(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 18, 2000 -- Decided March 2, 2000
VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
[Note: The Court did not write a full opinion in this case but supplemented the opinion of Judge
Eichen in the Appellate Division. The facts and history of the case outlined below are drawn from the
Appellate Division's opinion.]
On May 22, 1996, a Berkeley Heights police officer pulled over a car because of a missing license plate.
The owner of the car, Jason Lewis, was in the passenger seat. He provided the officer with a valid registration,
insurance card, and his own license. The driver, Brent Lark, told the officer that he did not have his license with
him. At the officer's request, Lark wrote down information that would have appeared on the license. When the
officer called the data in over his mobile computer; there was no record of such a license.
Because he believed that he had received false information from Lark, the officer called for backup. After
two additional officers arrived at the scene, Lark told the officer that his wallet had been taken the week before when
he had been mugged. Not believing that statement, the original officer ordered Lark and Lewis out of the car. Lark
was placed with the other officers while the original officer searched the car for identification information. He
discovered drug paraphernalia wedged behind the driver's seat. Lark and Lewis were arrested and placed in separate
patrol cars. The officer returned to his search and uncovered bags containing approximately ten ounces of cocaine.
Lark moved to suppress the search of the car and the seizure of the drug items. The Law Division upheld
the search. After reserving his right to appeal that issue, Lark pled guilty and was sentenced to a twelve-year term
with a four-year parole ineligibility component.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the case did not present any of the recognized “automobile
exceptions” to the requirement that a warrant must be obtained prior to a search. It found that the officer did not
have probable cause to conduct his search.
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification.
HELD: The Appellate Division correctly concluded that there was no sustainable basis for a warrantless search of
defendant's automobile.
1. Routine motor vehicle offenses justify only the issuance of a summons. Driving without a license, standing by
itself, clearly falls within that category of offenses. In this case, Lark's offering of false information to the officer,
which led to inability to identify him accurately, justified his arrest. Given the accurate information that was
provided by the car's owner, however, there was no basis on which to search and impound the vehicle incident to
Lark's arrest. (pp. 2-3)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in
JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
113 September Term 1998
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRENT D. LARK,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 18, 2000 -- Decided March 2, 2000
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at
319 N.J. Super. 618 (1999).
Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Thomas V.
Manahan, Union County Prosecutor, attorney).
Paul M. Klein, Deputy Public Defender II,
argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse
Torres, Public Defender, attorney).
Kristen A. McKearney, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for amicus curiae,
Attorney General of New Jersey (John J.
Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
VERNIERO, J.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Eichen's opinion
below. State v. Lark,
319 N.J. Super. 618 (App. Div. 1999). We
agree that defendant's rights were violated and that the evidence
of the drug offenses should be suppressed. We add only the
following.
Routine or simple motor vehicle offenses will usually
warrant only the issuance of a summons. As we previously
explained, “police officers and law-enforcement officials should
not assume that the statutory authorization to arrest for motor
vehicle violations [pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5-25] is unlimited or
unreviewable. The exercise of the statutory power to make
warrantless arrests for traffic offenses cannot arbitrarily and
unreasonably infringe on 'the fundamental constitutional rights
guaranteed to all citizens.'” State v. Pierce,
136 N.J. 184, 208
(1994)(quoting Gundaker Cent. Motors, Inc. v. Gassert,
23 N.J. 71, 79 (1956), appeal dismissed,
354 U.S. 933,
77 S. Ct. 1397,
1 L. Ed.2d 1533 (1957)). Thus, driving without a license, without
more, would not constitute sufficient grounds for a custodial
arrest.
In instances such as this, when a driver is without a
license and offers false information in response to a reasonable
police inquiry, there exists a sufficient basis for the police
officer to detain the driver for further questioning until the
officer learns the true identity of the driver. State v. Dickey,
152 N.J. 468, 476-83 (1998) (discussing contours of permissible
investigative stops). Assuming that the driver persists in
concealing his or her identity and there appears to be no other
reasonable alternative, the police officer may take the driver
into custody. However, even in that instance, the officer
generally may not search the vehicle unless one of the existing
exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable. State v.
Pierce, supra, 136 N.J. at 213-15 (discussing those exceptions,
including “automobile exception,” in addition to circumstances
justifying weapons search for officer protection and lawful
boundaries of search incident to arrest).
Following a driver's valid arrest, the police may, under
certain circumstances, impound the automobile and conduct an
inventory search. State v. Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 483-84;
State v. Mangold,
82 N.J. 575 (1980). In this case, however,
because the passenger produced valid credentials indicating
ownership of the vehicle, the police officer had no reasonable
basis to believe that the vehicle had been stolen. The
passenger, who was not under suspicion, could have retained
custody of the vehicle; thus, there was no basis to impound the
vehicle incident to the driver's arrest.
We do not perceive the rules applied in this case as
significantly burdening the legitimate function of law
enforcement in policing our roadways. Even if we assume that
there is some inconvenience to the police, that inconvenience “is
not an objectively reasonable basis to justify 'nibbling away' at
our constitutional rights.” State v. Lark, supra, 319 N.J.
Super. at 631. The burden, if any, would also be outweighed by
the benefit to law enforcement officers in having clear guidance
in this area of the law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate.
NO. A-113 SEPTEMBER TERM 1998
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRENT D. LARK,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED March 2, 2000
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Verniero
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY