(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in
the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 11, 2000 -- Decided February 28, 2001
COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
This appeal requires the Court to decide whether the No Early Release Act (NERA or the Act) may be
applied to a defendant convicted of a first- or second-degree offense as an accomplice rather than as a principal.
A Bergen County Grand Jury indicted defendant and his co-defendants, Everton Watts and Raheam
Goosby, of first-degree robbery, second-degree aggravated assault, third-degree aggravated assault on a police
officer, weapons offenses, and other charges. Defendant negotiated a plea agreement with the State in which he
would pled guilty to first-degree robbery, third degree aggravated assault on a police officer, and other crimes.
Defendant was informed that his plea to first-degree robbery would invoke the sentencing provisions of NERA.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended a maximum base term of twenty years.
Defendant provided a factual basis to support his plea, admitting that his role was to assist in planning a
robbery of the Radisson Inn hotel in Paramus and in providing transportation by driving a stolen vehicle to and from
the scene on October 20, 1997. Defendant helped plan the robbery, knowing that the two co-defendants would be
armed with guns when they entered the hotel to commit the robbery.
As planned, defendant drove Watts and Goosby to the Radisson Inn and waited outside while they entered
the lobby and robbed Thomas Patterson, the hotel clerk. Defendant knew that Watts and Goosby were armed when
they entered the hotel. After they robbed Patterson at gunpoint, they injured him by pistol-whipping him. When
police officers arrived at the scene, Watts and Goosby pointed their weapons at the officers before they were
arrested. Defendant was arrested while attempting to flee in the stolen vehicle. He later admitted he was an
accomplice to the robbery and that he shared the intent and purpose of his co-defendants.
Based on those facts, the court sentenced defendant for the first-degree robbery to a base term of thirteen
years and, pursuant to NERA, a minimum term of 85 percent, or eleven years and six months, before parole
eligibility. Concurrent terms were imposed on the remaining counts. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division
held that NERA may be applied to accomplices.
326 N.J. Super. 296 (1999).
The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification.
HELD: NERA may be applied to defendants who are guilty as accomplices.
1. NERA provides for defendants convicted of first- and second-degree “violent crimes” to serve 85 percent of their
sentences before becoming eligible for parole. The Act defines “violent crime” to mean a crime “in which the
actor” causes death or serious bodily injury; uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon; and any
aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault “in which the actor” uses or threatens the immediate use of physical
force. Defendant argues that NERA applies only to principals and not to accomplices because it limits its scope to
the “actor.” (Pp. 5-6)
2. The statute that establishes accomplice liability provides that a person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by
the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable; a person is legally accountable for another if he is an
accomplice of the other; and a person is an accomplice if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the offense,
he aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the act. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. For
defendant to be guilty of first-degree robbery as an accomplice, he must have intended that the principals engage in
the armed robbery and defendant must have acted purposely in planning, promoting, or facilitating the robbery.
That defendant acted in such a manner is beyond dispute given the factual basis of his guilty pleas. (Pp. 6-8)
3. The Code of Criminal Justice uses the word “actor” in at least eighty-seven subsections and at least seventy
additional subparts. In examining the statutory definition of the word “actor” as well as viewing the term in its
proper syntax, it becomes clear that “actor” is intended as a synonym for a defendant regardless of whether he or
she acts as a principal or an accomplice. Here, defendant was an “actor” when he helped to plan the robbery and
when he drove the principals to the scene of the robbery. (Pp. 8-9)
4. The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Appellate Division that the Legislature would not have intended that
the mastermind of an armed robbery could avoid the consequences of NERA sentencing by having a confederate
carry out the crime. Although an accomplice may be found guilty of a lower degree of a violent offense than a
principal if the two did not share the same mental culpability, for NERA purposes principals and accomplices are
treated the same. The Court has previously held that the Graves Act's minimum terms of imprisonment for
defendants who use a firearm to commit a crime applied to an unarmed defendant who acted as an accomplice. The
Court reasoned that the accomplice has committed the same crime as the individual who possessed or used the gun
if the accomplice had the purpose to promote or facilitate that crime - namely, robbery with the use of a firearm. If
the Legislature had a contrary intent, it could have said so, as it did in creating an exception to felony-murder -
providing that a defendant who had no reasonable ground to believe that another participant was armed is not
responsible for felony-murder committed by that other. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3). (Pp. 9-10)
5. Defendant also argues that NERA violates State and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment. As in State v. Johnson, __ N.J. __ (2000), also decided today, this Court concludes that NERA is not
unconstitutional. (P. 11)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in
JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
89 September Term 1999
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHARLES RUMBLIN, a/k/a DAWUD
M. McGHEE and JAMAL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued October 11, 2000 -- Decided February 28, 2001
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is
reported at
326 N.J. Super. 296 (1999).
Alison S. Perrone, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney;
Ms. Perrone and Claire Drugach, on the
letter briefs).
John J. Scaliti, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (William H.
Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr.,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
This appeal requires us to decide whether the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, may be applied to a
defendant convicted of a first or second degree offense as an
accomplice rather than as a principal. In a published opinion,
the Appellate Division held that NERA may be applied to
accomplices. State v. Rumblin,
326 N.J. Super. 296, 302 (1999).
We granted defendant's petition for certification,
163 N.J. 396
(2000), and now affirm.
A Bergen County Grand Jury indicted defendant and his co- defendants, Everton Watts and Raheam Goosby, for first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count One); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Two); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2) (Count Three); fourth- degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4) (Counts Four, Five, Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven); third-degree aggravated assault upon a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(a) (Count Seven); fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a (Counts Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen); second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Fifteen); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Sixteen); fourth-degree unlawful possession of hollow-nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3f (Count Seventeen); third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1) (Count Eighteen); fourth-degree unlawful taking of means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10d (Count Twenty); and fourth-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (Count Twenty-One). In addition, the indictment charged only defendant Rumblin with third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (Count Nineteen).
Defendant negotiated a plea agreement with the State in which he would plead guilty to first-degree robbery, third-degree aggravated assault upon a police officer, two counts of fourth- degree resisting arrest, third-degree possession of cocaine, and third-degree theft by receiving a stolen 1985 Chevrolet Camaro motor vehicle. Defendant was informed that his guilty plea to first-degree robbery would invoke the sentencing provisions of NERA. For its part of the plea agreement, the State would recommend a maximum custodial base term of twenty years and would dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment.
Defendant provided a factual basis to support his guilt on each of the six counts to which he entered guilty pleas. Defendant admitted that his role was to assist in planning a robbery of the Radisson Inn hotel located in Paramus, New Jersey, and to provide transportation by driving the stolen Chevrolet Camaro to and from the scene on October 20, 1997. Defendant helped to plan the robbery, knowing that the two co-defendants would be armed with guns when they entered the hotel to commit the robbery. As planned, defendant drove Watts and Goosby to the Radisson Inn and waited outside in the stolen Camaro while they entered the hotel lobby and robbed Thomas Patterson, the hotel clerk. Defendant knew that Watts and Goosby were armed when they entered the hotel. After they robbed Patterson at gunpoint, they injured him by pistol-whipping him. When police officers arrived on the scene, Watts and Goosby pointed their weapons at the officers before they were arrested. At the time of their arrests, a police officer recovered one of the weapons used in the robbery. That gun contained three hollow-nose bullets. Defendant was arrested while attempting to flee in the stolen Camaro. He later admitted that he was an accomplice to the robbery and that he shared the intent and purpose of his co- defendants to commit the robbery while armed with guns.
Based on those facts, the court sentenced defendant for the first-degree robbery to a base term of thirteen years and required him to serve eighty-five percent, or eleven years and six months, before becoming eligible for parole. Concurrent terms were imposed on the remaining five counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction in all respects.
Defendant argues that NERA does not apply to unarmed accomplices because NERA limits its scope to the “actor” who causes death or serious bodily injury or uses or threatens the use of a deadly weapon. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2d. The essence of defendant's assertion is that NERA applies only to principals and not accomplices. The State disagrees and maintains that because of the nature of accomplice liability under New Jersey law, NERA applies to both principals and accomplices alike.
Our analysis must begin with the statute itself. NERA, in pertinent part, provides:
a. A court imposing a sentence of incarceration for a crime of the first or second degree shall fix a minimum term of 85% of the sentence during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole if the crime is a violent crime as defined in subsection d. of this section.
. . . .
d. For the purposes of this section,
“violent crime” means any crime in which the
actor causes death, causes serious bodily
injury as defined in subsection b. of N.J.S.
2C:11-1, or uses or threatens the immediate
use of a deadly weapon. “Violent crime” also
includes any aggravated sexual assault or
sexual assault in which the actor uses, or
threatens the immediate use of, physical
force.
For the purposes of this section,
“deadly weapon” means any firearm or other
weapon, device, instrument, material or
substance, whether animate or inanimate,
which in the manner it is used or is intended
to be used, is known to be capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury.
Accomplice liability is based on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. That
statute, in pertinent part, provides:
a. A person is guilty of an offense if
it is committed by his own conduct or by the
conduct of another person for which he is
legally accountable, or both.
b. A person is legally accountable for
the conduct of another person when:
(1) Acting with the kind of culpability
that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense, he causes an innocent or
irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct;
(2) He is made accountable for the
conduct of such other person by the code or
by the law defining the offense;
(3) He is an accomplice of such other
person in the commission of an offense; or
(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with
such other person.
c. A person is an accomplice of another
person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense;
he
(a) Solicits such other person to commit
it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid
such other person in planning or committing
it; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails to make
proper effort so to do; or
(2) His conduct is expressly declared by
law to establish his complicity.
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, accomplice liability attaches when a
defendant shares the purpose of the principal who commits the
offense charged, State v. Norman,
151 N.J. 5, 32 (1997), and the
defendant “actually foresee[s] and intend[s] the result of his or
her acts.” State v. Bridges,
133 N.J. 447, 456 (1993). Here, to
be guilty of robbery in the first degree, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1b
requires that principals Watts and Goosby purposely attempted to
inflict serious bodily harm, or were armed with, or used, or
threatened to use a deadly weapon while committing the theft.
For defendant to be guilty of first-degree robbery as an
accomplice, he, too, must have intended that the principals
engage in the armed robbery and defendant must have acted
purposely in planning, promoting, or facilitating that robbery.
See State v. Weeks,
107 N.J. 396, 403 (1987). That defendant
acted in such a manner is beyond dispute given the factual basis
for his guilty pleas.
We reject defendant's contention that because NERA uses the
word “actor,” NERA does not apply to accomplices. The New Jersey
Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9, uses the word
“actor” in at least eighty-seven subsections and in at least
seventy additional subparts.See footnote 11 In examining the statutory
definition of the word “actor,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14e, g, j, and
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1a, as well as viewing the term in its proper
syntax, it becomes clear that “actor” is intended as a synonym
for a defendant regardless of whether he or she acts as a
principal or an accomplice. Here, defendant was an “actor” when
he helped to plan the robbery and when he drove the principals to
the scene of the robbery. Furthermore, there is no evidence in
any of NERA's legislative history that the Legislature intended
the word “actor” to apply solely to principals. NERA intends to
impose greater punishment upon violent criminals. N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2d. The Act does not differentiate among perpetrators of
violent crimes based upon principal and accomplice
classifications.
In construing NERA, the Appellate Division reasoned that
“the Legislature would not have intended that the mastermind of
an armed robbery could avoid the consequences of [NERA]
sentencing by having a confederate carry out the crime.”
Rumblin, supra, 326 N.J. Super. at 302. We agree that the word
“actor” refers to a defendant-perpetrator of an offense and
includes both principals and accomplices. We hold, therefore,
that although an accomplice may be found guilty of a lower degree
of a violent offense than a principal if the two did not share
the same mental culpability, Weeks, supra, 107 N.J. at 400-03;
State v. Bielkiewicz,
267 N.J. Super. 520, 533-34 (App. Div.
1993), for NERA purposes principals and accomplices are treated
the same. State v. Mancine,
124 N.J. 232, 259-60 (1991).
What we said in holding that the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6c, applies to unarmed accomplices, is applicable here. In State
v. White,
98 N.J. 122, 126-27 (1984), the unarmed defendant who
acted as an accomplice in two armed robberies was sentenced
pursuant to the Graves Act. In holding that the Graves Act
applied to unarmed accomplices, we observed:
An accomplice may be guilty of armed
robbery even though he did not personally
possess or use the firearm in the course of
the commission of the robbery. The
accomplice has committed the same crime as
the individual who possessed or used the gun
if the accomplice had the purpose to promote
or facilitate that crime, namely, robbery
with the use of a firearm. See N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1b; N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b; State v. Gantt,
195 N.J. Super. 114, 118 (App. Div. 1984),
certif. granted, [101] N.J. [220] (1985).
One is the alter ego of the other.
Surely, the Legislature intended that
when an accomplice is guilty of a robbery
that is held to be a crime of the first
degree because one perpetrator used or
possessed a firearm, the Graves Act would
apply in sentencing the accomplice. If the
Legislature had a contrary intent, it could
have said so. Cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3)
(defendant who had no reasonable ground to
believe that any other participant was armed
is not responsible for felony-murder
committed by another). The Legislature
created no exception from the Graves Act.
Where an accomplice has been found guilty of
armed robbery, he is subject to the minimum
imprisonment terms of the Graves Act.
Similarly, we hold that NERA applies to unarmed accomplices.
Defendant also argues that NERA violates state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Johnson, N.J. (2000), also decided today, this Court concludes that NERA is not unconstitutional.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate.
NO. A-89 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHARLES RUMBLIN, a/k/a DAWUD
M. McGHEE and JAMAL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED February 28, 2001
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1 1 The word “actor” appears in the Code at the following
locations: 2C:1-3a(6), -3c; 2C:1-14e,g,j; 2C:2-1a; 2C:2-
2b(3),(4); 2C:2-3b,c,e; 2C:2-4c(1),c(2),c(3); 2C:2-
8a,b,d,e(2),e(3); 2C:4c(1),(2),(3); 2C:2-8a,b,d,e(2),e(3); 2C:2-
9a,b; 2C:2-10c(2); 2C:3-3c(1),c(2); 2C:3-4a,b(1)(a),b(1)(b)(I)-
(iii),b(2),
b(2)(a),b(2)(b),b(2)(b)(I),c(1),c(2),c(2)(a),c(2)(b),c(3);
2C:3-5a(1),a(2),a(3),b(1),b(2),b(3); 2C:3-6a,b(1),b(2),b(3),
(3)(c),b(3)(c)(I),b(3)(c)(ii); 2C:3-7a,b(1)(a),b(2)(a)-
(d),c,e,e(2); 2C:3-8; 2C:3-9a (1),c; 2C:3-11b,c; 2C:5-1b,d; 2C:5-
2e; 2C:11-2.1; 2C:11-3a(1)-(3); 2C:11-4a,b(3); 2C:12-1b(4);
2C:12-2b(2); 2C:13-1c,c(2),c(2)(c),e(1)-(2); 2C:13-2b; 2C:13-3;
2C:13-4c(1)-(2); 2C:13-5,a(5),a(7),b; 2C:13-6; 2C:14-1a,c,d;
2C:14-2(nearly every subsection); 2C:14-3a,b; 2C:14-4b(1)-(2),c;
2C:14-5b; 2C:14-6; 2C:15-1b; 2C:17-1f; 2C:17-3b(1)-(6); 2C:18-
2a(1),b; 2C:18-3b(1),d(2)-(3); 2C:18-4; 2C:18-6a; 2C:20-1h;
2C:20-2c,d; 2C:20-5e,g; 2C:20-7.1d; 2C:20-9; 2C:20-10a; 2C:20-
17b; 2C:20-18; 2C:21-1a; 2C:21-4.3h; 2C:21-8.1a; 2C:21-13c;
2C:21-15; 2C:21-17d; 2C:24-1a(1),(2),(4); 2C:24-4b(5); 2C:24-9d;
2C:27-2d; 2C:27-3a(3); 2C:28-1c,d; 2C:28-5a(4); 2C:28-7b; 2C:29-
1b; 2C:29-3a(7),b(4); 2C:29-4; 2C:29-5e; 2C:29-6b; 2C:29-7;
2C:33-2a(2); 2C:33-2.1d; 2C:33-14.1; 2C:33-28a,b,c,d; 2C:34-
1a(4)(g), b(1)-(7); 2C:34-1.1d; 2C:34-3d; 2C:35-1.1c; 2C:35-3;
2C:35-6; 2C:35-7; 2C:35-7.1b; 2C:35A-3d; 2C:35A-4a(3); 2C:37-1b;
2C:39-16; 2C:43-6f; 2C:43-7.2d; 2C:44-1a(1); and, 2C:44-3g.