(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 14, 1998 -- Decided March 2, 1999
COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Division exceeded the scope of its
appellate review.
East Brunswick Police Officer John Napoli was on special roving DWI patrol on December 8, 1996,
at 1:40 a.m. While driving on Main Street, he observed Locurto's 1988 Toyota pick-up truck proceeding in
the opposite direction at "a high rate of speed." The posted speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour.
Officer Napoli made a U-turn and followed Locurto's vehicle for about 100 yards on Main Street.
Locurto made a left turn followed quickly by another left turn, causing Officer Napoli to momentarily lose
sight of the vehicle. Eventually, Officer Napoli stopped Locurto, and issued summonses for DWI, careless
driving, and possession of CDS. Officer Napoli did not issue a summons for speeding, ostensibly because the
careless driving charge was based on the alleged speeding.
In the East Brunswick Township Municipal Court, Locurto moved to suppress, arguing that Officer
Napoli did not have a reasonable basis for the motor vehicle stop. Locurto testified that he was traveling at
the posted speed limit. The Municipal Court found the testimony of Officer Napoli more credible, stating
that the absence of other traffic at the time enhanced the Officer's ability to observe the speed of the vehicle,
and that the short interval when the Officer lost sight of the vehicle did not affect his certainty that he had
stopped the correct vehicle. For sentencing, the careless driving charge was merged with the DWI charge,
and Locurto was granted a conditional discharge on the drug conviction.
The Law Division, conducting a trial de novo on the record, also denied Locurto's motion to
suppress and found him guilty on all charges. It adopted the credibility findings of the Municipal Court,
noting the experience of Officer Napoli, and the lack of other traffic.
The Appellate Division, in a published opinion,
304 N.J. Super. 514 (1997), reversed the denial of
the suppression motion. It determined that the lower courts had not made any factual findings, and
substituted its own detailed analysis of Officer Napoli's testimony. The Appellate Division concluded that a
reasonable fact finder may only conclude that it is more likely that Locurto's testimony was more plausible.
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification.
HELD: It was improper for the Appellate Division to engage in an independent assessment of the evidence.
A trial court is not required to articulate its credibility findings in detail when the reasons supporting those
findings could be inferred from, and are well-supported by, the account of the facts and testimony presented
in the trial court's decision.
1. A trial court sitting without a jury is required to state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with
the relevant legal conclusions. (pp. 8-9)
2. To satisfy the articulable and reasonable suspicion standard for stopping a motor vehicle, the State must
demonstrate only that the officer possessed such a suspicion, not that the offense occurred. (pp. 9-10)
3. Initially, an appellate court must not review the record from the point of view of how it would decide the
matter if it were the court of first instance. The aim of review is rather to determine whether the findings
made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record. Only if the appellate
tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and that the interests of justice
demand intervention and correction, should it appraise the record and make its own findings and conclusions.
(pp. 10-12)
4. In this case, the trial courts carefully scrutinized the testimony and record before making factual
determinations. Therefore, it was improper for the Appellate Division to engage in an independent
assessment of the evidence. (p. 12)
5. The Appellate Division also improperly concluded that the lower courts erred in failing to articulate the
basis for their credibility findings. The reasons supporting the Municipal Court's determinations of the
witnesses' credibility may be inferred from, and are supported by, the account of the facts and witnesses'
testimony in its decision. The Law Division did not engage in its own credibility determinations, but
described the evidence and testimony that persuaded it to accede to the Municipal Court's credibility. (pp.
12-16)
6. Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such
as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not
transmitted by the record. This rule of deference is more compelling where, as in the present case, two
lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues. (pp. 16-17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Law Division is
REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in JUSTICE
COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICES HANDLER and O'HERN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
158 September Term 1997
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DOMINICK J. LOCURTO,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued October 14, 1998 -- Decided March 2, 1999
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
304 N.J. Super. 514 (1997).
Glenn Berman, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Mr. Berman,
attorney; Simon Louis Rosenbach, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Howard S. Teitelbaum argued the cause for
respondent (Lynch, Teitelbaum & Geldhauser,
attorneys).
John F. O'Hern, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Peter Verniero,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
This appeal involves a conviction for driving while
intoxicated (DWI). Both the East Brunswick Township Municipal
Court and the Law Division found the testimony of the arresting
police officer to be more credible than the testimony of
defendant. The Appellate Division in a published opinion
reversed the conviction after rejecting the lower courts'
credibility determinations.
304 N.J. Super. 514 (1997). The
primary issue before us is whether the Appellate Division
exceeded the scope of its appellate review. We granted the
State's petition for certification,
152 N.J. 365 (1998), and now
reverse.
Officer Napoli made a U-turn and followed defendant on Main Street for about 100 yards attempting to catch defendant's vehicle. Defendant made a left turn on Emerson Street, and then a left turn on Matawan Road, causing the officer to momentarily lose sight of defendant's vehicle. Defendant was eventually stopped by Officer Napoli in Old Bridge Township. Officer Napoli issued defendant a summons for driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, careless driving, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in a motor vehicle, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1. Officer Napoli did not issue defendant a summons for operating his vehicle in violation of any speeding laws, ostensibly because the careless driving charge was based on the alleged speeding.
On February 29, 1996, the East Brunswick Township Municipal Court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, such as his sobriety test results, obtained as the result of the vehicular stop. That decision was based on sworn testimony from both Officer Napoli and defendant. The officer testified that defendant was driving at a high rate of speed in excess of the posted speed limit; defendant testified that he was driving at the posted thirty-five miles per hour speed limit. The Municipal Court found the testimony of the police officer more credible than that of defendant for several reasons. It found that the absence of other traffic on the road at the time of the offense enhanced the officer's ability to make careful observations of defendant's vehicle. The court also found credible the officer's testimony that the short interval of time in which he lost sight of defendant's vehicle when defendant made the two left turns did not affect his certainty that the vehicle he stopped was the same one he initially observed speeding. The court also determined that the officer's observations of speeding provided him with a “reasonable, articulable rationale” for stopping defendant's vehicle, and thus, denied defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted on all the charges. For sentencing, the trial court merged the careless driving charge with the driving while intoxicated charge, suspended defendant's driver's license for two years, and imposed statutory penalties. The court granted defendant a conditional discharge on the drug conviction.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division where a trial de novo was conducted based on the record. The Law Division also denied defendant's suppression motion and found him guilty on all the charges. In arriving at its conclusions, the Law Division adopted the credibility findings made by the Municipal Court, stating:
The standard that applies in this case is whether or not Officer Napoli had an articulable reason, a reasonably articulable reason for stopping this vehicle. . . . Napoli concluded that . . . based on his experience, which I believe he testified to be some ten years, that, in his opinion, the vehicle was traveling in excess of the speed limit, which he also testified was 35 miles per hour.
And he concluded that, based on his
observations, after making the U-turn, he
then continued to make observations of the
vehicle. Granted, those observations were
for a limited period of time. He did not
pace the vehicle. He didn't have any type of
radar apparatus. And he did not employ the
use of any other electronic devices or
assistance from other officers, in terms of
determining what the speed of the vehicle
was.
However, he had, in my mind, observed what he
thought to be a violation of a motor vehicle
ordinance or motor vehicle statute. And it
was, on that basis, that he took actions that
are set forth in his testimony, regarding the
Lo[c]urto vehicle.
The Law Division also rejected defendant's contention that
the officer's testimony that he was driving at a "high rate of
speed" was insufficient to support a careless driving charge.
The court found "the officer certainly could have issued a ticket
for speeding, . . . [but] instead . . . chose to issue a careless
driving ticket." In making that determination, the Law Division
emphasized the following findings made by the Municipal Court:
The way the [c]ourt proceeded was to listen
to the testimony of Officer Napoli. Then the
[c]ourt concluded that, although there was no
testimony regarding the effects on other
traffic, which is a viable and salient
argument, the [c]ourt concluded that there
was a potential danger, on the part of Mr.
Lo[c]urto, based on what the [c]ourt found to
be the credible testimony of Officer Napoli,
regarding the speed with which the Lo[c]urto
vehicle was traveling.
Now [the municipal court] found that, as to
the effects on the other traffic issue, that
the lack of other traffic actually in the
[c]ourt's mind, enhanced the credibility of
the officer. Because Officer Napoli could
not have stopped the wrong vehicle.
On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division observed that
the only issue before it was whether the officer had an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that defendant was operating
his automobile in violation of the speeding laws. 304 N.J.
Super. at 517. The panel determined that the Municipal Court
"made no factual findings" but simply "rejected defendant's
assertion that an officer's testimony that a vehicle is traveling
at a 'high rate of speed' is too 'vague, speculative, and
arbitrary,' to provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that defendant was violating the law." Ibid. The court also
found that "on the trial de novo to the Law Division, the judge
made no findings," but simply "'accede[d] to' 'the credibility
findings of' the Municipal Court judge, which we find non-existent." Id. at 518. The court conducted a de novo review of
the record and concluded that "the State did not carry its burden
of proving that there was a reasonable basis for the stopping of
defendant's vehicle" and reversed the decisions of the lower
courts. Ibid.
In the process of reversing the lower courts, the Appellate
Division substituted its own detailed analysis of Officer
Napoli's testimony and made detailed mathematical calculations,
describing the timing, distance, and investigation of his
suspicion that defendant was speeding and operating his vehicle
while intoxicated. Id. at 519-21. Based on that analysis, the
court concluded that “a reasonable fact finder may only conclude
that it is more likely that defendant's testimony is the more
plausible explanation.” Id. at 520. Consequently, the
Appellate Division reversed the denial of defendant's suppression
motion, and ordered the Law Division to enter an order
suppressing the evidence and vacating defendant's convictions.
II
-A-
Defendant agrees with the disposition made by the Appellate Division and asks the Court to affirm.
The framework for defendant's challenge to the validity of
the officer's stop of his motor vehicle is relevant to the
disposition of this appeal. Defendant's challenge was in the
form of a suppression motion, asserting that his vehicle was
illegally stopped. Motions to suppress evidence seized without a
warrant, such as the results of sobriety tests in DWI cases, are
heard in the municipal courts. R. 7:5-2(a). Orders denying
suppression are reviewable on appeal from an ensuing judgment of
conviction. R. 7:5-2(c)(2). The rule is silent, however,
concerning the standard judges must follow in making their
decisions on the motions. The rules that govern the conduct of
non-jury trials help to inform our decision. R. 1:1-2.
In criminal and quasi-criminal cases tried without a jury,
"the court shall make a general finding and shall, in addition,
on request find the facts specially. The court shall thereupon
direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." R. 1:7-4(a).
That rule has been interpreted as requiring a trial court sitting
without a jury to "state clearly its factual findings and
correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Curtis v.
Finneran,
83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980); Rolnick v. Rolnick,
290 N.J.
Super. 35, 42 (App. Div. 1996).
"It is firmly established that a police officer is justified
in stopping a motor vehicle when he has an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a motor
vehicle offense." State v. Smith,
306 N.J. Super. 370, 380 (App.
Div. 1997) (citing Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663,
99 S.
Ct. 1391, 1401,
59 L. Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979); State v. Murphy,
238 N.J. Super. 546, 554 (App. Div. 1990)). To satisfy the
articulable and reasonable suspicion standard, the State is not
required to prove that the suspected motor-vehicle violation
occurred. State v. Williamson,
138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994). The
lower courts found that the State demonstrated that Officer
Napoli possessed such a suspicion and denied defendant's motion
to suppress evidence procured subsequent to the stop of his
vehicle. Because the Appellate Division reversed that
determination, the threshold issue before the Court is whether
the Appellate Division properly reviewed the decision of the Law
Division.
The seminal case in this State regarding appellate review of
municipal court convictions is State v. Johnson,
42 N.J. 146
(1964). Observations made by the Court more than a quarter of a
century ago establish that appellate review of those convictions
is exceedingly narrow. The Court stated:
The contention that the trial court erred in
its determination of the facts, whether
underlying or ultimate, may be urged on
appeal in any nonjury case, as the defendant
did here in the Appellate Division. The
appellate tribunal's obligation is the same--no greater and no less--in each type of such
cases, recognizing, however, the legal
differences in the required burden of proof
. . . . It must review the record in the
light of the contention, but not initially
from the point of view of how it would decide
the matter if it were the court of first
instance. It should give deference to those
findings of the trial judge which are
substantially influenced by his opportunity
to hear and see the witnesses and to have the
"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court
cannot enjoy.
The aim of the review at the outset is rather
to determine whether the findings made could
reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence present in the record.
This involves consideration of the proofs as
a whole; the appraisal is not to be confined
simply to those offered by the plaintiff, for
the question is not simply whether there was
enough evidence to withstand a defense motion
at the end of the plaintiff's case or of the
entire case. When the reviewing court is
satisfied that the findings and result meet
this criterion, its task is complete and it
should not disturb the result, even though it
has the feeling it might have reached a
different conclusion were it the trial
tribunal. That the case may be a close one
or that the trial court decided all evidence
or inference conflicts in favor of one side
has no special effect.
But if the appellate tribunal is thoroughly
satisfied that the finding is clearly a
mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that
the interests of justice demand intervention
and correction, then, and only then, it
should appraise the record as if it were
deciding the matter at inception and make its
own findings and conclusions. While this
feeling of "wrongness" is difficult to
define, because it involves the reaction of
trained judges in the light of their judicial
and human experience, it can well be said
that that which must exist in the reviewing
mind is a definite conviction that the judge
went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have
been made. This sense of "wrongness" can
arise in numerous ways--from manifest lack of
inherently credible evidence to support the
finding, obvious overlooking or
undervaluation of crucial evidence, a clearly
unjust result, and many others. This, then,
is when and how the permissive power of R.R.
1:5-4(b) should be utilized by the first
appellate tribunal and is what our prior
cases mean no matter how they have expressed
it.
[Id. at 161-62 (internal citations omitted).]
See also Mechinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc.,
110 N.J. 464,
475 (1988) (holding a trial court's factual findings made
pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a) should not ordinarily be disturbed
where "there is substantial evidence to support [its] implicit
findging[s]").
Our study of the record in the present case convinces us
that the trial courts carefully scrutinized the testimony and the
record before making factual determinations. Therefore, it was
improper for the Appellate Division to engage in an independent
assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first
instance. The Municipal Court listened to the testimony of both
witnesses and concluded that the officer reasonably believed that
defendant was speeding when he first observed defendant's
vehicle. N.J.R.E. 701 permits lay persons, including police
officers, to express their opinions in matters of common
knowledge and observations if those opinions can assist the court
in determining a fact in issue. State v. Haskins,
131 N.J. 643,
648-49 (1993); State v. LaBrutto,
114 N.J. 187, 197 (1989).
Although the reasons for the Municipal Court's
determinations of the witnesses' relative credibility can be
inferred from its decision, the court did not fully explain the
reasons for its credibility findings. The fact that defendant
was driving while intoxicated undoubtedly affected his ability to
judge the speed of his vehicle. Intoxicated drivers generally do
not recall with precision the exact speed they were driving when
first observed by a police officer. A police officer, on the
other hand, has been trained to estimate the speed of a moving
vehicle. The Law Division acceded to the Municipal Court's
credibility determinations since it had only a written transcript
of the testimony of the witnesses. The Law Division's review of
the Municipal Court's implicit credibility findings required it
to "operate in the partial vacuum of the printed record, and . .
. the best and most accurate record [of oral testimony] is like a
dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of
the peach before it was dried." Trusky v. Ford Motor Co.,
19 N.J. Super. 100, 104 (App. Div. 1952). The Appellate Division
was also obligated to operate in that same "vacuum" in that it
was not permitted to "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility
of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence. [It was
restricted to the test of] 'whether the findings made [by the
trial court] could reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence present in the record.'" State v. Barone,
147 N.J. 599, 615 (1998) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162).
The Appellate Division also improperly concluded that the
lower courts erred in failing to articulate the basis for their
credibility findings, concluding that the law requires "the
factfinder [to] not only make necessary observations of . . .
credibility but also . . . articulate those findings in detail
for the record." 304 N.J. Super. at 519. The cases relied on by
the Appellate Division do not support that conclusion.
The Court in Curtis v. Finneran, supra, 83 N.J. at 569-71,
concluded that the trial court sitting without a jury in a
wrongful death action erred in failing to set forth factual
findings concerning the projected earnings of the decedent. The
decision is silent regarding the standard a trial court must
apply in making determinations of witness credibility. In State
v. Sisti,
209 N.J. Super. 148 (App. Div. 1986), the Appellate
Division affirmed the decision of the Law Division that found
the defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated. The court in
Sisti advised trial court judges in future DWI cases "where there
are proofs of guilt, with and without breathalyzer readings," to
"make findings and conclusions on both bases." Id. at 151. The
court's only mention of credibility assessments refutes, rather
than supports, the Appellate Division's statement of the law.
The court found that "although [the Law Division] did not have
the benefit of the municipal court judge's findings as to the
credibility of the witnesses," the Law Division "properly
determined guilt on the alternative bases provided by N.J.S.A.
39:4-50," ibid., by examining the record that contained
sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction without
any examination by the Law Division of witness credibility.
In State v. Hodgson,
44 N.J. 151, 163 (1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1021,
86 S. Ct. 1929,
16 L. Ed.2d 1022 (1966), the
Court found it unnecessary for a trial court to enunciate
credibility findings when the record as a whole made the findings
clear:
In view of the trial judge's overall remarks
in the record, there is no doubt that he
believed the detective's denial and
disbelieved the defendant and no purpose
would be served by seeking a further
expression from the trial judge in this
score. The matter is strictly one of
credibility and there is no reason for our
now rejecting the testimony credited by the
trial judge before whom it was given.
In the present case, unlike Sisti, both the Municipal Court
and the Law Division made determinations concerning witness
credibility in finding Officer Napoli to be a more credible
witness than defendant. Although the Municipal Court did not
specifically articulate detailed findings of credibility in the
record, the reasons supporting its determinations of the
witnesses' relative credibility may be inferred from, and are
well-supported by, the account of the facts and witnesses'
testimony presented in its decision. For example, the Municipal
Court stated that Officer Napoli had a fair amount of experience
and that there was no other traffic on the road at the time of
defendant's offense. In addition, the Municipal Court was aware
at the close of the evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion
that defendant was intoxicated while driving, a permitted
consideration when evaluating a defendant's assertion that he was
not speeding. All of those factors support the court's
conclusion that the officer was a more credible witness than
defendant.
Although the Law Division did not engage in its own
credibility determinations separate and apart from the Municipal
Court, it described on the record the evidence and testimony
presented before the Municipal Court that persuaded it to
“accede” to the Municipal Court's credibility determinations.
Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility
findings that are often influenced by matters such as
observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and
common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.
State v. Jamison,
153 N.J. 318, 341 (1998); Dolson v. Anastasia,
55 N.J. 2, 7 (1969); Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161. Moreover,
the rule of deference is more compelling where, as in the present
case, two lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on
purely factual issues. Under the two-court rule, appellate
courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent
findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two
lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error. Midler v. Heinowitz,
10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952).
Our review of the witnesses' testimony convinces us that
the comments made on the record by the lower courts were
sufficient to support their conclusion that the officer was a
more credible witness than defendant. To require judges in our
municipal courts with extremely voluminous case loads to
articulate detailed, subjective analyses of factors such as
demeanor and appearance to support credibility determinations on
each and every witness presented before them would
unnecessarily tax a system that is already overburdened.
Furthermore, the benefit to be gained from the detailed,
subjective credibility articulations advocated by the Appellate
Division would do little to add to the completeness of the
records already required to be developed by lower courts under
current standards.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed; the
judgment of the Law Division is reinstated.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICES HANDLER and O'HERN did not participate.
NO. A-158 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DOMINICK J. LOCURTO,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED March 2, 1999
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY