SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2776-94T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAKE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
Submitted March 26, 1996 - Decided April 23, 1996
Before Judges Baime, Villanueva, and Kimmelman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.
Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender,
attorney for appellant (Lon Taylor,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel and on the letter-brief).
Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Marcy H. Geraci,
Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BAIME, J.A.D.
Defendant was charged with two counts of first degree "carjacking" (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a(1)), third degree possession of a handgun without a permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b), two counts of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a), and third degree theft by receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7). A jury found defendant guilty of
one count of carjacking, the lesser-included offense of third
degree theft (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) on the other carjacking count,
and theft by receiving stolen property. Defendant was acquitted
of the remaining charges. The trial court merged the convictions
and sentenced defendant to a custodial term of ten years with a
five year parole disqualifier on the carjacking count.
On appeal, defendant argues (1) his motion for a judgment of
acquittal was improperly denied, (2) the trial court committed
plain error in its instructions on carjacking, and (3) the
sentence imposed was "cruel and unusual." For the reasons that
follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.
On September 25, 1993, Jason Sinclair and William Wagner
borrowed an automobile belonging to Sinclair's mother and drove
to Newark to purchase cocaine. After buying the drugs, the two
men drove away by a circuitous route in order to escape police
detection. According to the State's evidence, at a stop sign
defendant approached the passenger side of the automobile and put
a gun to Wagner's head. Both Wagner and Sinclair were ordered to
exit the vehicle. After relieving Wagner of some money and the
cocaine he had just purchased, defendant ordered Sinclair to give
him the keys to the car or he would shoot him. Ultimately,
defendant obtained the keys and drove away. Defendant and Louise
Jarrel, who was indicted only on the theft by receiving stolen
property count, were arrested while seated in the stolen
automobile several days later. Following the arrest, both
Sinclair and Wagner positively identified defendant's photograph
as that of their assailant. Shortly before trial, defendant
telephoned Wagner and unsuccessfully attempted to stop him from
testifying.
Defendant's version of the incident was markedly different.
According to defendant, he assisted Sinclair and Wagner in
purchasing drugs. When Wagner and Sinclair refused to give him
his fair share of the drugs, defendant retaliated by locking them
out of the car. More specifically, defendant testified that
while he, Wagner and Sinclair stood beside the automobile, he
pushed Wagner aside, jumped into the driver's seat, locked the
passenger door and drove away. Defendant admitted that he kept
the car for four days and changed the license plates.
We reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal respecting the count charging carjacking from Wagner. The applicable statute provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of carjacking if in the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle . . . or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle he:
(1) inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon
an occupant or person in possession or
control of a motor vehicle . . . .
An act shall be deemed to be "in the course
of committing an unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle" if it occurs during an attempt to
commit the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
or during an immediate flight after the
attempt or commission.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a.]
The indictment charged defendant with two counts of
carjacking. One count charged defendant with carjacking from
Sinclair, and the other charged him with carjacking from Wagner.
The jury acquitted defendant of the count alleging a carjacking
from Sinclair but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of
third degree theft. The jury found defendant guilty of the count
charging a carjacking from Wagner. Citing the split verdict,
defendant asserts that the jury clearly disbelieved the State's
version of the carjacking incident but rather found his own
testimony to be credible. He thus contends that (1) because
Wagner had already exited the vehicle and was standing outside of
it when he was shoved aside, he was not an "occupant" of the
vehicle when the unlawful taking occurred, and (2) the pushing of
Wagner did not constitute the use of "force."
Initially, we observe that defendant's argument disregards
the applicable standard for deciding a motion for a judgment of
acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case. The test for
determination of such an application is whether a jury could
reasonably find the defendant guilty, viewing the State's
evidence in its entirety, and giving the prosecution the benefit
of all its favorable testimony and the legitimate inferences
which can reasonably be drawn from the proofs. See State v.
Reyes,
50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); R. 3:18-1. At the time the
trial court ruled on defendant's motion, the jury had not yet
returned its verdict, and it would have been error had the
State's version of the crime not been considered. Even if
defendant had renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal
after the jury's verdict, however, the same standard would be
applicable. See State v. Kluber,
130 N.J. Super. 336, 341-42
(App. Div. 1974), certif. denied,
67 N.J. 72 (1975); R. 3:18-2.
It would have been grossly improper for the trial court to have
ignored the evidence favorable to the prosecution.
Although not critical to our disposition of this issue, we
add for the sake of completeness that the jury's acquittal of
defendant with respect to the count charging carjacking from
Sinclair does not necessarily mean that the factfinders rejected
all of the State's evidence. But even if that were the case, we
have long upheld inconsistent verdicts. See United States v.
Powell,
469 U.S. 57, 67,
105 S.Ct. 471, 478,
83 L.Ed.2d 461, 470
(1984); State v. Petties,
139 N.J. 310, 319 (1995); State v.
Kamienski,
254 N.J. Super. 75, 95 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
130 N.J. 18 (1992); State v. Still,
112 N.J. Super. 368, 373
(App. Div. 1970), certif. denied,
57 N.J. 600 (1971). The United
States Supreme Court has said that "[c]onsistency in the verdict
is not necessary," that "[e]ach count . . . is regarded as if it
was a separate indictment," and that "acquittal on one [count
cannot] be pleaded as res judicata of the other." Dunn v. United
States,
284 U.S. 390, 393,
52 S.Ct. 189, 190,
76 L.Ed. 356, 358-59 (1932). Thus, even were we to view the evidence and verdict
from the vantage point of twenty-twenty hindsight, the result
would not be different; the denial of defendant's motion for a
judgment of acquittal would be sustained.
Beyond this, defendant's own testimony, even if believed in
full, would not lead irresistably to an acquittal of the count
charging carjacking from Wagner. We do not construe N.J.S.A.
2C:15-2 as requiring that the defendant use force against an
"occupant" of an automobile only when the victim is within the
actual structure of the vehicle. The broad aim of the statute is
to enhance the punishment applicable to persons who use force or
intimidation "to gain possession of [a] motor vehicle." Cannel,
New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment on N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2
(1995). We interpret the statutory language consonant with this
objective.
Under the statute, the use of force or the threat of force
is deemed to be "`in the course of committing an unlawful taking
of a motor vehicle' if it occurs during an attempt to commit the
unlawful taking . . . or during an immediate flight after the
attempt or commission." N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2. Whether the occupant
or person in possession or control over the automobile is
actually situated within the structure of the vehicle when force
is employed or threatened is irrelevant under this statutory
language.
We add that defendant's strained reading of the law would
yield anomalous results. It would mean that a criminal who
places a gun to the head of an unsuspecting victim who is loading
groceries into his or her car would not fall within the reach of
the statute. We need not describe a litany of similar factual
scenarios to illustrate the absurdity of defendant's argument.
Suffice it to say, Wagner was no less an "occupant" of the
automobile merely because he temporarily stepped out of the car.
We are also unpersuaded by defendant's claim that his
pushing Wagner did not constitute the use of force. We need not
resort to the science of physics to determine whether the force
used was sufficient to elevate the crime from theft to
carjacking. Cf. State v. Sein,
124 N.J. 209, 217-18 (1991).
Suffice it to say that defendant's use of force was necessary to
"`wrest [control of] the object of [the] theft from the victim.'"
Id. at 216 (quoting Statement of the Senate Judiciary Committee
to Senate Bill 885, (Apr. 21, 1980)).
Defendant's remaining contentions clearly lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Defendant's attack upon the trial court's instructions does not require extended discussion. We merely note that defendant did not interpose an objection to the charge at trial, and, in any event, the charge fairly and accurately conveyed the appropriate legal principles.
We thus turn to defendant's claim that the sentence required by N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Carjacking is a first degree crime, but it is nonetheless punishable by a term of imprisonment between ten and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2b. The statute also requires imposition of at least a five year parole disqualifier. Ibid. We are entirely satisfied that the punishment imposed by the statute conforms with contemporary standards of decency and is neither
grossly disproportionate to the offense nor substantially
unrelated to an appropriate penological objective. See State v.
Maldonado,
137 N.J. 536, 556-57 (1994); State v. Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 169 (1987); State v. Des Marets,
92 N.J. 62, 82 (1983).
In reaching this conclusion, we afford substantial deference to
the authority of the Legislature to determine the types and
limits of punishments for crimes. Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277,
290,
103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009,
77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649 (1983); Coker v.
Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592,
97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866,
53 L.Ed.2d 982,
989 (1977). See also Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957,
111 S.Ct. 2680,
115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (plurality opinion of Scalia,
J.). We do not view the crime committed here as an isolated
event unassociated with a pressing public problem. Carjacking is
a calculated crime, and the Legislature could reasonably have
concluded that the needs of society dictate that the punishment
more nearly fit the offense than the offender. The Legislature
clearly gave priority to punishment as a deterrent to others and
as an aid to law enforcement. We find no illegality in the
sentence imposed.
Affirmed.