SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
State v. Fareed M. Gandhi (A-101-08)
Argued October 26, 2009 -- Decided February 24, 2010
LaVecchia, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The Court interprets New Jersey's anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, to determine whether the jury charge in this matter was insufficient because it did not explicitly require the jury to find that a defendant had the conscious object to induce, or awareness that his conduct would cause, a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death.
Defendant Fareed M. Gandhi and the victim in this matter, M.G., never had a romantic relationship; theirs was a social friendship only. When Gandhi was driving M.G. home one evening in January 2002, he began driving erratically, professed his love for her, and asserted that if he could not have her no one would. That incident began a course of conduct that devolved into sexually graphic and threatening computer messages. After Gandhi disregarded M.G.'s repeated requests that he stay away from her, she used his messages to support a harassment complaint. On July 11, 2002, Gandhi agreed in court never to contact M.G. again in exchange the withdrawal of the complaint. Judge Himelman accepted the agreement and dismissed the complaint, but issued an oral restraining order directing no contact by Gandhi with M.G., directly or indirectly, and warned that Gandhi would go to jail if he did not comply.
On October 23, 2002, Gandhi showed up at the house where M.G. resided with her parents. He left when M.G.'s father threatened to call the police. M.G. filed another harassment complaint. After being read his Miranda rights at the police station, Gandhi threatened to kill M.G.'s family, impregnate her and then kill himself. A few days later, Gandhi telephoned M.G.'s home several times. On November 18, 2002, Gandhi returned to M.G.'s house. After police officers arrived, Gandhi informed them that he would continue to come to M.G.'s house and if he was jailed he would return when he was released. He was arrested and charged with stalking. On November 19, 2002, Judge Blum set bail with a condition of no contact with M.G. and no returning to M.G.'s house. Gandhi was indicted on March 12, 2003, on one count of third-degree stalking between May 2002 and January 2003, in violation of a pre-existing court order.
In June 2003, Gandhi resumed sending sexually explicit and threatening messages to M.G., this time through the mail. His bail was revoked and he was incarcerated. At a bail hearing before Judge DeStefano, the court increased the amount of bail and continued and expanded the existing no-contact order to prohibit any contact with M.G. and her family. Although he remained incarcerated, Gandhi continued to send disturbing mail to M.G.'s residence. A grand jury returned a second indictment against Gandhi on April 28, 2004, charging him with one count of third-degree stalking between July 3, 2003 and February 11, 2004, in violation of an existing court order, and with multiple counts of contempt of court citing specific instances in which he was alleged to have purposely or knowingly disobeyed Judge Blum's and/or Judge DeStefano's orders, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.
The two indictments were tried in a bifurcated jury trial. During the first portion of the trial, which was dedicated to proving the stalking charges, all references to prior proceedings between the parties and to Gandhi's incarceration were sanitized. In his jury instructions, the trial judge explained that the State must prove first that "the defendant purposefully or knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person; and, second, that the defendant's conduct was such that it would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death to herself or to a member of her immediate family." The trial court rejected the arguments of Gandhi's counsel that the State must also prove Gandhi had a conscious object to produce, or was otherwise aware of, the effect his conduct would have on M.G. The jury convicted Gandhi of two counts of fourth-degree stalking. In the second portion of the trial, the jury learned about the no-contact orders for purposes of considering the elevation of the stalking convictions to the third-degree, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(c), and to evaluate the contempt-of-court charges. Gandhi was convicted of two counts of third-degree stalking in violation of a court order and eleven counts of fourth-degree contempt of court. He was sentenced to two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment.
In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel agreed with Gandhi's argument that a stalking conviction requires a showing of a defendant's purpose or knowledge of the impact of his behavior on his victim and further requires a showing that the conduct was repeated. However, the panel held that the trial court's jury instructions, which tracked the model jury charge for stalking, satisfactorily expressed those requirements. The panel also rejected Gandhi's challenges to the content of the verdict sheet, the admissibility of a statement made by Gandhi to police, and the purported insufficiency of the no-contact orders as a basis on which to elevate the convictions to the third degree. A remand was directed to permit resentencing for an error conceded by the State.
HELD: The jury charge in this case was not erroneous because New Jersey's anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, reaches and punishes one who purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of stalking conduct that would cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death. The statutory offense applies even if the defendant is operating under the motivation of an obsessed and disturbed love that purportedly obscures appreciation of the terror that his or her conduct would reasonably cause to the victim.
1. A reviewing court is not bound by the legal conclusions of a trial or intermediate appellate court. The Court applies, therefore, the rules of construction for statutory interpretation and reviews de novo the legal question whether the offense of stalking under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b) requires a showing that the defendant had to purposely intend or know that his behavior would cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death. At the time of defendant's indictment and conviction, the anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b), stated that a person is "guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family or to fear the death of himself or a member of his immediate family." After considering the grammatical structure of this provision and the use of the reasonable-person standard, the Court finds in the statute's plain language no intent by the Legislature to require that the State prove a defendant had a conscious object to inflict, or an awareness that his conduct would inflect, fear of bodily injury or death in his victim. (Pp. 12—21)
2. Next, the Court considers the legislative history of the anti-stalking statute, noting Gandhi's argument that he is in love with M.G., had no desire or intention to frighten or harm her, and cannot be convicted of stalking because he did not purposefully or knowingly place her in fear of bodily injury or death. The Court explains that after the statute was enacted in 1992, subsequent revisions increased protections for victims by deleting a specific intent requirement, adopting a reasonable-person standard, extending protections to the victim's family, and broadening the behavior that may constitute a course of conduct. Recognizing that a statute's culpability requirement generally applies to all elements of a crime unless a contrary intent is discerned, the Court finds such a contrary intent after reviewing the legislative history and plain language of the statute and relevant case law. The Court holds that the statute reaches and punishes one who engages in a course of stalking conduct even if that person is operating under the motivation of an obsessed and disturbed love that purportedly obscures appreciation of the terror that his or her conduct would reasonably cause to the victimized person. As a result, the Court rejects Gandhi's claim that the jury charge was erroneous for failing to instruct the jury that the State must prove he intended or knew that his behavior would cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death. (Pp. 21—31)
3. The Court also rejects Gandhi's argument that the no-contact orders, entered in conjunction with the withdrawal of M.G.'s initial harassment complaint and at subsequent bail hearings, were an insufficient basis on which to find that he engaged in stalking in violation of a court order and to elevate his offenses from fourth degree to third degree. Restraining orders are entered for purposes of shielding a victim who needs protection and who is compelled to seek judicial assistance to obtain that security; thus full compliance with restraining orders is required no matter the flaws a defendant may discern in their entry or form. As the Court has previously stated, failure to meet the technical and substantive requirements for a restraining order may result in an invalid order, but the order nonetheless has a legal effect until vacated. Even when a court lacks jurisdiction over a matter at the time an order is issued, a defendant is bound to obey the court's order until it is vacated through a judicial proceeding. Similarly, a mere procedural deficiency does not permit a defendant to intentionally ignore a court order. So long as a court order exists and a defendant has knowledge of it, he or she may be prosecuted for a violation thereof. Here, Gandhi was well aware of Judge Himelman's order, which the State told the jury was in effect during the time of the first stalking indictment, and Gandhi concedes that the order was never revoked. As such, the jury could have relied on it to elevate both of Gandhi's stalking convictions to the third degree had the State chosen to advance that argument. Instead, for the second stalking indictment, the State relied on the bail orders' no-contact provisions, which did not lose their character merely because bail consequences could attach for their violation. As judicial no-contact orders, Gandhi was obligated to strictly comply with them and his violations provided a sufficient basis to elevate his second fourth-degree stalking charge to an offense of the third degree, and for the multiple contempt charges. (Pp. 31—36)
4. The Court rejects further Gandhi's argument that the verdict to support elevation of the stalking conviction to the third degree could not have been unanimous because the verdict sheet did not require the jury to specify that it reached unanimous agreement as to which particular no-contact order justified elevation of each of defendant's convictions. First, the Court finds that this argument was not advanced by Gandhi below and was improperly raised here. Second, the Court notes after reviewing the record that there never was a break in time when Gandhi was not subject to a no-contact order, he did not request specific unanimity instructions pertaining to the no-contact orders, each no-contact order expressed generally the same no-contact provisions, the specific orders supporting the elevations were described to the jury by the State, defense counsel, and the judge, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury may have been confused about which no-contact order was violated to support the elevation to the third degree. In the absence of a request at trial for a more specific unanimity instruction on the orders being relied on to elevate the two stalking offenses, the Court does not find that the verdict sheet as worded, and as this case was presented, had the capacity to cause an unjust result. (Pp. 36—42)
5. With regard to Gandhi's additional challenges to the verdict sheet for failing to include the elements of the lesser-included offense of harassment and to require a finding that the prohibited conduct took place "repeatedly," the Court finds that the trial court's oral instructions sufficiently conveyed the elements of stalking and harassment to the jury and informed it of the prohibited course of conduct, including the requirement for repetition. The Court notes also the trial judge's emphasis to the jury on the importance of his oral instructions over the content of the verdict sheet. A verdict sheet is intended for recordation of the jury's verdict and is not designed to supplement oral jury instructions. Finding nothing in the record to suggest that the jury did not understand the instructions, the Court concludes that the verdict sheet's failure to use the word "repeatedly" with reference to the course of stalking conduct, and its failure to list the elements of harassment did not constitute reversible error. (Pp. 42—46)
6. Finally, the Court affirms the denial of Gandhi's motion to suppress a statement that he made to police prior to receiving Miranda warnings because the statement occurred during a field inquiry when Gandhi was neither in custody nor subject to interrogation, and it rejects Gandhi's arguments based on a typographical error on the verdict sheet. (Pp. 46—51)
The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding Gandhi's convictions is AFFIRMED, as modified, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for resentencing as ordered by the Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion.