SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-5432-94T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ROBERTO CASIMONO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________
Submitted: November 20, 1996 - Decided:
February 25, 1997
Before Judges Long, Skillman and Cuff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Morris County.
Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Lon Taylor, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief)
John B. Dangler, Morris County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Michael Jan,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CUFF, J.A.D.
Defendant Roberto Casimono appeals from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Because the trial judge
reconstructed the missing record of the post-conviction relief
hearing without the participation of counsel, we reverse and remand
for a proper reconstruction of the record.
Defendant was convicted in 1989 of possession of a substantial
amount of cocaine with the intent to distribute it, hindering
apprehension, and resisting arrest. He was sentenced to a
custodial term of eighteen years with a six-year period of parole
ineligibility on the possession conviction and a concurrent term of
five years for the hindering apprehension conviction. A
consecutive one-year term was imposed for resisting arrest. The
usual fines and penalties were also imposed.
This court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and
affirmed the conviction. State v. Casimono,
250 N.J. Super. 173
(App. Div. 1991). The Supreme Court denied certification,
127 N.J. 558 (1992). Defendant's pro se petition for certiorari was denied.
Next, he filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. When
this was denied, he filed this pro se petition for post-conviction
relief on August 9, 1994.
The hearing was conducted on December 12, 1994. Counsel was
appointed to represent defendant. After denial of his petition,
defendant filed a notice of appeal, and soon thereafter it was
discovered that a record of the post-conviction relief proceeding
had not been made.See footnote 1 This court temporarily remanded this matter
to the trial court to reconstruct the record pursuant to R. 2:5-3(f). Without the presence or participation of counsel for either
party, the trial judge announced his reconstruction of the record
on April 2, 1996.
R. 2:5-3(f) governs reconstruction of a lost or destroyed
verbatim record of proceedings. It provides:
If a verbatim record made of the proceedings
has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise
unavailable, the court or agency from which
the appeal was taken shall supervise the
reconstruction of the record. The
reconstruction may be in the form of a
statement of proceedings in lieu of a
transcript.
[R. 2:5-3(f) (emphasis added).]
By use of the word "supervise," it is apparent that the role of the
trial judge is to oversee or superintend the work of others. It is
a participatory process which involves the court and counsel. It
is not the sole responsibility of the trial judge to reconstruct
the lost record.
The reference to the statement of proceedings in lieu of
transcript, R. 2:5-3(f), gives some direction as to the form of the
process of reconstruction of a record and underscores that the
result of the process is a collective effort. In that procedure,
the attorney representing the appellant prepares the list of items
comprising the record and forwards it to the attorney for the
respondent who has an opportunity to review the proposed statement
and forward any objections or amendments to the appellant. In the
event that the objections are not resolved or the amendments are
not accepted, the court or agency from which the appeal is taken
must settle the statement of proceedings.
Measured against this procedure, the method utilized by the
trial judge fails. Here, there was no input from either attorney.
Moreover, the method employed here bears no resemblance to the
reconstruction methods approved in State v. Izaguirre,
272 N.J.
Super. 51 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
137 N.J. 167 (1994); State
v. Gaines,
147 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd sub nom,
State v. Powers,
72 N.J. 346 (1977); and State v. Kozarski,
143 N.J. Super. 12 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
71 N.J. 532 (1976).
In Izaguirre, we explained that the absence of a verbatim
record "raises a question concerning fairness that must be
addressed." Izaguirre, supra, 272 N.J. Super. at 56 (citing State
v. Smith,
84 N.J. Super. 452, 456-59 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
43 N.J. 270 (1964)). When a verbatim record of proceedings is
lost, it becomes the duty of the trial judge as a matter of due
process to reconstruct the record in a manner that provides a
reasonable assurance of accuracy and completeness. Id. at 56-57.
In Izaguirre and Gaines, the reconstruction procedure included
extensive participation of counsel and the trial judge, including
the exchange of trial notes maintained by the court and all
counsel. In Gaines, in addition to the participation of counsel,
the trial judge allowed the defendants an opportunity to contribute
their recollection of the testimony. In Kozarski, we can infer
that there was an exchange of statements between counsel which were
submitted to the trial judge, who ultimately resolved any disputes.
We do not read Izaguirre to require the precise procedure
utilized by the trial judge in that case in every instance. In
Izaguirre the court was required to supervise the reconstruction of
the record of an entire trial. At a minimum, however, the
prosecutor and defense counsel must participate, the defendant must
have an opportunity to attend the proceeding designed to resolve
any differences, and the trial judge must settle the record on
notice to all participants. That was not done in this case.
We must remand this matter for proper reconstruction of the
record because we have no reasonable assurance of the accuracy or
completeness of this record. Moreover, we are unable to perform
our appellate function on the state of this record. Defendant
filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. It appears
that counsel was appointed to represent defendant; however, as
reconstructed, the record does not inform us of the name of
assigned counsel. We do not know whether assigned counsel
submitted a brief. We do not know if counsel reviewed the trial
transcripts, interviewed defendant or made any argument on his
behalf at the hearing on the petition. In short, we cannot discern
whether the appointed attorney fulfilled the specific obligations
imposed on assigned counsel in a post-conviction proceeding. See
State v. Clark,
260 N.J. Super. 559 (App. Div. 1992); State v.
King,
117 N.J. Super. 109, 111-12 (App. Div. 1971). We also do not
know if assigned counsel offered any argument beyond the arguments
offered by defendant to relax the five-year bar for post-conviction
relief.
Accordingly, we remand this matter for reconstruction of the
record of the December 12, 1994 hearing of defendant's petition for
post-conviction relief consistent with this opinion. The matter should be completed within sixty days. We retain jurisdiction.
Footnote: 1An order dated August 28, 1995 states that the hearing