(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued November 28, 2000 -- Decided January 17, 2001
VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal requires the Court to determine whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial when he was
denied basic necessities such as food, soap, water, and a comb while in custody.
Defendant and his co-defendant, Adolfo Marquez, were arrested for drug-related offenses following a
motor vehicle stop, and charged in a single indictment with possession of cocaine and possession with intent to
distribute. Defendant and Marquez were tried together at a trial that lasted one week. During the course of the trial,
defendant was housed in the Gloucester County Jail; Marquez was free on bail. On at least three days of the trial,
defendant appeared dirty and unkempt. In contrast, the record indicates nothing untoward about Marquez's
appearance. Because each man testified by accusing the other of owning the drugs in question, credibility was a
critical issue for the jury.
On the first day of trial, the trial court noticed defendant's disheveled appearance and expressed concern to
the Sheriff's officer on duty. The trial court informed the officer that he wanted the situation “worked out” by the
next day, and that he expected defendant to be provided with whatever basic amenities are available. The trial
proceedings continued that day, despite defendant's appearance. The situation had not improved by the afternoon
of the second day of trial. After the lunch break, defendant's counsel informed the trial court that defendant had not
been provided with food for lunch. The trial court ordered one of the Sheriff's officers to deliver food to defendant.
Defendant testified on the third day, and immediately afterward, counsel informed the court outside the
jury's presence that despite counsel's efforts, the Sheriff's Office continued to deny defendant basic amenities.
Counsel noted the importance of credibility in the case and expressed the view that defendant's appearance would
weigh on the jury and could cause defendant severe prejudice. The trial court directed the Sheriff's officers to
arrange for a representative to appear before the court to explain defendant's treatment. A lieutenant appeared later
that day, confirming defendant's complaints. He attributed the lack of soap to a “miscommunication” and explained
that other supplies were on order. Although the trial court was troubled by the actions of the Sheriff's Office, it
concluded that defendant's appearance did not adversely sway the jury.
Following closing arguments, the trial judge charged the jury. The instructions on evaluating credibility
included language stating that the jurors could take into consideration “the appearance and demeanor of the
witness.” The jury found defendant guilty of third-degree possession of cocaine and second degree possession with
intent to distribute. Marquez was found guilty of the third-degree possession charge, but acquitted of the more
serious, second-degree distribution charge.
The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction in an unreported decision. It concluded that the
lack of basic amenities did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, noting that the trial court, after observing defendant,
did not believe his appearance had a negative effect on the jury. It also noted that defendant failed to request the
trial court to deliver a cautionary charge to the jury concerning his appearance. The Supreme Court granted
defendant's petition for certification.
HELD: Defendant's dirty and disheveled appearance created an unacceptable risk that the jury's verdict was
tainted, and that verdict must be set aside. Alternatively, the doctrine of fundamental fairness would also warrant
reversal on the facts presented.
1. Courts have long recognized that a defendant's outward appearance can threaten the fairness of proceedings.
Decisions holding that it is a violation of fair-trial guarantees to force a defendant to appear in prison attire are
instructive. The record here demonstrates that defendant was denied basic necessities while in custody. As a direct
result, he appeared dirty and unkempt during most of the trial. Defendant's condition was noticed by the trial court,
so presumably the jury was aware of it as well. The harm to defendant was compounded by the fact that his defense
consisted mainly of his own testimony, requiring the jury to assess his credibility as compared to that of his co-
defendant. (Pp. 7-12)
2. The State argues that defendant waived his right to complain about this issue on appeal because he failed to
request a curative instruction. The Court disagrees. Although counsel did not request a curative instruction, he did
object to defendant's treatment and articulated before the trial court precisely how that treatment could prejudice his
defense. (Pp.12-13)
3. Even if the Court were to assume that defendant's disheveled state did not prejudice the jury's determination, the
doctrine of fundamental fairness would also warrant reversal on the facts presented. That defendant was denied
basic amenities is undisputed. The record provides no identifiable State interest served by such action. Simply
stated, all persons in the criminal justice system are entitled to their dignity. (Pp. 13-15)
4. This holding is a limited one, and is based on a number of factors not likely to be present in future cases:
defendant was deprived of all necessary amenities with no justification offered by the State; his physical condition
was palpable to any reasonable observer; he testified before the jury and therefore put his truthfulness directly in
issue; and Marquez, the co-defendant, who was apparently neatly groomed because he was free on bail, testified
against defendant in what became a battle of credibility. Moreover, the jury presumably believed Marquez's
testimony over that of defendant's, as indicated by their acquittal of Marquez on the more serious charge of drug
distribution. (Pp. 15-18)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and
ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
98 September Term 1999
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANGEL MAISONET,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued November 28, 2000 -- Decided January 17, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, argued
the cause for appellant (Joel M. Harris,
First Assistant Public Defender, attorney).
Joseph H. Enos, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Andrew N.
Yurick, Gloucester County Prosecutor,
attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
VERNIERO, J.
In this criminal appeal, we must determine whether
defendant's treatment at the Gloucester County Jail warrants
reversal of his conviction. While in custody at the jail,
defendant was denied basic necessities such as food, soap, water,
a clean mattress and blanket, and a comb. After testifying
before the jury in a visibly disheveled state, defendant was
convicted of certain drug offenses and sentenced to sixteen years
in prison with six years and four months of parole ineligibility.
The Appellate Division upheld the conviction and sentence. We
now reverse and hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
The facts may be briefly stated. Defendant Angel Maisonet and co-defendant, Adolfo Marquez, were arrested for drug-related offenses following a motor vehicle stop, the details of which are not before us for review. Defendant and co-defendant were present in defendant's vehicle at the time the drugs were seized. In a single indictment, the Gloucester County Grand Jury charged both men with possession of cocaine pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35- 10a(1) and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 35-5b(2).
Defendant and Marquez were tried together at a trial that lasted one week. During the course of the trial, defendant was housed in the Gloucester County Jail; Marquez was free on bail. On at least three days of the trial, defendant appeared dirty and unkempt. In contrast, the record indicates nothing untoward about Marquez's appearance. Each man testified, essentially accusing the other of owning the drugs in question. Credibility was thus a critical issue for the jury to resolve.
On the first day of the trial, the trial court expressed its concern over the disheveled appearance of defendant:
The court: I have to ask a wild and crazy question, folks. Directed to the sheriffs. Do they sell combs in the jail?
Sheriff's officer: They don't sell combs. They have a care package, which is a bar of soap, a comb, and something else. And there is a price to it, but I'm not sure what it is.
The court: Well, I want it worked out . . . before tomorrow morning so [defendant] doesn't have the difficulty of coming to court without his hair combed.
. . . .
Defendant: I don't have nothing out there.
Co-defendant's counsel: When they come in
from State Prison they don't have anything.
Defendant: We don't have running water in
the cell they got me.
The court [to defendant's counsel]: [Y]ou
may want to have a discussion with the
Sheriff's Officer. A bar of soap, a combing,
I think . . . that should be taken care of.
And I want to make it very clear to the
sheriffs through the Sheriff's Office, if
[defendant] is entitled to basic amenities, I
expect that that will be accomplished. Just
sending a message. That's just a matter of
humanity and fairness and dignity. Everyone
is entitled to their integrity and fairness.
The proceedings for that day took place despite defendant's
appearance.
By the afternoon of the second day, the situation had not
improved. Defendant's counsel informed the trial court after the
lunch break that the Sheriff's officers had not provided
defendant with any food for lunch. The trial court then ordered
one of the officers to deliver food to defendant.
Still without a shower, defendant testified before the jury
on the third day. Immediately following that testimony,
defendant's counsel informed the court outside of the jury's
presence:
Perhaps this would be an appropriate time to
place everything on the record. Judge, I had
indicated to the court in chambers that
[defendant] is a state prisoner, and he's
been given really no -- nothing from this
county jail . . . . [A]s we stand here today,
Judge, [defendant] is on his fourth day
without a shower. He has yet to have been
provided soap, he has yet to have been
provided toothpaste. He wasn't provided a
meal -- lunch, yesterday . . . he's advised
that he's been sleeping with a blanket that
has -- is covered with ants.
Judge, in an effort to try to resolve this
situation, I went to the store yesterday, out
of my pocket, purchased [defendant] soap and
toothpaste. I brought it up here to the jail
. . . [and] I was advised by the sheriff in
charge there that absolutely under no
circumstances was I permitted to give [them
to defendant] or leave [them] for
[defendant].
[Defendant's] here Judge . . . [h]e hasn't
showered. And what's most concerning, Judge,
is that we have a jury of fourteen people
sitting here. We have jurors' seats . . .
five or six feet away from where [defendant]
was just on the stand. No offense to
[defendant], but anyone that goes four days
without a shower doesn't have the best body
odor.
And it's a concern because the jurors are
looking at these people. Credibility could
not be any more important in this case. The
jury is looking at him and saying, not only
looking at him but smelling him, and it's
going to weigh on the jury and it could
severely prejudice [defendant].
In response, the trial court directed the Sheriff's officers
to arrange for a representative to appear before the court to
explain defendant's treatment. A lieutenant from the Sheriff's
Office appeared later that day, confirming that defendant's
complaints were accurate. The officer attributed the lack of
soap to a “miscommunication.” He explained that the toothpaste
and other supplies were “on order.” When asked by the trial
court whether defendant was provided with a clean blanket, the
officer claimed that there were shortages at the jail, stating:
“If he got a blanket, he's lucky he has one, sir.” The Sheriff's
officer assured the court that defendant would be provided soap,
toothpaste, and a shower.
Although the trial court was troubled by the actions of the
Sheriff's Office, the court nonetheless concluded that
defendant's physical appearance did not adversely sway the jury.
The court stated:
Now, lookwise, [defendant] doesn't look like
he's out of kilter. I have to indicate to
you that I'm two feet away, three feet away,
four, five, six feet away, and fortunately in
this case, I don't smell anything . . .
untoward. Now, it doesn't make it right.
The answer is no, it doesn't make it right.
Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the
jury. The instructions on evaluating credibility included this
language: “As the judges of the facts, you are to determine the
credibility of each and every witness, and in determining whether
a witness is worthy of belief, and therefore, credible, you may
take into consideration . . . the appearance and demeanor of the
witness[.]” The jury found defendant guilty of third-degree
possession of cocaine and second-degree possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute. Marquez was found guilty of the
third-degree possession charge but acquitted of the more serious
second-degree distribution offense. Before sentencing, the trial
court denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed
his conviction and sentence in an unreported decision. The court
concluded that the failure of the Sheriff's Office to furnish
defendant with basic amenities did not deprive him of a fair
trial. As support, the panel noted that the trial court, after
observing defendant, did not believe his appearance had a
negative effect on the jury. The panel also noted that defendant
failed to request that the trial court deliver a cautionary
charge to the jury concerning his appearance.
The Appellate Division also addressed other contentions of
defendant not pertinent to this appeal. We granted defendant's
petition for certification,
165 N.J. 498 (2000), to address
whether defendant's disheveled appearance impermissibly affected
the jury's verdict, thereby requiring a new trial. We must also
determine whether the denial of basic amenities itself violated
principles of fundamental fairness, warranting our intervention.
A.
The right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is imbedded in the criminal law by virtue of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. As a corollary to that right, “one accused of a crime is entitled to have his [or her] guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1934, 56 L. Ed.2d 468, 475 (1978). Thus, trial courts have a duty to scrutinize closely those practices that pose a threat to fairness and do not serve an essential state purpose.
Courts have long recognized that a defendant's outward appearance can threaten the fairness of proceedings. Decisions addressing the effect of compelling a defendant to wear prison attire or to be shackled at trial are particularly instructive. The seminal case pertaining to prison attire is Estelle, supra, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 48 L. Ed.2d 126. In that case, the defendant appeared at trial in prison attire after his request for civilian clothes was denied. Neither the defendant nor his counsel objected to the denial of his request. Id. at 502, 96 S. Ct. at 1692, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 129-30.
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the State could not, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes. The Court reasoned that to force a defendant to appear in that fashion would impair the presumption of innocence while furthering no vital State interest. Id. at 505, 96 S. Ct. at 1693, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 131. Such a practice would disproportionately prejudice those who could not post bail prior to trial. Id. at 505, 96 S. Ct. at 1694, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 131. Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]o impose the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 505-06, 96 S. Ct. at 1694, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 131.
The Court ultimately held that the defendant's failure to object to his condition “negat[ed] the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 513, 96 S. Ct. at 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135. Although the Court in Estelle did not overturn the defendant's conviction, that case stands firmly for the proposition that fair-trial guarantees are violated when an accused is forced to appear at trial wearing prison clothes. See also People v. Hetrick, 178 Cal. Rptr. 303, 306 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding no waiver despite lack of formal objection because defense counsel made court aware of defendant's desire to be tried in civilian clothing rather than prison attire).
New Jersey has been especially vigilant in protecting a defendant's right not to be compelled to appear at trial in prison attire and, in so doing, has built on the standards established in Estelle. In State v. Carrion-Collazo, 221 N.J. Super. 103 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 171 (1988), the Appellate Division expressed concern about the prejudice that may arise when a defendant is compelled to appear at trial clothed inappropriately. In discussing Estelle, the court established protective procedures to be followed in all subsequent cases:
[E]ven in the absence of a constitutional requirement, future criminal defendants appearing for a jury trial in prison garb should be personally questioned by the trial judge concerning their desire to relinquish the right to appear in civilian clothing and that . . . right should be given up only by means of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver on the record before the trial judge.
The court also noted that the proper voir dire of the jury,
coupled with a cautionary instruction, could guard against
potential prejudice. The court instructed that “when a request
for civilian clothing or a precautionary voir dire or jury charge
is made by a defendant or his counsel such request may not be
denied.” Id. at 113; accord State v. Gertrude,
309 N.J. Super. 354, 357 (App. Div. 1998) (reversing conviction of defendant who
appeared at trial in prison clothes because protective procedures
articulated in Carrion-Collazo were not followed by trial court).
See also State v. Roberts,
86 N.J. Super. 159, 163 (App. Div.
1965) (recognizing that physical restraints may be used on
defendant only in exceptional circumstances because of inherent
prejudice that they impart to jury).
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the importance
of having a defendant appear at trial in an acceptable physical
condition. In Hicks v. State,
352 S.E.2d 762, 769 (Ga.), cert.
denied,
482 U.S. 931,
107 S. Ct. 3220,
96 L. Ed.2d 706 (1987),
the Supreme Court of Georgia observed that a defendant has a
right to a “suitable courtroom appearance.” In the same vein, in
State v. Spellman,
562 So.2d 455, 456 (La. 1990), the Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the conviction of a defendant who
appeared at trial in prison clothing in part because the trial
court had failed to find that the defendant's attire was
“reasonably clean and suitable.” The court said that, “[a]
defendant may insist he appear before jurors with all the dignity
of a free man, presumed innocent until determined otherwise[.]”
Ibid.
Here, the record demonstrates that defendant was denied
basic necessities while in custody. As a direct result of that
treatment, defendant appeared dirty and unkempt during most of
the trial. Defendant's condition was noticed by the trial court
on the first day of trial, so presumably the jury was aware of it
as well. In that regard, we find this case to be similar to the
prison-attire cases. Through no fault of his own and despite his
counsel's objections, defendant was compelled to appear at trial
in a disheveled state that undoubtedly had the potential to
diminish his credibility before the jury. The harm to defendant
was compounded by the fact that his defense consisted mainly of
his own testimony, requiring the jury to assess his truthfulness
as compared to that of his co-defendant.
We are satisfied that because defendant's credibility was a
central issue for the jury to determine, his dirty and disheveled
appearance created an unacceptable risk that the jury's verdict
would be tainted. At the root of the inquiry concerning
defendant's physical appearance is “not whether jurors actually
articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but
whether 'an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible
factors coming into play[.]'” Holbrook v. Flynn,
475 U.S. 560,
570,
106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346-47,
89 L. Ed.2d 525, 535 (1986)
(citation omitted). Thus, the fact that the trial court may have
failed to “smell anything” does not dispose of the issue. That
defendant's overall appearance, caused by factors beyond his
control, may have unduly impugned his credibility in the eyes of
jurors is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.
The State argues that defendant waived his right to
complain about those issues on appeal because he failed to
request a curative instruction either at the conclusion of the
trial or during voir dire. We disagree. Although defendant did
not request a cautionary charge, his counsel did object to his
treatment and articulated before the trial court precisely how
that treatment would prejudice his defense. Moreover, because
the court's instruction to the jurors invited them to consider
the physical appearance of defendant when assessing his
credibility, we are convinced that the circumstances endured by
defendant were clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
State v. Delibero,
149 N.J. 90, 106-07 (1997). We are thus
compelled to set aside the jury's verdict.
Even if we assume that defendant's disheveled state did not prejudice the jury's determination, the government's conduct itself raises the question whether fundamental fairness warrants reversal of defendant's conviction. The doctrine of fundamental fairness “serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.” Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 108 (1995) (citation omitted). Although that doctrine is to be applied sparingly, “[i]t is appropriately applied in those rare cases where not to do so will subject the defendant to oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation.” State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 712 (1989) (Garibaldi, J., concurring and dissenting).
That defendant was denied basic amenities is undisputed. Deprived of food, clean bedding, and running water, defendant was forced to appear in court in a physically degraded state. After a searching review of the record, we have found no identifiable State interest served by such action, and none was offered by the Sheriff's Office. Assuming that the jail truly lacked supplies on the days in question, defense counsel should have been allowed access to his client, subject to reasonable security procedures, to deliver the necessary items.
Simply stated, all persons in the criminal justice system are entitled to their dignity. When a defendant is inexplicably subjected to arbitrary, unfair, and egregious action at the hands of the State, principles of fundamental fairness require our intervention. “We appreciate that the principle of fundamental fairness . . . is an amphorous doctrine. We need not, however, explore its parameters because this is such a clear case.” State v. Baker, 310 N.J. Super. 128, 138 (App. Div. 1998). Therefore, although fair-trial grounds, standing alone, are sufficient to require reversal of defendant's conviction, we conclude that the doctrine of fundamental fairness would also warrant reversal on the facts presented. We articulate that alternative basis for reversal to guide future parties and the courts in ensuring that the circumstances at issue here are not replicated elsewhere in the system.
Our holding is not to be understood as establishing reversible error any time a defendant complains about any form of treatment or is denied a preferred standard of care while incarcerated. “Lawful incarceration necessitates the reasonable withdrawal from a prisoner of certain rights normally enjoyed by a person in free society.” State v. Ryan, 145 N.J. Super. 330, 335 (Law Div. 1976). No person lawfully incarcerated can expect the same or similar comforts of home. Ibid.
Rather, we emphasize that our holding is based on a number of factors not likely to be present in future cases: defendant was deprived of all necessary amenities with no justification by the State; his physical condition was palpable to any reasonable observer; he testified before the jury and thus put his truthfulness directly in issue; and Marquez, the co-defendant, who was apparently neatly groomed because he was free on bail, testified against defendant in what essentially became a battle of credibility. Moreover, the jury presumably believed Marquez's testimony over that of defendant's, as indicated by their acquitting Marquez of the more serious charge in the indictment.
Although we do not envision this record repeating itself, we take this occasion to comment generally on the responsibilities of a trial court in preserving fairness in all aspects of a trial. In State v. Zhu, a recent decision involving heightened security measures at a high-risk trial, we instructed that, “although the Sheriff is the presumed expert in these matters and has primary responsibility to provide for security, it is the non-delegable duty of a trial court ultimately to approve such measures consistent with constitutional protections to which all defendants are entitled.” Zhu, supra, 165 N.J. at 557.
By analogy, the trial court is responsible for assuring that the presumption of innocence is not lost at any stage in the proceedings because of extraneous, impermissible factors such as a defendant's physical appearance. As noted in a prior opinion of this Court:
The judicial branch has an overarching constitutional responsibility to guarantee the proper administration of justice, and particularly, the administration of criminal justice. In numerous contexts, we have remarked upon the independent obligation of the court to take all appropriate measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial. A vital aspect of this responsibility is the court's duty to preserve the jury's impartiality throughout the trial process.
Judicial solicitude for the impartiality of the jury finds expression in a variety of settings, e.g., impanelling of jury; examination of jurors; challenge for cause; challenge to impanelled juror; jury instructions; cautionary instructions. Further, the court has an independent duty to act swiftly and decisively to overcome the potential bias of a jury from outside influences.
In furtherance of their responsibilities, trial courts
possess inherent power and may, for example, direct Sheriff's
officers or other law enforcement agents to provide basic
amenities to those entrusted to their care. State v. Abbati,
99 N.J. 418, 428 (1985) (discussing contours of judiciary's inherent
power “to fashion needed and appropriate remedies”). Similarly,
the trial court is authorized to give a cautionary charge in any
case in which it reasonably concludes that the physical condition
of the accused may impermissibly influence the jury's verdict.
Ibid. That charge is advisable in that circumstance. Lastly, to
assist in effective appellate review, trial courts must create an
appropriate record whenever these issues arise. Zhu, supra, 165
N.J. at 557. Here, the trial court conducted a brief hearing on
the record, which enabled the court to determine the validity of
defendant's complaints outside the presence of the jury. That
was the appropriate procedure under the circumstances in this
case.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion.
NO. A-98 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANGEL MAISONET,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED January 17, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Verniero
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY