SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3229-99T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SONYA JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________
Submitted November 26, 2001 - Decided January 10, 2002
Before Judges Havey, Coburn, and
Weissbard.
On appeal from the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer
County, 99-03-0320.
Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender,
attorney for appellant (Olivia Belfatto
Crisp, Designated Counsel, of counsel
and on the brief).
John J. Farmer, Jr., attorney for
respondent (Analisa Sama Holmes, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEISSBARD, J.A.D.
Defendant, Sonya Jones, appeals from her conviction after a
trial by jury on a single count indictment charging interference
with custody, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4a(4). Defendant
had been on probation for passing a bad check and her conviction
on the interference charge resulted in a violation of the
probation. On January 21, 2000, defendant was sentenced to a
nine-year prison term on the jury trial conviction and a
concurrent five-year term on the bad check charge. Finding error
in the instructions to the jury, we reverse the interference
conviction and remand for a new trial. As a result, we also
vacate the concurrent sentence which was predicated upon the
interference conviction under Indictment No. 97-01-0005.
Defendant and Roland Jones divorced in July 1995, after
approximately eighteen years of marriage. At the time of the
divorce, they had three children, Roland Jr., born May 25, 1979,
Marissa, born September 27, 1980, and Cody, born October 10,
1984. Their daughter, Marissa, subsequently died in 1994 of a
heart ailment.
Defendant and Jones entered into a property settlement and
custody agreement. The agreement, drafted by defendant, provided
for the division of their assets and the custody of their
children. The consent judgment of divorce incorporated the
agreement.
With respect to custody, the agreement provided, in
pertinent part, as follows:
1. The Wife and Husband shall have joint
custody of the minor children born of the
marriage as follows:
a. Commencing with every Friday
evening, the party having custody
shall relinquish custody to the
other party for the period of one
(1) week.
b. The minor children will be
available to both parties on
holidays, as shall be worked out
between the parties.
c. Either party may temporarily
remove the children from the State
of New Jersey for a reasonable
period of time and only upon
reasonable notice to the other
party.
The agreement further provided that:
A modification or waiver of any of the
provisions of this Agreement shall be
effective only if made in writing and
executed with the same formality as this
Agreement. The failure of either party to
insist on performance or any other provision
of this Agreement shall not be construed as a
waiver of any subsequent default of the same
or similar nature.
Although the agreement was never modified in writing, it was
substantially modified by conduct; for some unspecified period of
time Roland Jr. lived exclusively with his father, and commencing
on June 15, 1998 Cody lived with defendant, spending only four
days with Jones during that entire summer.
On September 26, 1998, defendant purchased two one-way
airline tickets to Lima, Peru and on September 28, 1998 Cody, who
was just two weeks shy of his fourteenth birthday, left with
defendant for Peru.See footnote 11 Defendant did not inform Jones about the
trip. On October 1, 1998, Jones received a call from defendant's
landlord, presumably inquiring of defendant's whereabouts, as a
result of which he called Cody's school and learned that he had
not been in attendance. Jones then called the police and
reported his son missing. Jones also returned to court and
obtained an order granting him sole custody of Cody effective
October 16, 1998.
With the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), defendant and Cody were located in Bolivia in December
1998. Jones flew to Bolivia and returned to the United States
with his son. Defendant was arrested by local authorities in
Bolivia and returned to the United States where she was arrested
and taken into custody.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:
POINT I. THE COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A
FAIR TRIAL IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S
TEEN-AGE SON TO TESTIFY, THUS DEPRIVING HER
OF HER RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.
POINT II. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONDUCT A
HEARING PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 104(a) AND TO
PERMIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE STATE'S MAIN
WITNESS REGARDING THE ORAL MODIFICATION OF
THE DIVORCE AGREEMENT ON CUSTODY ISSUES
VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
AND THE ABILITY TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.
POINT III. THE COURT, IN ITS CHARGE,
CONFUSED THE JURY IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS THAT
THE DEFENDANT "TOOK" HER SON FROM THE CUSTODY
OF HIS FATHER WITHOUT DEFINING THIS TERM AND
THEN IN REPEATING THIS CHARGE IN RESPONSE TO
A QUESTION, THUS DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A
FAIR TRIAL.
POINT IV. THE COURT'S RULINGS EXHIBITED A
CLEAR BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION, THUS
DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT V. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 IS OVERBROAD IN
THAT IN INFRINGES UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT AND
CHILD, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT VI. THE SENTENCE WAS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE IN THAT DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE
RECEIVED THE MINIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT
FOR A SECOND DEGREE OFFENSE.
We find merit in Point III, although not for the precise
reasons argued by defendant. We address that issue first and
then comment briefly on other issues that may surface again in
the event of a retrial.
I.
The statute in question provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:See footnote 22
a. Custody of children.
A person, including a parent, guardian or
other lawful custodian, is guilty of
interference with custody if he:
* * *
(4) After the issuance of a temporary
or final order specifying custody,
joint custody rights or parenting
time, takes, detains, entices or
conceals a minor child from the
other parent in violation of the
custody or parenting time order.
Interference with custody is a
crime of the third degree but the
presumption of non-imprisonment set
forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.
2C:44-1 for a first offense of a
crime of the third degree shall not
apply. However, if the child is
taken, detained, enticed or
concealed outside the United
States, interference with custody
is a crime of the second degree.
The court charged the jury as follows with respect to the
elements of this offense:
In order for you to find the defendant guilty
of the crime of interference with custody,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the following:
One, that there was a court order
governing the custody of Cody
Jones.
Two, that on September 28, 1998,
Cody Jones was less than 18 years
of age.
Three, that the defendant took Cody
Jones from the custody of his
parent, Roland Jones.
Four, that the defendant took Cody
Jones outside the United States.
Five, that the defendant's conduct
was in violation of a judgment of
this Court.
And, six, that the defendant acted
knowingly.
It is charged, and you must find as
an element of the offense in order
to convict, that the defendant took
Cody Jones from the custody of his
parent, Roland Jones.
The State is not required to prove
that Cody Jones was in the physical
custody of his father at the time
of the taking. If the removal of
Cody Jones from the United States
interfered with his father's
parenting rights under the judgment
of divorce which incorporated the
property settlement agreement, then
a taking as required by law has
been established.
The court also charged the applicable mental state as being
"knowingly."
Defense counsel objected to the final portion of the charge
suggesting that the court should have simply "[stuck] to the
statutory language." Noting that in summation defense counsel
had argued that Jones' custody rights had to be interfered with
and also noting the "ambiguity of the word 'taking' [the court]
concluded that the jury had to be instructed [as to] what taking
meant." When pressed by the court as to whether the instruction
was legally erroneous, defense counsel responded:
The question, I suppose, is what's a
violation, Judge. And reasonable men will
differ, I include myself in that category
rather liberally. I consider myself
reasonable. I think that under the
circumstances of this family, where there was
an oral modification of this provision which
has not been allowed before the finder of the
fact and where there was a history of doing
it yourself legally, where there was a
history of Roland, Junior living full-time
with the father without any modification
reduced to writing or brought to court, where
there was a history of the son Cody Jones
staying not just without objection from the
father, but with agreement from the father
who then treated Cody Jones as if the father
was the wounded party and the party rejected
him, as a passive aggressive display of his
own hurt feelings, like a typical knuckle-
headed guy.
In response to the court's further inquiry as to whether
"there is anything legally wrong with the proposition that a
taking does not have to be from the physical custody of one
parent or the other," counsel could only state, "I think this is
a statute which needs further fine tuning . . . ."
Shortly after beginning deliberations, the court received
the following note from the jury:
Dear Judge,
Could you define the law in reference to Item
#3 in Outline for Jurors,See footnote 33 "That the
Defendant took Cody Jones from the custody of
his parent, Roland Jones." If Mrs. Jones had
physical custody, how does this relate to
custody?
In reply, the court sent a note back to the jury repeating,
in essence, key language from the charge. The court replied as
follows:
It is charged that the defendant took Cody
Jones from the custody of his father, Roland
Jones.
The State is not required to prove that Cody
Jones was in the physical custody of his
father at the time of the taking.
If the removal of Cody Jones from the United
States interfered with his father's parenting
under the Judgment of Divorce which
incorporated the Property Settlement/Custody
Agreement, then "taking" has been
established.
The jury returned its verdict about twenty-five minutes
later.
On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in two
respects in charging the jury. First, she contends that the word
taking is not one that is self-explanatory and, as a result, the
court should have guided the jury by providing a definition of
that word. Second, defendant contends that the court,
particularly in response to the jury's question which indicated
some confusion on the issue of how taking related to custody,
should have "tailored the charge to the facts of the case." The
State responds, essentially, that the charge was adequate,
particularly without the guidance of a Model Jury Charge, and
that taking did not need to be defined for the jury.
As to the definition of "taking," we disagree with
defendant's argument. In the context of this case we do not
believe the jury needed any further definition of that term,
which, we assume, would have come from a dictionary. Defendant
"took" her son to South America in any accepted sense of the
word. Indeed, we do not understand her to dispute that fact; it
was essentially conceded in summation. This is not a case where
the word was susceptible of varying interpretations or was
technical in nature. Words "used by ordinary citizens in
everyday conversation" need not be defined for the jury. State
v. Afanador,
134 N.J. 162, 171, 175 (1993). There was no danger
that the jury could have been misled without a definition of
taking.
We also perceive no error in the court instructing the jury
that there need not be a taking from physical custody but simply
a taking that interfered with the father's parenting rights.
Indeed, that is the language of the statute itself, which
prohibits taking the child in violation of "the parenting time
order." Thus, we suggest that the court did not, at least
initially, set out the elements of the offense properly, at least
in the context of this case, by stating as element three that
"the defendant took Cody Jones from the custody of his parent,
Roland Jones." The reference should have been to parenting time
instead of custody; the same being true of the reference to
custody in element one. However, the court's additional
explanation clarified the matter and there was no prejudice to
defendant.
Nevertheless, we do agree with defendant that the court
erred in failing to relate the law to the facts, particularly
with respect to whether the taking actually deprived Roland Jones
of rights under the custody order or whether he had, by his
conduct, waived those rights or, alternatively, whether he and
defendant had, by their mutual conduct, modified the agreement.
The failure to do so, we conclude, constituted error.
The present case demonstrates once again that "[i]t is not
always sufficient 'simply to read the applicable provisions of
the Criminal Code, define the terminology, and set forth the
elements of the crime.'" State v. Martin,
119 N.J. 2, 18 (1990)
(quoting State v. Concepcion,
111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988)). There
are times, and this case presents one, when "the court should
mold its instructions to the factual hypotheses of the parties."
Ibid. (citing State v. Concepcion, supra, 111 N.J. at 380). "The
purpose of a trial court's instruction is to 'explain the law to
the jury in the context of the material facts of the case.'"
State v. Martini,
131 N.J. 176, 271 (1993) (quoting State v.
Concepcion, supra, 111 N.J. at 379); see also State v. Sexton,
160 N.J. 93, 106 (1999).
The court's failure in this case to tailor the charge to the
facts likely resulted from the very narrow view the court took of
the statutory requirements. Thus, when defense counsel sought to
cross-examine Jones concerning his relationship with Cody,
arguing that the parties to the agreement appeared to have
"treated the situation as if the child was to stay with the
mother," the court found the evidence irrelevant. The court
opined that the matters that counsel sought to explore were "for
naught in light of the property settlement agreement incorporated
into the judgment of divorce. It is what it is. It's an order
of the court." When counsel complained that the court's approach
was "very close to strict liability," and precluded proof of
"variations on the custody agreement which are conveniently gone
along with," the court agreed that "in all fairness, the Court
does view this as a strict . . . rather strict liability type
statute, there's no other way for the Court to read it."
The court rejected counsel's view,
that the interest of justice demand that more
of the res gestae setting be developed for
the purposes of the jury considering . . . in
connection with their deliberations what the
interests of justice are.
The court thereupon summed up its view as follows:
The issue here, as the Court sees it, is
rather simple, was there . . . was there an
order of the Court? Was the order of the
Court violated? Did the defendant violate
that order knowingly? And the Court is not
about to undertake a new custody hearing. It
is not about to revisit the divorce
proceedings. It is going to limit this trial
to the issues that the Court has just
defined: The existence of an order, the
violation of the order, if any, and the
defendant's state of mind, if any.
In order to explain to the jury why defense counsel's cross-
examination appeared to be restricted, the court then told the
jury,
Ladies and gentlemen, just so that you
understand, the Court is not hiding things
from you. The Court has made rulings in this
matter. And the rulings essentially are
these: That the Court here, for the purposes
of this trial, is not concerned with the
relationship or the divorce proceedings
between Mr. and Mrs. Jones. That the focus
of this case is simply this. Was there a
court order in existence? Was the court
order violated? Did the defendant violate
that court order knowingly?
The Court is not going to reopen a dispute
that was resolved years ago which this Court,
at least, has determined, the judge has a
matter of law, that it is not relevant to
this case. Might be interesting, but the
Court has concluded that it is not relevant
to the resolution of this matter.
So, that is why Mr. Hamilton, who represents
Mrs. Jones, has been rather constricted in
the questions that he can ask here.
Again, it's a legal ruling of the Court and
if this Court is in error in its rulings,
there are Appellate Courts that will review
these proceedings and can correct the error
if the Court is wrong. But that's the ruling
that applies here in this courtroom for this
trial.
We take a somewhat different view of the matter. One of the
critical issues was whether defendant's admitted taking of Cody
actually deprived his father of parenting time. In that regard,
the precise terms of the settlement agreement, embodied in the
judgment of divorce, were not dispositive. That agreement, and
with it the court order effectuating it, could be modified by the
conduct of the parties. See Schuler v. Cmty. First Nat. Bank,
999 P.2d 1303, 1305 n.1 (Wyo. 2000) ("[I]f the parties mutually
adopt a mode of performing their contract differing from its
strict terms or if they mutually relax the contract's terms by
adopting a loose mode of executing them, neither party can go
back upon the past and insist upon a breach because the contract
was not fulfilled according to its letter." (citing Quin Blair
Enters., Inc. v. Julien Constr. Co.,
597 P.2d 945, 951 n.6 (Wyo.
1979))); 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:30 (4th ed. 2000). We
see no reason why these contract principles are not applicable to
this case where the alleged criminal conduct is based upon an
agreement between the parties later embodied in a court judgment.
Indeed, even if this were a criminal contempt proceeding for
violation of the court order, the fact that the parties had
modified the order by their conduct would be highly relevant.
Cf. State v. Wilmouth,
302 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 1997) (Where
domestic violence restraining order prohibited father of child
from having any contact or communication with child's mother,
there was no violation of order where father spoke with mother
about future visitation when dropping off child since parties'
prior conduct constituted "ad hoc modification of the order to
[permit communication in order] to change the stipulated place of
drop off and pick up.")
In this case, a jury could have found that a substantial
modification of the agreement, and order, did take place; Cody's
father had apparently given up his right to parenting time as set
forth in the agreement. Since June 15, 1998, Cody had only been
with his father once or twice, for a few days each, rather than
every other week as provided in the agreement. Indeed, the
father's contact between visits was apparently so sporadic that
he only learned of Cody's disappearance when called by
defendant's landlord. We may assume that if Cody had remained
away for an extended period, as defendant planned, Jones would,
at some point, have sought parenting time with Cody.
Nevertheless, this was a criminal trial and the jury was entitled
to hear the relevant facts and to understand how those facts fit
into the legal framework of the charge; only then could the jury
determine whether defendant had been shown to have violated the
statute beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court's obligation to clarify the law for the jury was
even more apparent when the jury requested reinstruction on this
very issue, only to have the judge repeat "the abstract
definition that left the jury uncertain in the first place."
State v. Concepcion, supra, 111 N.J. at 381. Rather, the court's
instruction, based on its view of the case as being close to
"strict liability," "reasonably could have had the effect of
directing a guilty verdict." State v. Hackett,
166 N.J. 66, 85
(2001).
Although defense counsel did not articulate this position at
trial as clearly as might be desired, we conclude that he
sufficiently alerted the trial court to the issue so as to avoid
any necessity of evaluating this claim as "plain error." In any
event, even under that rigorous standard we find the error such
as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
R. 2:10-2; State v. Hock,
54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 930,
90 S. Ct. 2254,
26 L. Ed.2d 797 (1970).
II.
Because the case must be retried, we need only comment
briefly on defendant's contentions that the court erred in
barring certain proffered testimony by Cody and by restricting
defendant's cross-examination of Jones.
With respect to Cody, defendant proffered that he would
testify about the circumstances of the trip, that he had been
actively involved in planning the trip, that the trip was meant
to be educational and Cody had brought his school books with him,
that the trip was planned to last a year, and that he did not
have a good relationship with his father. The court ruled that
the testimony would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, merely
being an attempt to engender sympathy or generate confusion. See
N.J.R.E. 403. Based upon the proffer, the court's ruling did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. See State v. Morton,
155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
121 S. Ct. 1380,
149 L. Ed.2d 306 (2001); State v. Collier,
316 N.J. Super. 181, 193
(App. Div. 1998), aff'd,
162 N.J. 27 (1999). Virtually all of
the suggested testimony was irrelevant; that is, it did not have
a sufficient relationship to any material fact actually in issue
in the case. See N.J.R.E. 401; see also N.J.R.E. 402; State v.
Covell,
157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999); State v. Hutchins,
241 N.J.
Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990). Clearly, Cody's testimony did
not provide his mother with a defense under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4c(3),
nor did his strained relationship with his father rise to the
level where it would pose an "imminent danger to his welfare"
under N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4c(1).
Nevertheless, on retrial Cody may have relevant testimony
concerning the manner in which the agreement between his parents
was modified, particularly from the summer of 1998 until his
departure in late September. If so, then such testimony would be
admissible.
Similarly, for the reasons stated previously, cross-
examination of Jones in this same area should be permitted. This
does not mean, however, that defendant has free rein to inquire
into every aspect of Jones' personal life. It is only evidence
that would bear on the manner in which the agreement was modified
that we sanction. The extent and manner of the examination
remains under the control of the trial judge, N.J.R.E. 611(a),
subject to defendant's overriding constitutional right to present
a defense. State v. Dimitrov,
325 N.J. Super. 506, 510 (App.
Div. 1999), certif. denied,
163 N.J. 79 (2000).
III.
Defendant contends that the trial judge exhibited bias in
favor of the prosecution, thereby depriving her of a fair trial.
We reject that argument. Although, as we have noted, the trial
judge took a constricted view of the statute and thereby fell
into error, we detect no bias. The judge treated defense counsel
with courtesy and gave him every opportunity to spread his
objection on the record and to make proffers of excluded
evidence. This contention is unfounded.
IV.
We reject defendant's claim that the statute is overbroad in
that it infringes on the constitutionally protected relationship
between parent and child. We begin with the strong presumption
that a statute is constitutional. State v. Muhammad,
145 N.J. 23, 41 (1996). The party challenging the constitutionality of a
statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality.
State v. One 1990 Honda Accord,
154 N.J. 373, 377 (1998),
clarification denied,
156 N.J. 378 (1998). It is presumed that
the Legislature acted with existing constitutional law in mind
and intended the statute to function in a constitutional manner.
NYT Cable TV v. Homestead at Mansfield, Inc.,
111 N.J. 21, 26
(1988).
The test for determining whether a statute is overly broad
is whether the statute "reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." City of Houston v. Hill,
482 U.S. 451, 458,
107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508,
96 L. Ed.2d 398, 410
(1987); State v. Mortimer,
135 N.J. 517, 530 (1994), certif.
denied,
513 U.S. 970,
115 S. Ct. 440,
130 L. Ed.2d 351 (1994);
Binkowski v. State,
322 N.J. Super. 359, 375 (App. Div. 1999).
Indeed, the doctrine of overbreadth is usually restricted to
limitations on First Amendment rights. State v. Rodriquez, 264
N.J. Super. 261, 273 (App. Div.), aff'd
135 N.J. 3 (1993).
Defendant contends that N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 is overbroad
because it constitutes excessive governmental intrusion into the
family relationship, adding that the statute is flawed because it
fails to distinguish between a parent who merely takes a child on
a prolonged vacation, as in defendant's case, and a parent who
permanently removes a child to another jurisdiction. For
support, defendant cites H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 410,
101 S. Ct. 1164, 1171,
67 L. Ed.2d 388, 399 (1981), which held that
the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected and
that parents are responsible for the care, custody, and nurturing
of their children.
Defendant's argument fails because the statute authorizes
only limited governmental intrusion into the parent-child
relationship in specific circumstances _- when a parent takes a
child, in this case outside the United States, in violation of a
valid custody order. Because the statute identifies with
specificity what aspect of the parent-child relationship is
criminal, it cannot be said that the statute substantially
infringes upon a parent's right to make decisions for his or her
child. The statute further limits the criminalization of
parental behavior by providing four affirmative defenses, and
allowing a parent to escape conviction if the parent can show
that (1) the child was in imminent danger; or (2) the parent
reasonably believed consent had been given; or (3) the child had
consented and was over the age of fourteen; or (4) the parent
believed he or she was in imminent physical danger from the other
parent. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(c), (d); see also Wilkins v. State,
985 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that child
stealing statute was not overbroad because statute did not
criminalize every activity with child by one parent but strictly
prohibited malicious, forcible, or fraudulent taking of child
with intent to detain and conceal from other parent), cert.
denied,
528 U.S. 1086,
120 S. Ct. 813,
145 L. Ed.2d 685 (2000).
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 is not overbroad; it specifies a narrow
range of parental acts that constitute the offense of
interference of custody and therefore does not substantially
interfere with a parent's right to rear his or her child.
V.
Defendant argues, finally, that her sentence was manifestly
excessive. We need not address that issue at this time except to
note the following: (1) the court could have sentenced defendant
to an extended term as a persistent offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7a(3), but did not do so; (2) the court did not "double count" by
considering the length of time Cody was out of the country, see
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4f(2); (3) however, it does appear, as defendant
argues, that one or more mitigating factors were present. The
court will be free to evaluate the matter again if there is a
subsequent conviction and sentencing.
VI.
Because defendant's sentence on the violation of probation
was predicated upon her conviction for interference with custody,
that conviction must be set aside as well.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Footnote: 1 1 If Cody had been fourteen, his consent would have
provided defendant with a complete defense to the charge.
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4c(3).
Footnote: 2 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4 was amended by L.1997, c. 299, § 7 to
substitute references to "parenting time" for references to
visitation. Subsequent amendments by L.1999, c. 190, § 2 are not
applicable in this case because they were effective August 31,
1999, after the date of the events which led to defendant's
prosecution.
Footnote: 3 3 The Outline For Jurors was a written statement of the
elements of the offense, as follows:
INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY - COUNT 1
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of the crime
of Interference with Custody, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the following:
1. That there was a court order governing the custody of
Cody Jones.
2. That on September 28, 1998, Cody Jones was less than 18
years of age.
3. That the defendant took Cody Jones from the custody of
his parent, Roland Jones.
4. That the defendant took Cody Jones outside the United
States.
5. That the defendant's conduct was in violation of a
judgment of this court.
6. That the defendant acted knowingly.