(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 3, 1995 -- Decided August 7, 1995
HANDLER, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue on appeal is whether and to what extent remission through treatment of an underlying
mental illness may constitute rehabilitation in determining whether jurisdiction of the juvenile court should
be waived.
Sixteen-year-old Clarence Scott pointed a sawed-off shotgun at two men in an unsuccessful attempt
to rob them. Thereafter, Scott attempted to rob a man sitting in his car. Scott pointed the shotgun and told
the man to exit his car. A fight ensued and the victim was shot. Scott and his cohort fled in the victim's
automobile.
Scott was charged in the Family Part of the Chancery Division (family court), as a juvenile with
offenses that would have constituted certain crimes if committed by an adult, including robbery, aggravated
assault and weapons offenses. Based on the serious nature of the offenses charged, the State moved to waive
jurisdiction from the family court to the Law Division and to have Scott prosecuted as an adult. At a hearing
on this issue, Scott presented testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Dyer, who expressed the opinion that Scott was
suffering from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, an incurable disorder. Dr. Dyer was of the belief that
with proper treatment and supervision, including psychotherapy and medication, Scott could achieve a state
of remission prior to reaching age nineteen.
The trial court determined that Scott could not be rehabilitated prior to reaching age nineteen,
noting that his mental illness would require treatment over an extended period of time, that proper treatment
would require appropriate dosages of medication combined with psychotherapy, and that although a state of
remission could be achieved through treatment, the disease would not be cured. Furthermore, the court
concluded that even if Dr. Dyer's testimony did establish a probability of rehabilitation, that probability did
not substantially outweigh the reasons for waiver.
After the family court waived jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Law Division, Scott was
indicted on twelve counts for the adult crimes covering the juvenile offenses with which he had been charged.
He pled guilty to three counts of first degree robbery and one count of second degree aggravated assault.
Scott pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifteen-year term of imprisonment
with a five-year period of parole ineligibility on each of the robbery charges, and a seven-year term of
imprisonment with a three-year period of parole ineligibility on the assault charge. Those sentences were to
run consecutively.
Scott appealed the waiver determination and the sentence imposed. The Appellate Division
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Scott's petition for certification, seeking review of the determinations
relating to his waiver to the Law Division and the excessiveness of the sentence imposed. The Court vacates,
as improvidently granted, the petition for certification relating to the issue of excessiveness of sentence.
HELD: There was adequate evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination that the
reasons for sixteen-year-old Clarence Scott's waiver to the adult court for prosecution outweighed
any probability of rehabilitation.
1. For certain enumerated offenses, the family court may waive its juvenile jurisdiction and transfer the case
to the adult court for criminal prosecution. There is a presumption in favor of waiver for such juveniles;
however, that presumption can be overcome. Waiver should not be granted if the juvenile can show that the
probability of his rehabilitation prior to the juvenile reaching the age of nineteen substantially outweighs the
reasons for waiver. The juvenile has the burden to establish both that there is a probability of rehabilitation
prior to reaching the age of nineteen and that the probability of rehabilitation substantially outweighs the
reasons for waiver. The probability of rehabilitation must be established prior to balancing that probability
against reasons for waiver. (pp. 5-7)
2. Although mental illness may make a juvenile less amenable to rehabilitation, it does not constitute a bar
to a determination of potential for rehabilitation. The key to the statutory concept of rehabilitation in the
context of a juvenile with a mental illness, is the assurance, on a stable and continuing basis, that the juvenile
offender will not engage in future criminal behavior. A chronic and incurable mental illness is highly
relevant in predicting future conduct, if that illness causes or contributes to criminal behavior. The existence
of such mental illness must be evaluated in light of all the factors that form the basis for the determination
of the likelihood of rehabilitation. The nature, extent and effect of such a mental illness must be analyzed,
weighed and applied. Moreover is treatment central to any determination of the prospect of rehabilitation.
(pp. 7-9)
3. The Court's standard for review is whether the findings of fact are grounded in competent, reasonable,
credible evidence, whether correct legal principles were applied, and whether the trial court's decision
constituted a clear error of judgment that shocks the judicial conscience. (p. 10)
4. Dr. Dyer's testimony arguably supports the conclusion that Scott was amenable to rehabilitation prior to
reaching age nineteen. However, the family court understood and applied the proper standard by which to
judge rehabilitation. It clearly determined that the reasons for waiver outweighed the probability of Scott's
rehabilitation. (pp. 9-16)
5. Once the probability of rehabilitation is established, then the age of the offender, his prior record of
delinquency, the circumstances of the crime, and the role of the individual participants may be taken into
account in determining whether to waive jurisdiction. The court must balance the value of probable
rehabilitation of the juvenile offender, if shown, against the general deterrent value of exposing the offender
to the more severe sentences available in adult court. Despite the conclusion that Scott could be
rehabilitated and would be better served in the juvenile system, Dr. Dyer admitted that Scott's condition is
severe, that his prognosis is poor, and that treatment of schizophrenia takes many years and is contingent on
finding the correct drugs and continued post-care treatment. Most important, Dr. Dyer could not conclude
that Scott would not act in an anti-social manner in the future. Therefore, there was adequate evidence to
support the trial court's determination that the reasons for waiver outweighed any probability of
rehabilitation. (pp. 16-19)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and
COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
65 September Term 1994
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLARENCE SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued January 3, 1995 -- Decided August 7, 1995
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Susan Green, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender,
attorney).
Terry S. Bogorad, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Ronald S.
Fava, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney).
Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
HANDLER, J.
This case requires the Court to consider the statutory concept of rehabilitation as a condition for determining whether
a juvenile offender is eligible to be tried as an adult.
Defendant was arrested for his alleged involvement in a series of
armed robberies. Because defendant was only sixteen years old at
that time, he was charged with acts of juvenile delinquency. The
court held a waiver hearing and determined that defendant should
be tried as an adult. Under the waiver statute, the court found
that the State had established probable cause to believe that
defendant committed the offenses charged, and, further, that
defendant had failed to establish the probability of his
rehabilitation prior to reaching the age of nineteen and that the
need for waiver outweighed any potential for rehabilitation.
The circumstance that poses special difficulty in
interpreting and applying the statutory concept of rehabilitation
in this case is that the defendant suffers from a serious and
chronic mental illness, but is nonetheless amenable to treatment
for that condition. The Court must consider whether and to what
extent remission through treatment of an underlying mental
illness may constitute rehabilitation in determining whether
jurisdiction of the juvenile court should be waived.
On February 14, 1991, at approximately six o'clock in the evening, four juveniles wearing ski masks approached Benjamin Melendez and Bernard White, who were outside a tavern in Paterson. Defendant Clarence Scott, who was one of the juveniles, pointed a sawed-off shotgun at Melendez and White,
while the others attempted to rob them. Finding no money on
Melendez and White, the foursome left and dispersed.
Defendant and another juvenile, Dallas Brown, remained
together. After walking a few blocks, they stopped on reaching
Isaac Miranda, who was sitting in his parked car. Defendant
tapped on the window with the shotgun, and Miranda was told to
exit the car. After Miranda exited the car, a fight ensued. The
shotgun discharged as Miranda attempted to gain control of it
from defendant. Miranda was shot in the leg, and defendant and
Brown fled in Miranda's automobile.
Defendant was charged in the Family Part of the Chancery
Division (sometimes referred to as the "family court") as a
juvenile with the following offenses that would have constituted
these crimes if committed by an adult: third degree unlawful
possession of a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1); third
degree possession of a prohibited weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:39-3b; second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a; three counts of fourth
degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4);
three counts of first degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2); third degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1b(2); and third degree hindering apprehension, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1).
Thereafter, based on the serious nature of the offenses
charged, the State moved to waive jurisdiction from the Family
Part of the Chancery Division to the Law Division and to have
defendant tried as an adult. The State presented testimony of
Detective Daley, who recounted the results of the robbery
investigations. Her testimony established probable cause under
the waiver statute for defendant to be tried as an adult.
Defendant presented the testimony of psychologist Frank J.
Dyer, Phd. Dr. Dyer expressed the opinion that defendant was
suffering from chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, a disorder
that could not be cured. However, Dr. Dyer stated that with
proper treatment and supervision defendant could achieve a state
of remission prior to reaching age nineteen.
The trial court determined that defendant could not be
rehabilitated prior to reaching age nineteen, noting that
defendant's mental disease would require treatment over an
extended period of time, that proper treatment would require
appropriate dosages of medication combined with psychotherapy,
and that although a state of remission could be achieved through
treatment, the disease would not be cured. The court,
furthermore, concluded that even if Dr. Dyer's testimony did
establish a probability of rehabilitation, that probability did
not substantially outweigh the reasons for waiver.
After the family court waived jurisdiction and transferred
the case to the Law Division, defendant was indicted in twelve
counts for the adult crimes covering the juvenile offenses with
which he had been charged. Defendant then pled guilty to three
counts of first degree robbery and one count of second degree
aggravated assault. According to the plea agreement, the State
recommended a maximum sentence of fifteen years with a seven-and-one-half year term of parole ineligibility.
The Law Division sentenced defendant to a fifteen-year term
of imprisonment with a five-year period of parole ineligibility
on each of the robbery charges, and a seven-year term of
imprisonment with a three-year period of parole ineligibility on
the assault charge. The sentences were to run concurrently.
Defendant appealed the waiver determination and the sentence
imposed. The Appellate Division affirmed the waiver
determination as well as the sentence. Defendant petitioned this
Court for certification, seeking review of the determinations
relating to his waiver to the Law Division and the excessiveness
of the sentence imposed. The Court granted defendant's petition,
137 N.J. 313 (1994), but now vacates, as improvidently granted,
the petition for certification relating to the issue of
excessiveness of sentence.
Under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a), if a juvenile is charged with certain enumerated offenses the juvenile is subject to being tried as an adult. The family court may waive its juvenile jurisdiction and transfer the case for criminal prosecution. Once it is established by the prosecution that a juvenile is fourteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense and that there is probable cause to believe
that the juvenile committed the offense in question, "no
additional showing is required in order for waiver to occur."
State v. R.G.D.,
108 N.J. 1, 11 (1987). Juveniles charged with
those enumerated offenses are "the primary candidates for waiver
to the adult courts," ibid., because the statute has created a
"presumption" of waiver for such juveniles. Id. at 12; State In
the Interest of A.J.,
232 N.J. Super. 274, 292 (App. Div. 1989);
State in the Interest of A.B.,
214 N.J. Super. 558, 566 (App.
Div. 1987), aff'd,
109 N.J. 195 (1988).
That presumption of waiver, however, can be overcome
if in any case the juvenile can show that the
probability of his rehabilitation by the use
of the procedures, services and facilities
available to the court prior to the juvenile
reaching the age of 19 substantially
outweighs the reasons for waiver, waiver
shall not be granted.
The juvenile has the burden to establish both that there is
a probability of rehabilitation prior to reaching the age of
nineteen and that the probability of rehabilitation substantially
outweighs the reasons for waiver. The statute requires a
balancing of "the need for deterrence against the prospects of
rehabilitation." State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R.,
89 N.J. 326, 344 (1982). That balancing occurs, however, only if
the juvenile first establishes the probability of rehabilitation.
State in the Interest of A.J., supra, 232 N.J. Super. at 292.
To establish the probability of rehabilitation, the juvenile
typically presents expert testimony. Such testimony should
relate the gravity of the crimes and the background of the
juvenile offender to the prospects for rehabilitation, addressing
various factors that will bear on the juvenile's amenability to
rehabilitation, including the juvenile's age and the success rate
of the proposed rehabilitation program. The length of time
needed for the juvenile to complete the program is also relevant.
See State in the Interest of B.G.,
247 N.J. Super. 403, 423-24
(App. Div. 1991) (affirming lower court ruling that
rehabilitation had not been established where juvenile was
unlikely to receive sufficient therapy in the six months
remaining before his nineteenth birthday). Further, because the
probability of rehabilitation must be determined in light of the
services available to the court, the expert should offer a
specific rehabilitation plan. See State in the Interest of A.L.,
271 N.J. Super. 192, 213 (App. Div. 1994) (agreeing with the
lower court that the offer of "a vague plan of rehabilitation by
psychiatric therapy" failed to satisfy the burden of proof).
Despite expert testimony which tends to establish the probability
of rehabilitation, "[e]xpert testimony need not be given greater
weight than other evidence or than it otherwise deserves in light
of common sense and experience." State in the Interest of C.A.H.
& B.A.R., supra, 89 N.J. at 343; see State in the Interest of
A.J., supra, 232 N.J. Super. at 292.
Mental illness clearly can be a pivotal factor in
determining the prospect for rehabilitation as a condition
bearing on waiver. Mental illness is significant because of its
impact on the capacity of the juvenile for achieving
rehabilitation. The focus, however, is not on the mental illness
as such but its effects on the juvenile's conduct and behavior.
This Court, in State in the Interest of A.B., supra, 109
N.J. at 200, considered the standards for assessing the potential
for rehabilitation as applied to a "developmentally disabled"
juvenile. The Court recognized that a developmental disability
constitutes a serious and chronic impairment that substantially
affects behavior. See, e.g., State in the Interest of R.M., __
N.J. __ (1995). The Court concluded that the concept of
rehabilitation for purposes of determining waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction "does not contemplate a showing that the
'developmental disability' will be removed before the juvenile
attains the age of nineteen." Rather, "[t]he question the waiver
court must resolve is whether the juvenile is likely, before he
attains the age of nineteen, to be led away from a path of crime
by the processes of social rehabilitation available to the
court." Ibid. In that context, rehabilitation does not entail
anything beyond successful treatment that can bring about
socially-accepted behavior.
Although a juvenile's mental illness may make the juvenile
less amenable to rehabilitation, it does not constitute a bar to
a determination of potential for rehabilitation. See
Commonwealth v. Matthews,
548 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 1990)
(recognizing that juvenile's mental illness was an important
factor militating in favor of waiver but was not a per se
condition requiring waiver); J.A.L. v. State,
471 N.W.2d 493, 505
(Wis. 1991) (stating that "the fact that a child suffers a mental
illness may favor waiver rather than retention in the juvenile
system because the mental illness itself may make rehabilitation
within the juvenile system less likely.").
The key to the statutory concept of rehabilitation in the
context of a juvenile with a mental illness is the assurance, on
a stable and continuing basis, that the juvenile offender will
not engage in future criminal behavior. A mental illness that is
chronic and incurable, however, is highly relevant in predicting
future conduct, if that illness causes or contributes to criminal
behavior. Hence, mental illness must be considered to be a
critical factor in any determination of whether rehabilitation is
feasible.
The existence of such mental illness must be evaluated in
the light of all of the factors that form the basis for the
determination of the likelihood of rehabilitation. The nature,
extent and effect of such a mental illness must be analyzed,
weighed and applied in that context. It is clear that treatment
of the mental condition will be central to any determination of
its significance and its impact on the prospect for
rehabilitation. Consequently, the court should consider the
period of time available for treatment; the projected period of
time required for improvement or remission to be achieved; the
basis for that projection, including the severity of the illness;
the difficulty involved in identifying the appropriate treatment
or medication; the response of the juvenile to prior treatment or
medication, if any; and, the success rate of the proposed program
for achieving and maintaining remission.
We turn to the record to consider the evidence of rehabilitation in the analytical framework that is imposed when a juvenile suffers from a severe mental illness. The standard of review of this issue, as a constituent aspect of a waiver determination, is whether the findings of fact are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence, whether correct legal principles were applied, and whether the trial court's decision constituted a clear error of judgment that shocks the judicial conscience. State v. R.G.D., supra, 108 N.J. at 15 (citing State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64 (1984)).
At the waiver hearing, the State established the grounds for waiver under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 through the testimony of Detective Daley. Defendant, in an attempt to rebut the presumption of waiver, presented the testimony of Dr. Dyer to establish defendant's rehabilitative potential. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(3).
Dr. Dyer testified to defendant's history of suicide attempts and depression, his past treatment at juvenile psychiatric institutions, complaints of auditory hallucinations, substantiated allegations of child abuse and the inadequate
discharge plans provided to defendant after his past releases
from the psychiatric institutions. After describing the results
of psychiatric tests administered during the personal evaluation,
Dr. Dyer concluded that defendant suffered from "chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenia." Dr. Dyer stated that
defendant's condition first manifested itself in defendant's
first suicide attempt at the age of seven, nine years prior to
the commission of the current crimes. However, Dr. Dyer
suggested that the "predisposition [may have been] present since
birth."
Dr. Dyer acknowledged that there is a causal link between
defendant's criminal behavior and his schizophrenia. Dr. Dyer
stated that medication does not cure schizophrenia, but remission
is possible. He testified that "[t]his disorder can be
controlled through the administration of the proper anti-psychotic agent[s] . . . They [the agents] can eliminate
delusional thinking. They eliminate the feeling of panic or
general unease that the schizophrenics feel . . . provid[ed] that
the right drug is found for the individual's specific condition,
[the agents] can restore a schizophrenic individual to a
reasonably normal level of functioning."
Dr. Dyer testified that on past occasions, while under
supervision and drug treatment in psychiatric institutions,
defendant's condition had improved such that he did not act out
and engage in anti-social behavior. Further, according to Dr.
Dyer, defendant's reversion to his anti-social tendencies were
caused by the State's failure to provide "an adequate discharge
plan."
Dr. Dyer expressed the view that proper medication,
education regarding the dosages and properties of medication,
instruction regarding the interaction of medication and other
substances, training regarding self-medication and individual
counseling or therapy may result in the remission of defendant's
condition. However, that result depends on "an adequate
discharge plan," which includes assignment to a halfway house
followed by outpatient psychotherapy and intensive probation
supervision. Based on defendant's prior positive responses to
institutionalization, Dr. Dyer concluded that defendant, provided
with that treatment and aftercare, could comport with the rules
of society prior to the becoming nineteen years of age.
Dr. Dyer's opinion with regard to defendant's potential for
rehabilitation clearly focused on the probability of remission
of defendant's mental condition, as opposed to its cure.
However, on cross-examination, the following testimony was
elicited:
State: Doctor, do you have an expert opinion to a
reasonable degree of certainly whether or not
[for] Clarence Scott, there is a probability
that he will be rehabilitated before his 19th
birthday by the procedures available to the
Family Court.
Dr. Dyer: No.
State: Are there several variables which are present
in this case which makes it impossible for
you to have such an opinion.
Dr. Dyer: My opinion is that he cannot.
State: I'm sorry. I didn't understand the answer.
Dr. Dyer: My opinion is that I cannot say that within a
reasonable degree of psychological certainty
this young man can be rehabilitated prior to
reaching the age of 19 according to the way
in which the term rehabilitation is used in
juvenile precedence in this State.
After that brief cross-examination, defense counsel
conducted re-direct examination of Dr. Dyer, which seemed to
confirm that Dr. Dyer's statement -- defendant could not be
rehabilitated -- was premised on Dr. Dyer's assumption that the
prosecutor was using the term rehabilitation to require something
more than remission.
In response to additional questioning by the court, Dr. Dyer
acknowledged that the treatment of schizophrenia normally takes
"a good number of years." With regard to defendant's ability to
achieve remission prior to reaching the age of nineteen, Dr. Dyer
agreed that although defendant has a history of "responding very
quickly" to treatment, defendant's prognosis is poor because of
"the severity of defendant's symptoms" and "the number of years
that have gone by without adequate treatment."
The following colloquy followed:
Court: So that from the public's point of view there
is nothing to indicate that if this young man
were placed back in society that he would not
continue . . . to act in [an] antisocial
manner. We have no degree of certainty to
assure the public of that fact?
Dr. Dyer: If Your Honor is referring to the standard for rehabilitation that indicates that the respondent will not commit the offense with -- which he has been charged or similar
offenses, then I would agree with that, Your
Honor.
The trial court concluded that defendant did not meet his
burden under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(3). It noted the long period
of time required to treat schizophrenia coupled with the
additional requirements of proper medication and continued
psychotherapy. Moreover, it referred to Dr. Dyer's statement
made during cross-examination in which he failed to express an
opinion with medical certainty that the juvenile would be
rehabilitated prior to the age of nineteen, as well as to the
contingent nature of any potential rehabilitative efforts.
The Appellate Division, in affirming the judgment of the
trial court, observed that Dr. Dyer exhibited "familiarity with
the concept of rehabilitation as used in the Juvenile Code." The
Appellate Division specifically found "the . . . colloquy between
the judge and Dr. Dyer evidence[d] their mutual understanding of
the correct standard." The court therefore concluded that there
was no indication in the record that the trial court misunder
stood the law to require cure of defendant's schizophrenia before
the age of nineteen as opposed to requiring treatment that can
effectively and substantially improve behavior. The Appellate
Division also noted Dr. Dyer's response to the trial court in
which he agreed that from the public's point of view there was
nothing to indicate that if defendant were placed back in society
he would not continue to act in an antisocial manner or that he
would not revert to his past behavioral patterns.
The family court reasonably determined on the record that
the most effective method of keeping schizophrenia in a state of
remission is "effective medication coupled with psychotherapy
over a long period of time." Although Dr. Dyer testified as to
the implementation of a specific plan, he never established a
success rate of that proposed plan. As previously noted, in
evaluating the probability of rehabilitation, the degree of
treatment necessary and success rate are relevant factors to
consider. See Matthews, supra, 548 N.E.
2d at 846 (sustaining
trial court determination that there was little or no likelihood
of rehabilitation within juvenile system due to length of time
over which treatment would be required; and explaining that
"[a]lthough expert testimony produced conflicting opinions as to
the defendant's amenability to rehabilitation as a juvenile, even
the most optimistic prognoses would place the defendant's
rehabilitation well into adulthood."). Dr. Dyer acknowledged
that defendant's condition called for intensive, consistent and
extensive treatment over an indefinite period of time.
Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Dyer's testimony failed to
establish a success rate for defendant's treatment within the
juvenile system, his testimony arguably supports the conclusion
that defendant was amenable to rehabilitation, prior to reaching
the age of nineteen. However, we are satisfied that the family
court understood and applied the proper standard by which to
adjudge rehabilitation, and, because the court clearly determined
that the reasons for waiver outweighed the probability of
defendant's rehabilitation we need not further treat the issue of
rehabilitation.
The family court determined that "[e]ven if I were to deem the doctor's testimony as showing that there's a probability of rehabilitation of this juvenile . . . prior to reaching the age of nineteen, I do not find that that substantially outweighs the reasons for waiver."
As noted in State in the Interest of A.B., supra, 214 N.J. Super. at 567, once the probability of rehabilitation is established,
then the age of the offender, his prior record of delinquency, the circumstances of the crime and the role of the individual participant, all may be taken into account in determining whether to waive jurisdiction. However, the burden remains on the juvenile to show that "the probability of his rehabilitation . . . substantially outweighs the reasons for waiver."
The reasons for waiver include both general and specific deterrence. State in the Interest of S.M., 211 N.J. Super. 675, 685 (App. Div. 1986). Therefore, a court must "balance the value of probable rehabilitation of the juvenile offender, if shown, against the general deterrent value of exposing the offender to the more severe sentences available to the adult court." State v. R.G.D., supra, 108 N.J. at 11-12. "It is upon this evidential axis that the waiver decision turns." State in the Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R., supra, 89 N.J. at 344. "Considerations of
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation should be integrated"
to reach an appropriate accommodation "between the demands for
individual and social justice." Id. at 339.
Central to the balancing between rehabilitation and reasons
for waiver is the concern for deterrence. See State in the
Interest of A.B., supra, 214 N.J. Super. at 566 (arguing that the
dominant reasons for waiver are the serious crimes with which the
juvenile has been charged and the strong public interest in
general and specific deterrence of those crimes). As the Court
has noted, deterrence is one of the important factors to be
considered in the punishment of offenders, for "[o]ne of the
objectives in treating convicted offenders is to fashion a
sentence that will serve to prevent future crime by him as well
as by others through its deterrent impact." State in the
Interest of C.A.H. & B.A.R., supra, 89 N.J. at 334. Moreover,
for juveniles who have committed serious offenses, the range of
discretion for courts to balance deterrence and rehabilitation is
greatly reduced. See State v. R.G.D., supra, 108 N.J. at 12
(noting that evolution of referral statute evinces conscious
shift in creating stronger presumption in favor of waiver and in
placing a much heavier burden on the serious offender); State in
the Interest of B.G., supra, 247 N.J. Super. at 423 (affirming
trial court which concluded that despite finding that juvenile
had been rehabilitated, "since the law also contemplates the need
to weigh rehabilitation against the reasons for waiver (i.e.,
deterrence), and since [juvenile] was a central figure in a
serious offense committed two months short of his eighteenth
birthday, the public interest demanded waiver.").
Dr. Dyer expressed the opinion that defendant would be
better served by providing appropriate treatment through the
juvenile system. "The adult penal system would [] simply . . .
continue the cycle . . . [H]e might get some form of counseling .
. . [and] medication . . . and then he would simply be paroled,
dumped back on the community and he would be left to his own."
Dr. Dyer thus concluded that defendant's needs would be better
served in the juvenile system where the court could ensure the
imposition of an "adequate discharge plan." However, despite his
conclusion that defendant could be rehabilitated, Dr. Dyer
admitted that defendant's condition is severe, that defendant's
prognosis is poor, that treatment of schizophrenia takes many
years and is contingent upon finding the correct drugs and
continued post-care treatment. Most important, Dr. Dyer could
not conclude that defendant would not act in an anti-social
manner in the future.
The trial court determined that the reasons for waiver
outweighed any potential for rehabilitation and that waiver was
proper. It specifically considered the brazen and violent nature
of defendant's current crimes, the presumption of waiver, the
need to protect the public, defendant's past record, and the
failure of the defense to establish that medication would "solve
defendant's psychotic problems."
We conclude that there was adequate evidence to support the
trial court's determination that the reasons for waiver
outweighed any probability of rehabilitation.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER's opinion.
NO. A-65 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLARENCE SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED August 7, 1995
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Handler
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY