SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2178-96T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PANTHER VALLEY PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Argued September 22, 1997 - Decided January
15, 1998
Before Judges Havey, Landau and Newman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Warren County.
Edward A. Berman argued the cause for
appellant (Hersh, Ramsey & Berman, P.C.,
attorneys; J. David Ramsey, of counsel;
Mr. Berman, on the brief).
John J. O'Reilly, Warren County Prosecutor,
and Laura M. Lynch, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Ms. Lynch,
of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HAVEY, P.J.A.D.
Panther Valley is a gated residential community located in
Allamuchy Township, Warren County. The community consists of
over 2,000 single-family homes, townhouses and condominium units.
The roads within the community are owned and maintained by
defendant Panther Valley Property Owners Association (PVPOA), a
New Jersey nonprofit corporation. In 1976, PVPOA filed a
request, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1, that municipal or state
law enforcement officials assume jurisdiction over the
community's private roads in the enforcement of motor vehicle
laws under Title 39. The request was approved by the Township
and Commissioner of Transportation.
Plaintiff State of New Jersey, through the Warren County
Prosecutor, filed a verified complaint and order to show cause in
the Law Division to enjoin PVPOA from enforcing its own rules and
regulations and imposing fines upon residents of the community
for speeding and careless or reckless driving. The trial judge
granted summary judgment to plaintiff, concluding that once PVPOA
ceded authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws under Title 39
to the State, PVPOA had no power to impose fines for motor
vehicle violations under the provisions of its bylaws.
PVPOA now appeals, claiming that: (1) the prosecutor had no
standing to challenge its bylaws by the institution of this suit;
and (2) PVPOA retained coextensive powers to promulgate and
enforce its own traffic regulations on its private roads pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3. We reject both contentions and affirm.
In 1968, Panther Valley's developer incorporated PVPOA and
delegated to it the authority to maintain and administer the
community's common property, including parks, playgrounds, open
spaces and other facilities held for the benefit of the
residents. Under the terms of the deed of conveyance and the
association's bylaws, individuals purchasing property within the
community automatically become members of PVPOA. PVPOA owns and
maintains the private roads within the community.
In 1976, PVPOA submitted a written request to the Allamuchy
Township Clerk that the Township assume jurisdiction over moving
motor vehicle violations under Title 39 occurring on PVPOA's
private roads. That request was made pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1, which provides:
Upon the filing of a written request by
a person . . . or by the board of trustees of
any corporation or other institution of a
public or semipublic character not for
pecuniary profit, incorporated under Title 15
of the Revised Statutes, with the clerk of
any municipality of this State within which
the property of such person, corporation or
institution is situate, that the provisions
of subtitle 1, Title 39, of the Revised
Statutes shall be made applicable to the
semipublic or private roads, streets, . . .
open to or used by the public . . . for
purposes of vehicular travel by permission of
such persons, corporations or institutions
and not as matter of public right, the
provisions of subtitle 1, Title 39 . . .
shall, in the discretion of the municipal
authorities vested with the police powers in
the locality within which the property . . .
is situate, and with the approval of the
Commissioner of Transportation of this State,
be made applicable thereto.
Allamuchy Township and the State Commissioner of Transportation
approved the request and, on February 20, 1976, the Commissioner
established speed limits governing Panther Valley's private
roads.
PVPOA's rules and regulations state that:
The laws and ordinances of the state and
local municipalities will be enforced only by
the State Police or by the appropriate State
and/or Municipal authorities.
Also, a sign at the entrance of the community advises that "all
traffic regulations enforced under New Jersey Title 39."
In April 1995, PVPOA amended its rules and regulations
declaring that "Driving in excess of the posted speed limits and
Reckless and/or Careless driving are prohibited." The rules
establish a schedule of fines, which vary according to the number
of the offender's previous violations and the recorded speed in
excess of the posted speed limit. The collection of a fine is
enforceable by the imposition of a lien upon the residence of the
PVPOA member, even if a tenant of that member commits the
violation.
Grady W. Cook, PVPOA's general manager, enforces PVPOA's
speeding regulations by utilizing a K-15 radar unit to monitor
speed. When a vehicle is observed speeding, Cook sends a letter
to the residence to which the vehicle is registered. The letter
advises the member of the amount of the fine being assessed and
his or her right to a hearing before the Covenants Committee.
Reckless and careless driving violations are instituted only
by citizens' complaints.See footnote 1 These complaints include passing over
a double yellow line, passing a stopped school bus and
tailgating. Upon written complaint for reckless or careless
driving, Cook sends the alleged violator a notice of hearing
before the Covenants Committee, and the matter is handled in the
same manner as speeding violations.
Since the 1995 amendments to the rules and regulations and
their publication, 136 fines have been assessed against members.
Of the 136 fines, 126 were assessed for speeding, and 10 for
reckless and careless driving. In four instances, PVPOA members
were fined for their tenants' alleged motor vehicle violations.
On March 22, 1995, PVPOA sent a letter to Elinor Mulligan, a
Panther Valley resident, informing her of a speeding violation.
In response, Mulligan advised John J. O'Reilly, the Warren County
Prosecutor, of PVPOA's practice of levying fines against its
members for moving motor vehicle violations. O'Reilly, on behalf
of the State of New Jersey, filed a verified complaint and order
to show cause against PVPOA seeking to enjoin the practice.
In granting the State summary judgment, the motion judge
first concluded that the County prosecutor, on behalf of the
State, had standing to institute the action. He reasoned that,
as the County's chief law enforcement officer, the prosecutor has
the power to supervise the enforcement of motor vehicle laws
within the County. The judge was of the view that, since PVPOA's
enforcement of its motor vehicle rules and regulations may
adversely affect law enforcement activities as they relate to the
Panther Valley community, there is a substantial public interest
in resolving the question whether private associations have
coextensive enforcement powers.
As to the merits, the judge first determined that PVPOA was
"indirectly" governed by the Condominium Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to
-38, because the Panther Valley community contained some
condominium units. That Act specifically prohibits a condominium
association from imposing fines for moving motor vehicle
violations when, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1, the condominium
association has requested the State to assume jurisdiction over
its private roadways. See N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15f. Alternatively,
the judge concluded that once PVPOA elected to cede jurisdiction
over the private roads to state and local law enforcement
agencies, the association retained no coextensive power to
enforce its own motor vehicle rules and regulations.
We agree with the motion judge that the County Prosecutor, as chief law enforcement officer of Warren County, see N.J.S.A. 2A:158-5, had the right to seek declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the breadth of PVPOA's power to fine its members for motor vehicle violations. See State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 167 (1953); Ruvoldt, Jr. v. Clark, Jr., 204 N.J. Super. 438, 442 (Law Div. 1983). The prosecutor was seeking judicial clarification respecting the validity of private enforcement of speed limits established by the Department of Transportation, and careless or reckless driving proscribed by Title 39, when enforcement of motor vehicle laws had been ceded to the State under N.J.S.A. 39:5-1. The prosecutor was rightly concerned that private enforcement of motor vehicle laws may hinder county-wide uniform enforcement of motor vehicle laws by the State Police, the agency charged with enforcing motor vehicle laws in Allamuchy Township.
We also agree that there is a substantial public interest in the outcome of this litigation: the prosecutor was concerned that
coextensive enforcement of Title 39 violations by a private
entity may be inimical to the public good and safety of the
public. The situation is akin to that in Falcone v. De Furia,
103 N.J. 219, 222-23 (1986), where a dispute arose regarding
whether the police chief or Township Committee had authority to
designate detectives to the Little Falls Township Police
Department. The Passaic County Prosecutor filed suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that an ordinance allowing for designation
by the police chief was invalid. Id. at 223. In determining
that the County Prosecutor had standing to litigate this
noncriminal case, the Supreme Court held that:
When plaintiffs present a question of
substantial public interest, any slight additional
private interest will suffice to afford standing.
Here, there is a substantial public interest in
resolving the issue of who has authority to name
police officers to a detective bureau. The proper
allocation of responsibilities between a governing
body and the chief of police is too important to
be left in limbo. As the chief law enforcement
officer in the county, the prosecutor has a
legitimate interest in the relationship between a
governing body and the chief of police on so
significant a question. Consequently, the Passaic
County Prosecutor has standing, even in the
absence of the Little Falls Chief of Police as a
party, to bring the present action.
[Id. at 226-27 (citations omitted).]
Likewise, here, the ability of a nonprofit association to assess
fines for violations of motor vehicle laws presents a novel
question of substantial public interest and involves the county-wide law enforcement authority of the prosecutor. The motion
judge properly concluded that the County Prosecutor had standing
to bring this suit.
PVPOA contends that the motion judge erred in concluding that the Condominium Act applies to the Panther Valley community and association. The Condominium Act provides that:
If authorized by the master deed or bylaws, the association may impose reasonable fines upon unit owners for failure to comply with provisions of the master deed, bylaws or rules and regulations, subject to the following provisions:
. . . .
On roads or streets with respect to
which Title 39 of the Revised Statutes is in
effect under section 1 of P.L. 1945, c. 284
[N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1], an association may not
impose fines for moving automobile
violations.
[N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15f (emphasis added).]
As noted, the motion judge reasoned that since some of the units
in the community were under condominium ownership, N.J.S.A.
46:8B-15f was applicable because the condominium owners had to
use the private roads in the Panther Valley community to travel
to and from their units.
The Condominium Act establishes a comprehensive scheme for
regulating condominiums and their associations. Under the Act,
"condominium" is defined as a "form of ownership of real property
under a master deed providing for ownership by one or more owners
of units of improvements together with an undivided interest in
common elements appurtenant to each such unit." N.J.S.A. 46:8B-3h. A "condominium" is created upon the recording of a master
deed executed and acknowledged by the owners. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-8.
Only when the master deed sets forth matters required under
N.J.S.A. 46:8B-9 will the comprehensive legislation apply to the
property. N.J.S.A. 46:8B-8.
The problem with the motion judge's conclusion that N.J.S.A.
46:8B-15f applies here is that Panther Valley is not a
condominium development. The community is a mix of single-family
residences, townhouses and condominiums. A small minority of the
units are governed by the Condominium Act. The development
scheme of the community, established by its covenants and
restrictions, includes substantial common properties deeded to a
nonprofit association (PVPOA) for the mutual use and enjoyment of
the residents. This type of "common interest development" which
is governed by a homeowners association to which all property
owners are members, unlike a condominium development, has no
statutory guidelines for its establishment. Wendell A. Smith,
New Jersey Condominium & Community Association Law 2 (Gann ed.
1993).
Merely because there are some condominium units within the
Panther Valley community governed by the Condominium Act does not
change the fact that PVPOA, owner of the streets and roadways in
question, is not a condominium association. Thus, N.J.S.A.
46:8B-15f is inapplicable.
PVPOA acknowledges that it had requested the local municipality and Commissioner of Transportation to assume jurisdiction over motor vehicle violations on PVPOA's private
roads. However, it argues that this "election" provided for
under N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1 was "never intended by the legislature to
be mutually exclusive." PVPOA asserts that, as a private
property owner, it retains power, coextensive with public law
enforcement agencies, to impose its own fines for violation of
motor vehicle laws on its private roads. In support of that
proposition, PVPOA cites N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3, which reads in part:
The filing of a written request
[pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1] . . . shall
not be deemed to constitute a dedication to
public use, of any such roads . . . open to
or used by vehicular traffic, nor shall it be
construed to prevent such persons,
corporations or institutions, as owners of
such property . . . from prohibiting such use
or from requiring other or different or
additional conditions than those specified in
subtitle 1, Title 39, of the Revised
Statutes, or otherwise regulating such use as
may seem best to such persons, corporations
or institutions.
PVPOA argues that, under this provision, its filing of a written
request pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1 did not prevent it from
"regulating such [vehicular] use as may seem best" to PVPOA. In
this case, PVPOA reasons, it deemed it "best" to preserve the
power to fine its members for moving motor vehicle violations
occurring on its private roads.
In order to resolve the question whether PVPOA retains
coextensive authority to enforce the provisions of Title 39 on
its private roads, we first consider the plain meaning of
N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3. National Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Middlesex
County Improvement Auth.,
150 N.J. 209, 223 (1997). Language of
the statute should be "`given its ordinary meaning and construed
in a common sense manner to accomplish the legislative purpose.'"
N.E.R.I. Corp. v. New Jersey Highway Auth.,
147 N.J. 223, 236
(1996) (quoting State v. Pescatore, 213 N.J. Super. 22, 28 (App.
Div. 1986), aff'd,
105 N.J. 441 (1987)). Particular words and
phrases found in the statute "must be construed within their
context and unless inconsistent with the Legislature's manifest
intent or unless another meaning is expressly indicated, they
must be given their generally accepted meaning." Stevenson v.
Keene Corp., 254 N.J. Super. 310, 317 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd,
131 N.J. 393 (1993).
The language of N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3 is plain. When a property
owner files a request that a public law enforcement agency assume
jurisdiction to enforce motor vehicle laws on the property
owner's private roads, the owner is not prevented from:
(1) "prohibiting" use of the private roads; (2) requiring "other"
or "different" or "additional" conditions than those specified in
subtitle 1 (motor vehicle and traffic laws) of Title 39; or
(3) "otherwise regulating such use" of the private roads as "may
seem best" to such property owner. PVPOA focuses solely on the
"catch-all" language, preserving its power to "regulate[]" such
use of the private roads as "may seem best" to it.
The problem with PVPOA's argument is that it ignores the
word "otherwise," which modifies "regulating such use." See Sun
Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Avalon, 286 N.J. Super. 440, 444
(App. Div.) ("the use of the adjective `principal' as a modifier
for the noun `use' in the ordinance aids in ascertaining the
meaning of the use restrictions"), certif. denied,
144 N.J. 376
(1996). The word "otherwise" is defined as "in a different way
or manner" or "in different circumstances." Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 835 (9th ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the word "otherwise" appears in the same context
as the words "other," "different" and "additional" conditions.
The meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with
which they are associated. State v. Mortimer,
135 N.J. 517, 536,
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 970,
115 S.Ct. 440,
130 L.Ed.2d 351
(1994); Germann v. Matriss,
55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970). Given that
"otherwise regulating" is associated with words connoting acts or
conditions that are "different" from or "additional" to those
covered under subtitle 1, Title 39, its inclusion indicates that
it carries the same meaning. State v. Afanador,
134 N.J. 162,
172 (1993). So read, "otherwise regulating such use" necessarily
means that the property owner retains authority only to impose
conditions as to matters not set forth in subtitle 1 of Title 39.
For example, PVPOA may restrict the hours of use of the
private roads or install "speed" bumps subject to municipal
regulation. However, PVPOA is not "otherwise" regulating use of
its private roads when it fines its residents for exceeding the
very speed limits established by the Department of
Transportation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 (rates of speed) and
for careless or reckless driving, conduct expressly governed by
N.J.S.A. 39:4-97 and -96.
This construction of the phrase "otherwise regulating such
use" is consistent with the legislative intent, gleaned from the
entire statutory framework governing enforcement of moving motor
vehicle laws. Furtherance of legislative purpose is the key to
the interpretation of any statute. G.E. Solid State, Inc. v.
Director, Div. of Tax.,
132 N.J. 298, 308 (1993). We must
therefore read a statute sensibly to effectuate the legislative
purpose and to avoid unreasonable results. Adams v. Cooper
Hosp., 295 N.J. Super. 5, 12-13 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied,
148 N.J. 463 (1997). To that end, "we consider not only the
particular statute in question, but also the entire legislative
scheme of which it is a part." Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy,
Inc.,
108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987).
The Legislature's clear purpose in enacting subtitle 1 of
Title 39 was uniformity in traffic regulation. The subtitle
gives the Commissioner of Transportation wide supervisory control
over ordinances and resolutions governing traffic and traffic
conditions on public streets or roadways. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-8;
N.J.S.A. 39:4-197; N.J.S.A. 39:4-201; N.J.S.A. 39:4-202.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-197 provides that "no municipality shall pass an
ordinance or resolution on a matter covered by or which alters or
in any way nullifies the provisions of [chapter 4, subtitle 1
entitled `Traffic Regulation']" unless it falls within one of the
specified exceptions in that section. An ordinance passed
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-197 is effective only upon approval by
the Commissioner, except as otherwise provided in N.J.S.A. 39:4-8b. N.J.S.A. 39:4-202; see also N.J.S.A. 39:2-1 (Division of
Motor Vehicles "shall have full charge" of the regulation of
motor vehicles, including their use and speed, and the
proceedings for violations and imposition of penalties). The
obvious intendment of giving broad oversight to the Commissioner
was "to advance the interests of safety and uniformity in traffic
regulation" throughout the State. Visidor Corp. v. Cliffside
Park,
48 N.J. 214, 223 (1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 972,
87 S.Ct. 1166,
18 L.Ed.2d 132 (1967); see also Eveler v. Atlantic
City,
91 N.J.L. 135, 137 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
In our view, N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3 must be read in the context of
this overall legislative scheme of demanding uniformity in
traffic regulation in the interests of public safety. PVPOA's
construction of the statute clearly frustrates that aim. Dual
enforcement of the traffic laws by the police and private
associations may undermine the Legislature's quest for
uniformity. Independent "speed traps" and use of uncertified
radar devices by untrained members of a homeowners association,
as here, has the clear capacity to obstruct lawful enforcement by
patrolling law enforcement officers who apply approved
methodology in a manner consistent with scientifically-accepted
procedures.See footnote 2
Moreover, assumption of jurisdiction over enforcement of
motor vehicle laws by state or local law enforcement agencies
necessarily triggers involvement of the local municipal court and
the jurisdictional reach of the Director of the Division of Motor
Vehicles. In other words, the private roads become part of the
overall network of public roadways and streets subject to the
enforcement provisions of Title 39. See N.J.S.A. 39:5-1 to -52.
The record discloses that PVPOA has a standing policy to divert
citizens' complaints concerning such serious motor vehicle
violations as reckless driving from the municipal court to its
Covenants Committee for internal resolution and the imposition of
the appropriate fine established by PVPOA. Such diversion
deprives the municipal court of the power to impose the requisite
penalty in accordance with law commensurate with the seriousness
of the offense and the driving record of the offender. It also
nullifies the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles' power
to suspend the license of the offender, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, or to
assess appropriate penalty points, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.6. See No
Illegal Points, Citizens for Drivers Rights, Inc. v. Florio, 264
N.J. Super. 318, 324 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
134 N.J. 479
(1993). Such a result is inconsistent with the legislative goal
of uniformity and of protecting the public from the persistent or
egregious offender.
Finally, we earlier concluded that N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15f, which
prohibits a condominium association from assessing fines for
moving motor vehicle violations, is inapplicable here because
PVPOA is not a condominium association. However, that
proscription in the Condominium Act is instructive since it deals
with the same subject matter as N.J.S.A. 39:5A-3; to what extent
a homeowners association retains coextensive power to enforce its
own motor vehicle rules and regulations on its private roads once
it cedes enforcement jurisdiction to a public law enforcement
agency. See In re J.W.D.,
149 N.J. 108, 115 (1997) (quoting
State v. Green,
62 N.J. 547, 554-55 (1973)) ("`every effort
should be made to harmonize the law relating to the same subject
matter'"). In our view, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-15f is a tacit expression
by the Legislature that any private homeowners associations,
condominiums or otherwise, have no business assessing fines for
motor vehicle violations once they cede enforcement jurisdiction
to a public agency pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5A-1. It is a
recognition by the Legislature that, in such circumstances, the
powers of the public law enforcement agency are preemptive and
exclusive.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1The bylaws simply make reference to "reckless and/or careless driving." No distinction is made between "reckless" and "careless" conduct for purposes of the imposition of a fine. Footnote: 2For example, PVPOA's preparation and use of its K-15 radar does not comply with controlling case law. See State v. Wojtkowiak, 174 N.J. Super. 460, 462-63 (App. Div. 1980).