(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued November 28, 1994 -- Decided December 19, 1994
PER CURIAM
This appeal concerns the validity of a search following an automobile stopped pursuant to N.J.S.A.
39:4-126 which requires a motorist to signal a lane change "in the event any other traffic may be affected by
such movement."
After the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence found pursuant to a stop, Charles H.
Williamson pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years'
imprisonment. He appealed the denial of the motion to suppress to the Appellate Division, contending that
the warrantless search of his vehicle was illegal because the State trooper who stopped him did not have a
sufficient basis for that stop.
According to the trooper, he was authorized to make the stop of Williamson's vehicle because he
observed a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-126. The trooper testified that at about 1:00 p.m., while he was driving
a police vehicle in the left lane of a three-lane divided highway, he observed Williamson's vehicle several car
lengths ahead in the center lane of the highway move into the right lane without signalling. No testimony
was offered that there were any motor vehicles anywhere in the vicinity other than the State trooper's and
Williamson's cars.
The Appellate Division remanded the matter for a new hearing on Williamson's motion to suppress
the cocaine seized from his car during the stop. The Appellate Division held that the State was required to
prove that Williamson's lane change actually affected other traffic within the meaning of the statute. The
Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: A traffic stop pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does not require proof that a defendant's failure to
signal a lane change actually affected other traffic. Rather, the motor-vehicle violation that
justifies the stop requires proof that the officer making the stop had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the defendant's failure to signal may have affected other traffic.
1. N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 does not require that a signal be given whenever a lane change is made. Thus, the
State need not prove either that the move actually affected traffic or that a motor-vehicle violation occurred
as a matter of law. The State need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could
convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense. The officer making the stop must have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the failure to signal may have affected other traffic. (pp. 2-3)
2. The record below does not contain an articulation of the officer's objective basis for the stop.
Rather, the hearing on the motion to suppress focused on the issues of what conduct, after the stop,
authorized the search of the car. Thus, the matter must be remanded for a determination of whether the
trooper had an objective basis to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. (pp. 3-5)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. Further proceedings shall be in accordance with
this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI and STEIN join in this opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
38 September Term 1994
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES H. WILLIAMSON,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued November 28, 1994 -- Decided December 19, 1994
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
270 N.J. Super. 318 (1994).
Stephanie P. Tettemer, Chief Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant
(John J. O'Reilly, Warren County Prosecutor,
attorney).
Joseph P. Rem, Jr., argued the cause for
respondent (Monaghan, Rem & Zeller,
attorneys; Laura G. Degnan, on the brief).
Anne C. Paskow, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General, attorney; Nancy Peremes
Barton, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This case concerns the validity of a search following an
automobile stop. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for
a new hearing on defendant's motion to suppress drugs seized from
his car. The facts of the case are set forth in the opinion of
the Appellate Division,
270 N.J. Super. 318 (1994).
We granted certification,
136 N.J. 298 (1994), to consider
whether the Appellate Division's opinion placed too great a
burden on the State to justify the stop. The specific concerns
that the State raises are whether the Appellate Division
incorrectly held that "the State was required to prove that
defendant's moving from the center to the right lane of [traffic
actually] `affected' other traffic within the meaning of N.J.S.A.
39:4-126 * * * "; and whether the Appellate Division incorrectly
equated the evidence needed to stop or arrest with the evidence
needed to convict.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 requires a motorist to signal a lane
change "in the event any other traffic may be affected by such
movement." (Emphasis added.) The statute, however, does not
require that a signal be given whenever a lane change is made.
In this case, a State trooper testified that while driving in the
left lane on a three-lane divided highway, he observed defendant,
driving a few car lengths ahead, move from the center lane into
the right lane without a signal. The trooper stopped defendant's
vehicle on that basis.
We agree with the State that it need not establish that the
move actually affected traffic. That is not the language of the
statute. We further agree that the State need not prove that a
motor-vehicle violation occurred as a matter of law.
Constitutional precedent requires only reasonableness on the part
of the police, not legal perfection. Therefore, the State need
prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it
could convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense. The
Attorney General emphasized, and we agree, that "the trooper
needed only a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
defendant's failure to signal may have affected other traffic
* * * ." "[O]ther traffic" could include a trooper's vehicle.
The language--may affect traffic--implies that traffic that may
be affected is fairly close and visible, and that the signal need
not be dictated solely by concerns of safety and accident
avoidance. Motorists in the vicinity whose movements may be
affected must be made aware of a driver's intentions. See State
v. Moss, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 1994) (explaining that
common dictionary meaning of "may" is "to be in some degree
likely to" and holding that there was other traffic that to some
degree was likely to be affected by the turn of defendant's
vehicle).
The record below does not contain an articulation of such
factors as the objective basis for the stop. The oral argument
before us did not dispel the need for such a record. The only
evidence of which we are aware is that the motorist was moving
away from the trooper's car, movement that would appear to
facilitate the movement of the trooper's car.
The statute does not require a signal for every lane change.
Perhaps it should. Because the statute does not contain such a
requirement, the officer ordering a stop must have some
articulable basis for concluding that the lane change might have
an effect on traffic.
The hearing on the motion to suppress focused not on that
issue, but on the more conventional issues of what conduct, after
the stop, authorized the search of the car. The testimony was in
sharp conflict. Defendant insisted that no contraband was in
plain view and the trooper told him that he (the trooper) had the
right to search the vehicle (in defendant's view) without any
probable cause.
Only a few sentences in the transcript of the hearing
address the validity of the stop. The questions posed to the
trooper were:
Q. And what motor vehicle violation did you
observe?
A. I observed the vehicle without signal and
warning just change lanes from the center
lane over into the right lane. Again this is
within a few car lengths ahead of me, I was
in the left lane.
Q. * * * [W]hat motor vehicle offense had
occurred in your opinion?
A. Failing to properly signal a lane change.
Defendant testified that the trooper had been following him
"for two or three miles to the point where I thought I was doing
something wrong so I got out of that lane and I put my turn
signal on and got in the slower lane." Defendant stated that the
trooper said, "you didn't turn on your blinker."
The trooper may have thought that any lane change without a
signal violates the statute. The Law Division's only reference
to the issue was:
[The trooper] was traveling westbound in
Knowlton Township in the left lane when he
observed a car in front of him in the center
lane that he described as a white Dodge
traveling in the same direction. He observed
the [defendant's] vehicle without signals or
warning lights change from the center lane to
the right lane. He perceived that to be a
violation of the motor vehicle act and
therefore stopped the vehicle in order to
cite the operator for a motor vehicle
violation, that being failing to signal upon
a lane change.
Given the scourge of drugs in our society, to insist on
resolving the validity of a traffic stop once drugs are found may
appear to be a small point. The statute, however, defines the
motor-vehicle violation that justifies the stop in terms of
whether the failure to signal may have affected any other
traffic. The hearing below did not address that question.
Whether the trooper had an objective basis to believe that a
traffic violation had occurred must be determined.
The remand of the Appellate Division is affirmed. Further
proceedings shall be in accordance with this opinion.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler,
Pollock, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein join in this opinion.
NO. A-38 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES H. WILLIAMSON,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED December 19, 1994
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY