SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
State v. Angela Baum and Jermel Moore (A-44-07)
Argued March 11, 2008; Re-argued September 8, 2008 -- Decided June 15, 2009
HOENS, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
The Court considers defendant Jermel Moore's arguments that evidence of drugs seized from an automobile in which he was a passenger should be suppressed because the driver's right against self-incrimination was violated and the warrantless search was unreasonable.
At a gas station near Route 78, a Bernards Township police officer saw a vehicle with tinted windows, New Jersey plates, and no inspection sticker. The officer stopped the vehicle after it pulled onto the highway. Everything that followed was captured on the patrol car's video recording system. The driver, defendant Angela Baum, could not produce a driver's license or insurance card, and the vehicle registration was not in her name or in the name of her passenger, defendant Jermel Moore. The officer asked Baum to step out of the vehicle, while Moore remained inside. In response to the officer's questions, Baum and Moore separately gave conflicting answers and information, including about where they had been and where they were going. Because Baum did not have a driver's license or other identification, the officer obtained and radioed in her name, address and birth date to verify that she was a validly licensed driver. While he was waiting for that information, he continued to question her, informed her that her answers did not match Moore's, and made his disbelief apparent. Eventually, the officer told Baum that he suspected there was something in her car that should not be there and asked her if she wanted to tell him what was going on. Baum told the officer that she and Moore had been smoking marijuana earlier in the day but she did not know whether Moore had any in the car. After the officer stated that he could summon a drug-sniffing dog, Baum admitted that there was marijuana in the car but stated that it belonged to Moore. A short time later, the officer learned from the dispatcher that Baum's license was suspended. Baum was arrested and advised of her Miranda rights, which she waived. Baum then revealed where a container of drugs could be found in the car. The container, which was retrieved by the officer, held cocaine and marijuana. Moore was advised of his rights and told the officer that the cocaine was his and the marijuana was Baum's. The entire encounter lasted twenty-six minutes.
Moore and Baum were indicted on several counts of drug possession. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence. The Law Division judge granted the motions, concluding that the officer's behavior toward Baum was coercive and amounted to an impermissible custodial interrogation. The judge determined that the officer should have given Baum her Miranda warnings after she admitted smoking marijuana with Moore. The judge found also that the information provided by Baum was not sufficient to support the warrantless search of the vehicle.
The Appellate Division reversed. 393 N.J. Super. 275 (2007). The panel explained that it was reasonable for the officer to separate Baum and Moore, the officer's suspicions increased as they responded to his questions, and Baum's responses gave reason to suspect there were drugs in the vehicle. The panel rejected the argument that the officer's comment about the drug-sniffing dog was unduly coercive and disagreed that the questioning of Baum constituted custodial interrogation. The panel explained, however, that even if the encounter constituted a custodial investigation, the circumstances were sufficiently exigent to obviate the need for a warrant and to permit the search.
The Supreme Court granted Moore's motion for leave to appeal. 192 N.J. 473 (2007).
HELD: Defendant Jermel Moore's motion to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of the vehicle in which he was riding should have been denied because he did not have standing to argue that the driver's right against self-incrimination was violated and because the search was not unreasonable.
1. The Court rejects Moore's argument, based on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, that the evidence must be suppressed because the warrantless search of the vehicle was based on incriminating statements Baum made before she was advised of her Miranda rights, or because the officer's questioning of Baum was unduly prolonged and coercive and resulted in an involuntary confession. The Fifth Amendment affords individuals the right to be free from self-incrimination. The privilege is a purely personal one, however. A third party, like Moore, cannot vicariously assert that another individual's right against self-incrimination has been violated. Although similar protection against self-incrimination exists under New Jersey law, it also applies to the individual. On this record, the Court finds no grounds to expand the protections against self-incrimination to permit third parties to assert a violation vicariously. The Court concludes that, to the extent Moore's suppression motion was based on a claimed violation of Baum's right against self-incrimination, it should have been denied. (Pp. 9-14).
2. The Court turns next to Moore's argument that suppression of the evidence is required because the stop of the vehicle, the continued investigation conducted by the officer, and the eventual search of the vehicle that uncovered the drugs were unreasonable. Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. Unlike Moore's argument under the Fifth Amendment, Moore has automatic standing to move to suppress the drugs found in the vehicle because he was charged with a possessory offense and his challenge is solely to the search of the automobile. Although the statements made by Baum led to the discovery of the drugs, the Court explains that Baum's words must be separated from this claim on which Moore has standing. (Pp. 14—18).
3. Here, the initial stop was justified by the absence of a required inspection sticker. The officer's request to see Baum's license and other documents was entirely permissible, as were his questions to Baum and Moore regarding their route of travel and purpose. Baum could not produce her license or other automobile credentials and could not identify the vehicle's owner, and Moore equivocated about just who that might be. Those circumstances, along with Baum and Moore's contrary explanations about their travel during the day, supported the officer's continued inquiries. As previously held by the Court, when reasonable inquiries by an officer relating to the circumstances that justified a stop give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, the officer may broaden the inquiry and satisfy those suspicions. The officer also may give voice to his suspicions if that technique is most likely to be effective. Although a continued detention may amount to an arrest if it is longer than needed or becomes more than minimally intrusive, the Court determines that there was nothing excessive about the length of time involved in this matter. Furthermore, the officer appropriately removed Baum from the vehicle and nothing in the record suggests that an unreasonable or intrusive investigatory technique focused on Moore. The Court concurs with the Appellate Division that the stop and investigation were not unreasonably extended or more intrusive than necessary. (Pp. 19—22).
4. With regard to Moore's argument that the officer's questioning of Baum, his tone, and his reference to the drug-sniffing dog made the search of the vehicle constitutionally infirm, the Court explains that this argument relates to the self-incrimination claim, which Moore lacks standing to assert. Viewing the totality of the circumstances of the encounter through the prism of the rights that Moore has standing to assert, the Court holds that the search was not unreasonable and the motion to suppress should have been denied. (Pp. 22—23).
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, as modified, and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings.
JUSTICE WALLACE, DISSENTING, joined by JUSTICE LONG, maintains that the challenges in this case are so inextricably bound together that Moore has standing to challenge the search both on his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and on Baum's Fifth Amendment right to be free from custodial interrogation that is both coercive and without the benefit of Miranda warnings.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE HOENS's opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE LONG joins.