (2d ed. 1986) (“Instead of speaking of
ignorance or mistake of fact . . . as a defense, it would be just
as easy to note simply that the defendant cannot be convicted
when it is shown that he does not have the mental state required
by law for commission of that particular offense.”)
The Commentary to the Hawaii Criminal Code gives an easy
example of how, under the MPC, a mistake of fact may negate
culpability.
[I]f a person is ignorant or mistaken as to a
matter of fact . . . the person's ignorance
or mistake will, in appropriate
circumstances, prevent the person from having
the requisite culpability with respect to the
fact . . . as it actually exists. For
example, a person who is mistaken (either
reasonably, negligently, or recklessly) as to
which one of a number of similar umbrellas on
a rack is the person's and who takes
another's umbrella should be afforded a
defense to a charge of theft predicated on
either intentionally or knowingly taking the
property of another. . . . A reckless mistake
would afford a defense to a charge requiring
intent or knowledge--but not to an offense
which required only recklessness or
negligence. Similarly, a negligent mistake
would afford a defense to a charge predicated
on intent, knowledge, or recklessness--but
not to an offense based on negligence.
[State v. Cavness,
911 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1996).]
State legislatures, however, “in emulating the Model Penal Code's three culpability provisions (its culpability definitions, its guidelines for resolving the requisite culpable mental state, and its mistake of fact doctrine), have not always understood their interrelationship. Hence, these states have failed to coordinate the enactment of these three types of culpability provisions.” Holley, supra, 27 SW. U. L. Rev. at 249-50. States have restricted the mistake-of-fact doctrine by imposing a reasonableness requirement. By thinking in terms of the reasonable person while failing to appreciate that the MPC's mistake-of-fact and culpability provisions are interrelated, these states have undermined the structure of the MPC. Id. at 249-53.
To explain, we may consider again the case of the absent minded umbrella thief. If only a reasonable mistake will provide a defense to the charge of theft, the absent-minded but careless restaurant patron will have no defense to a charge of theft. People v. Navarro, 99 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (1979), explains how a mistake of fact, even though it is unreasonable, may constitute a defense to a crime requiring a culpable mental state higher than recklessness or negligence. In Navarro, defendant took some wooden beams from a construction site. He was charged with theft. He claimed that he thought the owner had abandoned the beams. The trial court instructed the jury that this would be a valid defense only if the scavenger's belief was reasonable. The reviewing court held that such an instruction was erroneous because if the jury “concluded that defendant in good faith believed that he had the right to take the beams, even though such belief was unreasonable . . ., defendant was entitled to an acquittal since the specific intent required to be proved as an element of the offense had not been established.” Id. at 697 (footnote omitted). Otherwise, one would end up imposing liability for theft on a lesser basis than knowledge or purpose to steal the property of another.
How then shall we resolve the problem created by the selective inclusion and exclusion of the culpability provisions of the MPC?
The issue posed by our grant of certification was whether a mistake of fact was a defense to the charge of reckless manslaughter. The short answer to that question is: “It depends.” The longer answer requires that we relate the type of mistake involved to the essential elements of the offense, the conduct proscribed, and the state of mind required to establish liability for the offense. Defendant insists that the State is required to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, his mistake-of fact defense. Most states would agree with that statement. See, e.g., People v. Andrews, 632 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Colo. 1981) (guilt of defendant must be established beyond reasonable doubt as to issue of mistaken belief); People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Cal. 1975) (defendant required to raise only reasonable doubt as to mistake-of-fact defense); People v. Williams, 400 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (state must disprove mistake or ignorance when raised). In State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 463 n.8 (1975), the Court similarly said that once the defense of mistake of fact is raised, the burden of persuasion is on the State. Just what does that mean? Does it mean that the State must prove that the mistake was unreasonable? We must begin by examining the language of the statute.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4a allows a defense of ignorance or mistake “if the defendant reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake and” the mistake either “negatives the culpable mental state required to establish the offense” or “[t]he law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.” The crime of manslaughter is a form of criminal homicide. “A person is guilty of criminal homicide if [the actor] purposely, knowingly [or] recklessly . . . causes the death of another human being.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-2.See footnote 3 Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter, a first degree offense with special sentencing provisions, when the actor “recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, a second-degree crime, “when . . . [i]t is committed recklessly,” that is, when the actor has recklessly caused death. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b.See footnote 4
In this case, the jury has acquitted defendant of aggravated manslaughter. He can be retried only for reckless manslaughter. The culpable mental state of the offense is recklessness. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3) states:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when [the actor] consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from [the actor's] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to [the actor], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. . . .
The State argues that “[i]t is obvious that the firing of a gun at another human being without checking to see if it is loaded disregards a substantial risk.” The State argues that at a minimum there must be some proof establishing that defendant “reasonably arrived at the conclusion underlying the mistake.” N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4a. To return to the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4a, does the mistake about whether the gun was loaded “negative[] the culpable mental state required to establish the offense”, or does “the law provide[] that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense”? Of itself, a belief that the gun is loaded or unloaded does not negate the culpable mental state for the crime of manslaughter. Thus, one who discharges a gun, believing it to be unloaded, is not necessarily innocent of manslaughter. See State v. Reed, 211 N.J. Super. 177, 184 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 508 (1988) (holding trial judge did not err in charging aggravated manslaughter when defendant had aimed shotgun at victim and pulled trigger without checking whether gun was loaded); Charles E. Torcia, 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 171 at 392 (15th ed. 1994) (“[M]anslaughter is committed where a defendant points a gun, which he believes unloaded, at another person, as a joke or merely to cause fright, and pulls the trigger causing the gun to be discharged, resulting in such other person's death.”)
The State notes that under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4), a defendant is criminally liable for fourth-degree aggravated assault when the actor, “[k]nowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm . . . at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded.” The State contends that a defendant should not be able to assert a mistake-of-fact defense when charged with manslaughter, if such a defense would not be available against a charge of aggravated assault. In the case of certain offenses, state of mind is simply not an essential or material element. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3).
On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment allows a defendant to assert any fact that will negate a material element of a crime. See State v. Budis, 243 N.J. Super. 498, 513 (1990), aff'd, 125 N.J. 519 (1991) (holding that bar to admission of “crucial defense evidence . . . violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights”). The material elements of manslaughter are the killing of another human being with a reckless state of mind. The culpable mental state is recklessness -- the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustified risk that death will result from the conduct. What mistaken belief will negate this state of mind?
[T]he translation is uncertain at its most critical point: in determining the kind of mistake that provides a defense when recklessness, the most common culpability level, as to a circumstance is required. Recall that a negligent or faultless mistake negates . . . recklessness. While a “negligent mistake” may be said to be an “unreasonable mistake,” all “unreasonable mistakes” are not “negligent mistakes.” A mistake may also be unreasonable because it is reckless. Reckless mistakes, although unreasonable, will not negate recklessness. Thus, when offense definitions require recklessness as to circumstance elements, as they commonly do, the reasonable-unreasonable mistake language inadequately describes the mistakes that will provide a defense because of the imprecision of the term “unreasonable mistake.” Reckless-negligent-faultless mistake language is necessary for a full and accurate description.
[Robinson & Grall, supra,
35 Stan. L. Rev. at
729.]
Thus, to disprove a reasonable mistake by proving that it is
unreasonable, will turn out to be a mixed blessing for defendant.
If the State may disprove a reasonable mistake by proving that
the mistake was unreasonable, defendant may be convicted because
he was negligent, as opposed to reckless, in forming the belief
that the gun was unloaded. If recklessness is required as an
element of the offense, “a merely negligent or faultless mistake
as to that circumstance provides a defense.” Id. at 728.See footnote 5
Correctly understood, there is no difference between a
positive and negative statement on the issue -- what is required
for liability versus what will provide a defense to liability.
Id. at 732. What is required in order to establish liability for
manslaughter is recklessness (as defined by the Code) about
whether death will result from the conduct. A faultless or
merely careless mistake may negate that reckless state of mind
and provide a defense.
How can we explain these concepts to a jury? We believe
that the better way to explain the concepts is to explain what is
required for liability to be established. The charge should be
tailored to the factual circumstances of the case. The court
should explain precisely how the offered defense plays into the
element of recklessness. See State v. Concepcion,
111 N.J. 373,
379-80 (1988) (explaining that trial courts should mold jury
instructions “in a manner that explains the law to the jury in
the context of the material facts of the case,” and holding that
“jury should have been told to measure all of defendant's
relevant conduct against the legal standard for reckless
manslaughter”) (emphasis added). Something along the following
lines will help to convey to the jury the concepts relevant to a
reckless manslaughter charge:
In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, the defendant contends that he
mistakenly believed that the gun was not
loaded. If you find that the State has not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was reckless in forming his belief
that the gun was not loaded, defendant should
be acquitted of the offense of manslaughter.
On the other hand, if you find that the State
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was reckless in forming the belief
that the gun was not loaded, and consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that a killing would result from his
conduct, then you should convict him of
manslaughter.
Undoubtedly, our Committee on Model Criminal Charges can
improve the formulation.
To sum up, evidence of an actor's mistaken belief relates to
whether the State has failed to prove an essential element of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As a practical
matter, lawyers and judges will undoubtedly continue to consider
a mistake of fact as a defense. When we do so, we must carefully
analyze the nature of the mistake in relationship to the culpable
mental state required to establish liability for the offense
charged. Despite the complexities perceived by scholars, the
limited number of appeals on this subject suggests to us that
juries have very little difficulty in applying the concepts
involved. We may assume that juries relate the instructions to
the context of the charge. For example, in the case of the
carelessly purloined umbrella, we are certain that juries would
have no difficulty in understanding that it would have been a
reasonable mistake (although perhaps a negligent mistake) for the
customer to believe that he or she was picking up the right
umbrella.
To require the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant's reasonable mistake of fact introduces an unnecessary
and perhaps unhelpful degree of complexity into the fairly
straightforward inquiry of whether defendant “consciously
disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death
would result from his conduct and that the risk was “of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involve[d] a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.”
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The
matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK,
GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
NO. A-23 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RONALD SEXTON,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED July 15, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
Footnote: 1The MPC's provision covers both mistake of fact and mistake of law. We confine this discussion to mistake of fact. Footnote: 2 Comment 1 to Model Penal Code § 2.04 stated: “To put the matter as this subsection does is not to say anything that would not otherwise be true, even if no provision on the subject were made.” Footnote: 3 A separate provision covers death by auto. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. Footnote: 4 Murders committed in the heat of passion, and causing the death of another while fleeing from law enforcement, are also characterized as manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b. Footnote: 5Wisconsin sidesteps the problem by concluding that the subjective state of mind of one who is charged with criminal negligence is simply irrelevant. A bow hunter cannot claim that he mistakenly believed his companion was elsewhere when he shot him in the leg. State v. Lindvig, 555 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). But note that the culpable mental state is negligence.