(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 24, 1995 -- Decided December 5, 1996
Pollock, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in these two appeals is whether the jury instructions in these cases satisfied the
requirements of due process in explaining that the State bears the burden of proving defendants' guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant Medina was tried and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault, fourth-degree
aggravated assault, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and third-degree
terroristic threats. During the jury charge, the trial court explained the State's burden of proof, which
included an attempted definition of a “reasonable doubt.” During its instructions, the trial court charged the
jury that the presumption of innocence “does not fade or extinguish until 12 of you agree that [the
defendant] is guilty of something;” that “a reasonable doubt [is] doubt from which a reason can be given;”
that “a doubt which ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence...is not a reasonable doubt” and that
“you do not search for doubt, you search for the truth.”
Medina did not object to the jury instructions. However, before the Appellate Division, he claimed
that the jury charges violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution. The Appellate
Division affirmed Medina's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certification.
Defendant Farmer was tried and convicted of murder, possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, possession of a shotgun without a permit and hindering apprehension or prosecution. During the
jury charge, the trial court explained the State's burden of proof, which included an attempted definition of a
“reasonable doubt” that was substantially identical to that given by the trial court in the Medina matter.
Farmer's counsel objected to these instructions, arguing that the charge should include an
instruction that circumstantial evidence could also support a verdict of not guilty and that the State's burden
of proof extended beyond the elements of the crime to the underlying facts. Farmer's counsel further
contended that the instruction defined “reasonable doubt” in terms of what it was not and gave little
guidance about what the term meant. The trial court believed that its instruction was adequate, but gave a
supplemental instruction, which essentially informed the jury that it should apply the same standards to its
evaluation of both direct and circumstantial evidence. Farmer appealed his conviction, which the Appellate
Division affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Farmer's petition for certification.
HELD: Although portions of the trial courts' instructions that attempted to define the term “reasonable
doubt” constituted error, the charge did not so infect the instruction as to lower the State's burden of proof
or to violate due process. Trial courts are directed, however, not to repeat the offending clauses in the
future and to adopt the definition of reasonable doubt set forth in this opinion.
1. Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution require that the trial court inform
the jury of the State's burden to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury instruction
that fails to communicate that burden is not amenable to harmless-error analysis and requires reversal.
(pp.5-6)
2. Although trial courts have struggled to explain the State's burden of proof, the Court has cautioned
against using any charge that has a tendency to understate or trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to
determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Those instructions that
overall lessen the State's burden of proof violate due process. (pp. 6-8)
3. A jury need not find an articulable reason to support its doubts about the State's case, as was suggested
by the trial court's instruction that a reasonable doubt means doubt for which a reason can be given.
However, because the trial court provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt that more accurately
describes the State's burden, the offending language was unlikely to have lessened the State's burden of
proof in the eyes of the jury. (pp. 8-10)
4. A jury need not convict just because the State presents a “reasonable interpretation of the evidence” and
may accept or reject such a proffer. However, reviewing the charge as a whole, the challenged comment did
not impermissibly diminish the State's burden of proof. (pp. 10-11)
5. Although telling jurors not to “search for doubt” improperly eases the State's burden, the charge neither
constituted plain error nor confused the jury about the nature of the State's burden of proof. (pp. 11-12)
6. Although the trial court's instruction erroneously suggested that the defendant lost the benefit of the
presumption of innocence upon a finding that he was “guilty of something,” read as a whole, the instruction
made clear that the jury was to hold the State to its burden of proof for each offense. (pp. 12-13)
7. To avoid problems in the future, when explaining reasonable doubt, trial courts are instructed to charge
the jury that “the prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, yet
not necessarily to an absolute certainty” and to give only the definition of reasonable doubt set forth in this
opinion. Failure to adhere to the definition set forth in this opinion, over an objection, will run the risk of
reversible error. (p. 20-21)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE
POLLOCK's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-24/
25 September Term 1995
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DOMINGO R. MEDINA,
a/k/a DOMINGO RIVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
----------------------------------
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD F. FARMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued October 24, 1995 -- Decided December 5, 1996
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
Domingo R. Medina, etc., (Susan L. Reisner,
Public Defender, attorney).
Robert L. Sloan, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
Edward F. Farmer, (Susan L. Reisner, Public
Defender, attorney).
Roseann A. Finn, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Edward F. Borden,
Jr., Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms.
Finn and Jack L. Weinberg, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the letter briefs).
Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLLOCK, J.
The issue is whether the jury instructions in these cases
satisfied the requirements of due process in explaining that the
State bears the burden of proving defendants' guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. After consolidating the cases, the Appellate
Division affirmed the convictions of both defendants. We affirm
both judgments.
On the night of June 14, 1990, Jose Torres and Michael Babilonia drove to a Camden apartment building where their friend Jimmy Rivera lived. When Babilonia beeped the car horn, Rivera's girlfriend, Melissa, came to the window and said that Rivera was sleeping. Babilonia continued to beep the car horn and cursed at Melissa.
Defendant, Domingo Medina, who had been in the building, confronted Babilonia and Torres. Medina accused Torres of "being with" Medina's girlfriend, Anna, and of calling Medina a "pussy." Torres denied Medina's allegations.
Medina then pulled a handgun from the front pocket of his sweatshirt and pulled back the slide. Nervous, Torres began retreating. Medina threatened to shoot Torres if he continued walking. Torres continued. Medina followed him for half a block. Medina repeated his threat, but Torres continued to
retreat. Medina fired five shots at Torres. Three of the
bullets struck Torres, one in the lower back and two in the right
buttock. The gunshots caused severe injury to Torres' diaphragm,
liver, bladder, and sigmoid colon. At the hospital, Torres told
a hospital worker that Medina had shot him.
Police questioned Medina about the shooting. After they
advised him of his Miranda rights, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Medina admitted that
he had pointed a gun at Torres, that the gun was loaded, that he
had cocked the gun, and that he had followed Torres up the
street. He stated, however, that he had not intended to shoot
Torres but that the handgun had discharged accidentally five
times.
A Camden County grand jury returned a six-count indictment
against Medina, charging him with: second-degree aggravated
assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (count one); fourth-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)
(count two); third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count three); second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count four); third-degree terroristic threats,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b (count five); and attempted murder,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3 (count six).
During the charge to the jury, the trial court explained the
State's burden of proof:
This defendant, as I've said on more than one
occasion previously, is presumed innocent.
He is presumed innocent when he is indicted,
he is presumed innocent throughout trial, he
is presumed innocent at this moment and will
be presumed innocent when you begin your
deliberations. And that presumption does not
fade or extinguish until 12 of you agree that
he is guilty of something. And in order for
you to be persuaded to that the State must
meet its burden of proof. And it's the
State's burden of proof to prove to you every
element of each offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. And when we talk about a reasonable
doubt we mean doubt from which a reason can
be given, a doubt which arises from a fair
and rational consideration of the evidence or
perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a
doubt as would cause a man of ordinary
prudence to pause or hesitate when called
upon to act in the most important aspects of
life. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt that
is merely fanciful or speculative such as a
skeptical mind might suggest. A doubt which
ignores a reasonable interpretation of the
evidence or which arises merely from sympathy
or perhaps from fear to return a verdict of
guilt is not a reasonable doubt. A
reasonable doubt is not merely a doubt such
as may be conjured up in the mind of someone
desiring to escape the responsibility of
making a decision. While it is your duty to
give the defendant the benefit of every
reasonable doubt, you do not search for
doubt, you search for truth. And you give
the defendant the benefit of a reasonable
doubt if it arises in your minds after you
have carefully considered all the evidence in
the case. Reasonable doubt is not a mere
possibility or imaginary doubt because as we
all know, everything relating to human
affairs or indeed depending upon oral
evidence is open to some imaginary
uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant
existing in your minds after you have given
full and impartial consideration to all the
evidence. It may arise from the evidence or
it may arise from an absence of evidence.
[emphasis added].
Medina did not object to the instruction. The jury convicted
him of second-degree aggravated assault, fourth-degree aggravated
assault, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, and third-degree terroristic threats. It found him not
guilty of the charges of second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun, and attempted murder. The court sentenced Medina to an
aggregate term of ten years with a five-year parole disqualifier.
Before the Appellate Division, Medina claimed that the
charge violated his right to due process and a fair trial under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitutions and Article I, Paragraphs 1, 9 and 10 of the New
Jersey Constitution. The Appellate Division affirmed. We
granted certification, N.J. (1995).
In a criminal prosecution, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, ___, 25 L. Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). The due process clauses of the Federal Constitution, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2078, ___, 124 L. Ed.2d 182, 188 (1993); Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at ___, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 375; United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 107 (3d Cir. 1979); and the New Jersey Constitution, State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 200-01 (1992) compel this standard.
Under the Sixth Amendment, the jury, not the court, determines guilt in a serious criminal case. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed.2d 491 (1968); Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06,
15 S. Ct. 273,
39 L. Ed. 343 (1895). Due process mandates that
"the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Sullivan, supra,
508 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at ___, 124 L. Ed.
2d at 188. A jury
instruction that fails to communicate the State's burden to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not amenable to harmless-error
analysis and requires reversal. Id. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at ___,
124 L. Ed.
2d at 189-90.
The reasonable-doubt standard provides "concrete substance
for the presumption of innocence," and reduces the risk of
wrongful conviction. Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363, 90 S. Ct.
at ___, 25 L. Ed.
2d at 375. It assures that a defendant will not
be convicted if reasonable doubt exists about his or her guilt.
Id. at 363-64, 90 S. Ct. at ___, 25 L. Ed.
2d at 375.
Notwithstanding its venerated role, the standard is
problematic. As the United States Supreme Court recently
lamented, "[a]lthough this standard is an ancient and honored
aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy
explication." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. ___,
114 S. Ct. 1239,
___,
127 L. Ed.2d 583, 590 (1994). Neither the New Jersey
Constitution nor the Federal Constitution explicitly demands that
trial courts define reasonable doubt. Both constitutions require
only that the trial court inform the jury of the State's burden
to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Neither Constitution defines reasonable doubt.
Understandably, trial courts have struggled in explaining the
State's burden. This Court has cautioned "trial courts against
using any charge that has a tendency to `understate[]' or
`trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the
defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State
v. Biegenwald,
106 N.J. 13, 41 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Ferreira,
364 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (1977)); accord State v. Purnell,
126 N.J. 518, 544-45 (1992). Some federal circuit courts of
appeal have instructed district courts not to try to define the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because the definitions are
frequently either unhelpful or inaccurate. See, e.g., United
States v. Adkins,
937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This
circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions
of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly
lessen the burden of proof. . . . The only exception to our
categorical disdain for definition is when the jury specifically
requests it."); United States v. Hall,
854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th
Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's refusal to provide
definition, despite jury's request, because, "at best,
definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury. . . . An
attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk without any
real benefit.").
The United States Supreme Court has held that a jury
instruction that partially defined reasonable doubt, as "such a
doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty," and as "an
actual substantial doubt," violated the Due Process Clause. Cage
v. Louisiana,
498 U.S. 39, 40,
111 S. Ct. 328, ___,
112 L. Ed 2d
339 (1990). The Court explained that "the words `substantial'
and `grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher
degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the
reasonable doubt standard." Id. at 41, 111 S. Ct. at ___,
112 L.
Ed 2d at ___. Although the Court disapproves of equating the
reasonable-doubt standard with "moral certainty," an instruction
that makes the equation will not violate due process if the
charge also emphasizes that the jurors must base their conclusion
on the evidence. Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at
___, 127 L. Ed.
2d at 596-97.
Because "the Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the
government's burden of proof," id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at ___, 127
L. Ed.
2d at 590, reasonable-doubt instructions must be
considered in their entirety. See State v. Marshall,
123 N.J. 1,
135; State v. Wilbely,
63 N.J. 420, 422 (1973); State v. Malia,
287 N.J. Super. 198, 206 (App. Div. 1996); State v. Hudson,
286 N.J. Super. 149, 153 (App. Div. 1995). Only those instructions
that overall lessen the State's burden of proof violate due
process.
Medina contends that the instruction improperly diminished the State's burden of proof. When explaining reasonable doubt to the jury, the trial court stated: "when we talk about a reasonable doubt we mean doubt from which a reason can be given, a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of
the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as
would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when
called upon to act in the most important aspects of life." This
portion of the charge was incorrect. It erroneously implies that
the jury must find an articulable reason to support its doubts
about the State's case. See State v. Vaszorich,
13 N.J. 99, 115
(1953) (holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet
that "a reasonable doubt is one for which, should he be called
upon, a juror can give a reason," was "obviously erroneous under
our law"). Jurors may harbor a valid reasonable doubt even if
they cannot explain the reason for the doubt.
In State v. Hudson, supra, the Appellate Division
disapproved of a similar definition of reasonable doubt as a
"doubt for which a reason can be given." The court wrote "that a
reasonable doubt may be one that defies the jury's ability to
express or articulate the reasons for it." Id. at 153. The
court found, however, that the instruction by itself did not
violate due process. Examining the charge as a whole, the
Appellate Division concluded that the "overwhelming tenor" of the
disputed instruction was to convey to the jury the State's
responsibility to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ibid.
Similarly, in State v. Biegenwald, supra, we held as
inadequate an equation of reasonable doubt with "a doubt based on
reason, reasoning processes," but did not find a violation of due
process. The instruction provided an alternative definition of
reasonable doubt as an "honest and reasonable uncertainty as to
the guilt of the defendant which exists in your minds after you
have given full and impartial consideration to all of the
evidence in the case." Id. at 42-43. This alternative
definition, when viewed in the charge as a whole, properly
informed the jury of the prosecution's burden. Id. at 43.
Here, immediately following the offending clause, the trial
court provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt: "a
doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the
evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as
would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when
called upon to act in the most important aspects of life." This
clause more accurately describes the State's burden. It leads us
to believe that the offending language was unlikely to have
lessened the State's burden of proof in the eyes of the jury.
See Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at ___, 127 L.
Ed.
2d at 599 (holding potential prejudice caused by equating
reasonable doubt with a "substantial doubt" mitigated by
providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as "a doubt
that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.").
Defendant next alleges error in the part of the charge that
excludes from reasonable doubt "a doubt that ignores a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence." We disagree. Jurors need not
convict just because the State presents a "reasonable
interpretation of the evidence." They may accept or reject such
a proffer. Reasonable doubt can arise even when the State
presents a "reasonable interpretation of the evidence."
In State v. Purnell, supra, 126 N.J. at 543-44, we sustained
a definition of reasonable doubt that cautioned jurors against
viewing skeptically the State's evidence or "ignoring" an
interpretation of the evidence that might favor the State.
Viewing the charge as a whole, we held that it did not
impermissibly lower the State's burden of proof. Id. at 543-44;
see also State v. Bogus,
223 N.J. Super. 409, 430-31 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,
111 N.J. 567 (1988) (upholding a jury charge that
excluded from reasonable doubt "a doubt which ignores a
reasonable interpretation of the evidence"). Likewise here, the
trial court emphasized that Medina was presumed innocent, that
the jury should give him the benefit of a reasonable doubt, that
it should consider all of the evidence, and that the State's
burden was to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reviewing
the charge as a whole, we conclude that the challenged comment
did not impermissibly diminish the State's burden of proof.
Medina's third allegation of error concerns the trial
court's statement: "While it is your duty to give the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you do not search for
doubt, you search for truth. And you give the defendant the
benefit of a reasonable doubt if it arises in your minds after
you have carefully considered all the evidence in the case." The
emphasized clause is wrong. Telling the jurors not to "search
for doubt" improperly eases the State's burden. Indeed, in
determining whether the State has met its burden, the jury's duty
is to scrutinize the evidence and search for doubt.
The charge, however, does not constitute plain error. In
Purnell, supra, we examined a nearly identical clause and
concluded:
While telling jurors "to search for
truth," the court, in the same sentence, told
them "to give the defendant the benefit of a
reasonable doubt, if it arises in your mind,
after you have considered all of the evidence
in the case." In addition, the court
correctly charged the jury on the presumption
of innocence and on the State's burden of
proof. Furthermore, the State's burden of
proving each element of each offense beyond a
reasonable doubt was restated without
qualification in the context of the separate
instructions concerning the various charges
in the indictment, so that "[t]he concept of
the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt permeates the trial court's
jury charge." [Id. at 544 (citation
omitted)].
We are similarly unpersuaded here that the jury was confused
about the nature of the State's burden of proof.
Medina's final allegation of error concerns the trial
court's statement that the presumption of innocence "does not
fade or extinguish until twelve of you agree that he is guilty of
something." The misleading nature of this comment is self-evident. The State's burden is to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of an offense. A jury should find a defendant
guilty not in the abstract, but only of specific offenses. In a
multi-count indictment, moreover, a jury finding that the
defendant is "guilty of something" does not strip the defendant
of the presumption of innocence on the remaining charges.
Again, however, we believe that this statement does not
constitute plain error. Immediately after delivering the
offending clause, the court provided a more accurate explanation
of the State's burden of proof: "And in order for you to be
persuaded of that the State must meet its burden of proof. And
it's the State's burden of proof to prove to you every element of
each offense beyond a reasonable doubt." In addition, the court
restated in the context of separate instructions concerning the
various charges the State's burden of providing each element of
each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Read as a whole, the
instruction made clear that the jury was to hold the State to its
burden of proof for each offense.
The jury's verdict confirms this conclusion. Although
finding Medina guilty on three counts, the jury acquitted him on
two other counts. That finding indicates that the jury did not
relieve the State of its burden of proof after first finding that
Medina was at least "guilty of something."
Although some parts of the charge were incorrect, when read
in its entirety, the charge does not violate due process. The
court adequately explained that Medina was innocent until proven
guilty and that the State must prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. It told the jury that a reasonable doubt was
"that which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the
evidence or perhaps from the lack of evidence." Despite the
regrettable errors, the charge did not so infect the instruction
as to lower the State's burden of proof. In so concluding, we
admonish trial courts, however, not to repeat the offending
clauses in the future.
Defendant, Edward Farmer, age 62, lived with Theresa Chapman and her twelve year old son, George. On October 5, 1990, neighbors heard Farmer and Chapman arguing in their home. A loud "boom" from Farmer's dining room punctuated the fight. Farmer then asked two neighbors to call an ambulance. On entering Farmer's residence, one neighbor found Chapman lying on the floor in a pool of blood. The neighbor called for an ambulance.
Carrying a bag, Farmer ran to another neighbor's home and placed a shotgun on the porch. Farmer told his neighbors that he had "shot T.C. and she was laying on the kitchen floor." Farmer then placed a shotgun under a car in the parking lot of an apartment complex across the street from his home.
Emergency medical personnel declared Chapman dead at the scene. The spent shell found near Chapman's head matched the shotgun recovered from the parking lot. A short time later the police apprehended defendant, who was carrying a live shotgun shell in his left front pocket. During questioning, Farmer told investigators that he had only one thing to say: he had "kissed a set of dying lips."
A Camden County grand jury indicted defendant on six counts: murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2) (count one);
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count two); possession of a shotgun without a
permit, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1) (count three);
hindering apprehension or prosecution, in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:29-3b(1) (count four); tampering with witnesses, in violation
of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a(2) (count five); possession of a shotgun by
a person previously convicted, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7
(count six). The State subsequently dismissed counts five and
six and defendant proceeded to trial on the remaining four
counts.
Concerning the State's burden of proof, the trial court
charged:
The finding of an indictment by a Grand
Jury is not evidence of the guilt of an
accused and in this case is not to be taken
by you as such. This defendant, like all
defendants in criminal cases, is presumed to
be innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
That presumption continues throughout
the trial of this case and even during your
deliberations and unless and until you have
determined that the State has proven his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The burden of proof of the guilt of the
defendant is on the State and it never
shifts. It remains on the State throughout
the whole trial of the case. No burden with
respect to proof is imposed on the defendant.
He is not obligated to prove his
innocence or produce witnesses. Unless the
State has proven the crime charged in each of
its elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, what I have
just told you is very important because what
it is, the State must prove the elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, that
is what they must prove and as I charge you
on the law of the offense I will point out to
you what the elements are and that is what
the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Only the elements.
Now, the term “reasonable doubt” means a
doubt based upon reason and common sense. It
is a doubt for which a reason can be given
arising from a fair and rational
consideration of the evidence or a want of
evidence.
It means such a doubt as would cause a
man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate
when called upon to act in the most important
affairs of life. A reasonable doubt is not a
doubt that is merely fanciful or speculative
such as a skeptical mind might suggest.
A doubt that ignores a reasonable
interpretation of the evidence or which
arises merely from sympathy or from a fear to
return a verdict of guilt is not a reasonable
doubt.
A reasonable doubt is not merely a doubt
such as may be conjured up in the mind of one
desiring to escape the responsibility of a
decision.
While it is your duty to give the
defendant the benefit of every reasonable
doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You
are to search for the truth and give the
defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt
if it arises in your minds after you have
carefully considered all of the evidence in
the case.
Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
or imaginary doubt. Because as we all know,
everything relating to human affairs or
dependent upon oral evidence is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant existing in your minds after you
have given full and impartial consideration
to all of the evidence.
It may arise from the evidence itself or
from a lack of evidence. [emphasis added].
Farmer's counsel objected to this instruction. He argued
that the charge should include an instruction that circumstantial
evidence could also support a verdict of not guilty and that the
court should instruct the jury that the State's burden of proof
extended beyond the elements of the crime to the underlying
facts. The trial court responded that the charge adequately
explained both parts of the burden.
Defense counsel also objected that the instruction defined
"reasonable doubt" in terms of what it was not, and gave
"precious little guidance" about what the term means. The trial
court believed that its instruction was adequate, but gave the
supplemental instruction:
Okay, ladies and gentlemen, just one or
two things.
I want you to understand that in
determining whether or not the burden of
proof has been met, as I said to you, that
can be found by the evidence or a lack of
evidence and that is one of the things that I
went through with you and that may be either
direct or circumstantial evidence, however
you consider it.
That is, the same standards apply.
The jury found Farmer guilty of all four counts. The court
sentenced him to life imprisonment with a thirty-year parole
disqualifier. The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted
Farmer's petition for certification, N.J. (1995).
The challenged language is substantially identical to the language in the charge in State v. Medina. As in Medina, we hold that the charge, as a whole, did not violate Farmer's rights to a fair trial and due process. Read in its entirety, the instruction properly explained the State's burden of proof. We repeat, however, that the instructions should not define reasonable doubt as "a doubt for which a reason can be given;" exclude from reasonable doubt "a doubt that ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence;" or direct jurors to "search for truth" and avoid "search[ing] for doubt."
The court properly charged the jury on the State's burden of proof and Farmer's presumption of innocence. It stressed that "[t]he burden of proof of the guilt of the defendant is on the State and it never shifts." The court instructed that "[n]o burden of proof is imposed on the defendant." Further, the court instructed that the defendant is neither "obligated to prove his innocence nor produce witnesses." It emphasized that the State must prove Farmer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court repeated this standard when explaining each of the four counts. In all, the court informed the jury twenty-one times that the prosecution must prove Farmer's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court rehabilitated its charge on reasonable doubt by adding:
A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant existing in your minds after you
have given full and impartial consideration
to all of the evidence.
It may arise from the evidence itself or
from a lack of evidence.
On balance, the instruction passes muster.
Our affirmance of these convictions should not be construed as approval of language that misstates or dilutes the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As we warned in Biegenwald and Purnell, trial courts should not use any charge that has a "tendency to `understate[],' or `trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" That proposition, so basic to criminal law, vexes in its simplicity. Words bind courts in the attempt to explain reasonable doubt. Both the Federal Judicial Center and our Committee on Model Jury Charges, Criminal, have proffered explanations. The Federal Judicial Center suggests:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (1987) (instruction 21).
By comparison, our Committee proposes:
The defendant on trial is presumed to be
innocent and unless each and every essential
element of an offense charged is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must
be found not guilty of that charge.
The burden of proving each element of a
charge beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon
the State and that burden never shifts to the
defendant. The defendant in a criminal case
has no obligation or duty to prove his/her
innocence or offer any proof relating to
his/her innocence.
Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible
or imaginary doubt, because everything
relating to human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and
reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the
defendant existing in your minds after you
have given full and impartial consideration
to all of the evidence. It may arise from
the evidence itself or from a lack of
evidence.
Beneath each charge is the concern that courts should
instruct juries so that they neither convict the innocent nor
acquit the guilty. See Jon O. Newman, Beyond Reasonable Doubt,
68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1993). Mindful of the difficulty of
explaining reasonable doubt, we believe that the following
charge, a blend of the charges proposed by our Committee and the
Federal Judicial Center, provides a serviceable definition.
To avoid problems in the future, we instruct trial courts
when explaining reasonable doubt to charge the jury that "the
prosecution must prove its case by more than a mere preponderance
of the evidence, yet not necessarily to an absolute certainty."
Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at ___, 127 L. Ed.
2d
at 603 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Accordingly, we adopt the following definition of
reasonable doubt:
The government has the burden of proving
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors
in civil cases, where you were told that it
is necessary to prove only that a fact is
more likely true than not true. In criminal
cases, the government's proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest and
reasonable uncertainty in your minds about
the guilt of the defendant after you have
given full and impartial consideration to all
of the evidence. A reasonable doubt may
arise from the evidence itself or from a lack
of evidence. It is a doubt that a reasonable
person hearing the same evidence would have.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
proof, for example, that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. In this
world, we know very few things with absolute
certainty. In criminal cases the law does
not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly
convinced that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged, you must find him guilty. If,
on the other hand, you are not firmly
convinced of defendant's guilt, you must give
defendant the benefit of the doubt and find
him not guilty.
We believe the trial courts will better serve the interest
of justice if they do not attempt additional definitions of
"reasonable doubt." Consequently we direct trial courts not to
deviate from the definition contained in this opinion. The
failure to adhere to the definition, over an objection, runs the
risk of reversible error.
The judgments of the Appellate Division are affirmed.
JUSTICES HANDLER, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join
in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion.
NO. A-24/25 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v. (A-24)
DOMINGO R. MEDINA,
a/k/a DOMINGO RIVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
----------------------------------
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v. (A-25)
EDWARD F. FARMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED December 5, 1996
Justice Handler PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Pollock
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY